

WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
HEFT 97

TRANSMISSION AND TRANSFORMATION OF
BUDDHIST LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN
EAST ASIA

EDITED BY

SHINYA MORIYAMA



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN
WIEN 2020

WSTB 97

WIENER STUDIEN
ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE

GEGRÜNDET VON
ERNST STEINKELLNER

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON
BIRGIT KELLNER, KLAUS-DIETER MATHES
und MICHAEL TORSTEN MUCH

HEFT 97

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Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien

ISBN: 978-3-902501-35-6

IMPRESSUM

Verleger: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien

Universitätscampus, Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 2, 1090 Wien

Herausgeber und für den Inhalt verantwortlich:

B. Kellner, K.-D. Mathes, M. T. W. Much

alle: Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 2, 1090 Wien

Druck: Ferdinand Berger und Söhne GmbH, Wiener Straße 80, 3580 Horn

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Introduction

The papers in this volume are the result of the panel “Transmission and Transformation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology in East Asia”, held at the XVIIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at the University of Toronto, August 20–25, 2017. The panel conveners, Shinya Moriyama (Shinshu University), Shigeki Moro (Hanazono University), Masahiro Inami (Tokyo Gakugei University), and Motoi Ono (Tsukuba University), proposed this panel in order to reduce further the gap between Sanskrit-Tibetan based *pramāṇa* studies and Chinese based *yinming/inmyo* studies and to throw new light on the intellectual heritage of Buddhist logic and epistemology, preserved in various places from South to East Asia.

This volume consists of nine chapters written by the panel contributors. Although different contributors have different specific interests in the general topic of the panel, it should be emphasized that all share a common understanding that we are now in a new phase of Buddhist studies, one in which scholars of Buddhist logic and epistemology should pay attention to the fact that Buddhist thought is different in different places, shaped by the different cultures of these different places, many of which are quite distant from the place of origin. Gradually, in recent years, scholars have come to appreciate better the importance and the challenge of understanding how Buddhist thought, when transmitted outside of its place of origin, is transformed by the culture of those to whom it is transmitted.

Under the circumstance, we feel it necessary to reexamine a tacit presumption of modern studies of Buddhist logic and epistemology which focuses on the interpretation of Dignāga's *pramāṇa* theory based on Dharmakīrtian tradition and which pays little or no attention to interpretations of other traditions, such as the East Asian tradition of *yinming/inmyō*, whose roots are in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* and Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśaka*, both translated by Xuanzang 玄奘.

There are many reasons why previous studies have virtually ignored these other interpretative transmissions; one obvious reason, especially in the case of *yinming/inmyō* tradition, is linguistic. While the translations are excellent, the deep linguistic differences between Sanskrit and classical Chinese means that there are uncertainties in the accuracy of the translations so that one might have doubt about the reliability, and hence utility, of using the interpretations, analyses, and paraphrases of later scholars, such as Xuanzang's disciples, in understanding Dignāga's thoughts on logic and epistemology. However, does this really mean that all efforts of East Asian Buddhist logicians were without use in understanding Dignāga's work? We do not think so. We believe that by careful examination of the vast heritage of *yinming/inmyō* materials will reveal many ways in which this East Asian transmissions will shed light on important features of Dignāga's ideas which scholars engaged only with Sanskrit and Tibetan materials will have overlooked. We believe that the following chapters lend support to our conviction of the utility of using the Chinese commentarial tradition in studying Buddhist logic and epistemology.

Indeed, the utility of using the Chinese commentarial tradition in deepening our understanding of Buddhist logic and epistemology has already been demonstrated by Eli Franco's 2004 article, "Xuanzang's proof of idealism (*viññaptimātratā*)", in which he deals with Chinese Buddhist understanding of Dignāga's logic. Following Franco's pioneering article, several workshops, symposiums, and conference panels took place on the topic of East Asian Buddhist logic and epistemology: "Workshop: Buddhist logic and epistemology in the Chinese source" at National Chengchi University, Taipei, organized by Chen-kuo Lin, on Oct 14-17, 2012; "Logic and culture: Theories of logic in Buddhist, Muslim and Aristotelian scholastics" at Lumbini International Research Institute, Lumbini, organized by Gregory Paul, on November 12-15, 2013; "Pramāṇa across Asia: India, China, Korea, Japan", convened by Eli Franco and Jeson Woo, August 18-23, 2014; "Workshop: Buddhist Logic (*hetuvidyā/yinming/inmyō*) and its Applications in East Asia" at Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, organized by Birgit Kellner and Chen-kuo Lin, on June 27-28, 2016. Of them, the papers of first three conferences

are now available in: *A Distant Mirror: Articulating Indic Ideas in Sixth and Seventh Century Chinese Buddhism*, edited by Chen-kuo Lin and Michael Radich in 2014, *Logic in Buddhist Scholasticism: From Philosophical, Philological, Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Gregory Paul in 2015, and *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 56-57: Hetuvidyā and the Science of Pramāṇa. The South Asian Scene and East Asian Developments, edited by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz in 2018. In those collected works, we can find various concrete examples of how East Asian Buddhist materials are now integrated into the study of South Asian Buddhist philosophy and history. Its significance is “in considering the ideas of Chinese authors and thinkers as independent or alternative developments, equally valid, of ideas and systems also known in India” (Lin & Radich 2014: 17-18). The present volume pursues the same aim and aspires to supply further evidence to demonstrate the importance of taking a fresh look at Buddhist logic and epistemology from the perspective of East Asia.

In the following, each contribution is introduced with its short summary, dividing the whole collection into four sections.

1. Exploration of Earlier Buddhist Texts on Logic

Two Chinese Buddhist texts, the **Upāyahṛdaya* (*Fangbian xin lun* 方便心論) and the **Tarkaśāstra* (*Rushi lun* 如實論), occupies a special position at the emergence of Buddhist logic in India. Some scholars attribute the authorship of the former to Nāgārjuna, but others are critical or skeptical of the attribution. Likewise, its contents and characteristics as a logical work are also still obscure. Recently, Shōryū Katsura has clarified the mode of argumentation of the *Upāyahṛdaya*,¹ and in the first chapter of this volume, Motoi Ono further elucidates its historical position with respect to the **Tarkaśāstra*, on the one hand, and the so-called Spitzer manuscript, on the other, which was discovered in the Kyzyl caves and can be dated at the latest to the third century

¹ Shōryū Katsura, “The Mode of Argumentation in the Fangbian xin lun/*Upāyahṛdaya”, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, 56-57 (2018): 19-36.

according to Eli Franco's study.² By comparing the pre-Dignāga Buddhist dialectics and logic of the *Upāyahṛdaya* and *Tarkaśāstra* with the dialectics and logic of the Spitzer manuscript, Ono concludes that the third work is a bridge from the first to the second. In fact, these three texts display a number of similarities that are significant for determining the historical relations between them, as has been pointed out by Franco. By re-examining the relationships between the three, Ono came to the important conclusion that the Spitzer manuscript should be dated between the two Buddhist logical texts.

Brendan Gillon's "The Emergence of the Canonical Indian Syllogism as Revealed by Early Chinese Buddhist Texts" is another contribution to the philosophical analysis of the *Upāyahṛdaya* and the *Tarkaśāstra*. His research aims to clarify the development of the canonical Indian syllogism from its earliest attested form as an analogical argument, found in *Carakasamhitā*, to the later form as a deductive argument, found in Dignāga's works. Gillon, who has prepared an English translation of the *Upāyahṛdaya* with Shōryū Katsura and is now preparing an English translation of the *Tarkaśāstra* with Chen-kuo Lin, provides us with a clear explanation of the transition from an analogical to a deductive argument found in these two Buddhist texts. Gillon points out that, although the *Upāyahṛdaya* gives an example of a deductive version of the canonical Indian syllogism, it rejects it as a bad argument, whereas the *Tarkaśāstra* endorses a deductive version of the canonical Indian syllogism, almost identical with the one found in the *Upāyahṛdaya*, noting that such arguments satisfy the *tri-rūpa* criterion. This means that the *Tarkaśāstra* can be historically located not so long before Dignāga.

² Eli Franco, *The Spitzer Manuscript. The Oldest Philosophical Manuscript in Sanskrit*. Volume II. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Wien, 2004.

2. Discovery of a Sanskrit Manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* and Its Impact on the Reconstructions of Dignāga's Root Texts

Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the foundational text of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, exerted considerable influence on Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical schools in India and was held in high esteem by Tibetan Buddhist scholars as well. Unfortunately, this important text has not yet been found in its Sanskrit original. The most important sources of information that we have at our disposal are two Tibetan translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, one Tibetan translation of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary thereon, a few Tibetan commentaries as well as quotations and other references in a few Sanskrit texts. Only recently another source joined this group, a Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary that has been preserved in the TAR for centuries. An international team of scholars, including Horst Lasic, is working on both a diplomatic and critical edition of this material. The first two chapters have already been published in 2005 and 2012.

Jinendrabuddhi's text not only helps the student of Indian philosophy contextualise many of Dignāga's statements, but provides the philologist with a fair number of verbatim quotations from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. In connection with preparing the critical edition of the second chapter of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Lasic has prepared a provisional reconstruction of the text of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* itself. In his contribution to this volume, entitled "Dignāga on the Nyāya Definition of Inference," Lasic argues for following a unified approach in such undertakings, as well as the need for meticulous documentation to enable the users of the reconstructed text to make their own judgments regarding the reliability of a given passage. He puts an emphasis on his approach of using the two available Tibetan translations not only as a means for knowing the structure and contents of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, but also to form hypotheses regarding the exact wordings the translator teams found in the Sanskrit manuscripts they relied on. The aim is to use these hypothetically established wordings together with other

secondary witnesses, as for instance the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, to reconstruct an early state of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. To demonstrate this approach, Lasic has chosen a passage dealing with the Nyāya definition of inference, discussing certain details and pointing out the challenges he meets and how he tries to solve them.

As the programmatic first verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* suggests, there are parallel ideas in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* and his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Nonetheless, there are also important differences. In "On a fragment of Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*", Yasutaka Muroya examines certain passages containing some of these different ideas, shedding new light on this earlier phase of Dignāga's systematization of logic in particular and the development of his theoretical thought in general. Muroya, who is presently co-editing the critical edition of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the last chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* on 'false rejoinders' (*jāti*), also deals here with the issue of the faithfulness of Xuanzang's translation of the *Nyāyamukha*, using the Sanskrit reconstruction of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* currently underway. Moreover, Muroya examines the influence of Xuanzang's translation of the *Nyāyamukha* on the East Asian tradition of logic to demonstrate a unique development in the East Asian understanding of Dignāga's system of logic.

One of the questions discussed in Muroya's contribution to this volume is how to understand what kind of argument is "not called a false rejoinder (**jāti*)" (bu ming guolei 不名過類). This Chinese phrase appears only in the Chinese version of the *Nyāyamukha*. He discusses the implications of this phrase and traces its theoretical relevance using parallel formulations in Dignāga's two works. Muroya's discussion also draws on a hitherto overlooked fragment cited and criticized by the sixth-century Naiyāyika Uddiyotakara. In light of the phrase "not being called a false rejoinder", Muroya offers a new interpretation of this fragment, suggesting that, just as Uddiyotakara characterizes the idea of his anonymous opponent, Dignāga, too, is describing a particular situation in which a *jāti* can work against a fallacious argument and be regarded nonetheless as an effective refutation despite its logical defects. Muroya goes on to argue that the author of the fragment cited

by Uddyotakara is Dignāga himself. A further justification of Muroya's interpretation is found in a number of textual fragments he cites from various East Asian commentaries on the *Nyāyamukha*.

3. Impact of Dignāga's Arguments on Later Buddhist Philosophers in India and China

In his article, Toshikazu Watanabe, who is working together with Motoi Ono and Yasutaka Muroya to produce an edition of the sixth chapter (*jāti*) of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, pays special attention to Dignāga's concept of *nyūna*.

Dignāga defines *nyūna* as a kind of defective proof. However, in his two works on logic he gives different interpretations of the term. While in his earlier work, the *Nyāyamukha*, *nyūna* is explained as (1) the omission of any of the three members of proof, i.e., the thesis (*pakṣa*), reason (*hetu*) or example (*dṛṣṭānta*), in the third chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* Dignāga offers new interpretation. It says that *nyūna* means (2) the failure to have any of the three characteristics of a logical reason, i.e., being a property of the subject of the thesis (*pakṣadharmatva*), or the positive (*anvaya*) or negative concomitance (*vyatireka*).

Interestingly, a similar interpretation of *nyūna* can be found in the *Shun zhonglun* 順中論, which is extant only in Chinese translation and is attributed to the Yogācāra teacher Asaṅga or his younger brother Vasubandhu. By analyzing the text, Watanabe assumes that early Sāṅkhya theories on proof had some influence on Dignāga's introducing the *trairūpya* theory and applying it to his theory of fallacy. Moreover, Watanabe also examines the influence of Dignāga's interpretations of *nyūna* on East Asian Buddhist tradition and points out that Xuanzang's two disciples, Shentai 神泰 and Kuiji 窺基 (or Ji 基), hold different interpretations of *nyūna*: whereas Shentai understood

nyūna as the omission of either of the two members of proof, Kuiji understands *nyūna*, like Śāntarakṣita, as the failure to have any of the three characteristics of a logical reason.

The utility of East Asian Buddhist materials for clarifying Dignāga's arguments is clearly shown by Masahiro Inami's article that concerns the topic of fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*). In explaining Dignāga's theory of *pakṣābhāsa*, Dharmakīrti mentions and criticizes early interpretations of the theory. One earlier interpretation pertains to the Dignāga's treatment of theses refuted by what is established by verbal convention. Dignāga gives the example "the moon (*śaśin*) is not [called] *candra*." In his discussion of such theses, Dharmakīrti mentions an earlier interpretation, where the commentator, said by Dharmakīrti to be the author of the *Nyāyamukhaṭīkā*, understands that the moon cannot be inferred to be *candra* because *candra* is unique, and, thus, the commentator concludes that this thesis is refuted by the use of the word 'candra' for the moon. Another earlier interpretation pertains to the Dignāga's enumeration of five types of *pakṣābhāsa* in his *Nyāyamukha*. Dharmakīrti mentions in this regard that some Buddhist logician added three other types of *pakṣābhāsa*, namely *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣya* and *aprasiddhobhaya*. According to commentators on Dharmakīrti, this addition is to be attributed to a pre-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logician. Inami points out that these three other *pakṣābhāsas* are found in Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśaka*.

He goes on to note that these interpretations are similar to interpretations found in Kuiji's commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśaka* and its sub-commentary by Zenju. This underlines the utility of investigating pre-Dharmakīrtian ideas on Buddhist logic as well as considering the development of Buddhist logic in East Asia.

Dignāga's impact is not restricted to members of his school but spread to other schools like Madhyamaka, too. Huanhuan He's article begins with a discussion of the Vaiśeṣika inferences for *śabda* being impermanent in Bhāviveka's **Mahāyānāhastaratnaśāstra*, *Jewel in the Hand*, a work that is

only available in the Chinese translation by Xuanzang entitled *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論. She notices that these *śabda* inferences are quite different from those formulated in the currently available classical Vaiśeṣika writings. By examining related texts in Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan, He's paper firstly aims to offer some additional evidence for her previous conjecture on the relative chronology of Bhāviveka and Candrānanda. And, secondly, it also aims to explore the "tradition" that Bhāviveka had received from his Buddhist predecessors, such as Dignāga etc., as well as what differentiates him from them. The ultimate context in which these must be placed is of course the Madhyamaka proof of emptiness within the framework of two-truth theory.

4. East Asian Transformation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology

Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśaka* brought to China by Xuanzang, who translated this text into Chinese in 647, at the same time when he was translating the *Yogācārabhūmi*. His disciples like Shentai, Wenbei 文備, Xuanyin 玄應 and others participated in the translation of the *Nyāyapraveśaka*, and some of them wrote commentaries on it. Eight years later, in 655, Xuanzang translated Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* into Chinese. As Muroya's study has shown, he corrected the translation several times, and it is doubtful that Taishō version of the text is his final updated one. At any rate, after the translation, he did not translate any other of Dignāga's logical works, not even his magnum opus, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. As a result, only the above two texts were left for later Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhist monks as their authoritative sources for Buddhist logic and epistemology, and therefore they had no access to Dharmakīrtian development of *pramāṇa* system. Nevertheless, Xuanzang's disciples made great efforts to extract the essence of Dignāga's thoughts from these limited textual sources.³ Among them, Kuiji's extended

³ For bibliographical data of East Asian *yinming/inmyō* scholars, see Ryōken Saeki, *Inmyō sahō hensen to chojutsu*. Hōryūji, 1969; Shōhō Takemura, *Inmyōgaku: Kigen to Hensen*.

commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśaka*, also known as *Yinming dashu* 因明大疏, was extremely influential on the East Asian development of Buddhist logic and epistemology.

Focusing on Kuiji's interpretation of four kinds of contradictory reasons (*viruddhahetu*) or *si xiangwei* 四相違, one of the most difficult portions of this text, Shinya Moriyama examined the specific features of Kuiji's interpretation, in comparison to his contemporary Wengui 文軌's. Through examination of Kuiji's insightful analysis on the four kinds of contradictory reasons, Moriyama maintained the importance of paying attention to the development of Buddhist logic in China, which evolved differently from Buddhist logic in India. Moriyama's conclusion is that a distinguishing feature of Kuiji's interpretation is his presupposition of a debate model, according to which *viruddhahetu* is understood to reveal the contradiction between two parties' two different theses, and as a result, the gap between the *dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana*, which is usually understood as a standard type of the *viruddhahetu* and the other three types, often said to be exceptional, is bridged without trouble.

As is well known, an inference of consciousness-only (*weishi biliang* 唯識比量), which is usually attributed to Xuanzang, had a great impact on later East Asian Buddhist philosophy, not only in *yinming/linmyō* tradition but also in Yogācāra school or Faxiang/Hossō school. Shigeki Moro, who is the author of *Ronri to Rekishi* (Logic and History), a recent and very important study in Japanese on East Asian Buddhist logic, offers a critical study on another inference of emptiness (*sūnyatā*) that is found in the beginning of *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論 written by Bhāviveka. Moro focuses on the East Asian controversy around whether or not Bhāviveka's inference and a similar inference found in Dharmapāla's *Dasheng guangbailun shilun* 大乘廣百論 釈論 are the same. Whether or not these inferences are the same is crucial to

Hozōkan, 1986; Uwe Frankenhauser, *Die Einführung der buddhistischen Logik in China*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1996; Christoph Harbsmeier, *Science and Civilisation in China. Volume 7, Part I: Language and Logic*. Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 358-367.

determining whether or not there was actually a disagreement between Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla. According to *Seongyusingnon hakgi* 成唯識論學記 edited by Daehyeon 大賢, Sungyeong 順憬 regarded the two inferences as distinct but consistent. Zenju states in his *Yuishiki bunryō ketsu* 唯識分量決 that Wonhyo 元曉 and Sinbang 神昉 regarded these two inferences as the same, while Dojeung 道證 and Gyeongheung 曄興 thought them to be different. By examining those text, Moro makes clear that these discussions were also related to whether or not the dispute between Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka really happened.

In this manner, the Chinese reception of Buddhist epistemology is discussed in the context of the transmission of early Buddhist theories about *pramāṇas* from India to China, Korea, and Japan, a process which came to a halt soon after a brief flourishing of indigenous commentarial tradition in the early Tang period. Although there is another context of modern reconstruction of this tradition in the early twentieth century. This volume does not discuss this important aspect of transmission and transformation of Buddhist logic in modern East Asia.

I would thank Prof. Brendan Gillon for his valuable comments and suggestions on all articles and this introduction in the finalization of this volume.

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 15H03155 & 18H00609.

April 2020

Shinya Moriyama, Matsumoto

A Reconsideration of

Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic

– The **Upāyahṛdaya*, the Dialectical Portion of the Spitzer Manuscript
and the **Tarkaśāstra*

Motoi Ono, Tsukuba

0. Introduction

The **Upāyahṛdaya* (方便心論 *Fangbian xin lun*; henceforth UH) and the **Tarkaśāstra* (如実論反質難品 *Rushi lun fanzhinan pin*; henceforth TŚ)¹, both extant only in Chinese translation, are regarded important texts for the understanding of the history of Indian Buddhist logic prior to Dignāga. Prof. Ui already investigated both texts in the 1920s, and he translated the UH into Japanese. Both texts were then re-translated into Sanskrit by Prof. Tucci in 1929.² Recently, several scholars have once again taken up these works in their research.³ However, there are still a

** I am grateful to Dr. Yasutaka Muroya for his many valuable suggestions as well as to Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek and Prof. Brendan Gillon for correcting my English in the penultimate and in the final versions of the paper respectively.

¹ The Sanskrit titles of the *Fangbian xin lun* (方便心論) and the *Rushi lun* (如実論) are hypothetical. I have recently discussed the issue of the original title of the latter treatise in another paper (cf. Ono 2017a). There, the relationship between the TŚ and Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstra* (henceforth VVi) has been also examined.

² Cf. Ui 1925: 473-585; Ui 1929: 471-503; Tucci 1929a; Tucci 1929b. The two texts have been also translated into Japanese by Prof. J. Iida and Prof. G. Nakano (cf. Iida 1933; Nakano 1934).

³ The UH has been recently translated into modern Japanese by Prof. Ishitobi. She has also published many interesting articles on the UH (cf. Ishitobi 2006 and its bibliography). Prof. Katsura, Prof. Matilal and Prof. Kang have mentioned both texts (cf. Katsura 1986: 41-43, 48-51; Matilal 1998: 58-87; Kang 2008). More recently, Dr. Muroya has published an important philological study on the UH (cf. Muroya 2016),

number of open questions concerning their historical position as well as the relationship between them.

The most important work that has been hitherto undertaken for clarifying the history of pre-Dignāga Buddhist logic as represented in the UH, the TŚ and Yogācāra *hetuvidyā* works is probably Prof. Kajiyama's 1984 paper in Japanese, “仏教知識論の形成 (*Bukkyō Chishikiron no Keisei*) [The Formation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology].”⁴ The significance of this paper, however, has not been sufficiently recognized by scholars around the world.⁵ In addition, other recent research in this field has uncovered various new materials, materials that Kajiyama did not know or have available. I believe it valuable to reconsider Kajiyama's thoughts on these texts, also taking into consideration the results of the more recent research that has been done.

In particular, the so-called Spitzer manuscript (SHT=Sanskrit Handschriften aus den Turfanfunden Nr. 810) is a clue to understanding the history of pre-Dignāga Buddhist logic. This extremely old Buddhist philosophical Sanskrit manuscript, which was discovered in the Kyzil caves of Eastern Turkestan by German expeditions at the beginning of the twentieth century and can be dated at the latest to the third century,⁶

and an English translation of the first half of the UH has been published by Profs. Katsura and Gillon (cf. Katsura/Gillon 2017). Regarding the TŚ, Profs. Gillon and Lin (林鎮国) are currently working on an English translation. I have also written a few papers on the TŚ (cf. Ono 2017a; Ono 2017b; Ono 2020). Incidentally, no Sanskrit or Chinese commentaries on either text are known other than that of Paramārtha's (眞諦) lost Chinese commentary on the TŚ, which consisted of two volumes.

⁴ Cf. Kajiyama 1984.

⁵ The second part of this paper, dealing with the relationship between the UH and Nāgārjuna, was modified and published in English by Kajiyama himself (cf. Kajiyama 1991). Important insights found in other parts of this Japanese paper will be referred to below. By the way, this paper has been translated into Chinese (cf. 梶山雄一著, 肖平/楊金萍訳: 佛教知識論の形成 (上,中,下). 普門學報 15, 2003.5; 16, 2003.7; 17, 2003.7).

⁶ Cf. Franco 2000: [49]. A report of the Prussian Academy of Sciences states: “*Nach der Schrift dürfte es etwa um 200 n. Chr. geschrieben sein.*” Franco also states that “the

was recently studied in depth by Prof. Franco. In his work, he noticed the existence of a dialectical portion in the last part of the manuscript (Fol.*383r3-414⁷; henceforth SpMs) and was able to decipher, despite the very poor condition of the materials, a number of interesting facts that are relevant to our research on pre-Dignāga Buddhist dialectics and logic.⁸

The SpMs can, in my opinion, serve as a bridge between the UH and the TŚ. In fact, these three texts display a number of similarities that are significant, as has been pointed out by Franco. By re-examining the relationships between the three, this paper aims to offer some more insights into pre-Dignāga Indian Buddhist logic.⁹

1. The Spitzer manuscript and the **Tarkaśāstra*

According to Franco, the dialectical portion of the Spitzer manuscript consists of three or four sections. The first section (Fol.*383r3-*391) seems to deal with certain kinds of sophistical arguments¹⁰; in the second section, or second and third sections (Fol.*391-397), grounds of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) are mentioned along with an enumeration of dialectical categories¹¹; and in the last section (Fol.397-414) false rejoinders (*jāti*)

palaeographical evidence does not allow us to assume that it could be later than the 3rd century” (cf. Franco 2000: [50], [52]-[53]). Further, according to Franco, the result of Carbon-14 dating test is consistent with his assumption (cf. Franco 2005).

⁷ Regarding the number of folios of the SpMs’s fragments, I follow Franco’s suppositions entirely.

⁸ Cf. Franco 2004: 462-505. Franco has published several articles about this manuscript (cf. the list of secondary literature in Franco 2004). However, for the sake of convenience in this paper, I will chiefly refer to Franco 2004.

⁹ In this paper, I will mention when relevant also the *Carakasamhitā* (henceforth CS), the *Nyāyasūtra* (henceforth NSū), and later texts such as the VVi and the *Nyāyamukha* (henceforth NMu).

¹⁰ Cf. Franco 2004: 464-480.

¹¹ Cf. Franco 2004: 480-488.

appear to be treated, as well as a few other matters.¹² Thus, all of the topics found in the extant three chapters of the TŚ are found in the SpMs as well.¹³

1.1. The similarity between the first section of the Spitzer manuscript and the **Tarkaśāstra*'s first chapter

The first section of the dialectical portion of the Spitzer manuscript shows, as Franco has pointed out, a remarkable similarity to the TŚ's first chapter, 無道理難品. With regard to the statement found on Fol.*383v2 of the SpMs, “*pratipakṣasadbhāve 'smatpakṣānupapattir iṣṭā*,” Franco has mentioned that “what the opponent (in the SpMs: MO) ... claims is that a thesis is automatically invalidated by the very existence of its antithesis.”¹⁴ Franco then compares this statement to several similar arguments appearing in the TŚ's first chapter, including “if you think that our statement is inappropriate, your statement too is inappropriate” (TŚ 28c22-23: 汝稱我言說無道理. 若如此者, 汝言說亦無道理.), “if there is a statement / if the statement exists, then it is known [to be] appropriate” (TŚ 29a27: 若有言說, 知有道理), etc.¹⁵

It is clear at a glance that “the discussion in the Spitzer fragments runs along similar lines as those preserved in chapter 1 of the *Tarkaśāstra*.”¹⁶ Indeed, the controversy between *asmatpakṣa* and *pratipakṣa* found in the SpMs does correspond well to the sophistical arguments between 我言

¹² Cf. Franco 2004: 488-505.

¹³ Cf. Ono 2017a: 908.

¹⁴ Cf. Franco 2004: 465,16-18.

¹⁵ Cf. Franco 2004: 466,13-14; 22-23. His interpretation of the TŚ is based on Tucci's Sanskrit retranslation.

¹⁶ Cf. Franco 2004: 465,19-20.

説¹⁷ and 汝言説 in the TS.¹⁸ And since the contents of the TS's first chapter were hitherto isolated, having no parallels in the history of Indian dialectics,¹⁹ Franco's discovery has had a great impact on the matter at hand. However, as shall be shown in the following examination, there are still some open questions and Franco's interpretation of the above-mentioned passage in the SpMs should perhaps be reconsidered.

Above all, Franco states that “whoever the author of chapter I of the TS may have been, his stand seems to appear as that of an opponent in the Spitzer fragments.”²⁰ Franco sees the proponent—that is, the author—of the TS upholding a “position that is seemingly quite absurd”²¹ and the proponent of the SpMs criticizing these sophistical positions. In the history of pre-Dignāga Buddhist dialectics and logic this is a crucial point. It is exactly this point, however, about which I am unsure whether Franco's understanding is correct.

1.2. The position of the proponent in the first section of the Spitzer manuscript

Regarding the first chapter of the TS, Tucci interpreted the title 無道理難 as “illogical refutation.”²² This interpretation was criticized by Kaji-

¹⁷ Although the word 言説 is a standard rendering of the Sanskrit word *vyavahāra*, also for Shentai's (眞諦) translation team, it is also possible that in this context the word means the thesis (**pakṣa*). It should be noted that the UH mentions three *nyūnas* of the syllogism; the second, which apparently corresponds to “the lack of thesis,” is called 言減 (cf. UH 24c15: 減有三種. 一因減, 二言減, 三喻減.).

¹⁸ Cf. Franco 2004: 465-477. As Franco has pointed out, the texts are similar not only in their contents but also in the fact that they use an unusual form of indirect speech.

¹⁹ Although Kajiyama did draw attention to their basic similarity between the 相應 arguments in the UH and the arguments of Nāgārjuna (cf. Kajiyama 1984: 95,3-6).

²⁰ Cf. Franco 2004: 467,9-10.

²¹ Cf. Franco 2004: 466,12.

²² Cf. Tucci 1929a: note on TS 3,2: “This chapter contains an example of the illogical refutation, *anyāyakhāṇḍana* or *ayuktakhāṇḍana* or °*dūṣaṇa* 無道理難. The *dūṣaṇa* is

yama, who suggested the idea that it be interpreted as correct rejoinders. This corresponds to his interpretation of the second chapter's title, 道理難, as "false rejoinders to logical arguments." He is convinced that his interpretation of the second chapter's title is correct, since this chapter deals with the *jāti* theory. This was also contrary to Tucci's interpretation of 道理難 as "refutation according to logic."^{23,24} In this, Franco seems to follow Tucci's view, namely, that the arguments presented by the proponent in the TŚ's first chapter concern "illogical refutation."²⁵

Moreover, in Franco's understanding, in the SpMs, contrary to the TŚ, the proponent is criticizing an opponent who upholds a sophistical position. But this is not necessarily substantiated by the SpMs text itself. Due to the poor condition of the extant manuscript, it is difficult to decide one way or the other. And in fact, in my view it seems possible that the SpMs's proponent is upholding the same position as that of the TŚ's proponent.

The discussion of twenty-two steps found in the SpMs's first section has been reconstructed by Franco.²⁶ According to him, the first six steps are from the *pūrvapakṣa* viewpoint and from step seven onwards, belong to the *siddhāntin*. I agree with his view that the statement "*pratipakṣasād-*

chiefly based upon sophistical arguments, the non-validity of which can easily be recognized."

²³ Cf. Tucci 1929a: note on TŚ 12,1: "This chapter is called "Refutation according to logic" 道理難. It corresponds to the *jāti*-section of NSū."

²⁴ Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 95-96. However, a linguistic difficulty seems to remain in these interpretations of the chapters' titles. It is possible that the titles of the two chapters were switched at some point in time. Then it would be easy to assume the Sanskrit titles of the two chapters as being **yuktottara* 道理難 and **ayuktottara* 無道理難 (cf. PS 6.2). In any case, it is most likely that both chapters deal with rejoinders (難): the second chapter with false rejoinders, and the first chapter, as thought by Kajiyama, with correct rejoinders.

²⁵ Cf. Franco 2004: 466, n.156.

²⁶ Cf. Franco 2004: 472-475; Fol.*383v-*385v. The enumerations of the steps are indicated in the manuscript.

bhāve 'smatpakṣānupapattir iṣṭā' found in the first step belongs to the opponent. This statement (Fol.*383v2), perhaps together with some preceding sentences (Fol.*383r3?-*383v2), correspond, in my opinion, to the initial argument in TŚ's first chapter, where an opponent has asserted the inappropriateness of the proponent's position.²⁷

It seems to me, however, that the proponent's response to opponent's assertion does not begin from step seven, as Franco states, but has already begun with the next sentence with the words "*nanu yad bhavān āha*" (Fol.*383v2; "surely, what you have stated"). This sentence corresponds *de facto* to the second sentence of TŚ's first chapter.²⁸ And proponent's response continues, I believe, to the end of this section, just as in the case of TŚ's first chapter.²⁹

Franco has interpreted the initial SpMs statement as "if the counter-position exists (*pratipakṣasadbhāve*), it is desired/maintained that our position is inappropriate," thus ascribing to the opponent the sophistical assertion that "a thesis is automatically invalidated by the very existence of its antithesis." The word *sadbhāva*, however, can also mean "having real existence" or simply "true." Then this statement could be interpreted as "it is recognized (by the opponent) that, if the counter-position is true, our position is inappropriate." In any case, this statement only describes the general relationship between two opposing positions. It cannot be regarded as sophistical in and of itself.

Turning to the TŚ, here the proponent attempts to reject the opponent's initial assertion that "our (= proponent's) statement is unreasonable (我

²⁷ Cf. TŚ 28c23: 論曰。汝稱我言說無道理。 [= The proponent says: you assert that our statement is unreasonable/illogical]. Franco also thinks that the word 無道理, which Tucci rendered as *anyāyā* in his Sanskrit translation, might correspond to *anutpatti* (cf. Franco 2004: 465, n.152; 472, n.1)

²⁸ Cf. TŚ 28c24: 若如此者, [= If it is so,].

²⁹ Thus the enumeration in this section, contrary to Franco's assumption (cf. Franco 2004: 467), may probably be done only for the *siddhānta* arguments.

言說無道理)” by presenting various arguments, these numbering seventeen as I read them.³⁰ The first argument runs as follows:

If so, [we can also assert that] your statement, too, is unreasonable. Since your statement is unreasonable, [the result is that] our statement [opposed to your statement] is rather reasonable. If [on the other hand] your statement is reasonable, it is not correct [for you] to say that our statement is unreasonable.³¹

The third argument is similar, running as follows:

Or: If you say that our statement is unreasonable, it results in you displaying your own ignorance. Why? Because it is impossible that [the statement is] unreasonable. [Namely,] the statement is either equal to being unreasonable or different [from it]. If [the statement is] equal to [being unreasonable], the statement [itself], too, would not exist [since what is not reasonable is not a statement]. How can you say that our statement [which does not exist at all] is unreasonable? If [on the other hand, the statement] is different from [being unreasonable], the statement [must have been] reasonable. How can you say that our statement is unreasonable?³²

³⁰ I tentatively recognize the existence of the following seventeen arguments in the TŚ's first chapter: (1) TŚ 28c25-28, (2) TŚ 28c28-29a1, (3) TŚ 29a1-6, (4) TŚ 29a6-13, (5) TŚ 29a13-16, (6) TŚ 29a16-21, (7) TŚ 29a21-25, (8) TŚ 29a25-b4, (9) TŚ 29b4-13, (10) TŚ 29b14-27, (11) TŚ 29b27-c8, (12) TŚ 29c9-30a7, (13) TŚ 30a7-15, (14) TŚ 30a15-26, (15) TŚ 30a26-b6, (16) TŚ 30b6-17, (17) TŚ 30b17-23. Strictly speaking, the arguments (12), (14), (15) and (16) here seem to be criticisms of some grounds of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) as found in NSū 5.2.16 (*ananubhāṣaṇa*), NSū 5.2.6 (*hetvantara*), NSū 5.2.3 (*pratijñāntara*) and NSū 5.2.14 (*punarukta*), respectively. Prof. Nakano, however, has divided this chapter into thirty-one arguments (cf. Nakano 1934: 202-206).

³¹ Cf. TŚ 28c25-28: 若如此者，汝言說亦無道理。若汝言說無道理，我言說則有道理。若汝言說有道理，稱我言說無道理者，是義不然。

³² Cf. TŚ 29a1-6: 又，若汝稱我言說無道理，自顯汝無智。何以故。無道理者則無所有。言說者與無道理爲一爲異。若一者，言說亦無。汝云何稱我言說無道理。若異者，言說有道理。汝復何故稱我言說無道理耶。

At issue in this context seems to be the fundamental question of whether the act of discussion between two opposing statements is possible in the first place. Franco's understanding that "the author may be concerned here with the relationship between statements as such: Any two statements that stand in contradiction or opposition to each other would do"³³ is obviously correct. And such arguments are certainly in a sense sophistical.

At the same time, in my opinion, the SpMs's proponent presenting an objection to the opponent's initial assertion from Fol.*383v2 onwards can be regarded as showing the very same position as that of the TŚ's proponent. In fact, this passage seems to contain sophistical arguments that are parallel to those of the TŚ's proponent.

In the discussion in step eleven of the SpMs, for example, we find, according to Franco's reconstruction, the inference of the non-existence of a result/effect from the non-existence of a cause (cf. fol.384v1-2: *(nimittā?)bhāvāc ca naimittik[ābhā?]vo bhavati*).³⁴ The cause in this case is the appropriateness of the counter-example, with the result the inappropriateness of the proponent's thesis. This corresponds to the TŚ's discussion in which the proponent rejects the opponent's initial assertion that the proponent's statement is inappropriate by showing the inference of a cause, i.e., a statement's appropriateness, from the existence of a result, i.e., the statement.³⁵

³³ Cf. Franco 2004: 466, 16-18.

³⁴ Cf. Franco 2004: 473-474.

³⁵ Cf. TŚ 29b10-13: 於世間中言說爲果，道理爲因。世間中若見果，則知有因。若見言說，則知有道理。汝稱我言說無道理，是義與世間相違。若有言說無道理者，無有是處。 [= In this world, a statement is regarded as the result, and the appropriateness is regarded as the cause. In this world, if the result is observed, one knows there is a cause. If a statement is observed, then one knows there is appropriateness. You assert that my statement is inappropriate. This assertion is contradictory to worldly recognized common sense. There is no case in which appropriateness does not exist, although there is statement.] This discussion appears, according to my enumeration, in the ninth

Further, the sentence “it is not suitable [for you] to say that our statement is unreasonable (稱我言說無道理者, 是義不然)” or the like, which often appears at the end of each of the proponent’s arguments in the TŚ,³⁶ can also be found in a statement of the proponent in the SpMs (cf. Fol. 384v2: *tasmā? [d a] smātpakṣānupapattir api nāst(i).*).

I must of course recognize that the above points are not enough to prove my assumption that the positions of the proponents of the SpMs and the TŚ are the same. Nevertheless, through the internal textual evidence I am not convinced of Franco’s view that the opponent and the proponent have replaced each other in the two texts.³⁷ Thus, I think it necessary to reconsider the issue from another point of view.

1.3. Chronological order of the Spitzer Manuscript and the **Tarkaśāstra*

My assumption of the position of the SpMs’s proponent seems justified by the historical context in which the author of the SpMs stood. Regarding the relationship between the SpMs and the TŚ, Franco states, “I do not intend to imply a direct connection and claim that the author of the fragments knew the TŚ.”³⁸ This view is, I think, quite reasonable.

argument of the TŚ’s first chapter. In this argument, the proponent argues that the opponent’s assertion is “contradictory to worldly recognized common sense (世間相違).” “Worldly common sense” refers, in this case, to the so-called four principles (四種道理) in the Yogācāra tradition, especially to the first, i.e., the principle between cause and effect (因果道理).

³⁶ Cf. TŚ 28c24-25: 稱我言說無道理者, 是義不然; TŚ 29a1: 是故汝說我無道理, 是義不然; TŚ 29a20-21: 是故稱有言說無道理, 是義不然; TŚ 29b26: 汝言我說異, 是義不然.

³⁷ In any case, the length of the proponent’s discussion in the SpMs does not seem to be all that long when compared to that of the TŚ’s proponent, even if the missing parts of the manuscript are taken into account.

³⁸ Cf. Franco 2004: 467,10-11.

Indeed, it is most likely that the SpMs (3th CE according to Franco) was composed earlier than the TŚ.

For one, if the close similarity between the TŚ and Vasubandhu's (4th–5th CE) VVi in terms of *jāti* theory is taken into consideration, the TŚ should be dated, at the earliest, to the first half of the fourth century.³⁹ The *jāti* theory of the SpMs seems more primitive than that of the TŚ and is rather closer to the 相應 arguments in the UH, as I shall discuss below. Also in terms of the theory of grounds of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), the TŚ follows the theory of the NSū (ca. 250–350?) very closely, including the number (22 kinds), listed order and definitions.⁴⁰ Any correspondence between the theory of grounds of defeat in the SpMs and the NSū is unclear; the SpMs seems rather to follow the earlier category of grounds of defeat as found in the CS (2th CE).⁴¹

If this chronological order can be accepted (and I think it should be), it is difficult to presume a historical development in which the “illogical refutations” already rejected in the SpMs are revived as the proponent's argument in the TŚ.⁴² It would be more natural to assume that these were common arguments in the tradition of Buddhist dialectics and logic of the time, and that thus, the SpMs and the TŚ held the same position.

³⁹ Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 128–129; Ono 2017b; Ono 2020. Further, three conditions of logical reasons are clearly mentioned in the TŚ (cf. TŚ 30c20–21; 31a11–12; Kajiyama 1984: 94,1–5). This is the first positive mention of the three conditions of logical reason in Buddhist literature (cf. Kajiyama 1984: 94); an earlier, negative mention of this teaching is found in the 順中論 ascribed to Asaṅga.

⁴⁰ Cf. TŚ 34b25–36a16; Kajiyama 1984: 95,2–3.

⁴¹ The SpMs seems to mention the *kālātīta* as a type of grounds of defeat, as found in the CS (cf. Franco 2004: 481–482). Of course, this does not mean that the SpMs is earlier than the NSū. On the contrary, the NSū is definitely earlier than the SpMs, since the latter refers to the concept of *jāti*.

⁴² It is possible, however, to ascribe the thoughts represented in the Spitzer manuscript on the whole to the Abhidharma school, especially to the Sarvāstivādin (Franco 2000: [53]). If this is the case, the development in the dialectical tradition of these thoughts can be seen as not necessarily lineal.

In underestimating the sophistical arguments, Franco seems to be presuming, disregarding other chronological considerations, a historical development in which the author of the SpMs correctly rejected the “illogical refutations” found in earlier texts. However, if the Buddhists’ assessment of sophistical arguments at that time were different from that of Tucci and Franco, it is possible to presume a quite different historical process. And in fact, this is what Kajiyama has suggested.

14. Kajiyama’s view of the first chapter of the **Tarkaśāstra*

Kajiyama’s view of 相応 (*xiang ying*)⁴³ arguments in the fourth chapter of the UH is widely known. He believed that the arguments originally presented as correct rejoinders by the author of the UH – according to him, Nāgārjuna is a possible candidate – were later criticized in the NSū, and that this is where the concept of *jāti*, as a response to the UH’s 相応 arguments, was founded or invented.⁴⁴ Since Kajiyama 1991, there have been a few other ideas put forth about the origin of the concept of *jāti*.⁴⁵ But his understanding that the author of the UH did not consider 相応 arguments false, but rather valid, has been generally accepted.

⁴³ Kajiyama presumed that the Sanskrit equivalent of the word 相応 is *prasaṅga* or *prasaṅga-jāti* (cf. Kajiyama 1984: 16; 23-24; Kajiyama 1991: 108, n.7). Prof. Kang has criticized this presumption, suggesting the word *prayoga* as a candidate for the Sanskrit equivalent of the word 相応 (cf. Kang 2008: 65-81). In my opinion, it might be that its Sanskrit equivalent is *samaprasaṅga*, a word attested in Dignāga’s text.

⁴⁴ Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 4-52; Kajiyama 1991. Kajiyama also indicates that Nāgārjuna criticized the NSū’s *jāti* theory in several cases (cf. Kajiyama 1984: 35-39, 43-52). He concludes that the first and fifth chapters of the NSū was established before Nāgārjuna or in his life-time, whereas the second, third and fourth chapters of it was established after Nāgārjuna (cf. Kajiyama 1984: 48-49, 52).

⁴⁵ Some scholars (Oberhammer et al. 1996: 21, 100-101; Franco 2004: 498,3; Kang 2006: 161; Kang 2008 etc.) regard the concept of *uttara* in the CS as one of the origins of the NSū’s *jāti*. In contrast, Kajiyama presumes that the CS does not deal with *jāti*s at all (cf. Kajiyama 1984: 5-9). Further, Pind has challenged Kajiyama’s ascription of the author of the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* to Nāgārjuna (cf. Pind 2001).

In forming his view on the 相応 of the UH, Kajiyama has also considered the relationship between the UH's concept 相応 and the first chapter of the TŚ as follows:

“The TŚ distinguished the 相応, i.e., *reductio ad absurdum*, of the UH from false rejoinders, designating the former as “rejoinders [to] illogical/unreasonable [arguments]” (無道理難), and described it in an independent chapter. This fact shows that the TŚ was not only a treatise that followed the example of the NSū, but was an attempt to systematize Buddhist logic by taking the idea of 相応 of the UH and introducing the 順中論's theory of the three conditions of a reason.”⁴⁶

Thus, Kajiyama believed the first chapter of the TŚ to have inherited the idea of 相応, which the author of the UH regarded as valid arguments. At the same time, as Kajiyama points out,⁴⁷ many arguments among the 相応 arguments in the UH have been classified as false rejoinders (*jāti*) and are rejected by the NSū.⁴⁸ Buddhist thinkers after the NSū, as a

⁴⁶ Translated by the author of this paper from the original Japanese (cf. Kajiyama 1984: 95: “『如実論』は、『方便心論』の相応、つまり帰謬を誤難と区別して「無道理（にたいする論）難」と名づけ、別章としてこれを論じたのである。このことは『如実論』がただ『ニヤーヤ・スートラ』を模倣したのでなく、『方便心論』の相応を継承し、『順中論』の因の三相を組み入れて、仏教論理学を体系化しようとした試みであったことを示している。” Franco seems unfortunately to have overlooked this statement of Kajiyama, which is quite significant (cf. Franco 2004: 466, 9-12).

⁴⁷ Cf. Kajiyama 1991: 110-113.

⁴⁸ The following correspondences have been pointed out by Kajiyama (cf. Kajiyama 1991: 117; UH 27c25-28b22; Katsura 2015-2018: 26-27): 1. 増多 (NSū 5.1.4, *upakarṣasama*), 2. 損減 (NSū 5.1.4, *apakarṣasama*), 3. 同異, 4. 問多答少, 5. 答多問少, 6. 因同, 7. 果同, 8. 遍同 (NSū 5.1.2, *sādharmyasama*), 9. 不遍同 (NSū 5.1.2, *vaidharmyasama*), 10. 時同 (NSū 5.1.18, *ahetusama*), 11. 不到 (NSū 5.1.7, *aprāptisama*), 12. 到 (NSū 5.1.7, *prāptisama*), 13. 相違, 14. 不相違 (NSū 5.1.23, *aviśeṣasama*), 15. 疑 (NSū 5.1.14, *saṃśayasama*), 16. 不疑 (NSū 5.1.37, *kāryasama*), 17. 喻破 (NSū 5.1.29, *anupalabdhisama*), 18. 聞同, 19. 聞異, 20. 不生. Of these, the fourth (問多答少) and the fifth (答多問少) seem to be correct rejoinders that indicate the inconclusiveness (*anaikāntikatā*) of the logical reason (cf. Matilal 1998: 74-75).

response to the NSū's criticism of *prasaṅga* arguments (相応), probably accepted, on one hand, the concept of *jāti* at the level of ordinary dialectics and logic, but on the other hand, seem to have attempted to maintain their traditional concept of *prasaṅga* questioning, that is, acts of discussion between two opposing statements being possible at the level of meta-dialectics and logic.

1.5. Concluding Remarks

The original titles of the chapters of the TŚ, which I have recently considered in another paper, are in my opinion relevant to this matter.⁴⁹ There I clarified the following: The original Chinese title of the TŚ was merely 如実論, and the part 反質難品 of the present Chinese title 如実論反質難品 must have originally existed only in the titles of the first and second chapters as follows: 反質難品中無道理難品 and 反質難品中道理難品. The concept 反質難 should thus be regarded as a superordinate concept that includes both 無道理難 and 道理難. Thereby the word 反質難, a word specific to Paramārtha's (眞諦) translation team, is a rendering of the Sanskrit word *prasaṅga*.⁵⁰

In short, the TŚ can be seen as having divided the concept *prasaṅga* (相応; 反質難) into two, i.e., *prasaṅga* as sophistical arguments that cannot be analyzed according to logic (無道理難), and *jāti* (or **prasaṅga-jāti*),

Further, the arguments of the eighteenth and nineteenth 相応 can be regarded as an origin of the concept *viruddhāvyaḥcārīn* in Dignāga; in this sense, these can also be considered correct rejoinders. As a whole, at least eleven of twenty 相応 arguments are, according to Kajiyama, regarded as false rejoinders by the NSū. Cf. also Matilal 1998: 62.

⁴⁹ Cf. Ono 2017a: 909.

⁵⁰ This fact is ascertained by checking the usage of the rendering 反質難 in the 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論, a Chinese translation of the *Abhidharmakośa* done by Shentai's translation team (cf. AKś(ChSh) 162b5 =AKś 3,13; AKś(ChSh) 163b1 =AKś 6,22; AKś(ChSh) 166a5 =AKś 15,7; AKś(ChSh) 167b20=AKś 20,9).

which the NSū, and then later the Buddhists as well, regarded as false rejoinders based on logic (道理難). Such a division may have already been undertaken in treatises earlier than the TŚ. In fact, the dialectical portion of the Spitzer manuscript describing *jāti* can probably be regarded as one such treatise.

2. The **Upāyahṛdaya* and the Spitzer manuscript

2.1. *Nigrahassthānas* and elementary categories of dialectics/logic in the Spitzer manuscript

In contrast to the first section, the second/third sections of the SpMs do not seem to have a close relationship to the TŚ. While the description of *nigrahassthānas* appearing in the TŚ's third chapter is, as mentioned above, very similar in its structure and content to that of the NSū's fifth chapter, in the SpMs's fragmental descriptions of grounds of defeat there does not seem to have any structural correspondence to the NSū.

Nevertheless, there are several words attested in the SpMs that refer to grounds of defeat: *pratijñāhāni* (CS 40, UH 26c24-25, NSū 5.2.2), *ananubhāṣā* (UH 26c2, NSū 5.2.16), *kālātīta* (CS 37), *arthāntara* (CS 43, NSū 5.2.7) and *apārtha(ka)* (CS 33.4, NSū 5.2.10).⁵¹ It is noteworthy, then, that while *arthāntara* and *apārtha(ka)* appear in the list of grounds of defeat in the CS, they are not found in the UH's list of seventeen *nigrahassthānas*.⁵² For this reason, in terms of the theory of grounds of

⁵¹ Cf. Franco 2004: 472, 481-482.

⁵² According to Kajiyama (cf. Kajiyama 1991: 115-116), the UH's seventeen *nigrahassthānas* (cf. UH 26b19-c25) correspond to those of the NSū as follows: 1. 語顛倒 (NSū 5.2.11, *apṛāptakāla*), 2. 立因不正 (NSū 5.2.4, *pratijñāvirodha*), 3. 引喻不同, 4. 應問不問 (NSū 5.2.21, *paryanujoyjopekṣaṇa*), 5. 應答不答 (NSū 5.2.18, *apratibhā?*), 6. 三說法要不令他解 (NSū 5.2.9, *avijñātārtha*), 7. 自三說法而不別知 (NSū 5.2.17, *ajñāna*), 8. 共他論彼義短闕而不覺知, 9. 他正義而爲生過 (NSū 5.2.22, *niranujoyjānuyoga*), 10. 有說者衆人悉解而獨不悟 (NSū 5.2.16, *ananubhāṣaṇa*), 11. 輕疾聽者不悟, 12. 語少 (NSū 5.2.12, *nyūna*), 13. 語多 (NSū 5.2.13, *adhika*), 14. 無義語 (NSū

defeat there does not seem to be a close relationship between the UH and the SpMs.

On the other hand, the enumeration of the elementary categories of dialectics and logic appearing in the CS, the first chapter of the UH, and in the first chapter of the NSū can be partly traced in the second/third sections of the SpMs.⁵³ No such enumeration exists in the TŚ, at least in the extant chapters.⁵⁴

2.2. The similarity between the **Upāyahrdaya* and the Spitzer manuscript in terms of the *jāti* theory

What, then, should we think of the SpMs's description of *jāti*s? Connected to this, Franco states that between the TŚ, the NSū and the CS, the TŚ “displays the strongest similarity to the Spitzer fragments.”⁵⁵ He probably does not consider the UH in this context since the UH's 相應

5.2.8, *nirarthaka*), 15. 非時語, 16. 義重 (NSū 5.2.15, *punarukta*), 17. 捨本宗 (NSū 5.2.2, *pratijñāhāni*); cf. also Katsura 2015-2018: 25.

⁵³ Franco reports that the terms *saṃśaya* (CS 22, NSū 1.1.23), *prayojana* (CS 23, NSū 1.1.24), *pratijñā* (CS 8, NSū 1.1.33), *vākchala* (CS 35.1, 隨其言橫爲生過 UH 25b28-29, NSū 1.2.12), four *pramāṇas* (cf. UH 25a26-27: 知因有四. 一現見二比知三喻知四隨經書.), i.e., *pratyakṣa* (CS 18, NSū 1.1.4), *anumāna* (CS 19, NSū 1.1.5), *aupamya* (CS 21, NSū 1.1.6, *upamāna*) and *aitihya* (CS 20, NSū 1.1.7, *śabda*) are attested in the SpMs (cf. Franco 2004: 481-487). Although not clearly mentioned by Franco, *ahetu* (CS 36, 似因非因 UH 23c8 **hetvābhāsāhetu*) meaning *hetvābhāsa* can also be found together with *upāl(ambha)* (CS 38) on fol.*391/392v3. In addition, the *alātacakra* mentioned several times in the SpMs is also found in the first chapter of the UH (cf. UH 25b5: 旋火輪), and the stock example of doubt mentioned in the SpMs is found also in the same text in its description of the third fallacious logical reason (生疑似因) (cf. UH 26a2-3: 如有樹杙似於人故, 若夜見之便作是念杙耶人耶. 是則名爲生疑似因; Katsura/Gillon 2017: 227).

⁵⁴ A description of the elementary categories of dialectics and logic such as the NSū's sixteen *tattvas* is lacking in the extant Chinese translation of the TŚ, although there seem to be some statements suggesting that the TŚ originally had a section that did describe them (cf. Ui 1929: 487).

⁵⁵ Cf. Franco 2004: 498,4-5.

describe correct rejoinders; although they do correspond to the concept of *jāti*, they cannot be regarded as *jātis* in its meaning of false rejoinder. I believe, however, that the SpMs's *jāti* theory has a quite close relationship with the UH's 相應. I will present my reasons for this in the following.

2.2.1. The initial proof appearing in the *jāti* section of the Spitzer manuscript and its relationship to the **Upāyahṛdaya*

The initial proof criticized by the *jātivādin* in the SpMs is “sound is impermanent, because it is perceptible/perceived by the sense organ (*aindriyikatvāt*), just like a pot.”⁵⁶ The logical reason (*hetu*) of this proof is, as Franco has pointed out, different from what is usually seen in *jāti* theories in later Buddhist treatises on logic.⁵⁷ With regard to the proofs criticized by the *jātivādins* in the TŚ and the VVi, the logical reason “perceived by a sense organ (根所執: **aindriyikatva*)” appears only once, in the additional explanations of the thirteenth *jāti* of the TŚ, i.e., the *pratidrṣṭāntasama* (顯對譬義難).⁵⁸ In contrast, the logical reason “being produced immediately after an endeavor (*prayatnānantarīyakatva*)” is mentioned often: in ten *jātis* of the TŚ and perhaps nine of the VVi.^{59,60}

⁵⁶ Cf. Franco 2004: 498,7-9. Words such as *aindriyikatvāt* and the like occur repeatedly throughout the discussion.

⁵⁷ Cf. Franco 2004: 498,9-10.

⁵⁸ Cf. TŚ 33c2-3: 聲無常。何以故。根所執故。

⁵⁹ In the TŚ, there are a number of variants in the Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit word *prayatnānantarīyaka*, including 因功力生無中間生, 因功力生, 依功力 and 依功力生. In addition to *prayatnānantarīyaka*, reasons such as *kṛtakatva* regarding *kāryasama*, *naimittikatva* regarding *prasaṅgasama* and “*ajāḍasvabhāvād dharmāṇām*” regarding *nityasama* appear in falsely refuted proofs in the TŚ, the VVi, the NMu and the PSV. Franco's view that “the common reason for impermanence in the later period” is *kṛtakatva* (cf. Franco 2004: 498: 9-10) is, as far as Buddhist *jāti* theory is concerned, incorrect. By the way, the word *prayatna* can be attested once in the SpMs in this context (cf. fol.403v1); here Franco relates it to a word such as *prayatnānantarīyaka*.

It is not entirely clear why the logical reason of the initial proof in the Buddhist *jāti* theory was changed in these texts from “*aindriyatva*” to “*prayatnānantarīyatva*.” Nevertheless, it can be easily imagined that using “*aindriyatva*” as the logical reason for proving the impermanence of sound began to be regarded as inadequate.⁶¹ Why then did the author of the SpMs use it as the logical reason for the initial proof? As a matter of fact, the motive lies, in my opinion, in this concept being the opposite of the logical reason used by the non-Buddhists in their initial proof criticized in the UH’s 相応.

The initial proof of the non-Buddhists in the last chapter of the UH is the following:

“The soul is permanent, because it is not perceptible/perceived by a sense organ (**nitya ātmā, anaindriyatvāt*). Space is not perceptible, [and], therefore, permanent. Whatever is not perceptible is permanent. Why can, therefore, the soul, which is not perceptible, be not permanent?”⁶²

In the UH, this proof is, of course, regarded as faulty and is criticized by the Buddhist author by means of twenty correct rejoinders (相応). But in response to the NSū having invented the concept “*jāti*,” considerable

⁶⁰ At the same time, the thesis of the proofs criticized by *jātivādins* in the TŚ and the VVi are in most cases “sound is impermanent.” An exception is the proof mentioned in the twelfth *jāti*, i.e., 顯義至難 (*arthāpattisama*). Cf. TŚ 33a16-17: 無我。何以故。不可顯故，譬如石女兒； Ffgr. 21a of the VVi: *nāsty ātmānupalabdheḥ, vandhyāputravat* [= The soul does not exist. Why? Because it is not perceived, like the son of a childless woman.]. The proofs in the NMu and the PSV are quite similar to the proofs in the VVi. Thus, in *jāti* theories of later Buddhist treatises on logic, the proof “*anityaḥ śabdaḥ, prayatnānantarīyatvāt, ghaṭādivat*” is usually used as the initial proof.

⁶¹ For example, due to its deviation from perceptible but permanent things like the universal (*sāmānya*) (cf. TŚ 33c3-6: 此亦可疑。根所執如同異性則應是常。聲根所執如同異性，聲應是常。若如同異性非是常者，若如瓦器不應無常。).

⁶² UH 28a4-6: 我常，非根覺故。虛空非覺，是故爲常。一切不爲根所覺者盡皆是常。而我非覺得非常乎。

numbers of 相応 had to be reinterpreted as false rejoinders by the Buddhists themselves. Thus, the author of the SpMs, when describing his own *jāti* theory, may have adopted the structure of the initial proof as criticized in the UH.

Thereby the thesis in the initial proof of the non-Buddhists, namely, “the soul is permanent” had to be replaced by the thesis “sound is impermanent,” which the Buddhist proponent asserts to show that the opponent’s rejoinder was “false.” And at the same time, the concept “*aindriyatva*,” which is the opposite of the logical reason “*anaindriyatva*” of the incorrect proof criticized in the correct rejoinders of the UH, may have come to be used as the logical reason for the correct Buddhist proof being criticized by false rejoinders.

2.2.2. *Jātis* in the Spitzer manuscript

Unfortunately, there are not many descriptions in the SpMs that can be clearly seen as explaining a concrete type of *jāti*. Among those that the SpMs does describe, however, suggested by the collocational occurrence of the expressions “*dakṣiṇa*” (Fol.402v2) and “*yathā na gaur[a]*” (Fol.403r2) as Franco points out, is a type of *jāti* that came to be called “*ahetusama*” in the later period.⁶³ Note that this *jāti* has a corresponding concept in the UH’s list of 相応, namely, 時同 (**kālasama*), the tenth 相応, whose explanation also involves the simile of two horns.^{64,65}

⁶³ Cf. Franco 2004: 498-499; TS 31c20-26 (cf. Franco 2004: 499, n.204); NMu 5a14-18; PSV ad PS 6.3 (=VVi’s fragment?; cf. Ono 2017b: 62-63; Ono 2020: 275).

⁶⁴ Cf. UH 28a24-27: 復次，汝立我常言非根覺，爲是現在過去未來。若言過去，過去已滅。若言未來，未來未有。若言現在，則不爲因，如二角並生則不得相因。是名時同。 [= Further, you, in proving that the soul is permanent, state “because it is not perceived by a sense organ” as a logical reason. This [reason] is either present or past or future. If this statement is past, the past one is already vanished. If this statement is future, the future one is still not existent. If the statement is present, it cannot be the reason because such things cannot be the reason for each other, like two horns [of a cow]

Further, Franco relates the statement, seemingly coming from the *jāti-vādins*, “(ya)d uktam ghaṭasādharmy[ā]d anityaḥ śabda [i]ti tan nāsti (if one says that sound is impermanent due to its similarity to a pot, this is not correct)” found on Fol.404v1 to the third *jāti* in the TŚ, 長相難 (*vikalpasama*).⁶⁶ However, in my opinion it is difficult to relate this general statement to a particular *jāti*, and especially to *vikalpasama*. If anywhere, this statement might be related to the first or second *jāti* in the TŚ, 同相難 (*sādharmyasama*) or 異相難者 (*vaidharmyasama*).⁶⁷ In turn, *sādharmyasama* and *vaidharmyasama* can be identified with 遍同 and 不遍同 in the 相応 list of the UH.⁶⁸ In contrast, there is no concept in the UH to which *vikalpasama* clearly corresponds.

The validity of Franco’s interpretation in which he relates the statement “(a)tha manyase asti ghaṭasādharmyaṃ śabdasyeti prāptam an[y]... (if you think that sound has similarity to a pot, it results that ...)” appearing on Fol.404v2 to *sādharmyasama* is also open to question.⁶⁹ This statement reminds me rather of the explanation of the *aviśeṣasama*.

existing simultaneously. This [rejoinder] is called **kālasama*.]; cf. also Matilal 1998: 77; Katsura 2015-2018: 27, n.33.

⁶⁵ Regarding the statement “*kvacic caikaṃ sarvvagataṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ yathākā[ś](aḥ)*” appearing in Fol.404r1 (cf. Franco 2004: 499, 8-11), one can find no clear relationship to a particular *jāti*, although the mention of space being omnipresent is found in the explanation of 遍同, the eighth 相応 in the UH (cf. UH 28a20-23: 復次, 汝以虛空非覺故常。然虛空者遍一切處。一切處物豈非覺也。是名遍同。).

⁶⁶ Cf. Franco 2004: 499, 12-17.

⁶⁷ Regarding *sādharmyasama*, cf. TŚ 30c5-7: 外曰。若聲無常與器同相者, 聲即常住與空同相故。是故如空聲亦常住。同相者同無身故; PST(Ms) 246b6-247a1: *jātivādy āha – yadi nidarśitaghaṭasādharmyāt prayatnānantarīyakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ, nidarśitavipakṣākāśasādharmyād amūrtatvān nitya iti*. Regarding *vaidharmyasama*, cf. TŚ 31a5-7: 外曰。若汝立聲無常與瓦器同相者, 復何所至。聲即常住與瓦器不同相故。不同相者聲無身瓦器有身故; PST(Ms) 247a2: *para āha – yadi nidarśitaghaṭasādharmyāt prayatnānantarīyakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ, nidarśitaghaṭavaidharmyād amūrtatvān nitya iti*. Cf. also Ono 2017b: 52-53.

⁶⁸ Cf. Kajiyama 1991: 112, 5.3; 5.4.

⁶⁹ Cf. Franco 2004: 499, 17-500, 3.

According to Kajiyama, the latter can correspond to the thirteenth and fourteenth 相応 in UH's list, i.e., 相違 and 不相違.^{70,71}

On the other hand, in Fol.*406(?)v(?), Franco has found an argument of the opponent claiming that there is no example (*anudāharaṇāt*). He has reconstructed the argument as follows: “If sound is the same as a pot, then sound becomes nothing but a pot and thus the latter cannot be used as an example (*śabda ghaṭo bhavati tat saty evam udāharaṇābhāvaḥ prāptaḥ*). If sound is not the same as a pot (*atha na śabda ghaṭaḥ*), the latter can also not be used as an example.”⁷²

Although Franco has not provided any annotations, this argument, in fact, corresponds well to the argument that the UH presents as the third 相応. The explanation of this 相応 is as follows:

[The 相応] called “the sameness and the difference” (同異) is as follows: One establishes the permanence of the soul by mentioning space as the example. [In this case,] if space and the soul are one and the same, how can one exemplify the soul by space? If [on the other hand, the two are] different, they cannot become the example for each other. This is designated as “the sameness and the

⁷⁰ Cf. PSV ad PS 6.13'ab: **yadi ghaṭasādharmyadarśanād anyo 'py aviśeṣaḥ kriyate, sarve ghaṭadharmāḥ** śabde prāpnuvanti; Kajiyama 1991: 112, 4.6

⁷¹ I unfortunately cannot say anything regarding the three arguments that Franco has reconstructed on the basis of fragments involving, respectively, the words or phrases “*avivādītaḥetu*” (Fol.405), “*viśeṣaḥetu*” (Fol.406(?)a1) and “*atha sa[t]sv apy anyeṣu śabdānityatv[a/ā].e ...*” (Fol.406(?)a2-3) (cf. Franco 2004: 500,14-502,3). The last, however, reminds me of the discussions about *upalabdhisama* in later treatises (cf. TS 32a9-23: 依別因無常法顯故, 此則非因. 是名顯別因難; Ffrg.16a of the VVi; PSV ad PS 6.16ab: **anyenāpi hetunā sādhyasyopalabdhir upadarśyate yena, tad upalabdhisamam**; PST(Ms) 256a4: pareṇa hi – nāyaṃ hetur anityatve, vidyudādāv anyataḥ pratyakṣatvāder anityasiddher ity ukte.).

⁷² Cf. Franco 2004: 502,5-8.

difference.”⁷³

It is obvious that these two arguments are the same, although the *sādhya* and *dr̥ṣṭānta* are different in the two arguments. Something more significant, however, is that this argument in the UH has not been identified, as Ui pointed out,⁷⁴ with any *jāti* argument in other treatises, such as the NSū or the TŚ. The only parallel to this argument, disregarding a similar argument (not part of the *jāti* theory) in the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*,⁷⁵ is that in the SpMs.

2.2.3. Concluding Remarks

It must be noted that the SpMs’s explanations of certain *jātis* seem, not always but often, to presuppose the pair concept *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya*.⁷⁶ This tendency is in harmony with the UH’s introductory statement that recognizes *sādharmya* (同) and *vaidharmya* (異) as two concepts fundamental to twenty 相応.⁷⁷ There is no such statement at the beginning of the TŚ’s second chapter.

Further, standard descriptions of *jātis* in later treatises, as well as in the NSū and the TŚ, contain passages explaining why the rejoinders in

⁷³ Cf. UH 28a10-12: 同異者。立我常引空爲喩，空我一者一法，何得以空喩我。若其異者，不得相喩。是名同異; cf. also Matilal 1998: 75.

⁷⁴ Cf. Ui 1925: 578.

⁷⁵ Cf. VP(TD) 103b5-7; Kajiyama 1991: 110,17-22.

⁷⁶ Descriptions involving the concept *sādharmya* or *vaidharmya* can be found throughout the description of *jāti* in the SpMs (cf. 404v1-2, 405a1, 405r(?)a, 407v(?)a, 40*8(?)a1-2, 40*8(?)b1, 409a1, 409b1, 410v2, 410r(?)2, 411v2-3; Franco 2004: 492-497). In cases found in the TŚ and the NMu, the occurrence of these concepts is concentrated in particular *jātis*, such as *sādharmyasama*, *vaidharmyasama*, *vikalpa-sama* and *aviśeṣasama*.

⁷⁷ Cf. UH 27c13-15: 此二十種要則有二。一異，二同。以同顯義名同，以異顯義名異。凡爲義者必依此二故。此二者通二十法; also NBh ad NSū 5,1: *sādharmyavaidharmyā-bhyāṃ pratyavasthānasya vikalpāj jātibahutvam iti saṃkṣepeṇoktam*.

question are considered false. In texts after the TŚ, it has been attempted to do this even for the classifications of *jāti*s, this based on the reasons for regarding the respective *jāti*s as false rejoinders. In the extant fragments of the SpMs, however, no such passages have been found. Although it cannot be proven, of course, that the original work contained no such passages due to the fragmentary state of the extant materials, it seems that the original description of *jāti*s in the SpMs was considerably simpler than that in the TŚ, and possibly had no passages criticizing false rejoinders.

Also the fourth chapter of the UH, as a matter of course, has no descriptions criticizing the rejoinders, since the arguments called 相応 being explained here are all regarded as correct rejoinders. The UH and the SpMs are thus at least similar in that both seem to describe only the rejoinders themselves, although there is a clear difference between two texts as to whether their rejoinders are regarded as correct or not.

To conclude, taken together these various observations suggest the possibility that the *jāti* description in the SpMs is closer to the 相応 description in the UH than it is to the *jāti* description of the TŚ, and that the SpMs may represent an early stage of the Buddhist response to the *jāti* theory as introduced in the NSū.

3. The **Upāyahṛdaya* and the **Tarkaśāstra*

3.1. **Upāyahṛdaya*'s rejoinders criticized as false rejoinders in the **Tarkaśāstra*

The *jāti* theory in the TŚ essentially follows that of the NSū. Therefore, several types of 相応 in the UH that were criticized as *jāti* in the NSū can be regarded, in the TŚ, as being indirectly criticized as false rejoinders. Apart from 相応 arguments, however, we also find a few cases in the TŚ in which a proponent's rejoinder as it appears in the UH is rejected as a false rejoinder.

In the third chapter 辯正論品 of the UH, the Buddhist proponent refutes the opponent's assertion that *nirvāṇa* does not exist as follows:

Further, you say that the non-existence of *nirvāṇa* is known due to its imperceptibility. This too, however, is incorrect. How can one assert the non-existence of the ocean due to innumerability of its drops? The ocean, in fact, exists despite the innumerability of its drops. Likewise, *nirvāṇa*, in fact, exists by itself despite its imperceptibility. If you assert the non-existence of it, you must explain the reason. If you cannot explain it, your assertion is destroyed by itself. This [rejoinder] is called the argument according to the law (如法論).⁷⁸

As the last sentence shows, here this argument is positioned as a correct rejoinder. The similar argument in the TŚ, however, is the following:

Further, with regard to the proof “the soul does not exist, because it is imperceptible, like the ear of a snake,” the opponent says: The number of drops in the ocean or the weight of the Himālaya mountains do exist but cannot be perceived. Likewise, the soul does exist but cannot be perceived. Therefore, the logical reason “imperceptibility” cannot prove the non-existence of the soul. [To this opponent's rejoinder,] the proponent says: The amount is not different from collected things. [...] The number of drops or the weight of mountains are in fact not different [from collected things] and are therefore non-existent.⁷⁹

In the TŚ, the non-Buddhist opponent's argument is considered a false

⁷⁸ Cf. UH 27a17-22: 又汝言以無覺知無涅槃者，是亦不然。如大海水不知幾滴可言無耶。若不知滴數而猶有海，涅槃亦然，雖不可覺實自有之。而言無者應說因緣。若不能說，汝義自壞。是則名為如法論也; Katsura 2015-18: 31-32.

⁷⁹ Cf. TŚ 33c9-15: 復次。無我。何以故。不可顯故。譬如蛇耳。是義已立。外曰。海水滴量雪山斤兩，是有而不可顯。我亦如是，是有而不可顯。是故不可顯因不得立無我。論曰。數量與聚無別體。[...] 水滴量山斤兩既無別體故非實有。

rejoinder belonging, along with *prasaṅgasama*, *arthāpattisama* and *pratidṛṣṭāntasama*, to the second classification of *jāti*s, i.e., “non-existent” (不実義; *abhūta*).

While in the UH the Buddhist proponent refutes the opponent’s proof “*nirvāṇa* does not exist because it is imperceptible” with the counter-proof that the ocean exists despite the innumerability of its drops, in the TŚ the non-Buddhist opponent refutes proponent’s proof “the soul does not exist, because it is imperceptible” with a similar counter-proof, namely that the number of drops in the ocean, etc. do exist but cannot be perceived. The TŚ’s proponent regards this refutation to be a false rejoinder, since the number of drops in the ocean, etc. are non-existent.

In these two arguments, the opponent and the proponent, both of whom bring up imperceptibility as the logical reason for proving the theses “*nirvāṇa* does not exist” and “the soul does not exist,” have clearly switched positions. Since the *jāti* as found in the TŚ has no corresponding *jāti* in the list of the NSū, it is quite likely that the author of the TŚ had this description of the UH in mind.

There is another example of such a switch. While in the UH the Buddhist proponent rejects the non-Buddhist opponent’s proof “the Arhat does not exist because it is imperceptible, like a second head or a third hand,”⁸⁰ in the conclusion of the TŚ’s second chapter, the Buddhist’s proof “the soul does not exist because it is imperceptible, like a second head or a third hand” is regarded a correct rejoinder against the non-Buddhist’s

⁸⁰ Cf. UH 27a15-17: 難曰。汝以第二頭第三手不可見故明無羅漢，是事不然。雖無二頭，非無第一。言無羅漢乃是悉無。何得爲喻。 [= [The proponent] rejects: you will prove the non-existence of the Arhat due to the imperceptibility of a second head or a third hand. This is however incorrect. The non-existence of a second head does not result that there is no first [head]. If one [can] assert the non-existence of the Arhat [with the example of a second head, etc.], it results that nothing exists. How can one present [these] as example?]; Katsura 2015-18: 31.

assertion that the soul exists.⁸¹ In the TŚ's description of *arthāpattisama* (顯義至難) as well, this proof is again brought up as a correct argument being falsely refuted by the *jātivādin*.⁸² This proof was still used in Vasubandhu's VVi to explain the same *arthāpattisama*,⁸³ but is no longer mentioned by Dignāga.

3.2. A rejoinder of the **Upāyahṛdaya* positioned as both valid argument and false rejoinder in the **Tarkaśāstra*

As mentioned above, the UH describes a 相応 argument called 時同 that corresponds to the *ahetusama* in later periods. Following the NSū's criticism,⁸⁴ the second chapter of the TŚ, as well as probably the SpMs, regards this argument as a false rejoinder.⁸⁵ However, in the first chapter of the TŚ, we find the following description:

Further, [it is inappropriate for you to say that our statement is unreasonable] since the statement denies itself. [Namely,] your

⁸¹ Cf. TŚ 34a28-b6: 論曰。無我。何以故。定不可顯故。若有物定不可顯，是物則無。譬如非自在人第二頭。第二頭者於色香等頭相貌中不可思惟分別。是故定無。我亦如是。於眼等根中分別不顯。是故定無。 [= [The proponent says:] The soul does not exist. Why? Because it can never be perceived (不可顯; **anupalabdhī*). If something can never be perceived, it does not exist, just as a second head of a man does not exist by itself. A second head does not exist at all since it cannot be considered as separate from the characteristics of a head like color/form and smell. The soul also [does not exist]. [It] does not exist at all since it cannot be perceived as separate from sense organs like the eyes.]

⁸² Cf. TŚ 33a16-17: 無我。何以故。不可顯故。譬如石女兒。 [= The soul does not exist. Why? Because it is not perceived, like the son of a childless woman.]

⁸³ Cf. footnote 60 above.

⁸⁴ Cf. NSū 5.1.18.

⁸⁵ Cf. TŚ 31c20-26: 六無因難者。於三世說無因，是名無因難。外曰。因爲在所立義前世，爲在後世，爲同世耶。若因在前世立義在後世者，立義未有因何所因。若在後世立義在前世者，立義已成就復何用因爲。若同世俱生，則非是因。譬如牛角種芽等一時而有不得言左右相生。是故是同時，則無有因。論曰。是難顛倒...; Franco 2004: 498-499.

refuting statement exists either simultaneous to our statement or not. If [it exists] simultaneously, it cannot refute our statement, just as [two] horns of a cow or [two] ears of a horse existing simultaneously cannot destroy each other. If, on the other hand, [it does] not [exist] simultaneously, and your refutation exists beforehand and our statement exists afterwards, how is our statement refuted, because it still does not occur. Therefore, you cannot refute it. If our statement exists beforehand and your statement exists afterwards, how is our statement refuted, because it is already established. If they exist simultaneously, our statement and your refutation cannot be distinguished in the way “this is refutation, and that is what to be refuted,” just as the water of a river and the water of the ocean mixing simultaneously cannot be distinguished [from one another].⁸⁶

While the 時同 argument of the UH is rejected as a false rejoinder, i.e., the *ahetusama* in the second chapter of the TŚ, a similar argument is regarded as a valid sophistical argument in the first chapter of the same work.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Cf. TŚ 29a6-13: 復次，言說自相破故。汝難言說共我言說爲同時，爲不同時。同時者，則不能破我言說。譬如牛角馬耳同時生故不能相破。若不同者，汝難在前我言在後。我言未出汝何所難。是故不成難。若我言在前汝難在後，我言已成復何所難。若同時者，我言汝難是難是可難不可分別。譬如江水海水同時和合不可分別。

⁸⁷ Strictly speaking, the 時同 in the UH was classified in the TŚ into two *jātis*, i.e., the sixth 無因難 (*ahetusama*) and the sixteenth 自義相違難. The *jātivādin*'s arguments of these two *jātis* are, however, the same, whereas the proponent's ways of criticizing the *jātivādin*'s arguments are different in two cases. In the former, it is explained that the opponent's rejoinder is false due to confusing the epistemological reason (*jñāpakahetu*; 顯因) with the ontological cause (*kārahahetu*; 生因), while in the latter the proponent points out the self-contradiction of the *jātivādin*'s assertion, since his rejoinder itself can be criticized with the very same argument (TŚ 34a20-25: 若汝難在前我立義在後，我義未有，汝何所難。若我立義在前汝難在後，我義已立，汝難復何用。若汝言汝已信我難故取我難更難我，若作此說，是亦不然。何以故。我顯汝難還破汝義，不依汝難以立我義。 [= If your refutation exists beforehand and our thesis exists afterwards, what is refuted by you, because our thesis still does not exist. If our thesis exists beforehand and your refutation exists afterwards, how does your refutation work,

From above examination, we see that the TS was critical of the UH's view, not only indirectly through the NSū, but also directly. In addition, there is a case in which the TS does not judge whether the UH's argument is correct or incorrect, but uses the argument in two logically opposite ways.

4. Conclusion

The above investigation clearly shows that the SpMs should be dated between the UH and the TS. Using this chronological order of the three treatises, we can sketch the general flow of the development of pre-Dignāga Buddhist logic, especially its *jāti* theory, as represented in these texts in the following way:

The sophistical rejoinders of the UH were criticized by the NSū, with several of these rejoinders being regarded as false rejoinders (*jāti*) in the NSū's fifth chapter. In response to this criticism, the Buddhists also introduced the concept of *jāti* to their dialectics and logic, whereby they excluded a number of the sophistical arguments in the UH from correct rejoinders. Nonetheless, several essential arguments were kept as valid *prasaṅgas*. Thus, the *prasaṅga* arguments of the UH were divided into two. It is these two types of *prasaṅga* that are being described in the first two chapters of the TS, i.e., 無道理難品 and 道理難品.

Of these two *prasaṅga* concepts, however, the first, corresponding to 無

because our thesis is already established. You might say: "Since you have already accepted our refutation, you adopt our refutation, and refute us [based on it]." If you make such an argument, it is not right. Why? We [only] show that your refutation, in turn, rejects your thesis, and do not establish our thesis based on your refutation.]). Dignāga regards rather the second way, i.e., the indication of *jātivādin's* 自害過 (*svaghātivadoṣa*), as correct criticism of the *ahetusama* and the *prāptyaprāptisama* as well (cf. NMu 5a22-23: 又於此中有自害過. 遮遣同故.). And the above-mentioned argument in the first chapter of the TS, in which opponent's "refutation" (難) is rejected, corresponds, as a result, to Dignāga's criticism of the *ahetusama*.

道理難 of the TŚ, seems to have been abandoned by Vasubandhu already by the middle period of his scholarly career, i.e., in his VVi.

The second one, too, corresponding to 道理難 of the TŚ, i.e., *jāti*s, although still discussed in the VVi and in Dignāga's two treatises, the NMu and the PSV, is rarely dealt with by later Indian Buddhist logicians after Dignāga. Bhāviveka, a Mādhyamika philosopher, is one of the rare exception who used some *jāti* concepts in his treatises in order to reject opponents' objections to his proof of the emptiness (*śūnyatā*).⁸⁸ In the *pramāṇa* literature, Dharmakīrti discusses only the *jāti* "*kāryasama*".⁸⁹ A few *jāti*s are also mentioned by Prajñākaragupta in his treatise.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Cf. Ono 2019

⁸⁹ Cf. Katsura 1987: 55; Watanabe 2010. Incidentally, Dharmakīrti only mentions the name of *sādharmya* and *vaidharyasama* in his *Vādanyāya* (cf. VN 23,16).

⁹⁰ *kāryasama* and *vikalpasama* are mentioned in the PVA (cf. PVA 44,29-45,4; 72,18; 498,10; see Katsura 1987: 51,55; Watanabe 2010: n.12; Franco 1997: 249-250, n.30). Yamāri has commented on these passages.

Abbreviations and Literature

Primary literature

AKś	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. Ed. P. Pradhan. Patna 1975.
AKś (ChSh)	阿毘達磨俱舍釋論 (Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa translated into Chinese by Paramārtha) Taishō Vol. 29; No. 1559.
UH	Fangbian xin lun [方便心論, *Upāyahṛdaya] Taishō Tripiṭaka Vol. 32, No. 1632.
CS	Carakasamhitā (Caraka): Chapter 3, Section 8: <i>Vādāmaryādapadāni</i> . s. Ui 1925: 587-600.
TS	Rushi lun fanzhinan pin [如實論反質難品, *Tarkaśāstra] Taishō Tripiṭaka Vol. 32, No. 1633.
NMu	Yinming zhengli men lun ben [因明正理門論本, Nyāya-mukha] (Dignāga) Taishō Tripiṭaka Vol. 32, No. 1628.
NSū	Nyāyasūtra (Gautama): <i>Die Nyāyasūtra's. Text, Übersetzung und Glossar</i> . Von W. Ruben. Leipzig 1928 (Nachdruck Nendeln 1966).
PVA	Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (Prajñākaragupta): Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṃkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam). Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāyana. Patna 1953.
PS/PSV	Pramāṇasamuccaya/vṛtti. s. PSV ad PS 6.
PSV ad PS 6	Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti VI (Dignāga): Ed. M. Ono, Y. Muroya, T. Watanabe. http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_6.pdf . (forthcoming)

PST(Ms)	Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (Jinendrabuddhi). Sanskrit manuscript. cf. <i>Jinendrabuddhi's Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1 Part 2: Diplomatic Edition</i> . Ed. E. Steinkellner, H. Krasser, H. Lasic. Beijing/Vienna 2005: ix-xxxvi (Manuscript Description by Anne MacDonald).
VN	Vādanyāya (Dharmakīrti): M.T. Much, <i>Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāya. Teil I</i> . Wien 1991.
VP(T)	Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (Nāgārjuna?), Tibetan translation: P 5230, Tsa 114a8-126a5; D 3830, Tsa 99b1-110a4.
VVi	s. Ffrg.
SpMs	s. Franco 2004.
Ffrg	Sanskrit texts of Vādaśāstra's fragments collected by Frauwallner (cf. Frauwallner 1957: Anhang I; s. Ono 2020: 3.3)

Secondary literature

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Franco 2000	E. Franco, The "Spitzer Manuscript" – Report on Work in Progress. In: <i>Abhidharma and Indian Thought: Essays in Honour of Professor Doctor Junshō Katō on His Sixtieth Birthday</i> , Tōkyō 2000, 562-544 (= [49]-[67]).
Franco 2004	E. Franco, <i>The Spitzer Manuscript. The Oldest Philosophical Manuscript in Sanskrit. Volume II</i> . Wien 2004.
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The Emergence of the Canonical Indian Syllogism as Revealed by Early Chinese Buddhist Texts

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1. Introduction

The thesis of this paper is that the canonical Indian syllogism, as found for example in various philosophical works of Dignāga and others after him, is essentially a deductive argument which has its origins in argument by analogy, whose canonical form is found in *Caraka-saṃhitā* (*Caraka's collection*). The example, or *drṣṭānta*, found in the canonical Indian syllogism is a vestige of its analogical origins, as noted both by Keith (1921: 87) and by Randle (1930: 183). Decisive evidence of the transition from a canonical argument from analogy to a deductively valid argument is found in passages in *Fāng biàn xīn lùn* (方便心論), or *Treatise on the essence of expedient means*, and *Rú shí lùn* (如實論), or *Treatise on truth*. These texts, extant only in Chinese, yet said to be translations of Sanskrit texts, usually go by Sanskrit titles, the former *Upāya-hṛdaya*, or *Heart of expedient means*, suggested Giuseppe Tucci (1929:ix—xii), the latter *Tarka-śāstra*, or *Treatise on reasoning*¹. Both texts have been translated into Japanese, the first completely twice (Ui 1925 and Ishitobi 2006) and partially once (Nagasaki 1988) and the second completely once (Nakano 1934). Brendan Gillon and Shoryu Katsura have prepared an English translation of *Fāng biàn xīn lùn*, the first chapter of which appears in Gillon and Katsura (2017). Brendan

¹ Ono (forthcoming p. 2) reports that 如實論 appears as item 1353 in the *Zhì yuán fǎ bǎo kān tóng zǒng lù* (至元法寶勘同總錄), a Yuan dynasty catalogue of Chinese translations of Buddhist texts, compiled in 1290 CE. The Chinese title is accompanied by a sequence of characters which are a phonetic transcription corresponding to *tarka-śāstra*. However, as he shows very convincingly, this transcription is not that of the Sanskrit proper noun for the work, but that of a common noun which describes the work's genre, namely, a work of *tarka*, or dialectics.

Gillon and Chenkuo Lin are preparing an English translation of *Rú shí lùn*.

Below, we begin with the distinction between argument (*sādhana*) and inference (*anumāna*) and review the texts relevant to the study of reasoning in early classical India. Next, we turn to the two texts central to the thesis of this paper, *Fāng biàn xīn lùn* and *Rú shí lùn*, and explain how they show the transition from analogical argument to deductive argument. And finally, in light of what these texts show, we briefly reassess Dignāga's contribution to the development of logic in classical India.

2. Background

When humans reason, they take some things to be true and conclude therefrom that other things are also true. If this is done in thought, one performs an inference; and if this is done in speech, one makes an argument. Indeed, inference and argument are but two sides of the same coin: an argument can be thought, and hence become an inference (*anumāna*); an inference can be expressed, and hence become an argument (*sādhana*).

Texts which pertain to how thinkers in early classical India thought about reasoning can be divided into three: those which have arguments but which do not mention or discuss either argument or inference as such, those which mention or discuss inference as such but do not mention or discuss argument as such, and those which mention or discuss arguments and possibly also mention or discuss inference, and may even provide illustrations of either.

2.1 Texts with arguments

Before there were texts in India discussing either argument or inference, there were texts which contained arguments. Among the earliest such texts are *Kathā-vatthu* (*Points of controversy*), attributed to Moggalliputta Tissa, and *Milinda-pañha* (*Questions of King Milinda*). These texts date from around third century BCE. The latter text is filled with analogies, most used to explain various aspects of Buddhist doctrine,

but some to make arguments. In contrast, *Kathā-vatthu* is filled with arguments. It contains arguments formulated to refute some two hundred propositions over which the Sthaviravādins, one of the Buddhist schools, disagreed with other Buddhist schools. The treatment of each point comprises an exchange between a proponent and an opponent. The refutations turn on demonstrating the inconsistency of pairs of propositions. For example, in the passage below, the Sthaviravādin questions his opponent, here a Pudgalavādin, about whether or not the soul is known truly and ultimately.

Sthaviravādin: Is the soul known truly and ultimately?

Pudgalavādin: Yes.

Sthaviravādin: Is the soul known truly and ultimately just like any ultimate fact?

Pudgalavādin: No.

Sthaviravādin: Acknowledge your refutation,

If the soul is known truly and ultimately, then indeed, good sir, you should also say that the soul is known truly and ultimately just like any ultimate fact.

What you say here is wrong: namely, that we ought to say (a) that the soul is known truly and ultimately; but we ought not to say (b) that the soul is known truly and ultimately just like any ultimate fact.

If the latter statement (b) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (a) should not be admitted.

It is wrong to affirm the former statement (a) and to deny the latter (b).

One easily abstracts from this the following form,

Sthaviravādin: Is A B?

Pudgalavādin: Yes.

Sthaviravādin: Is C D?

Pudgalavādin: No.

Sthaviravādin: Acknowledge your refutation,

If A is B, then C is D.

What you say here is wrong: namely, (a)
that A is B but that C is not D.

If C is not D, then A is not B.

It is wrong that A is B and C is not D.

Indeed, this form is repeatedly instantiated throughout Book 1, Chapter 1, though it appears in no other extant text.

It is another five hundred years before polemical texts start to reappear. The earliest among these are texts attributed to Nāgārjuna (second century CE). They include *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā* (*Basic verses on the middle way*), *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* (*Exclusion of disputes*) and *Vaidalya-prakaraṇa* (*Tract on pulverization*). Then comes a text attributed to Āryadeva (third century CE), 百論 (*Śataka-sāstra*), or *Treatise in one hundred verses*. They contain many arguments, most arguments by analogy, some deductive, and of the latter, mostly fallacious.

Analogical arguments found in these texts either have the following form or can easily be recast into it.

FORM OF ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT THROUGH SIMILARITY

pratijñā (proposition):	p has S
hetu (reason):	because of p having H,
dṛṣṭānta (example):	as d has H and d has S.
	(where $d \neq p$)

FORM OF ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT THROUGH DISSIMILARITY

pratijñā (proposition):	p has S
hetu (reason):	because of p having H,
dṛṣṭānta (example):	as d has neither H nor S.

2.2 Texts discussing inference

Two early texts to discuss inference (*anumāna*), but not argument (*sādhana*), are *Śaṣṭi-tantra* (*Sixty doctrines*), attributed by some to Pāṇcaśikha (c. second century BCE) and by others to Vṛṣagaṇa (c. after the second century CE), and *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* (*Aphorisms on individuation*), a treatise of speculative ontology attributed to Kaṇāda (c. first century CE).

Śaṣṭi-tantra, surviving only in fragments, defines inference (*anumāna*) as follows:

*sambandhāt ekasmāt pratyakṣāt śeṣa-siddhiḥ anumānam.*² (Frauwallner 1958 p. 123)

To infer is to establish something in the remainder, on the basis of a relation and something perceptible.

One of the fragments lists six relations as ones which underpin an acceptable inference: the master servant relation (*sva-svāmi-bhāva-sambandha*), the matter alteration relation (*prakṛti-vikāra-sambandha*), the part whole relation (*kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha*), the cause effect relation (*nimitta-naimittika-sambandha*), the source product relation (*mātrā-mātrika-sambandha*), the association relation (*sahacāri-sambandha*) and the incompatibility relation (*vadhya-ghātaka-sambandha*). Unfortunately, these relations are neither explained nor illustrated.

Vaiśeṣika-sūtra also has passages which allude to inferences whereby one thing is inferred on the basis of something observable which bears one of five relations to the thing inferred. (VS 9.18; Jambuvijaya (ed) 1961 p. 69; cp. VS 3.1.8)

² For the sake of clarity, I shall not observe sandhi in the cited Sanskrit sentences and I shall introduce hyphenation into Sanskrit compounds.

Though no examples are given of such inferences, it is clear from the description that the inferences would have the following form:

FORM OF CANONICAL INFERENCE

pratijñā (proposition):	p has S
hetu (reason):	because p has H,
sambandha (relation):	there is a relation which possessors of H bear to possessors of S.

2.3 Texts discussing argument

Four early texts — *Nyāya-sūtra* (*Aphorisms on logic*), *Vaidalya-prakaraṇa* (*Tract on pulverization*), *Vāda-viniścaya* (*Settling on what debate is*) and *Sandhi-nirmocana-sūtra* (*Aphorisms on release from bondage*) — either just mention or both mention and discuss terms relevant to arguments or inferences. Five — *Caraka-saṃhitā*, *Hetu-vidyā*, *Fāng biàn xīn lùn*, *Rú shí lùn* and *Vāda-vidhi* — not only mention and sometimes discuss terms but also provide illustrations of either arguments or inferences.

3 Development

Having surveyed which of the early texts are pertinent to the study of the development of reasoning and argument in early classical India, we now turn to the emergence of the canonical Indian syllogism.

3.1 Appearance of a canonical syllogism

The non-Buddhist identified the canonical Indian syllogism as having five parts. They are the proposition (*pratijñā*), the reason (*hetu*), the example (*udāharaṇa*), the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*). Though these parts of the syllogism are listed in *Nyāya-sūtra*, attributed to Gautama (2nd century CE), no illustration of an argument appears. Neither is there any illustration of an inference.

The earliest text known to give an illustration of the canonical syllogism is *Caraka-saṃhitā*, which is attributed to Agniveśa (2nd century CE).

This text lists the same five parts, in one listing calling the example *dr̥ṣṭānta* (3.8.31), in another *udāharaṇa* (3.8.54). The illustration is of an analogical argument through similarity.

CARAKA-SAMHITĀ (3.8.31):

CANONICAL ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT

pratijñā:	<i>nityaḥ puruṣaḥ</i>
proposition:	the soul is eternal
hetu:	<i>a-kṛtakatvāt.</i>
reason:	because of being un-produced.
dr̥ṣṭānta:	<i>a-kṛtakam ākāśam tat ca nityam.</i>
example:	Space is unproduced and it is eternal.
upanaya:	<i>yathā ca a-kṛtakam ākāśam tathā puruṣaḥ.</i>
application:	And just as the sky is unproduced, so is the soul.
nigamana:	<i>tasmāt nityaḥ.</i>
conclusion:	Therefore, the soul is eternal.

Observe that the first three statements in the canonical analogical argument have the form of an analogical argument through similarity: p, or the soul, has S, or the property of being eternal, because p, or the soul, has H, or the property of being unproduced; as d, or space, has H, the property of being unproduced, and d, or space, has S, the property of being eternal. However, the canonical analogical argument here adds two more statements: the first spells out the analogy between the subject of the proposition and the example, using the correlative expression *yathā* (as) ... *tathā* (so) ...; the second restates the argument's proposition.

While *Caraka-samhitā* provides only one illustration of a canonical argument, we can reconstruct two illustrations of a canonical analogical argument from the earliest extant commentary to *Nyāya-sūtra*, *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (*Commentary on logic*). Vātsyāyana (fifth CE), the commentator, explains and illustrates each of the five parts.

NYĀYA-BHĀṢYA (1.1.33–39):

CANONICAL ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT THROUGH SIMILARITY

- pratijñā: *a-nityaḥ śabdaḥ*
 proposition: sound is non-eternal
 hetu: *utpatti-dharmakatvāt.*
 reason: because of having the property of arising.
 udāharaṇa: *utpatti-dharmakam sthāli-ādi dravyam a-nityam.*
 example: A substance, such as a pot, having the property of arising, is non-eternal.
 upanaya: *tathā ca utpatti-dharmakaḥ śabdaḥ.*
 application: And likewise, sound has the property of arising.
 nigamana: *tasmāt utpatti-dharmakatvāt a-nityaḥ śabdaḥ.*
 conclusion: Therefore, sound is non-eternal because of having the property of arising.

CANONICAL ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT THROUGH DISSIMILARITY

- pratijñā: *a-nityaḥ śabdaḥ*
 proposition: sound is non-eternal
 hetu: *utpatti-dharmakatvāt.*
 reason: because of having the property of arising.
 udāharaṇa: *an-utpatti-dharmakam ātmā-ādi dravyam nityam.*
 example: A substance, such as a self, not having the property of arising, is eternal.
 upanaya: *na ca tathā an-utpatti-dharmakaḥ śabdaḥ.*
 application: And obversely, a self does not have the property of arising.
 nigamana: *tasmāt utpatti-dharmakatvāt a-nityaḥ śabdaḥ.*
 conclusion: Therefore, a sound is non-eternal because of having the property of arising.

The two illustrations differ from one another with respect to the example and application statements, where one names a property, the other names its contradictory property.

The form of the two canonical analogical arguments reconstructed from *Nyāya-bhāṣya* also differ from the form of the illustration from *Caraka-saṃhitā*, but only with respect to the last three statements. Where the example statement in *Caraka-saṃhitā* has two clauses, each ascribing one of the two properties to the example, the one in *Nyāya-bhāṣya* has but one clause, with a modifier of the subject expressing one property and the predicate expressing the other. In spite of the grammatical difference, the forms of the example statements are equivalent. Next, while the application statement in *Caraka-saṃhitā*'s illustration spells out the analogy in full, the application statement in *Nyāya-bhāṣya* states only the second half of the correlative clause, introduced by *tathā* (so), relying on the immediately preceding example statement to convey what would have been conveyed by a clause introduced by *yathā* (as). Finally, while the conclusion statement in *Caraka-saṃhitā*'s illustration merely restates the proposition statement, the conclusion in *Nyāya-bhāṣya*'s illustration restates both the conclusion and the reason statement. In short, the illustrations differ in no logically significant way.

The two earliest Buddhist texts touching systematically on reasoning are *Vāda-viniścaya* (*Settling on what debate is*) and *Hetu-vidyā* (*Science of reasons*), which form parts of *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (*Compendium of the higher teachings*) and *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra* (*Treatise on the stages of the practice of yoga*), respectively, two texts both ascribed to Asaṅga (fourth century CE). The general topic of each text is debate (*vāda*). Both texts take debate to comprise two things: what is established (*sādhya*) and that whereby something is established (*sādhana*). In neither text does *sādhana* mean argument; rather in both texts it comprises what appear to be the five parts of an argument and the three means of epistemic cognition, more usually referred to as *pramāṇa*, namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and expert teaching (*āpta-āgama*). The first five establishers in *Vāda-viniścaya* are the same as the five parts of an argument stated in *Caraka-saṃhitā*. *Hetu-vidyā*'s list of establishers differs from those listed in *Vāda-viniścaya*. It

lists the example as *udāharaṇa*, instead of *dr̥ṣṭānta*. And instead of application and conclusion, it gives similarity (*sārūpya*), dissimilarity (*vairūpya*).

<i>Caraka- saṃhitā</i>	<i>Nyāya-sūtra Nyāya-bhāṣya</i>	<i>Vāda- viniścaya</i>	<i>Hetu- vidyā</i>
pratijñā	pratijñā	pratijñā	pratijñā
hetu	hetu	hetu	hetu
dr̥ṣṭānta	udāharaṇa	dr̥ṣṭānta	udāharaṇa
upanaya	upanaya	upanaya	sārūpya
nigamana	nigamana	nigamana	vairūpya

In addition, unlike *Vāda-viniścaya*, *Hetu-vidyā* provides more than sixty illustrations of inferences (*anumāna*). These inferences can all be recast in a way which satisfies the canonical inference form given above. Moreover, they are classified according to five relations which *hetu* possessors bear to *sādhya* possessors. Finally, these five relations are also used to classify the similarity (*sārūpya*) and dissimilarity (*vairūpya*) mentioned in parallel to the fourth and fifth parts of the canonical analogical argument, suggesting that the author understands the parallel between inferences and arguments.

3.2 The transition

Let us now turn to the pivotal texts which illustrate the transition from a canonical argument by analogy, illustrated both in *Caraka-saṃhitā* and in *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, to a canonical Indian syllogism, which has at its core a deductive argument.

Fāng biàn xīn lùn (方便心論), or *Treatise on expedient means*, now commonly known by the Sanskrit title *Upāya-hṛdaya*, was translated into Chinese in the 472 CE without attribution, though it later came to be attributed to Nāgārjuna. This text purports to be a primer on argument and reasoning, listing and defining many terms. It also contains

many arguments, several of which are analogical arguments both through similarity and through dissimilarity.

The author of the text neither states what an argument is nor what its parts are. Yet, in the first chapter, he speaks of excessive and deficient statements and says that there are three kinds: deficiency of reason (因減), deficiency of statement (言減) and deficiency of example (喻減). (T1632 24.3.14–18; Gillon and Katsura 2017 p. 215). Arguments which are not deficient in any of these ways is said to be complete (具足).

From the illustrations given, we can see what a complete argument comprises. The argument illustrating an argument deficient with respect to a reason is this: the six forms of consciousness are non-eternal, like a pot. Clearly, its complete version is the following: the six forms of consciousness are non-eternal, because they are produced, like a pot. The argument illustrating one deficient with respect to an example comprises a pair of arguments, each lacking an example: the body has no self, because it results from causes; sound too has no self, because it comes into existence from causes. Presumably the problem is that the second argument in the pair should have been cast as an example. Thus, a complete version of the argument would be: the body has no self, because of resulting from causes, like sound. The argument illustrating an argument deficient with respect to its statement appears to be an argument which has all of its parts, but one part, the reason, is not stated in a form which clearly identifies the reason as such. It says that the four great elements are non-eternal, like a pot which is produced, instead of saying that the four great elements are non-eternal, because they are produced, like a pot.

From the illustrations, it is clear that a nondeficient argument has the form: p has S, because of having H, like d, where d is assumed to have both H and S. In other words, a complete argument could be spelled out in the form whose explicit counterpart would be that of an analogical argument through similarity, of the same form as the first three statements of the analogical argument illustrated in *Caraka-saṃhitā*.

The only argument to appear in a form with five parts is given in the fourth, or last, chapter (T1632 28.1.4–6). Though the argument is deductively valid, the author rejects it as fallacious. We state the argument

as it occurs, supplying the labels for the parts to ease comparison. Though the Chinese equivalent of *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *drṣṭānta* appear in both the text, the equivalents of *upanaya* and *nigamana* do not.

FĀNG BIÀN XÍN Lùn (T1632 28.1.4–6):

CANONICAL DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

pratijñā:	我常
proposition:	the self is eternal
hetu:	非根覺故。
reason:	because it is not perceptible by the senses.
udāharāṇa:	空非覺是故常。 一切不根所覺者 盡皆是常。
example:	Space, because of not being perceptible by senses, is eternal. Everything which is not perceptible by senses is eternal.
upanaya:	而我非覺。
application:	and the self is not perceptible by senses.
nigamana:	得非常乎。
conclusion:	Could the self possibly be non-eternal?

Note that example statement comprises two sentences: the first restates what is expressed in the proposition and reason statements, the second affirms a universal proposition, *everything which is not perceptible by senses is eternal*. The example statement comprises a deductively valid argument, as does the second sentence together with the reason and proposition statements.

When we turn to *Rú shí lùn* (T1633), we find the logical situation reversed. Analogical arguments are rejected and arguments with a deductive core are endorsed. For example, the following argument is rejected by the text's author.

RÚ SHÍ LÙN (T1633 30.3.2–4):

CANONICAL ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT

- pratijñā: 聲無常
proposition: Sound is not eternal
hetu: 因功力生無中間生故。
reason: Because, arising due to an effort, arises immediately.
udāharaṇa: 譬如瓦器因功力生生已破滅。
example: as a clay vessel, arising due to an effort, and having arisen, perishes,
upanaya: 聲亦如是。
application: sound too is that way.
nigamana: 故聲無常。
conclusion: Therefore, sound is not eternal.

As the example and application statements make clear, the argument is an analogical one.

What the author advocates instead are arguments with a deductive core, similar to the rejected argument cited from *Fāng biàn xīn lùn*.

RÚ SHÍ LÙN (T1633 30.3.7–10):

CANONICAL DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

- pratijñā: 聲無常
proposition: sound is not eternal
hetu: 因功力生無中間生故。
reason: because, arising due to an effort, it arises immediately.
udāharaṇa: 若有物依因緣生即是無常。譬如虛空常住不因功力生。

- example: If a thing is eternal, (then) it does not arise due to an effort. For example, space is eternal and does not arise due to an effort.
- upanaya: 聲不如此。
- application: sound too is not that way.
- nigamana: 是故聲無常。
- conclusion: Therefore, sound is not eternal.

This argument, like the one rejected in *Fāng biàn xīn lùn*, has a deductive core. The example statement also comprises two sentences: the first, however, affirms a universal proposition, *If a thing is eternal, it does not arise due to an effort*, and the second states an instance of the universal proposition, which is distinct from the subject of the argument. The proposition and reason statements, together with the first sentence of the example statement, comprise a deductively valid argument.

Moreover, we know that the author is fully aware of the logical force of the deductive core, for he states the three conditions, or three forms (*tri-rūpa*), which a reason must satisfy for the argument in which it occurs to be sound.

TRI-RŪPA CRITERION (*Rú shí lùn*: T1633 30.3.18–26)

汝立因不決定常無常遍顯故。我立因三種相。(1)是根本法。(2)同類所攝。(3)異類相離。是故立因成就不動。汝因不。是故汝難顛倒。若汝立因同我因者。汝難則成正難。若無常立義難常義。是難成就

The reason you set forth is not definite because eternality and non-eternality appear throughout it. The reason I set forth has the three marks. (1) The (reason) is a property (法) of the pakṣa (根本), (2) it is included (攝) in things similar (同類) and (3) it is excluded (離) from things dissimilar (異類). Therefore, the reason I set forth succeeds in not deviating, your reason does not. Therefore, your objection is confused. If the reason you set forth were like my reason (in this respect), your objection would succeed in being a proper objection.

As noted by H. Ui 1929 (reported in Katsura 1985 p. 166), the earliest mention of the tri-rūpa criterion (因三相) appears in a brief passage in a non-logical text, *Shùn zhōng lùn* (順中論; T1565 42a12,22ff), or *Treatise on following the middle way*, ascribed to Asaṅga. It is not mentioned in either of the logic texts ascribed to him. Moreover, the author of this non-logical text rejects the criterion. The criterion is thought to be of a non-Buddhist origin.

3.3 Dignāga

By the time we come to Dignāga, the canonical Indian syllogism has been further modified. The application (*upanaya*) statement and the conclusion (*nigamana*) statement, both of which are logically superfluous, have been eliminated and the example statement has been changed yet again. The sentence stating the example is reduced to a noun phrase naming the example. And though the universal proposition is retained, the word *dr̥ṣṭa* (*observed*) is inserted. In addition, a second universal proposition is added, together with a noun phrase naming an instance of it. This universal proposition is the contrapositive of the first universal proposition. Here is an example, as reconstructed from the Tibetan in Katsura (2004: 143).

PRAMĀṆA-SAMUCCAYA

CANONICAL DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

pratijñā:	<i>a-nityaḥ śabdaḥ</i>
proposition:	Sound is non-eternal
hetu:	<i>prayatna-ānatarīyaktvāt.</i>
reason:	because of arising immediately upon an effort.
sādharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta:	<i>yat prayatna-ānatarīyakam tat a-nityam dr̥ṣṭam, yathā ghaṭaḥ;</i>
similarity example:	that which is immediately connected with an effort is observed be non-eternal, like a pot;

vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta: **yat** nityam **tat** a-prayatna-ānantarīyakam
dṛṣṭam, yathā ākāśam.

dissimilarity example: **that which** is eternal is observed not to be immediately connected with an effort, like space.

A few remarks are in order. First, the word *dṛṣṭa* (*observed*), added to the universal proposition, does not occur within the relative clause. It therefore has scope over the entire clause. Moreover, the word itself is liable to a factive construal, as does the English verb *to observe* and *to notice*. If it is so construed, then the statement as it stands entails the universal proposition which results when the word is removed. Second, the requirement to have a noun phrase naming an instance of the universal proposition does not alter the deductive validity of the core argument. It does, however, serve to exclude various unpersuasive arguments, such as the argument that sound is eternal because it is audible and that which is audible is eternal.

One novel insight attributable to Dignāga is his discovery of the wheel of reason (*hetu-cakra*), which provides an alternative and equivalent way to formulate the three form criterion. Furthermore, Dignāga uses the particle *eva* (*only*) to refine the statement of the second and third criteria for a proper reason (*hetu*). (Katsura personal communication.) Finally, Dignāga explicitly recognizes that inference (*anumāna*), the cognitive process whereby one increases one's knowledge, and argument (*sādhana*), the device of persuasion, are but two sides of a single coin.

4 Conclusion

The foregoing shows quite clearly that the canonical Indian syllogism, as it appears in Indian philosophical texts from the time of Dignāga on, has its origin in analogical arguments, such as those found in *Caraka-saṃhitā*. At some point before Asaṅga, Indian thinkers had hit upon a deductive version of the analogical argument, the earliest known version of which appears *Fāng biàn xīn lùn*. Other evidence that a deductive version had been hit upon is the citation of the *tri-rūpa* criterion in

the *Shùn zhōng lùn*. The earliest extant text we have which both endorses the deductive version of the canonical Indian syllogism and adopts the *tri-rūpa* criterion is *Rú shí lùn*. It seems not to be long before the deductive form of the canonical Indian syllogism and the *tri-rūpa* criterion were widely adopted.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

The work in this paper is based in part on joint work done with Katsura Shoryu on 方便心論 (*Upāya-hṛdaya*) and on joint work done with Lin Chenkuo on 如實論 (*Tarka-śāstra*), which has been generously funded by a collaborative research fellowship from The Robert H. N. Ho Family Foundation Program in Buddhist Studies. I also thank Muroya Yasukata for providing me with the bibliographical details of several of the Japanese works cited here.

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Dignāga on the Nyāya Definition of Inference

– A Discussion of Selected Passages from the Viewpoint of
Reconstructing the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*¹

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I would like to take this opportunity to open a discussion on the topic of reconstructing the Sanskrit text of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. In connection with the edition of the second chapter of Jinendrabuddhi's *Prāmaṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, I have prepared a raw reconstruction of the second chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, consisting of the verse text and the prose commentary. I did this as a supporting measure for editing Jinendrabuddhi's *Ṭīkā*. This reconstruction took place in small steps distributed over an extended period of time. I took up one passage of text after the other, always trying to have it ready before we started critically editing the corresponding passages of the *Ṭīkā*. Over the course of time, my awareness of certain problems and my sensibility towards them increased, whereby my approach to the reconstruction work underwent several changes. The resulting reconstruction of chapter two shows clear signs of these changing approaches. On several occasions I later reworked certain shorter sections to improve on them. This added further to the unevenness of the reconstructed text. I am thus convinced that this reconstruction is by no means in any shape that can easily be transformed into something worth publishing. Indeed, it is evident that if I want to publish this chapter, with the hope that it may serve as a reliable tool for doing

¹ Research for this article was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): P 27452. I would like to express my thanks to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, who kindly improved my English.

research in the field of South Asian philosophy, I will have to rework the whole chapter with a unified approach toward the text's constitution, its justification and its documentation.

My current approach is to form, for each of the two available Tibetan translations, a hypothesis about the text of the Sanskrit manuscripts used by the translators and to compare these with presumable Sanskrit fragments as transmitted in the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* and other sources, if such are available. Then in a further step I am building a hypothesis concerning the earliest form of the text, as is suggested by the materials mentioned. The final result of this procedure will be the reconstructed text.

I should clarify that if I speak of a "hypothesis about the text of the Sanskrit manuscripts used by the translators," this is an abridgement. To be more exact, I should say that I am forming a hypothesis about what the translators saw in the manuscripts they were working from. When I propose, for instance, that the Sanskrit manuscript used by the translator X omitted a certain part of a word, a whole word, or several words, there are cases where there is no means to decide whether the Sanskrit manuscript actually had an omission, or whether the translator overlooked the part in question even though it was there, or whether this part only got lost in the later transmission of the Tibetan translation. In order to avoid listing all these explanations in each case in which there is no way to decide on which one holds, I simply treat them as an omission in the translator's manuscript. My justification for this undifferentiated treatment is that it simplifies the task of representing this group of errors, and that in the end the important point is to indicate that there is a satisfying explanation at hand, regardless of whether, in some cases, alternative explanations to the same effect are

also conceivable.² I should at this point mention that there are fewer cases that cannot be decided than you might suppose at first glance.

In a case like Sanskrit *pūrvam kāraṇam asyāstīti* and Tibetan *śīar 'di ru yod do źes*, the divergence allows for several explanations. It can be explained

- (1) by assuming the omission of °ṃ *kāraṇa*° in the Sanskrit manuscript, which results in the reading *pūrvam asyāstīti*,
- (2) by assuming that the translator overlooked °ṃ *kāraṇa*°,
- (3) by assuming that the original Tibetan translation was *śīar <rgyu> 'di ru yod do źes*, and that *rgyu* was lost in the transmission of the Tibetan translation.

However, in a case like Sanskrit *dr̥ṣṭam vāyavādisvabhāve ... anumānam* and Tibetan *mthoñ ba'i rluñ la sogs pa'i ran bźin ... rjes su dpog pa'o*, there are only two explanations to choose from:

- (1) the *anusvāra* of *dr̥ṣṭam* was omitted in the Sanskrit manuscript
- (2) the *anusvāra* of *dr̥ṣṭam* was overlooked by the translator

For our purposes, namely to decide whether the Tibetan translation is a strong argument against the proposed Sanskrit reading, or supports it directly or indirectly, it actually does not matter which of the two explanations we rely on.

A case like Sanskrit *nāmajñatvāt* and Tibetan *mig śes nas* can only be explained as a mistake in the transmission of the Tibetan translation that led to the erroneous reading *mig* instead of *min*.

² I am aware that this simplified presentation burdens the reader with a certain amount of interpretational work and that therefore a more differentiated presentation might be desirable.

Let me add that the above explanations were given under the deliberate assumption that there is no evidence available that speaks against them. Without this deliberate assumption I would have had to choose passages from parts of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* not covered in this paper in order to illustrate my point.

I admit that I cannot, in every case, fulfill the task of providing a plausible explanation for the divergences between the constituted text and one or both of the Tibetan translations. And this is something that was to be expected from the beginning. The goal is to minimize the number of unexplained divergences and disclose the remaining ones. If one tries to overcome this problem by taking recourse to statements such as Tibetan translations are generally not reliable or one of the two translations is especially poor, one loses a chance of making discoveries since the divergences between the two available translations can provide valuable information. Moreover, if one fails to offer necessary justifications for one's decisions on a large scale or to disclose explicitly when one is unable to provide such justifications, the reader has no means to judge the reliability of the concerned passage.

This paper focuses on the beginning of that section of the second chapter that deals with the Naiyāyika's definition of inference. The contents of this section are relatively well known through Wezler's 1969 article "Dignāga's Kritik an der Schlusslehre des Nyāya und die Deutung von *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5," which uses some parts of this section together with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary in an effort to understand the original meaning of *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5.

In the following I will present reconstructed Sanskrit passages³ and the two Tibetan translations,⁴ splitting these into digestible pieces.

³ Note that words or parts of words printed in italic are not testified in Sanskrit sources. The main testimony for the Sanskrit text of this section is the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. For technical reasons, I restrict myself to this general statement in this

Whenever I consider it expedient and am able to do so, I will provide my hypotheses about the Sanskrit text informing the Tibetan translations immediately below them. I would like to mention that in this kind of work, I try to pay the same amount of attention to each word as a matter of principle, without regard to the implications this might have for the study of the history of Indian philosophy.

naiyāyikānām *api* tatpūrvakam trividham anumānam, pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca *iti*.

rigs pa can rnam na re de sñon
du soñ ba can gyi rjes su dpag
pa ni rnam pa gsum ste | sña
ma dañ ldan pa dañ | lhag ma
dañ ldan pa dañ | spyir mthon
ba can no žes zer ro ||

rigs can rnam ni de sñon du
'gro ba can gyi rjes su dpag par
ni rnam pa gsum ste | sña ma
dañ ldan pa dañ | lhag ma dañ
ldan pa dañ | spyi mthon ba'o
žes zer ro ||

Since this part consists almost entirely in a quotation of Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5, the reconstruction does not pose many problems. The word *naiyāyika* is quoted by Jinendrabuddhi with the plural genitive ending, which makes it unlikely that the Sanskrit original of the passage under discussion contained a word for 'saying,' as the Tibetan translations do.

The critical edition of PST 2 (64,1) emends *naiyāyikānām* *ityādi* of the manuscript to *naiyāyikānām tv ityādi*. It does this based on the Tibetan translation *rigs pa can rnam kyi kyañ žes pa la sogs pa*. A comparison with similar passages does not support this emendation.

article. For my detailed approach to indicate testimonies and textual dependences cf. the sample reconstructions provided in Lasic 2009:19, 2016: 169-172, 2019: 60-61.

⁴ The text of the translation by Vasudhararakṣita and Zha ma Seng ge rgyal mtshan is printed in the left column, the one by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i shes rab in the right column.

<i>PSV(V)</i>	<i>PSV(K)</i>	<i>PST</i>	<i>PSTt</i>
<i>PSV 1</i>			
rigs pa can rnam ni ... žes zer ro	rigs pa can rnam ni ... žes zer ro	naiyāyikānām tv iti (<i>PST 1</i> 96,3)	rigs pa can rnam kyi ni žes pa
ser kya pa rnam kyi ni ... žes so	ser kya pa rnam kyi kyañ ... žes zer ro	kāpilānām ityādi (<i>PST 1</i> 136,1)	ser skya pa rnam kyi žes pa la sogs pa
dpyod pa pa rnam ni ... žes zer ro	dpyod pa pa rnam kyañ ⁵ ... žes zer ro		
<i>PSV 2</i>			
rigs pa can rnam na re ... žes zer ro	rigs can rnam ni ... žes zer ro	the case in question	rigs pa can rnam kyi kyañ žes pa la sogs pa
bye brag pa rnam na re ... žes zer ro	bye brag pa rnam kyañ ... žes žer ro	vaiśeṣikānām apītyādi (<i>PST 2</i> 74,1)	bye brag pa rnam kyi yañ žes pa la sogs pa
grañs can pa rnam ni re žig ... žes zer ro cf. grañs can pa rnam na re ... žes zer ro (<i>PS</i>)	grañs can pa rnam ni ... žes zer ro	sāṅkhyānām apītyādi (<i>PST 2</i> 94,1)	grañs can pa rnam kyi yañ žes pa la sogs pa
dpyod pa rnam kyi ni ... žes zer ro	spyod pa rnam ... žes zer ro		

⁵ Hattori (1986: 227) emends to *ni*.

PSV 3			
rigs pa can rnams na re ... zhes pa 'di la	rigs pa can rnams ni ... zhes zer ba de la		
bye brag pa rnams kyi ... žes zer ro.	bye brag pa rnams kyañ ... žes bya ba 'jug go		
ser skya ba rnams na re ... zhes zer ro.	ser skya ba rnams kyañ		

In the first chapter of the *Ṭīkā* we find the quotation *naiyāyikānām tv iti*, the Tibetan translation, however, reads *rigs pa can rnams kyi ni žes pa*. A translation of *tu* with *ni* is something we would expect, whereas a translation with *kyañ*, as we have in our passage in the second chapter, feels at least suspicious. In the second chapter of the *Ṭīkā* we find *vaiśeṣikānām apītyādi* and *sāṅkhyānām apītyādi*. In both cases the Tibetan translation of *api* is *yañ*, as one would expect. The other comparable cases are not helpful for making a decision, since Jinendra-buddhi does not quote them. Of the two Tibetan translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, Kanakavarman's translation uses the particles *ni* and *kyañ* in the relevant passages. The distribution of the two particles does not completely correspond to what we find in the *Ṭīkā* and its Tibetan translation. Vasudhararakṣita's translation uses *ni* in the first chapter, and in the other chapters mostly *na re*.

From the available material, the case is not easy to decide. Relying on the Tibetan translation of the *Ṭīkā*, I consider an emendation to *naiyāyikānām apītyādi* preferable in the case of the *Ṭīkā*, though I admit that I cannot provide a straightforward explanation of the circumstances of how this scribal error might have occurred. With less conviction, I

accept provisionally *api* also in the reconstruction of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*.

As for the two Tibetan translations of the quoted *Nyāyasūtra*, I may mention that according to both, the word *trividham* is understood as being the predicate of the clause. This means that the Tibetan translations do not lend themselves to an interpretation of *trividham* qualifying only one of the three mentioned kinds of inferences, namely the one called *pūrvavat*, whereas such an interpretation has been discussed in the Sanskrit tradition. Also the Tibetan translations of *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* do not allow for the different interpretations that these Sanskrit words have received.

*

After quoting the definition *Sūtra*, Dignāga takes up its individual components for discussion.

tatra pratyakṣapūrvakam tāvad ayuktam, yasmāt

de la re zig mñon sum sñon du
'gro ba ni rigs pa ma yin te |
gañ gi phyir |

de la mñon sum sñon du 'gro
ba can ni mi rigs te gañ gi
phyir |

tatra pratyakṣapūrvakam/praty-
akṣapūrvam tāvad ayuktam,
yasmāt

tatra pratyakṣapūrvakam/prat-
tyakṣapūrvam ayuktam, yasmāt

In the discussion of the expression “which is preceded by that” (*tatpūrvakam*), Dignāga refers to an interpretation understanding “that” (*tad*) as referring to perception (*pratyakṣa*). We meet this interpretation in the *Nyāya* commentary on this passage that is used by Jinendra-buddhi.⁶ We also find it in Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyabhāṣya*, although here the term *pratyakṣa* is not used, but the less specific term *darśana*.⁷ We

⁶ PST 2 64,3-4. The passage is part of fragment 110 of Steinkellner 2017.

⁷ NBh 12,4

find it again in the *Nyāyavārttika* and other, later Nyāya works. The Nyāya commentary available through Jinendrabuddhi's text is referred to by Steinkellner in his 2017 book on fragments from Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* 1 and 2, as NBh^a. Here, in fragment 110, the analytical explanation of a certain compound reads: *tadanantaram prakṛtaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pūrvam yasya, tat tathoktam* (Steinkellner 2017: 138; boldface by HL). Steinkellner (2017: 141) translates this as follows: "That, for which **perception** treated as the main subject immediately before this (definition of inference) is **the preceding (element)** is stated in this manner" (boldface by HL). According to this reading, the word being explained here must be *pratyakṣapūrvam* or *pratyakṣapūrvam*. It is clear that the author of the NBh^a would not have explained this word had it not been previously mentioned. Consequently, we should assume that he is commenting here on an older commentary on the *Nyāyasūtras* that used this expression in this context.

An alternative way – in my opinion a preferable one – of understanding this passage is to separate *tad* from *anantaram*. By doing this it becomes possible to interpret *tad* as a part of the word being explained, and *pratyakṣa* can be understood as serving the purpose of indicating what *tad* refers to: *tad anantaram prakṛtaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pūrvam yasya, tat tathoktam*. "That which has **this**, [namely] perception, which was the topic immediately before [namely in NS 1.1.4], as a **preceding (element)**, is called thus."⁸ According to this interpretation the explained compound is *tatpūrvakam* or *tatpūrvam* and the explanation therefore relates directly to the Sūtra, thus fitting the context perfectly.

⁸ For *anantaram* in a similar context, cf. *kasya punas te viśayāḥ. anantaram indriya-jñānasya prakṛtatvāt tasyaiva* PST 1 52,6-7 (Of which cognition are these the objects? Since sense cognition was the topic immediately before, [they are the objects] of exactly this [namely, sense cognition]).

A noteworthy difference between the Tibetan translations of the passage under discussion is the *re žig* in Vasudhararakṣita's translation, which most likely renders Sanskrit *tāvat*. There is no equivalent for this in Kanakavarman's translation. At this point in the discussion, *tāvat* makes good sense, insofar as Dignāga would be indicating that he is delivering a first criticism of the Nyāya definition now, and that further criticism will follow.

The rendering into Sanskrit is a mere retranslation, without any direct testimonies. Considering that *mñon sum sñon du 'gro ba* (V) and *mñon sum sñon du 'gro ba can* (K) are translations of a Sanskrit word that explains *tatpūrvakam*, by replacing *tat-* with *pratyakṣa-*, assuming *pratyakapūrvakam* for the original text is quite possible. However, since the relevant paragraph in the NBh^a ends with “*iti pratyakṣa-pūrvam tad bhavati*,” *pratyakṣa-pūrvam* is also a possible candidate, especially if one assumes that it was the NBh^a that Dignāga used as the textual basis for his criticism.

*

sambandho nendriyagrāhyaḥ (PS 2.27c)

'brel pa dbaṅ po'i gzuñ bya
min ||

'brel pa dbaṅ pos gzuñ bya
min ||

liṅgaliṅgisambandho hi nendriyajñānaviṣayaḥ. kutas tatpūrvam anumānam syāt. nāpi sarvatra liṅgaliṅginau pratyakṣau.

rtags dañ rtags can gyi 'brel pa
ni dbaṅ po'i śes pa'i yul yañ ma
yin la rtags dañ rtags can mñon
sum pa'añ ma yin na de sñon
du soñ ba can ni rjes su dpag
pa'o žes gañ gis 'gyur | ji ltar na
rjod par byed |

rtags dañ rtags can gyi 'brel pa
ni dbaṅ po'i śes pa'i yul ma yin
no || gañ las de sñon du 'gro ba
can gyi rjes su dpag par 'gyur
ba rtags dañ rtags can thams
cad la yañ mñon sum ni yod pa
ma yin no ||

līṅgaliṅgisambandho hi nendriyajñānaviśayaḥ, nāpi <sarvatra> līṅgaliṅginau pratyakṣau. kutas tarhi(?) – tatpūrvakam anumānam iti syād, ka-tham ucyate.

līṅgaliṅgisambandho hi nendriyajñānaviśayaḥ. kutas tatpūrvakam anumānam syāt. nāpi sarvatra līṅgaliṅginau pratyakṣau.

Dignāga's arguments against the expression "which is preceded by perception" (*pratyakṣapūrvā[ka]m*) as an acceptable part of a definition of inference show that he relies on an interpretation to the effect that the objects of the perceptions referred to in Nyāya definition of inference are an inferential mark (*līṅga*), the possessor of this inferential mark (*līṅgin*), and the connection (*sambandha*) between these two. Dignāga's main argument, which he presents as part of the verse text, is directed against the perception of the connection. He says: "The connection cannot be grasped by the senses" (PS 2.27). Only in the prose text does he add the additional argument that the inferential mark and its possessor are not perceptible in all cases.⁹

The view being attacked, namely, that inference relies on the perceptions of the inferential mark, its possessor, and the connection between them, can be found in the NBh^a and also in other commentaries and sub-commentaries on the *Nyāyasūtras*. I find it remarkable that the author of the NBh^a mentions, as a prerequisite of inference, first the prior perception of the inferential mark and its possessor, and then adds the prior perception of their connection as an alternative. In Vātsyāyana's commentary on this passage, however, the connection plays a major role; there is no reason to assume that this passage might consider the prior cognition of the connection of the inferential mark

⁹ Jinendrabuddhi provides a second interpretation to the effect that in all cases, inferential marks and their possessors are imperceptible (PST 2 65,17-66,4). Note also that the edition erroneously reads *sarvatragrahaṇam* (PST 2 65,16) instead of *sarvatreti grahaṇam*.

and its possessor to be only an alternative to the prior perception of the inferential mark and its possessor themselves.

pūrvam yasya pratyakṣeṇa liṅgaliṅginau prasiddhau tatsambandho vā, sa evottarakālaṃ liṅgamātradarśanāl liṅginam anumimīta iti pratyakṣapūrvam tad bhavati (NBh^a; cited in PST 2 64,4-6). “Only the one for whom the (logical) mark and the marked or the connection between these are earlier known through perception infers the marked at a later time through seeing merely the mark” (Steinkellner 2017: 141).

tatpūrvakam ity anena liṅgaliṅginoh sambandhadarśanam liṅgadarśanam cābhisambadhyate. liṅgaliṅginoh sambaddhayor darśanena smṛtir¹⁰ abhisambadhyate (NBh 12,45). “The [expression] ‘which is preceded by this’ refers to the cognition of the connection between the (inferential) mark and its possessor (*liṅgin*) [in the past], and to the cognition of the (inferential) mark [at the time of the inference]. [The same expression] refers [by extension also] to the remembrance [that is caused] by a cognition [in the past] of the (inferential) mark and its possessor as connected.”

With regard to Dignāga’s main argument, it is interesting to note that the Naiyāyikas admitted inferences in cases where the connection between the inferential mark and its possessor is not perceptible. We see this in Vātsyāyana’s second explanation of the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference: **sāmānyatodṛṣṭam** nāma – yatrāpratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoh sambandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate, yathecchādibhir ātmā, icchādayo guṇāḥ, guṇāś ca dravyasaṃsthānāḥ, tad yad eṣāṃ sthānam sa ātmeti (NBh 12,16-19). “The *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* Inference is that in which, the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum* being imperceptible, the imperceptible *probandum* is inferred from the similarity of the *probans* to something else; [...]” (Jha 1984: 154-155). In a confrontation with Naiyāyikas

¹⁰ *smṛtir* J : *liṅgasmṛtir*

who entertain this view, Dignāga's opinion that connections between inferential marks and their possessors are generally not perceptible would not have had much persuasive force, since they did not share his opinion. Dignāga would have had to modify his statement to the effect that **not all** connections between inferential marks and their possessors are perceptible, as he did in the case of inferential marks and their possessors. Even in this more limited version, Dignāga's argument is sufficient to show that it is inappropriate to characterize inferences in general as depending on the perception of the connection between the inferential mark and its possessor. So why did he choose to present the implicitly all-comprehensive version of the argument? I see three possible answers to this. (1) He was not aware that the all-comprehensive version of his argument fails against at least some Naiyāyikas. (2) He presented his argument based on what he held to be true, and did not care whether it was convincing to all Naiyāyikas. (3) He targeted his argument against a specific explanation of the Sūtra that did not explicitly admit that in some cases of inference the connection between the mark and its possessor is imperceptible, as maybe the explanation provided in the NBh^a. In this connection, the question of how to understand *vā* in "*tatsambandho vā*" becomes crucial.

As for the Tibetan translations and the reconstruction of the Sanskrit text, things are far from clear. Jinendrabuddhi provides two quotations from this passage. One is the verse text PS 2.27c, and the other is *nāpi sarvatra liṅgaliṅginau pratyakṣau*. The prose part consists of three elements: (a) An explanatory paraphrase of the verse text which makes it explicit that the connection being spoken of in the verse is the one between the inferential mark and its possessor, (b) a statement to the effect that not all inferential marks and their possessors are visible, (c) a statement to the effect that the assumption that all inferences are preceded by perceptions is irreconcilable with the two other mentioned circumstances.

As for element (a): Whether in the original Sanskrit text, *liṅgaliṅgi* was combined with *sambandha* into a *tatpuruṣa* compound or not cannot be determined from the Tibetan. I have opted for the compound, since *liṅgaliṅgisambandho hi* seems to me stylistically more likely than *liṅgaliṅginoh sambandho hi*, *liṅgaliṅginor hi sambandhaḥ*, or *sambandho hi liṅgaliṅginoh*. I assume that the *ni* in the Tibetan translations renders Sanskrit *hi*, considering it an explanatory equivalent of the word *yasmāt* that introduces the verse, and which itself is also only a retranslation. The two Tibetan translations are almost identical.

As for the two other elements, one difference between the two Tibetan translations, among others, is that they are given a different sequence. In Vasudhararakṣita's translation the elements figure in the sequence as I have listed them above. There, elements (a) and (b) are grammatically equally ranking constituents of a conditional clause. They are connected by *la*, and the particles *yañ* and *'añ*, respectively, underscore the equal ranking. Both are subordinated to (c).

In Kanakavarman's translation, however, (a) constitutes a main clause on its own, without a grammatically marked relation to (b) or (c). Element (b) might be subordinated to (c), the grammatical construction is, however, not completely clear to me. My tentative translation of Vasudhararakṣita's version is the following: "For, if the connection between the inferential mark and the possessor of the inferential mark is not the object of sense cognition, and also (*yañ* ... *'añ*) the inferential mark and the possessor of the inferential mark is not <in all cases> perceptible, how can it be that 'inference is preceded by these [perceptions]?' [The meaning is:] How can one say [so]." And my tentative translation of Kanakavarman's version is: "The connection between the inferential mark and the possessor of the inferential mark is not the object of sense cognition. How can it be that 'inference is preceded by these [perceptions],' [since] also (*yañ*) the inferential

mark and the possessor of the inferential mark are not in all cases perceptible?”

Whereas the Tibetan translation of Vasudhararakṣita is meaningful, as it is, the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi’s quotation does not fit very well as one part of a two-part conditional clause. Since Kanakavarman does not indicate that the Sanskrit version contained an explicit expression of a condition, I take Vasudhararakṣita’s translation in this respect as making explicit what the Sanskrit text possibly only implied, namely that elements (a) and (b) are the fulfilled premises that spark the rhetorical question of how one can justifiably assume and proclaim that inference is preceded by perception.

Since element (a) is an explanatory paraphrase of PS 2.27c, and therefore possibly Dignāga’s main argument here, it is highly conceivable that the rhetorical question followed it immediately to clarify the target of the argument. Further is there no reason to assume that Kanakavarman would have separated elements (a) and (b) from each other if they had followed one another directly. In contrast, I see it justifiable to assume that Vasudhararakṣita put elements (a) and (b) together to clarify that both of them lead to the rhetorical question of how one could justifiably assume that inference is preceded by perception. For this reason I follow Kanakavarman as far as the sequence of the three elements is concerned.

Moreover, Vasudhararakṣita’s translation contains the expression *ji ltar na rjod par byed*, which has no equivalent in Kanakavarman’s translation. I understand this expression as clarifying that the rhetorical question of why it can be that inference is preceded by perceptions is actually meant to ask how one can dare to proclaim that inference is preceded by perceptions. Since Kanakavarman’s translation has no equivalent for this sentence, it is not unreasonable to assume that the corresponding Sanskrit sentence was originally a marginal note.

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Next Dignāga takes up the word *pūrvavat* from NS 1.1.5.

pūrvavad ity atra pūrveṇa tulyaṃ pūrvavad iti vatiḥ bhavati, atha vā pūrvam asyeti matup. ataḥ kim.

sña ma dañ ldan pa źes bya ba
'di la sña ma dañ mtshuñs pas
na sña ma lta bu'o źes lta bu'i
sgrar 'gyur ba'am | 'di la sña
ma'i chos yod pas na de dañ
ldan pa'o źes ldan pa'i sgrar
'gyur grañ na | de las cir 'gyur |

*pūrvavad ity atra pūrveṇa
tulyaṃ iti pūrvavad ity vatiḥ
(lta bu'i sgra) bhavati, atha vā
pūrvam dharmo 'syāstīti tad-
vad iti matup. ataḥ kim.*

sña ma dañ ldan pa'o źes gañ
smras pa de 'dir mi rigs te | gañ
gi phyir | sña ma dañ mtshuñs
pa ni sña ma bzin źes dper
'gyur ba'am 'di la sña ma yod
pa źes ldan par 'gyur grañ | de
las cir 'gyur ze na |

*pūrvavad iti vad uktam, tat
atrāyuktam. kasmāt. pūrveṇa
tulyaṃ pūrvavad iti vatiḥ bha-
vati, atha vā pūrvam asyāstīti
matup. ataḥ kim.*

From the two Tibetan translations we learn that Dignāga introduces his criticism with the question of whether the suffix that appears in the form *-vat* is to be taken as expressing comparison (*vati*) or possession (*matup*). The two Tibetan translations differ in several points. My tentative translation of Vasudhararakṣita's version is as follows: "Is there in [the word] *pūrvavat* the *vati*[-suffix] [used], [according to the explanation] '[it is] similar to the earlier, [and] therefore [is called] *pūrvavat*?' Or is [it] the *matup*[-suffix], [according to the explanation] 'it has the earlier, [namely] a property, [and] therefore [is called] *tadvat*.' – [And] what is [the consequence] of this [namely, of applying the one or the other interpretation]?" There are two points that are slightly irritating in Vasudhararakṣita's version. One is the word *dharma/chos* in the paraphrase that serves the purpose of clarifying that *pūrvavat* contains the *matup*-suffix. The other point is that in the

second interpretation *pūrvavat*, the word being explained, is abbreviated to *tadvat*. The later point may be more problematic in the English translation than in Sanskrit. My tentative translation of Kanakavarman's version is: "The [word] *pūrvavat*, which has been stated, is inappropriate here [in the definition of inference]. – Why? – Is [there] the *vati*[-suffix], [according to the analysis] '[it is] similar to the earlier, [and therefore is called] *pūrvavat*?' Or is [it] the *matup*[-suffix], [according to the analysis] 'it has the earlier.' – [And] what is [the consequence] of this [namely, of applying the one or the other interpretation]?" While in Vasudhararakṣita's translation the linguistic explanations of the alternative interpretations of the word *pūrvavat* are more elaborated, Kanakavarman's translation provides more help to understand the relevance of the question. The provided help seems to me rather superfluous. Since Vasudhararakṣita's translation shows no trace of it, I propose considering *yad uktam, tat ... ayuktam. kasmāt* as marginal notes that slipped into the main text.

We find the paraphrase "*pūrveṇa tulyam*" also in the NBh^a (cited in PST 2 64,7). There, it is not separated from the following *pūrvavat* by an *iti*. One might be inclined to see this as supporting Kanakavarman's version. The assumptions underlying an attempt to use the NBh^a in support for one Tibetan translation in such details is that Jinendra-buddhi provides in his commentary quotations from the work that Dignāga's criticism is targeted against, and that Dignāga really uses sentences or parts of sentences of this work. We must be aware that the explanations of *pūrvavat* and *śeṣavat* we find in this section contain explanatory paraphrases serving the purpose of referring the reader to the relevant rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* for using the suffixes *-vati* and *-matup*, respectively.¹¹ Since such explanatory paraphrases follow a general pattern, they are bound to be very similar, irrespective of the

¹¹ Pāṇ 5.1.115 (*tena tulyam kriyā ced vatiḥ*) and Pāṇ 5.2.94, (*tad asyāsty asminn iti matup*)

author who provides them. Similarity in expression can therefore in such cases not be of much help in identifying quotations.

I will finally compare the explanatory paraphrases we find in the NBh^a with the paraphrases we find in Vasudhararakṣita's and Kanakavarman's translations.

pūrvavat-matup:

PSV(V): sñar 'di ru yod do źes 'bras bu sña ma dañ ldan par byed na ni yul de źes pa yañ sña ma dañ ldan par 'gyur la |

PSV(K): 'bras bu 'di la sñar rgyu yod do źes bya ba ni sña ma dañ ldan pa yin la | de'i yul can gyi źes par yañ sña ma dañ ldan pa yin no ||

*PSV(V): pūrva<ṃ kārāṇa>m asyāstīti pūrvavat kāryam ... (?byed na), tadviśayam api jñānaṃ pūrvavat.

*PSV(K): pūrvam kārāṇam asya *kāryasyāstīti* pūrvavat, tadviśayam api jñānaṃ pūrvavat.

NBh^a: pūrvam kārāṇam. tad asyāstīti pūrvavat kāryam. tadviśayam api jñānaṃ pūrvavat. (cited in PST 2 65,1-2)

śeṣavat-matup:

PSV(V): gañ¹² rgyu lhag ma dañ ldan pas lhag ma dañ ldan pa yin na ni de'i źes pa yañ lhag ma dañ ldan par 'gyur la |

PSV(K): 'di la 'bras bu lhag ma yod pa de ni lhag ma dañ ldan pa ste (em. : de) rgyu'o || de'i yul can gyi źes pa yañ lhag ma dañ ldan pa yin no ||

¹² I assume that *gañ* is not part of the explanatory paraphrase, but is the remainder of an otherwise lost phrase that introduced the explanation by the opponent. The corresponding passage in Kanakavarman's translation is: *gal te ldan pa yin na*.

*PSV(V): śeṣa<ṃ kārya>m asyāstīti śeṣavat kāraṇam, tasyāpi (or tad<viśayam> api; or de'i yul can gyi em. : de'i) jñānaṃ śeṣavat.

*PSV(K): śeṣaṃ kāryam asyāsti. tac śeṣavat kāraṇam. tadviśayam api jñānaṃ śeṣavat.

NBh^a: śeṣaṃ kāryam. tad asyāstīti śeṣavat kāraṇam. tadviśayam api jñānaṃ śeṣavat. (cited in PST 2 65,2-3)

Of special note is that both passages of the NBh^a start with a short sentence informing the reader about what the base words to which the suffix *-matup* has been added, namely *pūrva-* and *śeṣa-*, respectively, refer to, namely to *kāraṇa* and *kārya*, respectively. Neither of the Tibetan translations allows us to believe that the translators saw such a sentence in their manuscripts. According to Kanakavarman's translation, the identifications of *pūrva-* with *kāraṇa-*, and *śeṣa-* with *kārya-* are part of the explanatory paraphrases themselves. Vasudhararakṣita's translation contains no such identification at all. Since in Vasudhararakṣita's translation the identification is missing in both explanations, it is rather unlikely that the omissions, if there was anything omitted at all, happened by chance. It is justified to assume that there was some intentional editing at work. The question however is whether the identifications of *pūrva-* and *śeṣa-* with *kāraṇa-* and *kārya-* were part of the original text of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, being removed later in a certain transmission line, or whether they did not originally belong to the text and were inserted later in a certain transmission line.

I am aware that I have presented here more problems and unsolved riddles than solutions. To draw attention to the difficult situation one faces when one tries to reconstruct parts of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* was the plan of this presentation anyway. I am very curious about expert opinions on this, and will be thankful for any remarks.

Bibliography and abbreviations

em.	emended
Hattori 1986	Masaaki Hattori, <i>Dignāga, on Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions.</i> Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968.
Jha 1984	Gaṅgānātha Jhā, <i>The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara. Transl. into English with notes from Vāchaspati Mishra's 'Nyāya-Vārtika-Ṭātparyatīkā', Udayana's 'Parishuddhi' and Raghūttama's Bhāṣyachandra.</i> Delhi 1984.
Lasic 2009	Horst Lasic, Dignāga's Description of a Logical Mark in <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> 2.5cd. <i>International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture</i> 13 (2009), 7-22.
Lasic 2016	Horst Lasic, Dignāga and the Śaṣṭitantra: Philological observations on a text criticized in the <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> . In: Horst Lasic, Xuezhong Li (eds.), <i>Sanskrit manuscripts in China II. Proceedings of a panel at the 2012 Beijing Seminar on Tibetan Studies, August 1 to 5.</i> Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House 2016, pp. 155–172.
Lasic 2019	Horst Lasic, Dignāga on a famous Sāṅkhya definition of inference, <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens</i> 56-57, 51-65
NBh	Vātsyāyana's <i>Nyāyabhāṣya</i> , cf. Thakur 1997
NBh ^a	A commentary on the <i>Nyāyasūtras</i> , cf. Steinkellner 2017: 29
NS	<i>Nyāyasūtra</i> , cf. Thakur 1997
Pāṇ	Pāṇini's <i>Grammatik</i> . Herausgegeben, übersetzt, erläutert und mit verschiedenen Indices versehen von Otto Böhtlingk. Hildesheim/New York 1977.
PS	Dignāga's <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i>

PST	<i>Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā</i>
PST 1	Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser Horst Lasic, <i>Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 1. Part I: Critical Edition.</i> Beijing – Vienna 2005.
PST 2	Horst Lasic, Helmut Krasser, Ernst Steinkellner, <i>Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 2. Part I: Critical Edition.</i> Beijing – Vienna 2012.
PST _i	Tibetan translation of the <i>Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā</i>
PSV	Dignāga's <i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i>
PSV(K)	Tibetan translation of the <i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i shes rab (P No. 5700)
PSV(V)	Tibetan translation of the <i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> by Vasudhararakṣita and Zha ma Seng ge rgyal mtshan (D No. 4204; P No. 5701)
Steinkellner 2017	Ernst Steinkellner, <i>Early Indian epistemology and logic. Fragments from Jinendrabuddhi's Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā 1 and 2.</i> Tokyo 2017
Thakur 1997	<i>Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.</i> Edited by Anantalal Thakur. New Delhi 1997.

Signs and other conventions

◌	shows that vowel sandhi has not been applied in order to prevent blending of words testified in Sanskrit sources with others
<>	contain an omitted part in a manuscript
/	separates alternatives
<i>italic</i>	indicates in reconstructed text words and parts of words not testified in Sanskrit sources
<u>wavy underline</u>	used to attract the readers' attention

On a Fragment of Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha**

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0. Introduction

The discovery of Sanskrit manuscripts of Jinendrabuddhi's (ca. 700–770 CE) *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (PST) has had a great impact on philological approaches to the main text, Dignāga's (ca. 480–540) *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS). By relying on Jinendrabuddhi's references and paraphrases, several studies have exemplarily restored the Sanskrit text of the PS as well as its auto-commentary, *Vṛtti* (PSV), thereon. Naturally, parts of the restoration or reconstruction of Dignāga's *magnum opus* will remain hypothetical and other parts conjectural in direct proportion to the existence, quality and quantity of Jinendrabuddhi's references to it.

The Sanskrit reconstruction of Dignāga's original wording, the availability of related “linguistic materials,” and the contextual information gained from the PST have also had an enormous effect on the methodology of interpreting Dignāga's earlier work, the *Nyāyamukha* (NMu), which currently is accessible only through Xuanzang's (玄奘, 602–664) Chinese translation (the *Yinming zhengli men lun ben* 因明正理門論本, Taishō 1628, 1 fascicle).¹

* Work on this paper was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the context of the FWF Projects P27863-G24 and P30827-G24, as well as by the JSPS Grant-in-Aid Research Project 15H03155. I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the Austrian Academy of Sciences, the China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC) and Muni Shree Jambūvijayaājī for enabling access to copies of the manuscript in question. My sincere gratitude goes to Prof. Motoi Ono and Prof. Toshikazu Watanabe for generously offering research materials and discussing various issues in the context of our joint project of preparing a critical edition of PST 6 and a Sanskrit reconstruction of PS 6 with the PSV.

Through a complete critical edition of the PST as well as a Sanskrit reconstruction of the PS,² a large number of passages of the PS are becoming available in Sanskrit, passages that have parallels in the NMu.³ This is enabling us to infer and occasionally reconstruct the Sanskrit text also of the NMu. In turn, this is enabling a philological evaluation of Xuanzang's translation and allowing us to determine its faithfulness to the original with greater certainty than ever before.⁴ Xuanzang's version of the NMu represents its initial dissemination in East Asia. Thus, by having a possible textual basis of Xuanzang's translation, when examining the Chinese text, we can also better understand the reception of the work by East Asian Buddhist intellectuals, who may have studied the text directly with Xuanzang, or indirectly through no longer extant Chinese commentaries on the NMu composed by Xuanzang's disciples.

I am much obliged to Prof. Brendan S. Gillon for his invaluable comments and suggestions and to Prof. Watanabe for his substantial contributions to section 4 of the present article through a paper he recently published (2017b). Special thanks are due to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek and Dennis Johnson for English proofreading. The convention for citing passages from the PS and PSV is as follows: upright roman script is used for words known from the PST, *italics* for all text retranslated from the two Tibetan translations.

¹ In the present paper, references to the Chinese version of the NMu are given on the basis of Xuanzang's translation. On the expression "linguistic materials" and various methodological considerations regarding the reconstruction of the PS, see Steinkellner 2005: Introduction, p. iv, n. 4; cf. also Katsura (2009: 154–157), Pind (2015: I/Introduction, xix–xx) and Lasic 2016.

² For Sanskrit reconstructions of the PS based on the PST, see, e.g., Steinkellner 2005 (for all of PS 1 with the PSV); Lasic 2015–2018 and 2016 (for PS 2.36c with the PSV); Katsura 2009 (for PS 3.1–31), 2011 (for PS 3.32–43ab) and 2016 (for PS 3.43cd–51 and PS 4.1–21); Pind 2015 (for most of PS 5 with the PSV); and Ono forthcoming (for PS 6).

³ For a good overview of relevant secondary literature, see Katsura 1977: 108. Also of importance is Lü's (1928) pioneering work and Lü / Yinchang (1928). On Lü's (1896–1989) contribution to the study of *yinming*, see Lin 2014: 353–357.

⁴ For a Sanskrit reconstruction of the stanzas related to the *jāti*s, see Ono 2017c. On an examination of the concluding stanza of the NMu, see Muroya 2017a. Cf. also Muroya 2017b.

Furthermore, parallel passages in the PS and the NMu that are formulated differently offer us new insights into the development of Dignāga's thought. Various questions are raised when examining the type, quality and quantity of these parallels. By comparing these parallels—whether literally identical, modified, or related in content or context—we are provided a better understanding not only of earlier phases of Dignāga's thought, but also of the theoretical culmination of his system of logic.

This article will take up a passage of the NMu for which no parallel material has yet been discussed by other scholars and compare it to a textual fragment cited in Uddyotakara's (ca. 6th century) *Nyāyavārttika* (NV). Moreover, it will discuss some problematic issues in the context of sophistic rejoinders (*jāti*), a method of argumentation that seems to have been commonly used in debates. The discussion will also examine a later Naiyāyika commentary on the NV as well as a few interpretations thereof by Buddhist logicians from Tang China as are recorded in Japanese *inmyō* literature.

1. A passage in the *Nyāyamukha*

The dialectical and logical significance of the *jāti* (*guolei* 過類, also *lei* 類) has been evaluated in various ways. Remaining a controversial point,⁵ no agreement has been found by modern scholars on how to interpret the term.⁶ The *jāti*, or a method of argumentation by parity of reasoning, has been variously explained literally as denoting “similarity (to a refutation),”

⁵ Cf. Kang 2006: 162–163.

⁶ On the issue of the meaning and different modern renderings of the term *jāti*, see, e.g., Prets (2001: 546), Gillon (2003: 59), Ono (2003), Kang (2006: 161–165), Watanabe (2017: 162–163) and Muroya (2017b: 95). On the role of debate in early Nyāya, see Preisendanz 2000. On Dignāga's concept of *jāti* in relation to proper refutation (*dūṣaṇa*), see Watanabe 2017: 151–162.

this based on Dharmottara's (ca. 740–810) paraphrase, or as “a kind / genus (of refutation) that is fallacious” or “a fallacious similarity (to a refutation),” which is based on Wengui's (文軌, ca. 7th century) etymological explanation of the Chinese two characters.⁷

The material handed down in Dignāga's works is undoubtedly among the most valuable and significant for understanding not only the sixth-century definition of the *jāti*, including that of the synonymous *dūṣaṇābhāsa*, but also for studying the theory of the *jāti* as inherited by Dignāga both from his Buddhist predecessors as well as from Brahmanical discussions. In his works, Dignāga demonstrates a strictly logical approach to analyzing and opposing the use of *jāti* by applying the theory of the “wheel of reasons” (*hetucakra*) and the triple characterization of a proper logical reason (*trairūpya*). To this he adds the invariable concomitance (*avinābhāvitva*) of probandum and probans, which it seems his predecessors had not fully

⁷ On Dharmottara's interpretations, see NBṬ 255,3: *jātiśabdaḥ sādṛśyavacanah* (“The term ‘*jāti*’ denotes similarity”); cf. also NBṬ 255,3–4: *uttarasthānaprayuktatvād uttarasadrśāni jātyuttarāṇi* (“Because [*jāti*s are] employed in place of [proper] refutation, [they are] similar to a refutation, [and thus are also called] “refutation by similarity”). For Wengui's interpretation, see YLSGS 2011a16–18 (Shen 2008: 377,20–21): 此十四種，皆於能立非理妄破，故名爲「過」。然似能破，故名爲「類」。此即是能破之類，而有過故，名爲「過類」。(“Because all these fourteen kinds [of *jāti*s] refute [a proponent's] proof unreasonably, [they are] called ‘fallacy.’ Thus, because [they] resemble a [proper] refutation, [they are] called ‘similarity’ / ‘kind.’ Because they are similar to refutation / a kind of refutation and yet fallacious, [they are] called a ‘fallacious similarity’ / ‘a fallacious kind.’”) This passage is silently quoted by the Japanese Buddhist logician Zenju in his *Inmyōron sho myōtō shō* (ISMS: T68, 220c12–14); cf. Muroya 2017b: 95–96, nn. 10 and 12 on the passage from the ISMS. On Wengui's authorship of the YLSGS, but not that of Kuiji as recorded in the original woodblock print, see, e.g., Shen 2008: 14–19. I am indebted to Prof. Motoi Ono and Prof. Toru Funayama for calling my attention to Zenju's text.

systematized.⁸ Dignāga's quest for logical thoroughness and universal validity becomes even more evident when his description of the *jāti* in the NMu is compared with that in the PS.⁹

As has already been noticed by a number of scholars, Dignāga incorporates much of his NMu description of the *jāti* into his PS. But the elaborations and higher level of sophistication in the PS represent a development of the theory as it stood when he composed the NMu. The PS also contains an additional section that presents a detailed refutation of the *jāti* theory as found in Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstra*.¹⁰ However, these are not the only differences between the two works: there are also elements found only in the NMu. These are unique to the NMu and relate to dialectic presuppositions. They appear to represent an earlier phase of Dignāga's conceptualization of the *jāti*, as will be demonstrated in the present article.

In the NMu, an introductory section offers a general characterization of the *jāti*. Here, Dignāga speaks of the function, effect and value of applying a *jāti* in a polemical disputation, as follows:

NMu 3c22–24 : 所言「似破謂諸類」者，(1) 諸¹¹同法等相似過類，名「似能破」。 (2a) 由彼多分於善比量爲迷惑他而施設故， (2b) 不能顯示

⁸ Cf. Ono 2017b: 82 with n. 100.

⁹ On the new arrangement in the PS of the list of fourteen kinds of *jāti*s as admitted by Dignāga, see Kang (2012) and Ono (2017c); the latter recognizes Dignāga's new methodic approach already in the NMu, where *jāti*s are subdivided into five groups according to new criteria, namely, the common features of logical faults that are censured by *jāti*s (cf. Ono 2017c: 455).

¹⁰ For the most recent research on the fragments from the *Vādaśāstra* collected from the PSV and PST, see Ono 2017b.

¹¹ While the Taishō edition reads *wei* 謂, I adopt *zhu* 諸, which is retained in Yijing's translation of the NMu (Taishō 1629; T32, 9a15), as well as in some Japanese manuscripts of Xuanzang's translation (for instance, the Kongōji manuscript available in digital form at the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies Library, Tokyo, acc. no. 0724–001, f. 8, l. 19), and also adopted by Lü / Yincang (1928: 16,5) and Qiu (1934: vol. 5, 7b5). The reading *zhu* 諸 that denotes the plural form may explicitly reflect the same particle for *lei* 類 in the stanza, i.e., *zhu lei* 諸類. It is attested, for instance, in

前宗不善。(3a) 由彼非理而破斥故，及 (3b) 能破處而施設故，(3c) 是彼類故，(3d) 說名「過類」。(4a) 若於非理立比量中如是施設，(4b) 或不了知比量過失，(4c) 或即爲顯彼過失門，(4d) 不名過類。

What is stated by [the expression in stanza 19ab, namely,] “the pseudo-refutations (**dūṣaṇābhāsas*) are similarities (**jātis*),” is that fallacious similarities (**jātis*) such as *sādharmyasama* and others are (1) called “pseudo-refutations.” (2a) Because these [**jātis*] are mostly adopted for the purpose of confusing the other [position, i.e., that of the proponent,] when a proper inference is [stated], (2b) they fail to indicate the improperness (**asādhutva*) of the proponent (**pūrvapakṣa*). (3a) Because [the **jātis*] refute [the proponent’s position] unreasonably (**anyāyena*), and (3c) because these are similar to a [proper refutation] (**tajjātīyatvāt*) (3b) inasmuch as [they are] adopted in place of [a proper] refutation, (3d) these [rejoinders] are called “fallacious similarities” (**jātis*). (4a) If, when an inference is stated [by the proponent] unreasonably, [a **jāti* is] adopted in such a way, [it is] (4b) either [due to] not recognizing the fault of the [proponent’s] inference, (4c) or for the purpose of (*wei* 爲) indicating a point in the fault of the [proponent’s inference], (4d) [but, then, this is] not called a fallacious similarity (**jāti*).¹²

The passage quoted above has been subdivided into four parts for practical reasons. Part (1) contains a full statement of the definition of the “pseudo-refutation” (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*, Ch. *sipo* 似破 or *sinengpo* 似能破) as found in stanza 19ab: “Pseudo-refutations are *jātis*” (**tadābhāsās tu jātayaḥ*).¹³ For understanding the subsequent commentarial passage (parts

the citation found in the Japanese Buddhist scholar-monk Zōshun’s 藏俊 *Inmyō daisho shō* 因明大疏抄 (IDS: T68, 606c28 and 777a12).

¹² For other scholarly translations with varying structural analyses of this passage, see Lü / Yincang’s (1928), Ui (1929: 654), Tucci (1930, 54) and Katsura (1982: 98). I thank Prof. Ono for discussing this passage with me.

¹³ For this Sanskrit reconstruction, see Ono 2017c: 454, k. 19ab. The plural form of *dūṣaṇābhāsa* is found in parallel passages from NB 3.139 (*dūṣaṇābhāsās tu jātayaḥ*) and

2–4), it is useful to distinguish between three levels of how the terminology is used, namely, (i) *sādharmyasama* and others as individual types of *jāti*s, (ii) *dūṣaṇābhāsa* as a superordinate category within the structural framework of the NMu and (iii), *jāti* as a generic term classified by Dignāga as equivalent to *dūṣaṇābhāsa*. The italics in “*fallacious* similarity” for *jāti* is my emphasis; I assume this nuanced addition in Xuanzang’s Chinese rendering of the term.

In part (2), the reason that *jāti*s such as *sādharmyasama* and others are not proper refutations, that is, not having the capacity of offering a proper refutation, is explained by their being used as a strategy for disturbance and confusion. In part (3), Dignāga provides an explanation for why *jāti* are equated with pseudo-refutations by adducing two main reasons, (3a) and (3b–c). Part (4), most importantly for the present article, treats those cases in which a certain type of pseudo-refutation is “not called a *fallacious* similarity” (*bu ming guolei* 不名過類), or “not called a **jāti*,” as Xuanzang’s rendering suggests. Although no gloss on “mostly” (*duofen* 多分; **prāyas-*, **bhūyas-*) in part (2a) is provided in the NMu, the mention of this restriction could be regarded as an implicit indication of the cases described in part (4).

It is evident that the description of *dūṣaṇābhāsa* and *jāti* in the NM draws more inspiration from the dialectical perspective and less from the logical features emphasized in the definition of a proper refutation (**dūṣaṇa*).¹⁴ Most of the parts of the passage above are absent in the PS, the exceptions

PVin 3.85b (*tadābhāsās tu jātayaḥ*); cf. Katsura (1982: 97, n. 1), Inami (1991: 33, 80–81, n. 51) and Watanabe (2017: 142, n. 2). Cf. also footnote 67 below.

¹⁴ See NMu 3c18: 能破闕等言 (“[Proper] refutations are the statement / indication of deficiency [**nyūnatā*] and so on.”); cf. also NMu 3c19–22 for a commentary on it. For parallel passages, see NB 3.138 (*dūṣaṇāni nyūnatādyuktiḥ*) and PVin 3.85a (*dūṣaṇā nyūnatādyuktiḥ*); cf. Katsura 1982: 97, n. 1; Watanabe 2017: 142, n. 2. For a detailed analysis of Dignāga’s concept of *nyūnatā* (“deficiency, paucity”), see Watanabe 2017 and his contribution in the present volume. Cf. also footnote 67 below.

being parts (1) and (2b). In the PS, Dignāga offers a specific logical account of the *uttararūpaka*, a term equivalent to the *dūṣaṇābhāsa* in the NMu,¹⁵ defining it as the “statement of the pseudo-fallacies (of a logical formulation)” (*tadābhāsābhidhāna*).¹⁶ The dominant orientation of the PS is logic, and thus the focus here is on duly recognizing the *jātivādin*’s beligerent accusation of logical fallacies that are not given in reality. The PS tends to be much less invested in the polemical tactics and sophistic psychology of the NMu.

Concerning part (4d), my above understanding differs from that of earlier modern scholarship, with the exception of certain Chinese *yinming* specialists. The most controversial points seem to be (1) the implication of “not being called a *fallacious* similarity (**jāti*)” (henceforth, simply, “not being called a *jāti*,” without explicitly indicating the value judgment as found in the Chinese translation), and (2) whether other types of *jāti* might exist that are not the common improper rejoinder type of sophistic *jāti*.¹⁷

¹⁵ In his discussion of *niranuyoḍjyānuḍyoga* (“the questioning of what is not to be questioned” in NS 5.2.22) on the Naiyāyika’s twenty-two “points of defeat” (*nigrahasthāna*) in the *Vādanyāya* (VN), Dharmakīrti appears to allude to *jāti* by referring to *uttarābhāsa* (VN 64,15). In general, Dharmakīrti classifies the *jāti* under his second interpretation of *adoṣodbhāvana* (“the indication of what is not a fault”) that pertains to an opponent (*ut-tarapakṣa*); cf. VN 23,16–17 (for a translation, see Much 1991: 53).

¹⁶ PS 6.2: *tatpradarśanam evāto yuktam uttaram ucyate / tadābhāsābhidhānaṃ ca jātiṣū-ttararūpakam //*. (“Hence, precisely the [proper] indication of these [fallacies such as deficiency (*nyūnatva*) and the like] is called a proper rejoinder. Among the *jāti*s, for their part, the statement of the [pseudo-fallacies] falsely similar to these is [called] a pseudo-rejoinder.”) PSV (K) P170a1–2 (Kitagawa 1965: 531,4–7): *de’i phyir de bstan pa nyid ni || rigs pa’i lam du brjod pa yin || der snang ba ni brjod byed pa yang || lan dang ’du ba ltag chod yin ||*; PSV (V) D78b2–3, P84a7–8 (Kitagawa 1965: 531,4–7): *de nyid rab tu bstan phyir dang || de ltar snang ba brjod pa’i phyir || lan ’di brjod par rigs pa yin || ltag spyod la ni rjes mthun lan ||*. Cf. Ono 2017c: 49, n. 30; Watanabe 2017: 152 (on PS 6.2ab) and 161 (on PS 6.2cd); Muroya 2017b: 97.

¹⁷ Qiu (1934: vol. 5, 8a8) entitles part (4) as “Next [is the section on] the refutation of an incorrect proof, i.e., the pseudo-*jāti*” (次破非能立, 似過類), whereby he appears to draw on Wengui’s explanation (cf. *ibid.*, 8b3 with the subscript “Gui 軌”); cf. Shen 2008: 393,1–2 for the presumably relevant text of Wengui. Shen (2008: 185) divides the pseudo-refutation described in parts (2–4) of the NMu into two parts; one (parts [2] and

When we look at the well-known classification of *jāti* in the transmitted version of the *Nyāyasūtra* (NS), in the context of the “amicable debate” (*vāda*) it is difficult to clearly distinguish this type of *jāti* from improper rejoinders in general. As noted by Katsura (1982: 99), who follows Tucci's interpretation, scholars also diverge in their interpretation of parts (4b) and (4c).

Ui (1929: 655): “The *jātis* are of these kinds [as mentioned above]. On the contrary, when the proponent who states an inference with bad reasoning, the opponent states an inference as a refutation, but then the latter does not either indicate the [former's] fault because the [latter's] own inference has no fault, or indicates the [former's] fault; these are not included in the pseudo-refutations as the *jātis*.”

Tucci (1930: 54, n. 91): “In the first case there would be the point of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) called overlooking the censurable *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*. As regards the second case there is *dūṣaṇa*.”

Ui describes the case (4b) as being the opponent (*uttarapakṣa*) presenting a logically sound proof that is comparable to a refutation despite not indicating any fault of the proponent, and (4c) as being a proper refutation. Tucci understands the first case (4b) as violating the rule of debate known as a point of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*), and the second (4c) as being a proper refutation. Tucci (1930: 53, n. 90) also notes that “[a]n improper refutation of a wrong statement is not a *jāti*, but a *nigrahassthāna*,” thereby practically excluding the possibility of subsuming cases (4b) and (4c) under the *jāti*. Common to both Ui and Tucci is their understanding of the second

[3]) on the pseudo-refutation called a fallacious similarity, and the other (part [4]) on the pseudo-refutation not called a fallacious similarity. On the latter, Shen explains that because it is not found in the fourteen kinds of fallacious similarities as defined in the NMu, it is not called a fallacious similarity. Moreover, it is not taught in the PS: 此類似破不在十四過類之中，故不名過類，是似能破中較為特殊的類型，所以陳那後來在《集量論》中就省而未說。

type (4c) as being a proper refutation. Furthermore, it is clear that in this context they do not see (4c) as being associated with any type of *jāti*.

2. A fragment of the *Nyāyamukha* in the *Nyāyavārttika*

The examination of the problematic part (4) of the NMu can be augmented by surveying similar or parallel discussions in other primary literature. This may lead, at the very least, to a better understanding of how Dignāga's description in the NMu was read or interpreted by later authors.

2.1. References to part (2a)

Uddyotakara appears to have been aware of Dignāga's distinction between the two functions of the *jāti*. In the introductory part of his commentary on the *jāti* chapter of the NS, the sixth-century Naiyāyika discusses different views regarding the purpose (*prayojana*) of employing *jāti*. First, he refers to the view that *jātis* are used to refute a correct proof. This aspect is also referred to by Dignāga in the NMu, namely, in part (2a). Uddyotakara's discussion is more detailed, describing more precisely a *jātivādin*'s objectives and psychology in a debate.

NV 497,11–13 = NV (C) 1102,8–1103,4 (on NS 5.1.1): *sādhūsādhānanirākaraṇārthaṃ vā^a prayogaḥ. yadā^b vādī parasya sādhanam sādhy iti^c manyate lābhapūjākhyātikāmaś ca bhavati tadā jātiḥ^d prayunkte – kadācid ayaṃ jātyuttareṇākulīkṛtabuddhir uttaram na^e pratipadyeta; uttarāpratipattyā ca nigṛhyeteti^f. anabhidhāne tu^g jāter ekāntaparājayaḥ^h parasyety aikāntikāⁱ parājayaḍ varam sandeha^j ity ukto^k jāteḥ prayogaḥ.*¹⁸

¹⁸ v.l.: a. *vā*] J1; *ca* ed., C – b. *yadā*] J1; *yadā ca* ed.; *yadā tu* C. – c. *sādhv iti*] J1, C; *sādhvīti* ed. – d. *jātiḥ*] ed., J1; *jātim* C – e. *°kulīkṛtabuddhir uttaram na*] J1; *°kulīkṛto nottaram* ed., C – f. *°grhyeteti*] J1; *°grhyate* ed., C – g. *tu*] ed., J1; om. C – h. *°parājayaḥ*] ed., J1; *°jayaḥ*

Or the employment [of a *jāti*] is for the purpose of refuting a proper proof. When a debater (*vādin*) considers [his] opponent's (*para*) proof to be proper but becomes desirous of profit, respect and reputation, then he employs the *jātis*. [This *jātivādin* has the following in mind:] "This [opponent] might not make a reply if his mind is confused (*ākulīkṛtabuddhi*) by [my] rejoinder using a *jāti* (*jātyuttara*¹⁹), and [then] he could be defeated due to failing to make a reply. But if a *jāti* is not presented, the opponent will definitely defeat [me]. Thus, uncertainty [of outcome for me] is better than [my] definite defeat." Such is said to be the employment of the *jāti*.

Here, one can see that using a *jāti* is motivated by a debater's highly eristic and hostile intentions. He desires worldly merits and triumph in a debate, and eagerly attempts to avoid a definite defeat. This *jātivādin* is keenly aware of his debate partner's logical superiority and proper argumentation. The employment of the *jāti* is intended to bring about confusion in the debate partner's mind and bring him to defeat due to the "non-appearance of a reply" (*apratibhā*),²⁰ or at least to create the impression among the judges and the audience that the debate partner's argument is unconvincing. This deceitful attitude is also found in Dignāga's much less elaborate description, which primarily highlights the sophistic aspect and logical irrationality of the *jāti*.

C – i. *aikāntikāt*] ed., C; *aikāntikāc ca* J1. – j. *sandeha*] J1; *astu sandeha* ed., C – k. *ukto*] J1; *yukto* ed., C. On this passage, cf. DhPr 255,25–256,1.

¹⁹ My understanding of the term *jātyuttara* is based on Dharmottara's gloss, which takes it as an instrumental *atpuruṣa*; cf. NBT 256,2: *jātyā sādṛśyenottarāṇi jātyuttarāṇi*. The use of *jātis* to denote its modal aspect and instrumental functionality is not unexpected; this is also found in other philosophical traditions. Cf., e.g., Vātsyāyana's gloss (NBh 40,15–16; NBh [C] 36,5–6) on *chala-jātinigrahasthānasādhanopālabhaḥ* ("[a debate in which] proof and refutation are undertaken through quibbles, sophistic rejoinders and [the indication of] points of defeat") in NS 1.2.2 defining the *jalpa* ("contentious debate, disputation"). One could also render *jātyuttara* as a "refutation that is a sophistic rejoinder."

²⁰ Cf. NS 5.2.18.

	NMu	NV (sequence: $a \rightarrow c \rightarrow b$)
a	由彼多分於 <u>善比量</u>	<i>yadā vādī ... <u>sādhanaṃ sādhy iti manyate</u> ...</i>
b	爲 <u>迷惑他</u>	<i><u>parasya</u> ... kadācid ayaṃ jātyuttareṇ <u>ākulīkṛta-</u> <u>buddhir</u> ...</i>
c	而 <u>施設故</u>	<i>... tadā jātīḥ <u>prayuṅkte</u></i>

Table 1 : Relation of the NMu to the NV
(underlining shows the correspondences)

Uddyotakara appears to refer to an earlier source, one that may be related to the NMu. As shown in table 1, passage (2a) of the NMu, 由彼多分於善比量爲迷惑他而施設故, may be regarded as a parallel, in content and partly in the manner of expression, to “*yadā vādī parasya sādhanaṃ sādhy iti manyate ... tadā jātīḥ prayuṅkte – kadācid ayaṃ jātyuttareṇ ākulīkṛtabuddhir ...*” However, this passage of the NV may not be linked to the NMu directly. It is a little surprising that Xuanzang would have rendered *sādhana* (*能立, “proof”)²¹ with *biliang* (比量, “inference”), which is normally an equivalent of *anumāna*. Rather, the occurrence of similar ideas in the same context suggests the possibility that both Uddyotakara and Dignāga based their statements on a common source such as Vasubandhu. The latter’s works on logic were known to Uddyotakara. And Dignāga’s description in part (2) could be related to a dialectical work by Vasubandhu such as his lost *Vādaśāstra*, upon which Dignāga is said to have written a commentary.²²

²¹ *sādhana* constitutes one of the four cardinal categories of Vasubandhu’s presentation of the “fourfold statement” in debate (*caturvākya*) in his *Vādaśāstra*, whereas the theory is criticized by Uddyotakara; cf. Frauwallner 1933: 300, Fragmente A. I. 3f. (V) = NV 152,4–5; NV (C) 355,7–8.

²² On the *Vādaśāstra*, see Frauwallner 1933: 294.

2.2. A fragment of part (4) in the NMu

After explaining the application of a *jāti* against a proper argument, Uddyotakara addresses a theory of an opponent referred to as *eke* (“some”). This anonymous thinker holds that *jātis* can be employed for more than the purely sophistic use of *jāti* presented above.

NV 497,16–18; NV (C) 1103,5–7 (on NS 5.1.1): *asādhūsādhananirākaraṇārtham ity eke*^a. *eke tu jāteḥ prayogaṃ manyante 'sādhūsādhananirākaraṇārtham. evaṃ cāhuḥ* – (4a) *asādhau tu*^b *sādhane prayukte ya āsām prayogaḥ*, (4b) *so 'nabhijñatayā vā*^c *sādhanadoṣasya*, (4c) *taddoṣapradarśanārtham vā* (4d) *prasaṅgavyājeneti*.²³

Some say that [the employment of a *jāti* is] for the purpose of refuting an improper proof. [Namely,] some, for their part, consider the employment of a *jāti* to be for the purpose of refuting an improper proof. And [indeed] they state [this] in the following way: “(4a) But when an improper proof is employed, (4b) the employment of these [*jātis*] is [made] either due to the non-recognition of the proof's fault, (4c) or [made] for the purpose of indicating its fault (4d) in the semblance of an undesirable consequence (*prasaṅga*) [of equality].”

As is explained here, according to the view maintained by “some” (*eke*), the scope of applying a *jāti* can be extended to refuting an improper argument. Unfortunately, it is not explained how the anonymous opponent sees a *jāti* doing this, nor are we told what type of *jāti* this might be. However, this passage of the NV evidently testifies that there were people who positively assessed the *jāti* as an effective method of refutation. Uddyotakara himself does not accept this way (*prayojanābhāva*) of using a *jāti*, because he believes that when the party to a debate (*uttarapakṣa*) recognizes a logical fallacy in the argument of his opponent (*pūrvapakṣa*), he

²³ v.l.: a. *eke*] J1; *anye* ed., C – b. *tu*] J1, C; om. ed. – c. *vā*] J1; om. ed., C.

should point this out directly, not indirectly through a *jāti* as an improper rejoinder.²⁴

In my opinion, this anonymous opponent (*eke*) being referred to by Uddyotakara may be Dignāga. The passage marked as a quotation with *iti* in the NV, namely, a passage after *evaṃ cāhuḥ* until *prasaṅgavyājena*, can be regarded as a close parallel, though not identical, to part (4) in the above passage from the NMu. The correspondences between the NV and the NMu may be identified in the following way:

	NMu	NV
4a	若於非理立比量中如是施設	<i>asādhau tu sādhanē prayukte ya āsāṃ prayogaḥ</i>
4b	或不了知比量過失	<i>so 'nabhijñatayā vā sādhanadoṣasya</i>
4c	或即爲顯彼過失門	<i>taddoṣapradarśanārthaṃ vā</i>
4d	不名過類	<i>≠ (or: ≈) prasaṅgavyājena</i>

Table 2: Relationship between part (4) in the NMu and the NV

As in the case of passage (2a), the NV may not be directly associated with the NMu, for instance, due to the unusual rendering of *sādhana* with *biliang* (比量, **anumāna*). Nevertheless, the individual phrases in parts (4a) to (4c) in the two texts, including *vā* being denoted by *huo* (或, **vā*) even twice, match noticeably well. Accordingly, it is conceivable that Uddyotakara is referring here to Dignāga's NMu, or is citing a passage in one of his lost works that read similarly to part (4) of the NMu.

It should be noted, most significantly, that there is no clear equivalent here for part (4d) of the NMu, “not being called a *jāti*” (*bu min guolei* 不名過類). And conversely, there is no trace in Xuanzang's translation of *pra-*

²⁴ Cf. NV 497,18–498,2; NV (C) 1103,7–10.

saṅga as found here in the NV. This last disagreement makes it problematic to ascribe the anonymous author (*eke*) of the NV to Dignāga. Various reasons might be assumed for this disagreement, as for instance, a textual problem in the Sanskrit transmission of the NMu (which cannot, at present, be judged), Uddyotakara having modified the citation, or a problem in Xuanzang's translation.

Especially the third possibility leads us to further thoughts. If Uddyotakara faithfully quoted a passage from one of Dignāga's lost works, the disagreement, which may then turn out to be superficial, could be reduced to Xuanzang's free rendering or contextual adaptation. At least the co-occurrence of *guolei* 過類 and *prasaṅga* reminds me of Xuanzang's quite unusual rendering of *prasaṅga* with *guolei* 過類 in another passage of the NMu.²⁵ It may be possible that the *prasaṅgavyāja*, as found in the NV, was freely translated as "not being called a *jāti*" (*bu ming guolei* 不名過

²⁵ If the text of Xuanzang's translation remains as it is transmitted, for which I have no other evidence, it is likely that the expression *xiangsi guolei gu* 相似過類故 ("due to the fallacious similarity that lies in the equality [of the arguments of both proponent and opponent]") in NMu 4a8-9 is the equivalent of *samaprasaṅgataḥ* in PSV 6.20d; more precisely, *xiangsi* 相似 = *sama*; *guolei* 過類 = *prasaṅga*; *gu* 故 = °*taḥ*. For translations of the expression of the NMu; cf. Tucci (1930: 55) and Katsura (1984: 50); for that of the PSV, cf. Kitagawa (1965: 350), Watanabe (2017: 160) and Muroya (2017b: 120). The Sanskrit expression *samaprasaṅga* is attested by Jinendrabuddhi's unquestionable *pratīka*; cf. PST Ms B 254a7–254b1 (cf. footnote 28 below). The reconstruction of the relevant passage of the PSV is: *samaśabdaḥ punar jātiṣu sarvopasaṃhāreṣu samaprasaṅgato veditavyaḥ*. ("Furthermore, it should be understood that the word 'equal' [contained in the individual terms of the *jāti*] is [used] due to [the indication of] an undesirable consequence of equality of the arguments of both debaters that would follow] concerning all [kinds of] application [of an example to the object of proof] when the *jāti*s are [employed]."). PSV (K) P174b6–7 (Kitagawa 1965: 554,4–9; Katsura 1984: 49, nn. 2 and 3): *mtshungs pa'i sgra yang thams cad nye bar bsduḥ pa'i ltag chod rnams la thal bar mtshungs pa nyid du rig par bya'o* ||; PSV (V) D83b2–3, P90b4–6 (Kitagawa 1965: 554,5–9): *mtshungs pa zhes bya ba'i sgra ni thams cad kyi mjug (mjug pa Kitagawa) bsdu bar ltag gcod rnams la thal bar 'gyur bar mtshungs par rig (rigs P; cf. Kitagawa 1965: 350, n. 898) par bya'o* ||. On the usage of *samaprasaṅgitā* by Candrakīrti, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 270, n. 55, who (ibid., 270–271, n. 57) also refers to *jāti* and counter-argument as "exposed to attack" (*sāvakāśa*); cf. also MacDonald 2015: II/55–56, n. 123; Ono 2019: 904–903.

類) to emphasize the distinctive scopes for applying a *jāti*. One could understand the implication of the “semblance of *prasaṅga*” or the “*prasaṅga*-like argument” (*prasaṅgavyāja*) in the NV to be distinct from what might be tentatively called an original or “genuine” (**avyāja*) *prasaṅga*, as referred to in the NMu in parts (2) and (3). In passing, equating *jāti* with *prasaṅga* is notably done by Vātsyāyana, the fifth-century commentator on the NS, in a gloss on the definition of the *jāti* in NS 1.2.18: *prayukte hetau yaḥ prasaṅgo jāyate sā jātiḥ* (“The [indication by an opponent of an] undesirable consequence (*prasaṅga*) that arises when a logical reason is employed [by a proponent] is the [fallacious] similarity.”).²⁶

The distinction between apparent (*vyāja*) and genuine (**avyāja*) *jāti* would become possible under the presupposition that Dignāga is describing a second type of refutation, that of part (4), as a kind of effective *jāti*, and thus is characterizing it differently than the common kind of *jāti* described in parts (2) and (3), which are solely fallacious. If Xuanzang had limited the scope of the common or original *jāti* only to the sophistic technique of rejoinder, which is pertinently denoted by its Chinese rendering with *guolei* (過類, lit. “fallacious similarity”), it would imply that the second type, in part (4), would have to be differentiated from the common kind of *jāti*.

It cannot of course be excluded that the apparent disagreement in part (4) may have resulted from Uddyotakara having made an editorial modification. He may have freely adjusted part (4) to the context at hand—explaining the objective of employing a *jāti*. Then, one should indeed assume that Dignāga was explaining that there are cases in which certain rejoinders are not included in the *jāti*. This leads to the understanding that was accepted by East Asian scholars in Tang China and early medieval Japan,

²⁶ NBh 51,11; NBh (C) 401,8 (read *prayukte* with the Jaisalmer manuscript, as reported by Kang [2008: 47], instead of *prayukte hi* in both editions). For translations, see, e.g., TPhSI (II/101, s.v. *jātiḥ* [2]; III/82, s.v. *prasaṅgaḥ* [2]; III/242, s.v. *sādharmyasamaḥ*), Prets (2001: 550), and Kang (2008: 48). Cf. Muroya 2017b: 116.

as will be demonstrated below (§ 3–3.2). And there is a further possibility, namely, that Uddyotakara quoted an anonymous source which is totally unknown to us.

2.3. Vācaspati Mīśra's interpretation

While Vācaspati does not reveal the identity of Uddyotakara's anonymous opponent, the former elaborates on this passage and provides further contextual clarification. Vācaspati's gloss demonstrates how the key terms *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgavyāja* are understood and whether the text is concerned with an explanation of the *jāti*.

NVTṬ 642,8–14; NVTṬ (C) 1103,16–21: *matāntaram nirākartum upanyasyati – asādhūsāadhaneti. tattvaviśayam api sādhanam asādhv iti veditavān vādakāle cāpratibhayāsyā^asādhutvopapādanam na parisphurati^b. asādhv etad iti tu^c smaraty asau^d jātiṃ prayuṅkte. tad idam uktam – anabhiññatayā vā^e sādhanadoṣasyeti. athavā jānann api jātiṃ prayuṅkte, tasya sādhanasya doṣapradarśanārtham prasaṅgavyājena. “madīyam tāvad dūṣaṇābhāsam eva^f, evaṃ tvadīyam api sādhanābhāsam. yadi tu tat^g samyak sādhanam^h, tatoⁱ madīyam api samyag dūṣaṇam^j syāt” iti prasaṅgaḥ. tadvyājena sādhanam dūṣayātīty arthaḥ.*²⁷

He (Uddyotakara) mentions a different view in order to refute [it], saying “an improper proof.” An [opponent] who has noticed that the [proponent's] proof, though its object pertains to the truth, is improper, but [can]not set out a demonstration (*upapādana*) of [its] improperness due to the absence of insight at the time of discussion. But [then]

²⁷ v.l. a. *cāpratibhayāsyā^o* ed., J; *cāpratibhayā^o* C – b. *parisphurati* ed., J; *sphurati* C – c. *tu* ed., J; om. C – d. *smaraty asau* J; *smarann evāsau* ed., C – e. *vā* J; om. ed., C – f. *eva* ed., J; om. C – g. *yadi tu tat* ed., J; *yadi tvat* C – h. *samyak sādhanam* ed., J; *sādhanam samyak* C – i. *tato* ed., J; *tadā* C – j. *dūṣaṇam* ed., J; om. C.

he employs that *jāti*, while being mindful that this [proof of the proponent] is improper. Therefore, this is stated by [the phrase] “or, due to the non-awareness of the proof’s fault.” Or he employs the *jāti*, even though he knows [the fault], for the purpose of indicating the fault of that proof in the semblance of an undesirable consequence. The undesirable consequence [as mentioned here] is the following: “Mine is on my part nothing but a pseudo-refutation, [but] likewise yours is also a pseudo-proof. But if [you argue that] it is a proper proof, then mine should also be a proper refutation.” He (the opponent) [then] vitiates the [proponent’s] proof in the semblance of (or: through) such [an argument]. This is the meaning [of the relevant passage].

Here Vācaspati presents a syntactical analysis of part (4d), *prasaṅgavyāja*. He clearly construes it with the second half of the passage, part (4c), introduced with the second *vā*. It is also notable that Vācaspati understands that the agent to which *anabhijñatā* pertains concerning part (4b) is the *jātivādin* or the opponent, who has been only vaguely aware of the proponent’s fallacy and incapable of identifying it.

Furthermore, Vācaspati’s gloss on *prasaṅga* shows that it signifies a “similarity” or “equality” of tension between the debaters in terms of either the validity or the non-validity of their arguments. This is expressed in two ways: “Just as mine is a pseudo-refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*), so is yours a pseudo-proof (*sāadhanābhāsa*)” and “if yours were a correct proof (**samyaṁsādhana*), then mine would also be a correct refutation (**samyagdūṣaṇa*).” This understanding appears to comply with Dignāga’s description of the *jāti* in his PS, at least when we follow the interpretation of Jinendrabuddhi.²⁸

²⁸ Cf. PST Ms B 254a7–254b1 ([T] D307a7–307b1, P346b6–8) on PS 6.20d: *sarvopa-saṁhāreṣu samaprasaṅgata itī “yathaivedaṁ tava sādhanam, mamāpi tathaivedaṁ uttarāṁ” ity evaṁ sarvapūrvottarapakṣeṣu tulyatvāpādanataḥ*. (“[The phrase in the PSV] ‘due to an undesirable consequence of equality concerning all [kinds of] application’ is [to

3. East Asian interpretations

Around the seventh to eighth century, during the period of Tang dynasty and following Xuanzang's translation of the NMu, a large number of commentaries on the NMu were composed by Chinese Buddhist intellectuals, including scholars from the Silla Kingdom. Nearly all of them have been lost. However, textual fragments have survived in the form of quotations or references. These textual fragments have been preserved predominantly in Japanese works on Buddhist logic, works from the *inmyō* tradition.

3.1. Fragment from Dingbin's commentary

In his *Inmyōron sho myōtō shō* 因明論疏明燈鈔 (Taishō 2270, 12 fascicles, completed in 781; ISMS), Zenju (善珠, 723–797), an eighth-century Buddhist scholar-monk of the Japanese Yogācāra (Hossō 法相) tradition, records a fragment from Dingbin's (定賓, first half of the 8th century²⁹) lost commentary on the NMu which refers to the passage in question.³⁰

show that the expression 'equality' is used] due to bringing about [a consequence of] the equality concerning all [arguments of the] proponents and opponents in such a manner that 'just as your proof is thus [valid or invalid], so is this rejoinder of mine too.'") On this passage, see Muroya 2017b: 121, as well as footnote 25 above. Cf. also Watanabe 2017: 157–158.

²⁹ On Dingbin and his biography, thought and influence on Japanese Buddhism, see Moro 2015: 386–417 (chapter 5.3).

³⁰ Zenju's reference to Dingbin begins at ISMS, T68, 313b4–5: 賓師云。「又若於中〈至〉非月有故」者，總明四過。（“The master [Ding]bin says [as follows:] [The passage in the NMu that] ‘Further, if, when ... not the moon, because it exists’ shows in general four kinds of faults.”); cf. also *ibid.*, 313b24: cf. 313b22–24: 故『理門』中但立因中所依不成，不立宗中所別不成。此義云何。賓師解云。（“Therefore only the ‘unestablishedness of the locus’ (**āśrayāsiddha*) of the logical reason is presented in the *Nyāyamukha*, but not the ‘unestablishedness of the qualificand’ (**aprasiddhaviśeṣya*) of the thesis. What is the meaning of the [latter]? The master [Ding-]bin states his interpretation [as follows].”)

The fragment is contained in the part of a discussion related to classifying the fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*). As regards the logical formulation *acandraḥ śaśī sattvāt* (“a rabbit-bearer is not the moon, because it exists”), Dignāga defines this as a kind of pseudo-thesis, namely, the type of pseudo-thesis that is invalidated by a “contradicting proposition which is commonly accepted through verbal knowledge” (*śābdaprasiddha-viruddha*).³¹ Some commentators in Tang China appear to have analyzed this specific type of pseudo-thesis more extensively than did Dignāga, detecting four kinds of faults according to the system found in Śāṅkarasvāmin’s manual on logic.

Whether the following passage is a literal quotation from Dingbin’s commentary in its entirety remains to be determined. The final phrase (*yu ru bi shu* 餘如彼疏 “The rest is like that commentary”) could suggest that Zenju’s quotation is either entirely or partially a summary based on the original wording in Dingbin’s commentary, if the phrase indeed refers to the same commentary.

T68, 313c9–16: 或「有宗中不成所別并有因過」者，即如立言，我體是思，因云，生樂等故。此方雙犯宗及因過也。問。佛法破外道云，我非常住，因云，樂等故，猶如心識。此因應有所依不成。答。此能破門故，不須辨因無所依。彼若彈云因無所依，即變示汝本立宗其因無依。故『理門』云「或即爲顯彼過失門」。故知能破不同。能立門中要^a有依也。餘如彼疏。³²

Or, as regards [the passage] “there is [a fault of] the thesis whose qualificand is unestablished (*bucheng suobie* 不成所別, **asiddhaviśeṣya*)³³

³¹ Cf. NMu 1a21–22 (cf. Tucci 1930: 7; Katsura 1977: 113–114). On this *pakṣābhāsa*, see, e.g., Kitagawa (1965: 130), Katsura (1977: 114) and Tillemans (2000: 5–6).

³² v.l. a. 要] ed.; 要因 Ms. Kō (in Taishō).

³³ On *aprasiddhaviśeṣya* (“a thesis in which the qualificand [i.e., the property-possessor] is not commonly admitted to exist”) as one of the *pakṣābhāsas* as defined in the *Nyāya-praveśa[ka]*, see, e.g., Inami 1991: 73, no. 7.

as well as a fault of the logical reason [i.e., the non-established locus],” [it is] as said [in the following]:

[Thesis:] The nature of the self is [the capacity of] thinking.

Reason: Because pleasure and so on are produced.

The opponent violates the faults of both the thesis and the reason.³⁴

Question. The Buddhist teaching refutes [this] non-Buddhist, stating:

[Thesis:] The self is not permanent.

Reason: Because of pleasure and so on.

[Example:] Like the consciousness of the mind.

[The non-Buddhist charges that] this logical reason would have [the fault of] the non-established locus (*suoyi bucheng* 所依不成, **āśrayā-siddha*). Reply. Because [the Buddhist refutation is made by] way of refutation (*nengpo men* 能破門, **dūṣaṇadvāra*), one does not need to identify the reason's lack of a locus. If he (the non-Buddhist) reproaches [the Buddhist] for the reason's lack of a locus, then he (the Buddhist) changes his opponent's original thesis [and thus] indicates the reason's lack of a locus. Thus, it is said in the *Nyāyamukha*: “Or in order to indicate a point of the fault of the [proponent's inference].” Therefore, one knows that [the rule concerning] a refutation is not identical [to that of a proof]. [Namely,] as regards the way of proof (*nengli men* 能立門, **sādhanaadvāra*), there must exist a locus [for a logical reason]. The rest [of the explanation] is as [given in] that commentary [by Dingbin].

Although it stands in the context of the *śābdaprasiddha-viruddha*, the above passage is associated with part (4c) of the NMu. The Buddhist contestant representing the opponent (*uttarapakṣa*) in the debate is aware of the fault of the Brahmanical proponent's logical reason, a reason whose

³⁴ A similar reasoning is adduced in NMu 1b21-22 as a case of **dharmyasiddha* (有法不成); cf. Katsura 1977: 124-125; MacDonald 2015: II/101-102, n. 212.

“locus is unestablished” (*āśrayāsiddha*) with regard to the self (*wo* 我, **ātman*). However, he does not point this out directly, but instead sets forth a logical formulation using a similar reason, being aware of committing the same fault. The Buddhist argues that the fault of *āśrayāsiddha* does not apply to his own refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) because the precondition is different from the case of setting forth a proof (*sādhana*).³⁵ Dingbin’s distinction between two “ways” or modes of debate, *nengpo men* (能破門, **dūṣaṇadvāra*) and *nengli men* (能立門, **sādhanadvāra*), is noteworthy.

The Buddhist rejoinder is considered to have the aim of indicating the opponent’s fallacy while being released from the fallacy of the opponent’s proof. This circumstance stands in contradistinction to part (1b) of the NMu, which denotes as one of the significant criteria for a genuine *jāti* that a pseudo-refutation (*sinengpo* 似能破, **dūṣaṇābhāsa*) does not point out the proponent’s logical fault. Whether the rejoinder stated by the Buddhist is regarded a proper refutation or an improper one is not explicitly mentioned by Dingbin. However, it is evident that the refutation presupposed by Dingbin is not entirely free from logical fallacy; it may be regarded as a pseudo-refutation which is effective in criticizing the proponent’s proof.

3.2. Fragment from Wengui’s commentary

Like Zenju, Zōshun (藏俊, 1104–1180), one of the leading figures in the twelfth-century Japanese *inmyō* tradition, notably refers to a number of lost Chinese commentaries on the NMu and cites abundantly from them. In his *Inmyō daisho shō* 因明大疏抄 (Taishō 2271, 41 fascicles, completed

³⁵ On Dignāga’s treatment of a non-real subject in the thesis when it is posited by an opponent, see NMu 1b27–c4 with Katsura (1978: 110–114).

in 1152; IDS), Zōshun refers to Wengui's (文軌, ca. 7th century³⁶) interpretation of part (4) of our NMu passage. Since the end of the fragment specifies that this is “the master of the law [Wen-]gui's intention and meaning” (軌法師意義; cf. T68.778a8), it is likely that the cited passage contains paraphrases of Wengui's text and a summary, or at least is primarily constituted thereof.

Let us first take a look at the context in which this fragment appears. At the beginning of the passage, Zōshun introduces the question of whether a *jāti* can be a “genuine” refutation (*zhenpo* 眞破) when the reasoning of the proponent's argument is not sound.³⁷ Interestingly, this question demonstrates an understanding of the *jāti* that is separate from the domain of pseudo-refutations and alludes to the possibility that a *jāti* may function as a proper refutation. Then, after quoting the passage of part (4) of the NMu,³⁸ Zōshun cites extensively from Dingbin's commentary on the NMu.³⁹ This fragment of Dingbin's commentary is composed of two further commentaries, one by the Korean Buddhist philosopher Yuanse (Kor. Woncheuk, Wōnch'ūk 圓測, 613–696), also called “the master of the law Ximing” (*Ximing fashi* 西明法師), and the other, as mentioned above, by Wengui. Both fragments seem to have been quoted also from commentaries on the NMu. The following passage shows Wengui's second interpretation of part (4b) as well as of parts (4c) and (4d).

T68, 777c24–778a8: 第二門者，或立論人愚因明理，不能了知比量過失。且如聲論對佛弟子立比量言，聲定是常，因云，所聞性故。既無同喻，

³⁶ On Wengui (Kor. Mungwe) and his possible origin being Shilla, see Moro (2015: 118–119).

³⁷ Cf. IDS, T68, 777a17–18: 尋云。若於非理比量如是施設，過類爲眞破耶。（“Some state [the following] to seek [an answer]: If [a fallacious similarity (**jāti*) is] adopted in such a way for [refuting] a [logically] invalid inference, does the fallacious similarity become a genuine refutation?”）

³⁸ IDS, T68, 777a19–21.

³⁹ IDS, T68, 777a22–778b4.

單立異喩云，若是無常，定非所聞，譬如瓶等。今佛弟子不言，彼是不共不定，但齊彼故。還寄同彼，不知過失，立比量云，聲定無常，因云，所聞性故。既無同喩是所聞者，單立異喩云，若有是常，定非所聞，如虛空等。如此敵量亦非過類，顯彼失故。故云「或不了知比量過失」。上來以明二門相狀訖。

其次論文，雙明二門。能顯彼過，不名過類。故云「或即爲顯彼過失門，不名過類」。何須言「或」。謂應正難而不正難^a，或爲似難而顯彼過也。（軌法師意義如此也。）⁴⁰

The second way [for interpreting the passage (part [4b]) of the NMu “not recognizing the fault of the proponent’s inference”] is [as follows]: Or a proponent is inept at the rules of the science of reasoning and unable to recognize the fault of [his own] inference. While, for instance, an advocate of [eternal] sound states to a Buddhist disciple the [following] reasoning:

[Thesis:] Sound is certainly eternal.

Reason: Because it is audible.

Inasmuch as there is no similar example, he merely sets forth a dissimilar example, stating: “If this is not eternal, it is certainly not audible, like a pot and so on.” Now the Buddhist disciple does not say that the [inference by the non-Buddhist proponent] is over-exclusive-inconclusive (*bugong buding* 不共不定, **asādhāraṇānaikāntika*), because he merely goes along with the [proponent]. Furthermore, he who becomes similar to the [proponent] does not recognize the fault [of his own inference and] sets forth a [following] inference, stating:

[Thesis:] Sound is certainly non-eternal.

Reason: Because it is audible.

⁴⁰ v.l. a. 而不正難] “em. (?)” (in Taishō); 而不正難。而不正難 Ms (in Taishō).

Inasmuch as there is no similar example concerning audibility, he merely sets forth a dissimilar example, stating: “If it is eternal, it is certainly not audible, like the ether and so on.” [The presentation of a dissimilar example by the Buddhist is] similar to the inference [presented] by the [Buddhist's] opponent, [and], furthermore, [the former's inference] is not [called] a fallacious similarity (*fei guolei* 非過類), because it indicates the fault of the [non-Buddhist]. Therefore, it is stated [in the NMu] that “or he does not recognize the fault of the [proponent's] inference.” With the [explanation] above, the features and conditions of both ways [to interpret the passage of the NMu] have been demonstrated.

The next passage (parts [4c] and [4d]) in the treatise (the NMu) shows two points. [Namely,] what can indicate the [proponent's] fault is not called a fallacious similarity (*bu ming guolei* 不名過類). Therefore, it is stated [in the NMu] that “or, namely, [what is presented] in order to indicate the [proponent's] fault is not called a fallacious similarity.” Why should [the word] “or” be mentioned? [It] means that, although [the opponent] should make a proper censure, he does not make a proper censure, *or* that, by making a pseudo-censure, he indicates the [proponent's] fault. (The intention and meaning of the master of the law [Wen-]gui is like this.)

As regards part (4b) of the NMu, Wengui assumes the notable case of adopting the audibility (*śrāvaṇatva*) of sound as a logical reason, a logical reason that has been classified as over-exclusive and thus inconclusive (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) by Dignāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin.⁴¹

⁴¹ On the *śrāvaṇatva* as the logical reason in the fifth position of Dignāga's “wheel of reasons” (*hetucakra*), see NMu 2a23: 或立爲常，所聞性故。 On the treatment of the *asādhāraṇānaikāntika* by Dignāga and Śaṅkarasvāmin, see Kitagawa 1965: 33, 200–202 (on PS 3.24cd = Kitagawa 1965: 498); Katsura 1979: 71 (on NMu 2b10–11) and 74–76 (on NMu 2b14–17); Ono 2010: 132–134 (on PS 3.24cd); Moriyama 2014: 124–125 (on PS 3.24cd) and Tachikawa 1971: 124 (on NP 5,11–13, item [2]).

In the passage above, however, the non-Buddhist proponent, who is said to be unfamiliar with the theory of logic, makes a hypothetical statement that would merely satisfy the third condition by adducing a dissimilar example (**vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*). An opponent such as a Buddhist could actually point out the fallacy of the reason to the effect that the reason is inconclusive due to the lack of similar instances. But he does not mention this fault. Rather, imitating the proponent, the Buddhist uses the same fallacious reason and posits a contradicting proposition, arguing again for the presence of a dissimilar example (e.g., the ether). Although both sides use an inconclusive reason, Wengui qualifies the rejoinder by the Buddhist opponent to be effective. In his opinion, this is thus not regarded as a *jāti* (*fei guolei* 非過類).

Wengui's explanation of parts (4c) and (4d) is quite abstract. However, it is noteworthy that, according to Wengui, this type of pseudo-refutation is interpreted as having two aspects, namely, an "incorrect censure in place of a proper censure" (*ying zheng nan er bu zheng nan* 應正難而不正難) and a "pseudo-censure which is still able to indicate the adversary's fault" (*wei sinan er xian biguo* 爲似難而顯彼過). For both aspects, Wengui maintains that the rejoinder is essentially improper, but inasmuch as it demonstrates the adversary's fault, it is not called a *jāti* (*bu ming guolei* 不名過類).⁴²

Unfortunately, Wengui does not specify what kind of effective pseudo-refutation was presented by the opponent in the first case.⁴³ But it seems

⁴² This combination of impropriety and effectiveness with regard to a rejoinder is reminiscent of the concept of the "genuine pseudo-refutation" (*zhen-si-nengpo* 真似能破) that is attributed to the fallacy of antinomy (*xiangwe jue ding guo* 相違決定過, **viruddhāvya-bhicāritvadoṣa*). Jingyan (淨眼), one of Xuanzang's disciples, mentions that the concept of "genuine pseudo-refutation" was originally explicated by a certain interpreter from the "West" (*xifang shi* 西方釋). On the "genuine pseudo-refutation" as one of four kinds of refutation (*nengpo* 能破) in Jingyan's two commentaries, see Shen 2008: 181, 246 (in: *Yinming ru zhengli lun lüechao* 因明入正理論略抄), 292 (in: *Yinming ru zhengli lun houshu* 因明入正理論後疏).

⁴³ In Dignāga's list of the fourteen *jātis*, the fallacious indication of an "over-exclusive" reason appears in *kāryasama* (NMu 5b29; on PS 6.7) and *vikalpasama* (NMu n.e.[?]; on

clear that the counterargument presents a reasoning that reveals a contradiction to the proponent. Although not clearly mentioned, the Buddhist opponent appears to bear in mind the charge of “antinomy.” In fact, the Buddhist’s argument makes the proponent involved in the fallacy of the antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) in respect to the identical subject of the thesis (*pakṣadharmin*), or sound (*śabda*) in the present case. Such a censure is specious due to the failure of both parties to fulfill the second condition of a sound logical reason. It is also notable that in the discussion treated by Wengui, there is a possible transition from *asādhāraṇa-anai-kāntika* in the refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) to *viruddhāvyabhicārin* in the proof (*sādhana*). This reminds us of Dignāga’s reference to a similar transition of logical fallacies, as will be shown below (cf. § 4.2).

To sum up the East Asian interpretations of part (4), we observe that these interpreters of Xuanzang’s version of the NMu take it for granted that the passage in question is discussing cases of logically incorrect rejoinders or pseudo-refutations (*sinengpo* 似能破, **dūṣaṇābhāsa*). They maintain that such rejoinders could attain a positive assessment insofar as they, though indirectly, indicate the fallacy of a proponent’s reasoning. Focusing primarily on rhetorical effects in disputation rather than logical soundness, these intellectuals in general and Wengui in particular see certain pseudo-refutations as being categorically discernible from the fallacious **jāti*, which cannot be assessed positively, as may be viewed as programmed in Xuanzang’s rendering of *jāti* as “fallacious similarity.” Accordingly, it is to some extent evident that in East Asia the scope of the *dūṣaṇābhāsa* was broader than that of the *jāti*.

4. Dignāga on the *jāti* as a proper *dūṣaṇa*

PS 6.12b’cd-13a’). A pseudo-antinomic reason appears in *sādharmyasama*, *vaidharmyasama*, *vikalpasama* and *aviśeṣasama* (NMu 4c10: 似相違決定). Cf. Kitagawa 1965: 328–329; Katsura 1984: 67.

The passage in question in the NMu, part (4), can also be compared to a different part of the NMu, a connection that, as will be shown below, seems to be indicated by Uddyotakara. Indeed, a comparative investigation of internal evidence in Dignāga's works reveals the wider context of his theory concerning the typology of rejoinders, as well as how he distinguishes between their properness and improperness with regard to dialectics and logic.

4.1. Relation of *jāti* and *dūṣaṇa* in the NMu

After individually defining and explaining the seven *jāti*s from *sādharmyasama* through *arthāpattisama*, Dignāga *in toto* presents general observations and analyzes the real status of the *jāti*s that should rightly be recognized as fallacious arguments to be disproved. He then takes up a discussion that is of interest to the discussion at hand.

NMu 4c14–15: 若所立量有不定過，或復決定同法等因有所成立，即名「能破」，是等難故。

If [an inference as] a means of valid cognition that is to be proved [by the proponent (**pūrvapakṣa*)] has the fault of inconclusiveness (*bud-ing guo* 不定過) [concerning its logical reason], or if [an inference of the opponent (**uttarapakṣa*) is], for its part, proved by reason of [a *jāti*, such as] **sādharmya[sama]* and others (*tongfa deng* 同法等, **sādharmyādi*), that is conclusive (*jueding* 決定), then [this **jāti* is] called a “[proper] refutation,” because such [a *jāti*] is a criticism which is equal (*dengnan* 等難) [to the proponent's proof].⁴⁴

⁴⁴ For other translations, see Ui (1929: 670), Tucci (1930: 61), Katsura (1984, 66, § 10.9) and Watanabe (2017: 153); for glosses, see Qiu (1934: vol. 6, 3b4), who takes *bud-ing guo* (不定過) as *gon bugon xiangwei* (共不共相違) and supplements **pūrvapakṣa* (若〈前宗〉) and **uttarapakṣa* (或復〈後宗〉) for the former and the latter part, respectively, probably alluding to Lü's (1928: 49,7–8) translation of the parallel in the PSV. Concerning the expression

Scholars have offered various interpretations of the above passage. Its ambiguity is connected with the following three phrases in particular: the syntactical association of “conclusiveness” (*jueding* 決定, **aikāntika*⁴⁵), the variously interpreted *tongfa deng* (同法等, **sādharmyādi*⁴⁶), and the hitherto differently analyzed *dengnan* (等難; cf. *tulyapratyavasthāna*⁴⁷). Without going into the details of the various scholarly interpretations, the above understanding draws on a parallel passage in the PS, as mentioned below (§ 4.2). In the rendition of Qiu (1934) and Watanabe (2017), the rather laconic reference to **sādharmyādi* may well be understood as an

tongfa deng 同法等, it may be possible to understand it as a logical formulation based on similarity and dissimilarity.

⁴⁵ For the usage of the term *aikāntika* in the context of the *jāti*, see PSV on PS 6.15a: *yady aikāntikaiḥ sādharṃyasaṃādibhiḥ ... pratyavasthānaṃ syāt*; cf. PSV (K) P173b8 (Kitagawa 1965: 546,16–17): *gal te ... chos mthun pa dang mtshungs pa la sogs pa nges pa rnam kyis rtsod par byed pa la*; PSV (V) D82a1–2, P88b4–5 (Kitagawa 1965: 546,15–17): *gal te ... phyogs gcig tu nges par chos mthun pa la sogs pas phyogs gcig tu nges pas 'gal bar 'gyur ro*. The Sanskrit reconstruction of the PSV is based on PST Ms B 251a1 ([T] D303b3–4, P342a6–7: *gal te 'di rnam mtha' gcig pa rnam kyis so sor gnas par gyur na*). Cf. also footnote 58 below.

⁴⁶ At the beginning of the section containing the passage cited above, the expression *tongfa deng* (同法等) denotes the *sādharmyasama* and further six *jātis* up to *arthāpattisama*. Cf. NMu k. 23ab (4c4): 由此同法等 多疑故似彼; for translations, cf. Ui (1929: 670), Tucci (1930: 59–60) and Katsura (1984: 63); for a reconstructed Sanskrit version of this stanza, see Ono 2017c: 453,1: *sādharmyādiṣu hi prāyaḥ saṃśayo 'tas tadābhatā* /. For the usage of *sādharmyādi* that refers to certain individual types of the *jāti* beginning with *sādharmyasama*, see PSV on PS 6.21: *anaikāntikena hi sādharṃyādinā*; cf. PSV (K) P175a2–3: *ma nges pa chos mthun pa la sogs pas*; PSV (V) D83b6, P91a (*ma nges pa ni chos mthun pa la sogs pas*). The Sanskrit reconstruction of the PSV is based on a clear *pratika* in the PST; see PST Ms B 254b3 ([T] D307b3, P347a3: *ma nges pa chos mthun pa nyid la sogs pas*).

⁴⁷ Otherwise one would understand *deng* (等) as a particle denoting the plural and render *shideng nan gu* (是等難故) as “because these are criticisms.” For the usage of *tulyapratyavasthāna* (“an opposition which is equal [to a proponent’s proposition]”) in the context of the *jāti*, see PST Ms B 251a1 on PS 6.15a ([T] D303b4, P342a7: *so sor gnas pa mtshungs pa*) and B 258a4 on PS 6.22 ([T] D311b6, P352a3: *mtshungs par dgra zlar gnas pa*). For an occurrence of *pratyavasthāna* in the PSV in the same context, see footnotes 45 and 58.

equivalent of *sādharmyasama* and others.⁴⁸ Especially in this context, as has been pointed out by Watanabe, the relevant *jāti*s are restricted to four kinds, namely, *sādharmyasama*, *vaidharmyasama*, *vikalpasama* and *aviśeṣasama*.⁴⁹

It has been accepted by scholars that there are certain kinds of *jāti*s in both the NMu and the PS that Dignāga holds as functioning as a valid refutation under special circumstances. According to the NMu, this is the case in which either the logical reason used by the *jāti* is conclusive, or (*huo* 或, **vā*) the *pūrvapakṣa*, though mention of the proponent is not explicitly made, is inconclusive (*buding guo* 不定過, **anaikāntikatvadoṣa*). The value of the particle **vā*, commonly denoting an alternative, is problematic; its equivalent in the PSV is *ca* (cf. § 4.3). Aside from this, it may be understood from the NMu that there *are* certain *jāti*s which, while otherwise believed to be pseudo-refutations (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*) from a formal point of view, are logically conclusive. The latter type, namely logically conclusive *jāti*s, can be shifted from *dūṣaṇābhāsa* to valid *dūṣaṇas*. This implies that the scope of the *jāti* is wider than the *dūṣaṇābhāsa*, inasmuch as a *jāti* is principally characterized as a *dūṣaṇābhāsa* but can circumstantially also become a *dūṣaṇa*. This understanding is substantially different from that derived from Xuanzang's translation. Indeed, for the East Asian commentators the scope of the *dūṣaṇābhāsa* is wider than that of the *jāti*,

⁴⁸ Cf. Qiu 1934: vol. 6, 3b6: 此同法相似等，若是〈後宗於因能自〉決定 ...; Watanabe 2017: 153.

⁴⁹ Watanabe refers to the possibly related phrase “the first four [*jāti*s] out of these [seven]” (*cizhong qian si* 此中前四) in NMu 4c6 (Ui 1929: 670; Tucci 1930: 61; Katsura 1984: 63); the remaining three *jāti*s are *upalabdhisama*, *samśayasama* and *arthāpattisama*. As mentioned by Watanabe, the selection of these specific four kinds is confirmed by Jinendrabuddhi (PST Ms B 250b7–251a1 on PS 6.15a; PST [T] D303b2–3, P342a5–6); cf. Watanabe 2017, 154 with n. 38. Cf. also Kitagawa 1965: 328–329; Katsura 1984: 67; Kang 2012: 630 (“kernel group”); Muroya 2017b: 113, n. 72.

in the sense that the *dūṣaṇābhāsa* loses, as it were, its identity of *jāti* (“fallacious similarity” in its Chinese rendering) when the former is transformed into a *dūṣaṇa* in a dialectical situation.

Compared to the description in the PS, the theory of the *jāti* in the NMu, which represents an earlier state of Dignāga's thinking, seems incomplete or not fully systematized. It is as concise as it is elliptic. Nonetheless, the ambivalent logical status is sporadically mentioned in relevant passages throughout the NMu. For instance, in the explanation of *sādharmyasama*, Dignāga states that this type of *jāti* can be a valid refutation and announces that other *jātis* having a similar status will be treated in later parts of the text.⁵⁰ As Watanabe (2017) has elaborately shown, the additional *jātis* are NMu 4c21–22 on *aviśeṣasama* (second type), 4c24–26 on *upalabdhisama* (first type), 4c26–27 on *upalabdhisama* (second type), 5a6 on *arthāpattisama*, 5a23–27 on *prāptyaprāptisama* and *ahetusama*, NMu 5b22–25 on *anuktisama* and 5b23–25 on *anutpattisama*.⁵¹ Watanabe also points out that Dignāga ascribes the same status to *prāptyaprāptisama* and *ahetusama* in PS 6.4a; no others are mentioned.⁵²

It is worth noting here that Uddyotakara appears to have been aware of a certain advocate who associated the inconclusiveness of a proof with that of the rejoinder. Immediately after discussing the second purpose of the *jāti* (cf. § 2.2), he mentions a theory in which five kinds of *jātis* can be employed against “inconclusive” proofs (*anaikāntike sādhanē pareṇa prayukte pañca jātayaḥ prayoktavyāḥ*).⁵³ It remains unclear what these

⁵⁰ NMu 4a11–12. For translations, see, e.g., Ui (1929: 656–657), Tucci (1930: 55) and Katsura (1984: 50).

⁵¹ Cf. Watanabe 2017: 159–160.

⁵² Cf. Watanabe 2017: 160.

⁵³ Cf. NV 498,3–8 on NS 5.1.1, especially NV 498,3–4; NV (C) 1103,10–12: *etenaiṇānaikāntike pañcānām prayogaḥ pratyuktaḥ. ya āhur anaikāntike sādhanē pareṇa prayukte pañca jātayaḥ prayoktavyā iti, tad apy anenaiva pratyuktam*. (“Precisely with

five *jātis* are.⁵⁴ In my opinion, considering the parallel relationship of the preceding passage to the NMu as discussed above (cf. § 2.2), it is possible to assume that Uddyotakara is referring to Dignāga's theory in the NMu or in one of his lost works. Moreover, Uddyotakara appears to criticize the same opponent's position on the principle of the parallel relationship or "relationship of the former and the latter" (*parāparabhāva*), in which a sound proof (**yuktasādhana*) should be countered by a sound refutation (**yuktottara*) and an unsound proof (**ayuktasādhana*) by an unsound refutation (**ayuktottara*).⁵⁵ This theory seems to be the one described by Dignāga (cf. patterns [i] and [iii] in § 4.2, table 3). As a response, Uddyotakara explains that the *jāti* cannot be treated as an appropriate rejoinder (**yuktottara*), and that the advocate, possibly Dignāga, does not correctly understand the definition of the *jāti* (*jātilakṣaṇāparijñānāt*), taking it to be a false rejoinder which fails to "indicate the fault of the thesis and others" (*pratijñādidoṣodbhāvana*).⁵⁶

this [explanation], the employment of five [*jātis*] against an inconclusive [proof] is rejected. [Namely,] when someone states that five *jātis* should be employed when an inconclusive proof is employed by the proponent, this [view] is also rejected with the same [explanation].") For a German translation, cf. TPhSI (II/105r, s.v. *jātiḥ* [2]), which takes the advocate in question to be the same as "some" (*eke*) mentioned in § 2.2. Cf. Muroya 2017b: 113.

⁵⁴ Vācaspati Miśra remarks that these are *sādharmyasama*, *vaidharmyasama*, *vikalpasama*, *sādhyasama* and *saṁśayasama*, although without giving any reason for his identification; cf. NVTṬ 642,18–20; NVTṬ (C) 1103,24–26.

⁵⁵ Cf. NV 498,5–6; NV (C) 1103,12–13 on NS 5.1.1: *etena yuktāyuktapakṣayoḥ^a pūrvāparabhāvaḥ pratyuktaḥ – ayukte sādhanē 'yuktam uttaram vaktavyam, yukte yuktam iti*. [v.l. a. °*yuktapakṣayoḥ*] ed.; °*yuktayoḥ* C] ("With this [explanation], it is rejected that the correctness or incorrectness of the second (*apara*) [should] pair with the correctness or incorrectness of the first (*pūrvā*), namely, [the relationship] that when there is an incorrect proof, an incorrect rejoinder should be stated, [and] given a correct [proof], a correct [rejoinder should be stated].")

⁵⁶ Cf. NV 498,7–8 (NV [C] 1103,13–14) on NS 5.1.1 (cf. Muroya 2017b: 113, n. 73) and NV 154,1–4 (NV [C] 359,9–12) on NS 1.2.2 (cf. Muroya 2017b: 106, n.50).

4.2. A clear description in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*

The shift of a certain type of *jāti* from *dūṣaṇābhāsa* to *dūṣaṇa* is described by Dignāga more elaborately and systematically in the PS than in the NMu. The attribution of conclusiveness or inconclusiveness to the *pūrvapakṣa* or the *uttarapakṣa* as well as the subtypes of inconclusive reasons are concretely demonstrated, although there remain several vague points. These receive a commentarial clarification by Jinendrabuddhi.

Yet, as pointed out by Lü Cheng (1928) and others, it is most likely that the above passage of the NMu and that of the PSV below stand in a parallel relationship in light of their content and context.⁵⁷ The following passage is found after a brief criticism of a set of the four *jāti*s *sādharmyasama*, *vaidharmyasama*, *vikalpasama* and *aviśeṣasama*.

PSV 6.15a: *etāni sādharmyasamādīny apy*

uttarāṇi syur ekānte (PS 6.15a)

yady aikāntikaiḥ *sādharmyasamādibhir uttarapakṣe* pratyavasthānaṃ syāt, *pūrvapakṣe cānaikāntikavati yathopavarṇitena*, tato *dūṣaṇadvāreṇa sādhanadvāreṇa vā sādharmaṇāsādhārāṇaviruddhānaikāntikasādhya*bādhakacodanād *etāni dūṣaṇāny eva bhaveyuh*.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Cf. Lü 1928: 49, no. 133; Lü / Yincang 1928: 20, no. 122; Katsura 1984: 65 n. 4; Muroya 2017b: 97; Watanabe 2017: 153–154.

⁵⁸ The Sanskrit reconstruction of the PS and PSV is based on PST B 250b7–251a6 ([T] D303b2–304a2, P234a5–342b6), besides the following Tibetan translations: PSV (K) P172b8–173a2 (Kitagawa 1965: 546,14–547,5): *chos mthun pa la sogs pa 'di dag kyang || nges pa yin na lan du 'gyur ||* (15a) *gal te phyi ma la chos mthun pa dang mtshungs pa la sogs pa nges pa rnams kyis rtsod par byed pa la phyogs snga ma la yang ji skad bshad pas ma nges pa dang ldan na ni 'gyur te | de'i phyir sun 'byin sgo nas sam | sgrub par byed pa'i sgo nas thun mong dang | thun mong ma yin pa dang | 'gal ba dang | ma nges pa dang | bsgrub par bya ba la gnod par byed pa sgrub par byed par rtsod pa'i phyir 'di dag ni sun 'byin pa nyid du 'gyur te ||*; PSV (V) D82a1–3, P88b4–6 (Kitagawa 1965: 546,14–547,3): *de dag ni chos nyid chos mthun pa mtshungs pa la sogs pa phyogs phyi ma'o || gal te phyogs phyi ma las phyogs gcig tu nges par chos mthun pa la sogs pas phyogs gcig tu nges pas 'gal bar 'gyur ro ||* (15a.) *phyogs snga ma la ni ji skad du brjod*

These [aforementioned rejoinders] such as *sādharmyasama* [and the other three *jātis*]

would be [proper] rejoinders (*uttara*), too, if [they are] conclusive. (15a)

If an opposition were made by an opponent (*uttarapakṣa*) by means of *sādharmyasama* and others which are conclusive, and (*ca*) by means [of the inconclusive rejoinders] as explained [above], when a proponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) has stated an inconclusive [reason], then these [*jātis*] would become nothing but [valid] refutations, because [they] censure [the proponent], by way of refutation and proof, for [the proponent's reason] being (1) common and over-exclusive (*sādhāraṇa-/asādhāraṇa[-anaikāntika]*), (2) contradictory-inconclusive (*viruddhānaikāntika*, i.e., *viruddhāvyabhicārin*⁵⁹) and (3) invalidating what is to be proved (*sādhyabādhaka*, i.e., *viruddha*).⁶⁰

First of all, it is noticeable here that Dignāga admits two or more patterns for employing a *jāti* when it is used by the opponent (*uttarapakṣa*) to refute the proponent (*pūrvapakṣa*). The distinction between the patterns is dependent on whether the argument or inference of the proponent is conclusive (*aikāntika*) or inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). The same criteria thus apply to the *jāti* as the *uttarapakṣa*. A *jāti* is either conclusive (*aikāntika*) or inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). Theoretically speaking, four combinations are possible in reference to the two debaters, with two kinds of argumentative soundness. In the text of the PSV, two combinations are demonstrated explicitly. Regarding the combination of an inconclusive *pūrvapakṣa* with a conclusive *jāti*, which is not addressed in the text,

pa'i ma nges pa dang ldan pas de sun bton pa dang | sgrub pa'i sgo nas 'gal ba dang ma nges pa bsgrub par bya ba la gnod par brtsad pa'i phyir de dag ni sun 'byin gzhan nyid yin no ||. Cf. also footnote 45 above.

⁵⁹ On the *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, see, e.g., Tillemans (2000: 93, n. 332), Ono (2010) and Moriyama (2014).

⁶⁰ For a Japanese translation, see Kitagawa (1965: 328).

Watanabe (2017) holds that this is presupposed in both the NMu and the PS.⁶¹ And the combination of a conclusive *pūrvapakṣa* with an inconclusive *jāti* is not relevant in the present context of PS 6.15a, since this is a common type of sophistic rejoinder.

In the text of the PSV, it is certain that Dignāga is referring to the combination of the *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa*, both being inconclusive (*anai-kāntikavant* and *yathopavarṇita* [i.e., *anaikāntika*], respectively). It is tempting to assume that precisely this combination is related to part (4) of the NMu (cf. § 1), in which, in my understanding, a debater can direct a *jāti* against an improper inference (**asādhvanumāna*; cf. NV: *asādhūsādhana*) without directly pointing out the *pūrvapakṣa*'s logical fallacy. An echo of this combination is found in the Naiyāyika accounts (cf. § 2.2–2.3). In the case of Tang Chinese interpretations (cf. § 3.1–3.2), this pattern itself is mentioned, but their framework results in the exclusion of the *jāti* from the category of valid refutations.

In my understanding of Dignāga's description, his focus lies in analyzing the process of the *jāti* refutation. This analysis is undertaken in terms of its three aspects: opposition (*pratyavasthāna*), way / mode (*dvāra*) and censure (*codanā*). Each aspect has different attributes. In the above passage, however, Dignāga's explanation is not clear regarding the mutual relationships between the individual aspects and their attributes. One of the ambiguities lies in the fact that his explanation is so brief that one cannot identify, for instance, which object of censure (*codanā*) is connected to which mode (*dvāra*), or which mode is connected to which attribute of opposition (*pratyavasthāna*).

Regarding the *dvāra*, Dignāga presupposes that a refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) has two intermediate modes or "ways" (*dvāra*). One type of refutation can be undertaken by way of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and the other through proof (*sādhana*). These two types of refutation may entail the separation of the

⁶¹ Cf. Watanabe 2017: 154–155, pattern no. 2.

logical fallacies into two groups. On the one hand, the indication of *sādhāraṇa-/asādhāraṇānaikāntika* or *sādhyabādhaka* by the *uttarapakṣa* is allocated to the “refutation through refutation” (*dūṣaṇadvāra-dūṣaṇa*). On the other, the indication of *viruddhānaikāntika* is regarded as the “refutation through proof” (*sādhanadvāra-dūṣaṇa*).⁶² This transition of the logical fallacies is also illustrated in a passage on the *vikalpasama* in PSV 6.12’bcd–13a’: *dūṣaṇe sādharmaṇāsādhāraṇānaikāntikābhāsam*, *sādhane viruddhānaikāntikābhāsam*.⁶³ Here, the opponent using a *jāti* appears to be arguing that the failure or the success of the proponent in establishing his own reasoning should be equally applicable to the opponent’s reasoning. This indication of equality or parity (*sama*) is articulated in the form of a refutation or a proof, respectively, although the *jātivādin*’s reasoning is logically unsound.⁶⁴ This two-way countering by the *jātivādin* constitutes a typical situation of *prasaṅga* that demarcates a specific usage in

⁶² Jinendrabuddhi confirms this allocation of the two logical fallacies to the “way” of refutation or proof (cf. § 4.3.2 below).

⁶³ One could also refer to Dignāga’s similar statement in the analysis of *vikalpasama*, although it is concerned with the *jātivādin*’s “fallacious censure or indication” (*codanābhāsa*) of a logical fault. Cf. PSV on PS 6.12’bcd–13a’: *dūṣaṇe sādharmaṇāsādhāraṇānaikāntikābhāsam*, *sādhane viruddhānaikāntikābhāsam* (“When [the *vikalpasama* serves as] a refutation, [it is] a fallacious [indication of a] common-inconclusive or over-exclusive-inconclusive [reason]. When [the *vikalpasama* serves as] a proof, [it is] a fallacious [indication of a] contradictory-inconclusive [reason].”); PSV (K) P172a2–3 (Kitagawa 1965: 543,6–9): *sun ’byin pa yin na ni thun mong dang thun mong ma yin pa’i ma nges par snang ba yin no || sgrub byed yin na ’gal ba dang ma nges par snang ba yin no ||*; PSV (V) D81a5, P87b5 (Kitagawa 1965: 543,7–9): *sun ’byin pa la ni thun mong ngam thun mong ma yin pa’i ma nges pa ltar snang ba’o || bsgrub [D : sgrub P] pa la ni ’gal ba mi ’khrul ba can du rtsod pa ltar snang ba’o ||*; for this passage, cf. also Watanabe 2017: 158, n. 48. For translations, see Kitagawa (1965: 318) and Watanabe (2017: 158). The Sanskrit reconstruction of the PSV is based on PST Ms B 249a4 ([T] D301b3; P339b8); cf. footnote 74 below for the text.

⁶⁴ PSV 6.12’bcd–13a’: *svapakṣāsiddhivat paratrāsiddhidarśanād dūṣaṇam vaitat syāt, sādhanam vā*; PSV (K) P172a2 (Kitagawa 1965: 543,4–6): *rang la grub pa bzhin du gzhan la ma grub par bstan pas ’di sun ’byin pa nyid du ’gyur ram sgrub byed du ’gyur ba yin ||*; PSV (V) D81a4–5, P87b4 (Kitagawa 1965: 543,4–6): *rang gi phyogs la ma grub pa bzhin gzhan la ma grub pa bstan pa’i phyir sgrub par byed par ’gyur ro ||*; for the text, cf. Watanabe 2017: 157–158. For translations, see Kitagawa (1965: 318) and Watanabe

the context of the *jāti*, inasmuch as the equality is apparently brought about as an undesirable consequence.⁶⁵

For Dignāga, the aspect of the twofold “way” or modal intermediation, whether proof or refutation, appears to be related to the debater’s intention of applying a specific logical reason. If he intends to establish his own thesis with it (*svapakṣasiddhyartha*; cf. PST Ms B 249a4–5⁶⁶), his installment of the *jāti* becomes a *sādhana*, whereas if the *jāti* is being primarily used to indicate a fallacy in the proponent’s reasoning, then it is a *dūṣaṇa*. Dignāga’s distinction between these two levels of refutation, which finds no equivalent in the NMu, seems to be part of Dignāga’s theoretical development as reflected in the PS.

Dignāga’s definition of “refutation” in NMu k. 19ab (*dūṣaṇa*) and PS 6.2ab (*uttara*)⁶⁷ directly covers only the first type, “refutation through refutation,” whereas the second type seems not to be formally treated as such.

(2017: 158). The Sanskrit reconstruction of the PSV is based on PST Ms B 249a3–4 ([T] D301b1–2, P339b5–7). For Dignāga’s similar illustration in the case of *sādharmyasama* and *vaidharmyasama*, see PS 6.8’d–9 (Kitagawa 1965: 539,5–6 and 539,15–16); cf. also NMu 4c8–10 (cf. Kitagawa 1965: 308, n. 748; Katsura 1984: 64, nn. 1–2).

⁶⁵ On the usage of *prasaṅga* in the context of the *jāti*, see footnote 25 and §§ 2.2–2.3. Explaining the theory of an antinomic reason (*viruddhāvvyabhicārin*) as described by Dignāga, Moriyama (2014: 123) makes the important observation that “its logical structure constitutes a *prasaṅga* (*reductio ad absurdum*) style of reasoning: the proponent’s claim is rebutted by a counter-proof, which reveals the absurdity of the proponent’s metaphysical presuppositions.”

⁶⁶ PST (T) D301b3, P339b8. For the relevant passage of the PST, cf. footnote 74 below.

⁶⁷ On the definition of *dūṣaṇa* and *dūṣaṇābhāsa* in the NMu, see footnotes 13 and 14 above. The definition of *uttara* and *uttararūpaka* in PS 6.2 is: *tatpradarśanam evāto yuk-tam uttaram ucyate / tadābhāsābhidhānam ca jātiṣūttararūpakam //* (“Therefore, precisely the indication of the [deficiency (*nyūnatā*) and so forth] is said to be the proper rejoinder. Among the *jāti*s, for their part, the statement of the fallacious [indication of the deficiency and so forth] is the pseudo-rejoinder.”); cf. PSV (K) P170a1–2 (Kitagawa 1965: 531,4–5): *de’i phyir de bstan pa nyid ni || rigs pa’i lam du brjod pa yin || der snang ba ni brjod byed pa yang || lan dang ’du ba ltag chod yin ||*; PSV (V) D78b2–3, P84a7–8 (Kitagawa 1965: 531,4–7): *de nyid rab tu bstan phyir dang || de ltar snang ba brjod pa’i phyir || lan ’di brjod par rigs pa yin || ltag spyod la ni rjes mthun lan ||*. This reconstruction of the PS is based on PST Ms B 243a7–243b1 ([T] D295a4–5, P332a8–332b3). For the

It may be related to the dialectical nature of antinomy, which is bound to invalidate (*vi-√rudh*) the proponent's proof. However, an account of whether or to what extent the fallacy of antinomy falls under the *jātivādin* is missing in Dignāga's discussion.

On the basis of the PSV passage, the relationship between the *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa* is summarized in the table below.⁶⁸

pūrvapakṣa		uttarapakṣa		
		<i>pratyavasthāna</i>	<i>dvāra</i>	<i>codanā</i>
i	(<i>aikāntikavant</i>)	<i>aikāntika</i>	<i>dūṣaṇa</i> /	<i>sādhāraṇa- /asādharaṇā- naikāntika</i>
(ii)	(<i>anaikāntikavant</i>)		<i>sādhana</i>	<i>viruddhānaikā- ntika</i>
iii	<i>anaikāntikavant</i>	* <i>anaikāntika</i>		<i>sādhyabādhaka</i>
(iv)	(<i>aikāntikavant</i>)	(<i>anaikāntika</i>)	(<i>uttararūpaka</i> / <i>jāti</i>)	

Table 3: Dignāga's model of the cases in which a *jāti* becomes a refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) [* : implicit; () : unstated.⁶⁹]

The horizontal relationship between the items in each column of (i) and (ii) is not clearly determined. For their correlation, as will be shown below, Jinendrabuddhi's gloss is of help, although there is no absolute certainty

text and translations, see Ono (2017c: 49) and Watanabe (2017: esp. 151–152) as well as the latter's contribution to the present volume.

⁶⁸ Watanabe (2017: 154, Table 1) also summarizes this combinatory pattern.

⁶⁹ In this table, I have supplemented in parentheses items that are not explicitly treated by Dignāga, but which can be hypothesized partly through Jinendrabuddhi's explanation.

that it reflects Dignāga's intentions. Given this reservation, Jinendrabuddhi's gloss suggests the relevance of only pattern (i) and (iii). The relevance of pattern (iv) constitutes the common type of *jāti*.

The pattern (ii), partly in parentheses, is regarded as a kind of proper refutation and is elaborated by Kitagawa (1965), who adduces the following cases as an illustration, including pattern (iii):⁷⁰

(1) [pattern (ii): *sādharmyasama* = inconclusive *pūrvapakṣa* ↔ conclusive *uttarapakṣa*]

pūrvapakṣa: Sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, [un]like a pot (*vaidharmyadrṣṭānta*).

uttarapakṣa: Sound is non-eternal, because it arises after efforts, like a pot (*sādharmyadrṣṭānta*).

(2) [pattern (iii): *vaidharmyasama* = inconclusive *pūrvapakṣa* ↔ inconclusive *uttarapakṣa*]

pūrvapakṣa: Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, like the movement of a pot (*sādharmyadrṣṭānta*).

uttarapakṣa: Sound is eternal, because it is not visible, [un]like the movement of a pot (*vaidharmyadrṣṭānta*).

Pattern (ii) is a case of *sādharmyasama* that resorts to the homogeneity (*sādharmya*) of “sound” to the exemplified “pot” (**ghaṭavat*), which is originally presented by the proponent as a dissimilar example.⁷¹ As regards the second case, Kitagawa considers it to be the *vaidharmyasama*, it resorting to the heterogeneity (*vaidharmya*) of “sound” from the illustrated “movement of a pot” (**ghaṭakarmavat*), which is considered visible.

⁷⁰ Kitagawa 1965: 328–329; cf. also Muroya 2017b: 122; Watanabe 2017: 158–159.

⁷¹ On Dignāga's *sādharmyasama*, see Kitagawa (1965: 307) and Katsura (1984: 54). Cf. also TPhSI II/241–246, s.v.; Prets 2001: 550–552; Gillon 2003 (with a detailed analysis of Vātsyāyana's text on both *sādharmyasama* and *vaidharmyasama*).

Kitagawa further explains the validity of pattern (iii) as a valid refutation in that the opponent as a *jātivādin* is successful in demonstrating their similarity with respect to the logical reasons, *amūrtatva* and *acākṣuṣatva*, being equally invalid, or more precisely, being classified as common-inconclusive (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*).

4.3. Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation

4.3.1. Aspect of *pratyavasthāna*

Jinendrabuddhi's introduction to Dignāga's unique characterization of *jāti*s is significant. It touches directly on the main issue of whether *jāti*s are absolutely invalid as rejoinders, or whether certain *jāti*s can serve as valid or legitimate rejoinders under certain circumstances. He must have been aware that this topic was not self-evident in PS 6.15a. Historically speaking, this assumption of a rather ambivalent nature of *jāti*s would have been unacceptable for other thinkers, such as the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara, who, as was suggested above, criticizes Dignāga's description (cf. § 2.2). It is, moreover, out of place in Dharmakīrti's scheme of debate situations (cf. footnote 15 above).

In the passage below, Jinendrabuddhi's gloss is mainly concerned with the aspect of "opposition," or literally "standing in opposition" (*pratyavasthāna*), whether it is conclusive or not. At the beginning, he refers to Dignāga's abbreviated statement "*sādharmyasama* and so on," specifying that these are the following four *jāti*s, namely, *sādharmyasama*, *vaidharmyasama*, *vikalpasama* and *aviśeṣasama*.

PST on PS 6.15a⁷²: *kiṃ punar etāni sādharmaṇyavaidharmaṇyavikalpāviśeṣa^asamāny uttarābhāsāny eva sarvatra bhavanti, uta kvacid uttarāṇy apīty ata āha — uttarāṇi syur ityādi. aikāntikavati pūrvapakṣe*

⁷² PST Ms B 250b7–251a3; PST (T) D303b2–5, P342a5–342b1.

*yady aikāntikair ebhiḥ pratyavasthānaṃ syāt, tadaitāni dūṣaṇāṇy eva bhaveyuh. tulyapratyavasthānān na tadābhāsāni. prakārāntareṇāpy uttarāṇy eva syur iti darśayann āha — pūrvapakṣe cānaikāntikavattīyādi. anaikāntikavati vā^b pūrvapakṣe yadi yathopavarṇitena vyabhicāriṇā sādharṃyasamādinā pratyavasthānaṃ syāt, evam apy etāny uttarāṇy eva^c syuh.*⁷³

However, are these [rejoinders such as] *sādharmya[sama]*, *vaidharṃya[sama]*, *vikalpa[sama]*, *aviśeṣasama* nothing but pseudo-rejoinders (*uttarābhāsa*) in all cases, or in some cases [do they serve as proper] rejoinders as well? On account of this [question], he (Dignāga) states that “[they] would be [proper] rejoinders” and so on. When [the reasoning of] the proponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) has a conclusive [reason] (*aikāntikavant*), [and] if [the opponent (*uttarapakṣa*) makes] an opposition (*pratyavasthāna*) by these [*jātis*] which are conclusive, then these [*jātis*] would become truly [proper] refutations. Because [these *jātis* are] an opposition that is equal [in power to the proponent’s reasoning], [these are] not fallacious [refutations (i.e., *uttarābhāsa*)]. They would be truly [proper] rejoinders, though in a different way (*prakārāntara*). [For] demonstrating this, he (Dignāga) states “and when [the reasoning of] the proponent is inconclusive” and so on. Or when [the reasoning of] the proponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) has an inconclusive [reason] (*anaikāntikavant*), [and] if [the opponent (*uttarapakṣa*) makes] an opposition by *sādharmyasama* and others [of such a kind] as explained [above, namely], which are deviating (*vyabhicārin*), [then,] even so, these [*jātis*] would be truly [proper] rejoinders.

Possibly along the line of Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi explains two ways of combining the *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa* as set forth by *jātivādins*. The

⁷³ v.l. a. °*vikalpāviśeṣa*°] em.; °*vikalpaviśeṣa*° Ms – b. *vā*] Ms; n.e. T – c. *eva*] Ms; n.e. T.

first pair presents reasonings that are both conclusive (*aikāntikavant*, *ai-kāntika*), the second pair, that are both inconclusive (*anaikāntikavant*, *anaikāntika*).

It is especially worth noting that Jinendrabuddhi refers to the concept of an “opposition that is equal (to the proposition)” (*tulyapratyavasthāna*) or the “equally balanced opposition.” This is used to explain how a *dūṣaṇābhāsa* (*uttarābhāsa*) might serve as a proper *dūṣaṇa* (*uttara*). Unfortunately, Jinendrabuddhi does not offer an account of the term *tulyapratyavasthāna*. It is conceivable that this term indicates the equality of power (**tulyabala*) of a counterargument to an opponent’s argument.⁷⁴ It seems that this concept can be traced back to the possibly identical or similar Chinese expression *dengnan* (等難) that is found in the same context in the NMu translation.⁷⁵ If the reasoning of both sides is equally conclusive or inconclusive, the validity or invalidity of their reasoning stands in a balanced relationship and the proponent’s position becomes as doubtful as that of the opponent. Unless further argumentation is presented, this would lead the debate to end in a draw.

Following Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation, for Dignāga, eristic modes of argumentation that include a *jāti* can shift from being illegitimate to being

⁷⁴ In the *jāti* chapter of the PS, the term *tulyabala* does not occur. My interpretation is based on the next passage in the PST, which concerns Dignāga’s analysis of the *jātivādin*’s indication of antinomy (*viruddhāvyabhicārin*) as being fallacious (*viruddhāvyabhicārābhāsa*). Cf. PST Ms B 249a4–5 on PSV 6.12’bcd–13a’ (PST [T] D301b3, P339b8–340a1): *sādhane viruddhānaikāntikābhāsam iti. yady apākyatvādi svapakṣasiddhyartham eva prayuñkte, tato viruddhāvyabhi°cāryābhāsam atulyabalatvāt.* [v.l.: a. *viruddhāvyabhi°*] em. (‘gal ba mi ’khrul ba T); *viruddhavyabhi°* Ms.] (“As regards [the expression] that ‘[a *jāti* would be] the fallacious [indication of a] contradictory-inconclusive [reason], if [it is employed as] a proof [of an opponent’s thesis (*uttarapakṣa*)].’ If the [opponent] employs [a reason such as] the property of ‘not being to be burned / cooked’ exactly for the purpose of establishing his own position, then [such a rejoinder is] the fallacious [indication of a] contradictory and non-deviating [reason], because [the opponent’s reason] does not have power equal [to the proponent’s reason].”) Cf. also footnotes 63 and 66 above.

⁷⁵ Cf. footnote 47 above.

legitimate. A sound argument by a proponent can be neutralized in the balance of power by an argument set forth by the opponent, and if the proponent fails to reply in a reasonable manner, his argument can lose its initial logical force. It can also be assumed that targeted in Dignāga's specific treatment of the two aspects of the *jāti*, if not in its entirety, are the logical formulations employed by ordinary people (*laukika*) or bad logicians (*kutārkika*) in which the "invariable concomitance" (*avinābhāvitva*) of the probandum and probans is not properly demonstrated in the exemplification.⁷⁶ Dignāga's observation that a *jāti* can be legitimate under certain circumstances may have referred to a certain dialectical dynamic that can occasionally count in a real debate, but one that is not necessarily of a well-intentioned rational nature. Although Dignāga was not promoting sophistic eloquence or polemic hostility with this usage of a *jāti*, this possibility, even within its restricted legitimation, did not encounter agreement in either Nyāya texts or Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*.

4.3.2. Aspects of *pratyavasthāna*, *dvāra* and *codanā*

Jinendrabuddhi now explains the latter half of Dignāga's PS 6.15a. He provides comments on various aspects, including the *dvāra* and *codanā*, and, differently from Dignāga's brief treatment, concretely adduces the

⁷⁶ Cf. PST Ms B 248a4–5 on PS 6.10cd (PST [T] D300b2–3, P338b3–4): *nanu ca yathā jātivādinā prayogeṇa^a hetor avinābhāvitvaṃ nopadarśitam, tathā pūrvapakṣavādināpi tato laukikaṃ prayogaṃ prati dūṣaṇatvaṃ evānayoṃ yuktam, tulyaparyavasthānāt^b. v.l. a. prayogeṇa] em. (cf. sbyor bas T); prayogena Ms – b. °paryavasthānāt] Ms (cf. yongs su gnas par T). ("However, is it not that, as the [opponent] presenting the *jāti* does not demonstrate the invariable concomitance of a logical reason by his logical formulation, likewise [nor does] the [proponent] presenting [his] position? Hence, it is reasonable that these two [*jātis*, i.e., *sādharmyasama* and *vaidharmyasama*] become a [valid] refutation in respect to the logical formulations [employed] by ordinary persons, because [these *jātis* can be] an opposition which is equal [to such proponent's proof].") For translations, see also Kitagawa (1965: 312–313, n. 754) and Muroya (2017b: 127–128, nn. 106 and 112).*

allocation of individual fallacies to the four *jāti*s in terms not only of *pratyavasthāna*, but also of *dvāra* and *codanā*.

PST on PS 6.15a⁷⁷: *etad eva darśayati – tato dūṣaṇadvāreṇetyādinā. tatra sādharṃyavaidharṃyasamayor anaikāntikavati pūrvapakṣe 'n- aikāntikenaiva pratyavasthānād dūṣaṇadvāreṇānaikāntikacodanāt, aikāntikavaty aikāntikena pratyavasthānāt sādhanadvāreṇa viruddhā- naikāntikacodanāt. vikalpasame tu sādharmaṇāsādhārāṇānaikāntika- vati pūrvapakṣe sādharmaṇāsādhārāṇābhyāṃ pratyavasthānād dūṣa- ṇadvāreṇa sādharmaṇāsādhārāṇānaikāntikacodanāt, aikāntikavaty ai- kāntikena^a pratyavasthānāt sādhanā^bdvāreṇa viruddhānaikāntikaco- danāt. evam aviśeṣasame prathame. tṛtīye tv aikāntikavaty aikāntikena pratyavasthānād dūṣaṇadvāreṇa sādhyabādhakacodanād etāni dū- ṣaṇāny eva bhaveyuh.*⁷⁸

He (Dignāga) shows exactly this [shift of the *jāti*] with [the passage] “then, by way of refutation” and so forth. As regards this, in the case of *sādharṃyasama* and *vaidharyasama*, [these would become truly valid refutations] (1a) because, when the proponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) has stated an inconclusive [reason], [the opponent (*uttarapakṣa*)] censures [him] for [that reason’s] being inconclusive by way of a refutation (*dūṣaṇadvāra*) based on the opposition (*pratyavasthāna*) by a mere inconclusive [rejoinder], [or] (1b) because, when [the proponent] has stated a conclusive [reason], [the opponent] censures [him] for [that reason’s] being contradictory-inconclusive (*viruddhānaikāntika*) by way of a proof (*sādhanadvāra*) based on the opposition by a conclu- sive [rejoinder]. In the case of *vikalpasama*, for its part, [certain re- joinders would become proper refutations or proofs], (2a) because, when the proponent (*pūrvapakṣa*) has stated a common[-inconclu-

⁷⁷ PST Ms B f. 251a3–6; PST (T) D303b5–304a2, P342b1–6.

⁷⁸ v.l. a. °*kavaty aikāntikena*] em.; °*kavati naikāntikena* Ms (*ldan pa la mtha’ gcic tu gnas pa ma yin pas* T) – b. *sādhana*°] em. (*sgrub par byed pa’i* T); *sādhārāṇa*° Ms.

sive] (*sādhāraṇa[-anaikāntika]*) or over-exclusive-inconclusive (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) [reason], [the opponent] censures [him] for [that reason's] being common[-inconclusive] (*sādhāraṇa[-anaikāntika]*) or over-exclusive-inconclusive (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) by way of a refutation based on the opposition by a common or over-exclusive [reason], [or] (2b) because, when [the proponent] has stated a conclusive [reason], [the opponent] censures [him] for [that reason's] being contradictory-inconclusive (*viruddhānaikāntika*, i.e., *viruddhāvya-bhicārin*) through a proof based on the opposition by an inconclusive [rejoinder]. [The explanation in case of *vikalpasama* applies] in the same way concerning the first [type of] *aviśeṣasama*.⁷⁹ In the case of the third [*aviśeṣasama*], these rejoinders would be truly [proper] refutations, (3) because, when [the proponent] has stated a conclusive [reason], [the opponent] censures [him] for [that reason's] invalidating what is to be proved (*sādhyabādhaka*, i.e., *viruddha*) by way of a refutation based on opposition by a conclusive [rejoinder].

A detailed summary of Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is given in the table below. Dignāga's combination patterns (cf. Table 3 above) are reproduced in the right-hand column (D.).

J.	pūrvapakṣa	uttarapakṣa	D.
<i>jāti</i>		<i>pratyavasthāna</i>	<i>dvāra</i> <i>codanā</i>
a <i>sādharmyasama</i> /	<i>anaikāntikavant</i>	<i>anaikāntika</i>	<i>dūṣaṇa</i> <i>anaikāntika</i> iii
b <i>vaidharmyasama</i>	<i>aikāntikavant</i>	<i>aikāntika</i>	<i>sādhana</i> <i>viruddhānaikāntika</i> i

⁷⁹ On the similarity in the indication of logical faults as found between *vikalpasama* and the first type of *viśeṣasama*, see Kitagawa 1965: 324. A fallacious indication of the proponent's reason as inconclusive does not occur in the NMu, but it is found in the PS; cf. Katsura 1984: 68–69.

c	<i>vikalpa-sama</i>	<i>sādhāraṇa-asādhāraṇā-naikāntikavant</i>	<i>sādhāraṇa-asādhāraṇa</i>	<i>dūṣaṇa</i>	<i>sādhāraṇa-asādhāraṇānaikāntika</i>	iii
d		<i>aikāntikavant</i>	<i>aikāntika</i>	<i>sādhana</i>	<i>viruddhā-naikāntika</i>	i
e	<i>aviśeṣasama (1)</i>	<i>*anaikāntikavant</i>	<i>*anaikāntika</i>	<i>*dūṣaṇa</i>	<i>*sādhāraṇa-asādhāraṇānaikāntika</i>	iii
f		<i>*aikāntikavant</i>	<i>*aikāntika</i>	<i>*sādhanā</i>	<i>*viruddhā-naikāntika</i>	i
g	<i>aviśeṣasama (3)</i>	<i>aikāntikavant</i>	<i>aikāntika</i>	<i>dūṣaṇa</i>	<i>sādhyabādhaka</i>	i

Table 4: Jinendrabuddhi’s model of the cases in which a *jāti* becomes a refutation (*dūṣaṇa*). [J. = Jinendrabuddhi, D. = Dignāga, * = hypothetical, () = unstated.]

It can be noticed that in all combinations on the horizontal level, the conclusiveness and inconclusiveness of the proponent correspond to those of the opponent in a respective manner. Pattern (i) of Dignāga’s model corresponds to the conclusive cases (b, d, f, g) of Jinendrabuddhi’s model, and Dignāga’s pattern (iii) to Jinendrabuddhi’s inconclusive cases (a, c, e).⁸⁰ His clarification may conform to Dignāga’s scheme of the twofold

⁸⁰ Interestingly, Jinendrabuddhi’s pattern (g)—the third type of *aviśeṣasama*, which is Dignāga’s pattern (i)—functions as a mode of refutation only. On this, Dignāga appears to offer a summary in the form of the following stanza: PS 6.14: *sādhyabādhakadharme ’pi tulyatvenāviśeṣakṛt / hetor doṣe viruddhābhā doṣābhāve tu dūṣaṇam //* (“The [third type of *aviśeṣasamā*] makes [a censure of] non-distinction due to equality (*tulyatva*) when the property [as what is to be proved by the *jātivādin*] invalidates what is to be proved [by the proponent]. [This censure is] a fallacious [indication of] contradiction when the [*jātivādin*’s] logical reason has a fault, but if there is no fault, [it becomes] a [proper] refutation.”); PSV (K) P172b7–8 (Kitagawa 1965: 546,10–13): *bgrub bya gnod byed chos dag kyang || mtshungs pa nyid kyis khyad med byas || gtan tshigs skyon ni ’gal bar snang || skyon med na ni de lan yin ||*; PSV (V) D82a1, P88b3 (Kitagawa 1965:

combination (i) and (iii), which constitutes a situation in which their reasoning possesses equal power (**tulyabala*) to establish one's own claim in relation to the proof of the proponent. As mentioned above, these two patterns appear to have been known to Uddyotakara as the "parallel relationship" (*parāparabhāva*; cf. § 4.1).

5. Conclusion

The starting point of the present article was the disputed understanding of the passage in Dignāga's NMu (cf. § 1) bearing the number (4) that describes a case of "not being called a *fallacious* similarity (**jāti*)" (*bu ming guolei* 不名過類). The purpose and context of this passage have been variously interpreted. In particular, modern scholars have held that this specific case should not be included in the scope of the functions of the *jāti*. The questions to be clarified were whether a logically improper *jāti*, which is commonly defined as a fallacious refutation (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*), can serve to indicate the logical fallacy of an opponent who posits a fallacious reasoning in the same way a proper refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) does, and whether this specific kind of *jāti* can be regarded as effective and valid as a proper refutation. Passage (4) is not taken up in the PS, although it frequently features parallel or extended descriptions, especially in the chapter on *jāti*. All this complexity has led to this passage not only having been isolated from the context of the *jāti*, but also from another passage in the NMu (cf. § 4.1) where Dignāga discusses dialectical legitimacy, legitimacy that might pertain to a *jāti* in a contentious debate.

I have demonstrated that this problematic passage (4) in the NMu can indeed be considered part of the description of the *jāti* by comparing it to a remarkably similar, if not completely identical, passage by Uddyotakara

546,10–13): *bsgrub bya ba ni gnod chos kyang || mtshungs pa nyid kyi (kyis P) bye brag med || gtan tshigs skyon la 'gal ltar snang || skyon yod min te phyogs phyi ma ||*. For a translation, see Kitagawa 1965: 327. The Sanskrit reconstruction of the PS is based on PST Ms B 250b5–7 ([T] D303a6–303b2, P342a1–5).

(§ 2.2) in his NV, where he quotes an unidentified opponent. This has been augmented by an investigation of the interpretation of this passage by Vācaspati Miśra (§ 2.3) in his commentary on the NV, as well as an analysis of the East Asian reception of Xuanzang's translation of passage (4) through fragments of texts by Dingbin (§ 3.1) and Wengui (§ 3.2). This has led us to reconsider the modern understanding of passage (4) in the NMu and moreover, to reevaluate the intention of Xuanzang's translation. This has clearly shown that the quoted sixth-century Naiyāyika understood the passage in question as being within the scope of the *jāti*, and in the seventh- to eighth-century East Asian context, it was considered within that of the *dūṣaṇābhāsa*. It is notable that while Uddyotakara and Vācaspati discuss the positive functions of the *jāti*, the East Asian logicians deal with the positive aspect of the *dūṣaṇābhāsa* when it serves as a valid *dūṣaṇa*, thus losing the status of a *jāti*. In the South Asian context, the *jāti* is a superordinate category that has two sides; it functions as both *dūṣaṇābhāsa* and *dūṣaṇa*.

The East Asian categorization is obviously tied to Xuanzang's translation of "not being called a *fallacious* similarity (**jāti*)" (*bu ming guolei* 不名過類). I am currently inclined to ascribe Xuanzang's expression to being a free rendering of an expression such as Uddyotakara's *prasaṅgavyājena* ("in the semblance of an undesirable consequence [of equality]"). This term from the NV signifies a certain type of *jāti* that is emphatically differentiated from the native, sophistic *jāti*. The former type of *jāti*, while still logically fallacious, is nevertheless adopted to refute an equally invalid argument. This peculiar usage may be integrated into pattern (iii) of Dignāga's model of the application of the *jāti* that is described in the PS (cf. table 3). Xuanzang was surely aiming at imparting a negative implication to the scope of the *jāti*, seen in the Chinese rendering with "fallacious similarity" (*guolei* 過類) that he adopted for the native *jāti*. Observations of the intellectual milieu of Xuanzang's disciples as seen from the fragments of Tang China commentators on the NMu might allow us to

assume that Xuanzang, too, endorsed the theory of the shift of *dūṣaṇā-bhāsa* to *dūṣaṇa*.

To explore internal evidence that testifies to the theoretical coherence of Dignāga's description, we have examined relevant passages not only from the NMu but also from the PS, likely Dignāga's last work of logic as seen in its substantial development of his thoughts and theories. In the NMu, possibly in part due to general features of the work,⁸¹ the relevant description of the *jāti* (§ 4.1) is neither systematic nor elaborate. In the PS, in contrast, Dignāga has dedicated a brief section (§ 4.2) to explaining the ways in which a *jāti* can serve as a legitimate refutation. It is clear that Dignāga includes here those cases in which a *jāti*, both logically valid and invalid, is applied to a corresponding valid or invalid reasoning, thus acquiring the status of a proper refutation (cf. Table 3). This explanation in the words of Dignāga, with the help of Jinendrabuddhi's commentarial explication (§ 4.3–4.3.2), makes it plausible that passage (4) in the NMu is also part of Dignāga's theory of *jāti*.

It is probable that Dignāga's earlier formulation of passage (4) in the NMu resulted from his awareness of eristic disputation and that it reflects influences from his intellectual tradition that are closely linked to the so-called *vāda* tradition and the logical works of Vasubandhu, for whom the argument based on the *jāti* was fallacious.⁸² The concept of employing a logically invalid *jāti* to refute an equally invalid argument appears to have found a theoretical refinement in the PS, where Dignāga has attempted to systematize and describe the wide-ranging scope of the *jāti*. With the ex-

⁸¹ On the different target groups of the NMu and PS as interpreted by Jinendrabuddhi, see Muroya 2017a.

⁸² For Vasubandhu's critical treatment in the *Vādaśāstra*, see Frauwallner 1957 and Ono 2017b; cf. also Ono 2017a on the **Tarkaśāstra* ascribed to Vasubandhu according to some sources.

ception of the **Upāyahṛdaya* (Taishō 1632) and some Mādhyamika thinkers,⁸³ Dignāga's assignment of a limited legitimacy to the *jāti* is unique in the South Asian Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition. He may have had good reasons, though as yet unexplored, to justify his detailed analysis of the *jāti*, an analysis that comprises nearly half of the NMu. Dignāga's interest may be a clue to his intellectual surroundings, the surroundings from and in which his new system of logic originated and developed. Indeed, the position of debate (*vāda*) in a wider sense within the logic of Dignāga remains ambiguous in a number of aspects and certainly requires further investigation.

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⁸³ On the relation of Dignāga's treatment to the **Upāyahṛdaya*, which represents an early phase of the *vāda* tradition, see Watanabe 2017: 162. On the usage and assessment of *jāti* by Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, see Ono 2019.

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- NBT *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara), in: NB.
- NMu *Nyāyamukha* (Dignāga): Chinese Translation by Xuanzang 玄奘. *Yinming zhengli men lun ben* 因明正理門論本, Taishō 1628.
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NVTṬ (C) *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, ed. by Taranatha Nyaya-

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- PST Ms B Manuscript B of the PST.
- PST (T) Tibetan translation of PST by (dPañ lo) Blo gros brtan pa: sDe dge edition, Tōhoku 4268; Peking edition, Ōtani 5766.
- PS / PSV *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and its *ṣṭī* of Dignāga.
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- PS / PSV (V) Tibetan translation of PS and PSV by Vasudhararakṣita and Zha ma Seng ge rgyal mtshan: sDe dge edition, Tōhoku 4204; Peking edition, Ōtani 5701.
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YLSGS

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On the Concept of *nyūna* in Dignāga's Theory of Fallacy¹

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Introduction

In Indian logic, *nyūna* (or *nyūna-tā/-tva*) is a term used to refer to a kind of fallacy, namely, one in which one of the member statements of the proof (*avayava*) has deficiency. This is the concept which Dignāga (ca. 480–540) adopted in his *Nyāyamukha* (NMu). But in his later *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (PS) and his own *Vṛtti* on it (PSV), he changes the definition of *nyūna* by connecting it to the theory of *trairūpya*. His new interpretation of *nyūna* was then taken up by his Buddhist followers, including Dharmakīrti (ca. 550–650) and his successors.

It was, however, not Dignāga who first linked the theory of *trairūpya* to the concept of *nyūna*. Prior to the PS, in the *Shun zhonglun* (順中論), which is attributed to the Yogācāra teacher Asaṅga (4th cent.) or his younger brother Vasubandhu (ca. 350–430), a view similar to Dignāga's new interpretation of *nyūna* is mentioned as the opinion of a Sāṅkhya opponent.

Dignāga's theory of logic was transmitted to East Asian Buddhists

¹ Work on this paper was generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the framework of the FWF project 27452, as well as by the JSPS Grant-in-Aid Research Project 15H03155 and 18H05568. I would like to thank Prof. Brendan S. Gillon for giving me invaluable suggestions and Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for correcting my English.

through Xuanzang's (玄奘, 600/602–664) Chinese translations of the NMu and the *Nyāyapraveśaka* (NP) of Śāṅkarasvāmin (ca. 500–560), i.e., the *Yinming zhengli men lun* 因明正理門論 and the *Yinming ru zhengli lun* 因明入正理論, respectively. Although Xuanzang did not translate either the PS or the PSV into Chinese, some of his disciples, such as Shentai (神泰, fl. ca. 650) and Kuiji (窺基, 632–682), nonetheless use Dignāga's revised interpretation of *nyūna* in their commentaries on the NMu and the NP.

In this paper, I shall compare Dignāga's views on *nyūna* with the views presented by pre- and post-Dignāga logicians, and I will use this comparison to shed some light on several aspects of the transmission and transformation of Buddhist logic in its movement from India to East Asia.

1. Dignāga's interpretations of *nyūna*²

First, we will take a look at the difference between Dignāga's two interpretations of *nyūna* as presented in his two works on logic.

1.1. *Nyāyamukha* — traditional interpretation: deficiency of the statement of any one of the three members of a proof

In the NMu, Dignāga mentions *nyūna*[-*tā/-tva*] when discussing refutation (能破, **dūṣaṇa*).

[1-1] NMu 3c19–21³: 此中^{(1→}「能破闕等言」^{←1)}者、謂前所說闕等言詞諸分過失彼一一言、皆名能破。由彼一一能顯前宗非善說

² A part of sections 1 and 2 of this paper are based on my previous article (Watanabe 2017), but with some modifications.

³ Katsura 1982: 97–98, §9; Tucci 1930: 53–54.

故。

¹⁾ Cf. *Kāvyaśaṅkārā* 5.28a: *dūṣaṇaṃ nyūnatādyuktiḥ*. (see Kobayashi 1977: 895, fn.21); NB 3.138: *dūṣaṇāni nyūnatādyuktiḥ*; PVin 3.85a: *dūṣaṇā nyūnatādyuktiḥ*.

As for [the phrase] in this [verse (k.19a)] “a refutation is a statement [pointing out] a deficiency (闕), etc.”: [“A statement pointing out a deficiency” means] (1) a statement [pointing out] a deficiency (闕), which have been explained before, and so forth (謂前所說闕等言詞), [namely,] (2) a statement [pointing out] each fault of the [three] members of a proof (諸分過失彼一一言). All these [statements] are called a refutation. This is because each of them can make it clear that the thesis of the opponent is not correct.

It is clear that the phrase “謂前所說闕等言詞諸分過失彼一一言” is an explanation of the words “a statement [pointing out] a deficiency, etc.” (闕等言, **nyūnatādyukti*) which appear in the k.19. But as is seen in previous studies, there are two different interpretations of this phrase. In both interpretations, the meaning of 等 (**ādi*) in 闕等 (**nyūnatādi*) refers presumably to same fault(s) of a proof such as excess (*adhika*) or repetition (*punarukta*).⁴ The difference between them lies in how to understand the relationship between (1) “謂前所說闕等言詞,” the first part of the phrase, and the latter part (2) “諸分過失彼一一言.” The first interpretation is (i) that these two parts are appositional, i.e., 闕等 and 諸分過失 express a same type of fallacy in a proof. The other is (ii) that the two parts are juxtaposed, i.e., 闕等 and 諸分過失 express a different type of fallacy in a proof.⁵

To solve the problem, we should see the passage where Dignāga has

⁴ See Watanabe 2017: 143–144.

⁵ While Tucci 1930: 53 adopts the first interpretation, Ui 1929: 652 and Katsura 1982: 97 do the second one.

mentioned the “deficiency” before. It is, as Katsura 1982:97 pointed out, the beginning of the NMu and it reads as follows:

[1-2] NMu 1a11–13⁶: ^{(1→}「宗等多言說能立」^{←1)}者、由宗因喻多言辯說他未了義、故此多言於論式等說名能立。^{(2→}又以一言說能立者、爲顯總成一能立性^{←2)}。由此應知隨有所闕名能立過。

¹⁾ Cf. NP 2,1: *pakṣādivacanāni sādhanam*. (See Katsura 1977: 109)

²⁾ See NPV 19,5–6: *sādhanaṃ iti caikavacanānirdeśaḥ samastā-sādhanatvakhyañpanārthaḥ*. (See Inami 1991: 76, n. 33.)

As for [the phrase of NMu k.1a] “a multipartite statement consisting of the thesis, etc. is called a means of proof (能立, **sādhana*)”: Since [the proponent] uses a multipartite statement consisting of a thesis, logical reason and an example to argue for something which [his] opponent does not understand, this multipartite statement is therefore called a means of proof in [Vasubandhu’s] *Vādaśāstra* (論式) and elsewhere. Moreover, [in k.1] “the means of proof” is expressed in the singular in order to make it clear that the aggregate [of these three members of a proof] forms a single means of proof. Therefore, it should be understood that [the case where any one of three] is deficient is called a fault of a proof.

From this description, it is understood that “a fault of a proof” in the last sentence of this passage [1-2] is the deficiency of any one of the three members of a proof, i.e., a thesis (*pakṣa*, 宗), logical reason (*hetu*, 因) and an example (*drṣṭānta*, 喻). Therefore, the deficiency (闕, **nyūnatā*) mentioned in the text [1-1] is also the deficiency of any one

⁶ Katsura 1977: 110–111, §1.1.; Tucci 1930: 5–6.

of the three members of a proof. Consequently, of the two interpretations of relevant phrase in the text [1-1], the first interpretation (i), i.e., the deficiency means a fault of the three members of a proof, should be adopted.

However, there is still another problem: What does this “deficiency” mean? The deficiency of any one of the three members of a proof occurs (a) when any one of them is not stated at all, or (b) when, even though each of the members have been stated, one of them has a logical problem. Since Dignāga does not give any detailed description about the meaning of deficiency in the NMu, it is not clear whether he distinguishes these two meanings. As is seen in the following sections 3 and 4, however, much attention is paid to the difference in the tradition of East Asian Buddhist logic.⁷

Either way, the meaning of *nyūna* in the NMu is deficiency of any one of three members of proof. Although Dignāga's view on the necessary members of proof is different from earlier texts such as the *Nyāyasūtra*, *Carakasamhitā* and *Rushi lun* (如実論 **Tarkasāstra*), the meaning of *nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*] as deficiency of members of proof is common.⁸

⁷ It might be possible that Ui's and Katsura's translations of the passage [1-1] (see above footnote 5), i.e., the second interpretation (ii), is also influenced by this tradition in some way.

⁸ NS 5.2.12: *hīnam anyatamenāpy avayavena nyūnam*. “The deficiency is the lack of any one of the [five] members of a proof.”; *Carakasamhitā* Vimāna 8.54: *tatra nyūnam – pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanānām anyatamenāpi nyūnaṃ nyūnaṃ bhavati*. “As for the *nyūna* in [the ten faults of formulation]. *nyūna* means the deficiency of any one of [the members of a proof such as] thesis, logical reason, example, application, and conclusion.” Tucci 1929 translated “*bujuzu fen* 不具足分” in the *Rushi lun* as “*nyūna*.” *Rushi lun* (T 32/35b18–20): 十一不具足分者。五分義中一分不具。是名不具足分。五分者。一立義言。二因言。三譬如言。四合譬言。五決定言。 “As for the eleventh [of twenty-two points of defeat called] the deficiency: The lack of [any] one of the five members of a proof is called deficiency. The five members of a proof are the statement of the thesis, the statement of the logical reason, the

1.2. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Vṛtti* — a new interpretation: the absence of the statement of any one of the three characteristics

In his later work, however, he offers a new interpretation of *nyūnatā*.

[2] PSV 3.1ab: atra cānyatamarūpānuktir nyūnatety uktam bhavati.⁹

And in this case (i.e., in saying that a statement of a logical reason that has three characteristics is an inference for others), it was also said [by implication] that the deficiency means the non-statement (*anukti*) of any one of the [three] characteristics (*rūpa*).

According to this new interpretation, a deficiency occurs when a disputant does not state one of the three characteristics of the proper logical reason, not one of the three members of the proof.¹⁰ This new interpretation of *nyūnatā* brings about some changes in Dignāga's theory of fallacy. They can be described from both a practical and a theoretical

statement of the example, the statement of the application, and the statement of the conclusion.”

⁹ Cf. K (P124b4): 'dir yang tshul gang yang rung ba brjod na ni mtshang ba zhes bya ba brjod pa yin no ||; V (D40b2, P43a1): 'dir yang tshul gang yang rung ba cig (D: gcig P) ma smras na yang ma tshang ba brjod par 'gyur ro ||

In this paper, words of the PS and PSV in Roman typeface represent those that are attested in Jinendrabuddhi's Sanskrit manuscript or in fragments, whereas those in italics have been reconstructed from Tibetan translations.

¹⁰ The word *anukti* could also mean improper statement. However, Dharmakīrti uses *anukti* to mean the absence of a statement in the same context. See NB 3.56–57: *trirūpaliṅgākhyānam parārthānumānam ity uktam. tatra trayāṇām rūpāṇām ekasyāpi rūpasyānuktau sādhanābhāsaḥ. (56) uktāv apy asiddhau sandehe vā pratipādyapratipādakayoḥ. (57)* “It is said [by Dignāga] that a statement of a logical reason that has three characteristics is an inference for others. In this case, if any one of the three characteristics are not stated, a proof would be fallacious. If [any one of the three characteristics are], although stated, not is established or is doubtful either for the opponent or for the proponent, [a proof would be fallacious].”

viewpoint.

First, the practical modification caused by this new definition of *nyūna* is that the absence of the statement of the thesis is no longer regarded a fault of a proof. In both the NMu and the PS, Dignāga argues that of the three characteristics of a proper logical reason, i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*, *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, the first is expressed by means of the statement of the logical reason (*hetu*, 因) and that the remaining two are expressed by means of the statement of the example (*drṣṭānta*, 喻).¹¹ Therefore, because the statement of the thesis does not express any of the three characteristics, its absence can no longer be included in the fault of a proof called *nyūnatā*.¹²

¹¹ PS and PSV 4.1 (K [P148a4–6], V [D60a2–3, P63b6–8]): **trirūpo hetur ity uktaḥ pakṣadharme tu samsthitaḥ | rūḍhe rūpadvayaṃ śeṣaṃ drṣṭāntena pradarśyate** || “It has been said that a valid reason (*hetu*) possesses the three characteristics (*trirūpa*). According to convention (*rūḍhi*), however, it (i.e., the reason) is established as a property of the topic of a proposition (*pakṣadharma*) only. The remaining two characteristics [of a valid reason] are [to be] presented by an example [statement] (*drṣṭānta*).” (Translated in Katsura 2004: 140); PSV 4.6 (K [P150b8–151a1, V [D61b7–62a1, P65b4–5]): **yataḥ pakṣadharmatvapradarśanārthaṃ hetuvacanam tad anumeyāvinābhāvitvapradarśanārthaṃ ca drṣṭāntavacanam anumeyapradarśanārthaṃ ca pakṣavacanam. na cānyasyānumitāv aṅgabhāvaḥ.** (≈ NMu 3a9–11: 爲於所比顯宗法性故說因言。爲顯於此不相離性故說喻言。爲顯所比故說宗言。) “The reason for [eliminating *upanaya* and *nigamana*, etc. from the members of a proof is as follows]: the statement of the logical reason serves to express [the logical reason’s] being the property of the subject of a thesis, the statement of the example serves to express its (i.e., the logical reason’s) inseparability from the [property] to be inferred, and the statement of the thesis serves to express that which is to be inferred (i.e., the subject of a thesis qualified by the property to be inferred).”

¹² According to Dignāga, although the statement of the thesis is not necessary in a proof, giving such a statement, unless it is not negated by perception, etc., should not be considered a fault of the proof. Unlike this view, Dharmakīrti regards it as a fault of a proof in his later works, i.e., the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*. See Inami 1991.

Through this new interpretation, Dignāga's theory of fallacy is reorganized within the framework of the *trairūpya* theory. In the NMu, the absence or the deficiency of a statement of the logical reason or the example is considered a fault of the proof simply because it causes an insufficiency of the formulation of the proof. But in the PS, although such an absence or deficiency is still considered a fault, this is because one of the three characteristics is not being expressed. As a result, Dignāga, with this new interpretation of *nyūnatā*, succeeds in connecting all the faults of a proof, except for the faults of the thesis (*pakṣadoṣa*),¹³ to the theory of *trairūpya*.

However, it should be noted that although *nyūnatā* is related to the *trairūpya* theory in the PS, the concept of *nyūnatā*, as is seen from the expression “non-statement” (*anukti*) in its definition, is still restricted to the problem of how the proof is formulated. But when deciding the soundness of a proof, the point to be examined is not whether the three characteristics are stated, but rather whether they are established (*siddha* or *sampanna*). Indeed, from a logical point of view, if a logical reason possesses all three characteristics, then the proof should be accepted as being sound, even if one of the members of the proof, e.g., the example, is not stated. Thus between the new interpretation of *nyūnatā* in the PS and the traditional one in the NMu, there is no difference in that neither of them have anything to do with examining the contents of a proof.

2. *Shun zhonglun* — connection between *nyūna* and *trairūpya*

¹³ As Kitagawa 1965: 60–67 has pointed out, one of the reasons for introducing the theory of the faults of a thesis (*pakṣadoṣa*) or the fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*) is to exclude problems that cannot be solved within the theory of *trairūpya*. This theory is therefore not connected to the *trairūpya* theory. See also Inami 1991: 71–72.

It was, however, not only Dignāga who connected the theory of *trairūpya* to the concept of *nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*]. In the *Shun zhonglun* (順中論), more precisely the *Shun zhonglun yi ru da bore boluomi jing chupin famen* (順中論義入大般若波羅蜜經初品法門), which is attributed to Asaṅga (4th century) or his younger brother Vasubandhu¹⁴ and was translated by Gautama Prajñāruci (瞿曇般若流支) into Chinese in 543, a similar view is mentioned as a theory of an opponent. There, a Sāṅkhya opponent, discussing their proof for the existence of primordial matter (勝, *pradhāna/prakṛti*) and the self (丈夫, *puruṣa*), offers two interpretations of *nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*].

[3] *Shun zhonglun* T 30/42a5–15: 問曰。如汝所說「緣具不成、是則有過。譬喻則減、復退壞」者此我今說。何等緣具。何者減相。若何等人「宗因喻等三是緣具」、彼如是人則三種減。唯因譬喻此二有過、以緣具故。宗則無減、以是言說之根本故、又義成故。此久已說有三種減、因喻二減。若人分別此之三分具足和合故名緣具、彼如是人應三種減。

若復有人「因三相語則是緣具」、彼人三種云何有減。若緣具過若譬喻減、云何彼人而當有減。若緣具過、汝未知故作如是說「說喻減已、得緣具過、若復退壞」。

[Opponent = Sāṅkhya:] You (Buddhist) said that [if] the fulfillment of the conditions (緣具) [for a proper proof] is not established, there is a fault [in your proof]. [If your proof] is deficient of (減, **nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*]) the [statement of] an example, [you are] defeated. I shall now discuss this. What does “the fulfillment of the conditions [for a proper proof]” mean? What is the characteristic of the deficiency (減, **nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*])? If someone says (A) that the fulfillment of the conditions [for a proper proof] means [a statement of all] three

¹⁴ According to Ōtake 2013, the *Shun zhonglun* can be ascribed to Vasubandhu. While he does discuss Frauwallner's theory of two Vasubandhus, he gives several reasons for assuming there was only one Vasubandhu.

[members of the proof, i.e.,] the thesis, logical reason and example, then he [assumes] three kinds of deficiency. [But] only two of them, i.e., [the deficiency of] the logical reason and example, would cause a fault, because [when the thesis is accompanied by a logical reason and an example, it] fulfills the conditions. There is no deficiency of [the statement of] the thesis because it (i.e., the thesis) is the foundation for the formulation [of a proof] and because the meaning [of the proof] is established [by the thesis]. So far, it has been explained that the three kinds of deficiency consist of the deficiency of [the statement of] the logical reason or the example [or both]. If someone thinks that because of the combination of [the statement of] all these three members, the condition of [a proof] is regarded as being fulfilled, then, for him, the deficiency is of three kinds.

If, however, someone else says (B) that the fulfillment of the conditions [for a proper proof] means stating the three characteristics of a logical reason (因三相, **trirūpa*), then why does he consider the three kinds [of deficiency mentioned above] as a deficiency? Why does he consider the fault in fulfilling the condition [for a proper proof propounded by the theory A] or the deficiency of [a statement of] the example as a deficiency? If [you, i.e., Buddhists,] say that [the latter, i.e., the deficiency of the statement of an example] is a fault in fulfilling the condition [for a proper proof], then your [previous] statement is made of ignorance: [if your proof] is deficient of an example, then there is a fault in fulfilling the condition or you are defeated.

Here, the Sāṅkhya opponent mentions two views regarding the fulfillment of the conditions (緣具) for a proper proof and **nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*] “deficiency” (減). According to the former, i.e., theory A, the condition for a proper proof is that it possesses all three members of a proof—the thesis, the logical reason and the example. If one or two of the three members other than thesis, i.e., the logical reason and the example,

is/are deficient, then one of the three kinds of **nyūna[-tā/-tva]* would occur. Since there must be a statement of the thesis for a proof to be a proof, the fault of a proof called **nyūna[-tā/-tva]* occurs only in the following three cases: (1) the thesis and logical reason are properly stated, but the example is not, (2) the thesis and example are properly stated, but the logical reason is not, or (3) the thesis is properly stated, but the logical reason and example are not. This view of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* is similar to Dignāga's description in the NMu, although there is a difference in that this view does not accept the lack of the statement of the thesis.

However, the view adopted here by the Sāṅkhya opponent is the latter view, i.e., theory B. In this view, a statement of all three characteristics of the logical reason (因三相, **trirūpa*) is the condition for a proper proof. Although this second view does not mention a definition of **nyūna[-tā/-tva]*, it is understood indirectly from the description of the condition of a proper proof that the **nyūna[-tā/-tva]* is the deficiency of a statement of any one of the three characteristics. Since there is little difference between the *trairūpya* theory explained in the subsequent part of the *Shun zhonglun* and that of Dignāga,¹⁵ one might say that this view of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* shares the same idea of interpreting *nyūnatā* as found in the PS. Despite this similarity, it cannot be said that they are the same, because with regard to this second view of **nyūna[-tā/-tva]* in the *Shun zhonglun*, there are still some unclear points, e.g. how the three characteristics can be expressed without the statement of an example. However, the fact that the Sāṅkhya had a great influence on Dignāga's system of logic suggests the possibility that Dignāga's new

¹⁵ See Katsura 1986: 166. In the *Shun zhonglun*, the *trairūpya* theory adopted by the Sāṅkhya opponent is attributed to 若耶須摩 (*ruo ye xu mo*). As Pind 2001: 158 shows, this is a translation of “*nyāyasūkṣma*.” Although Jinendrabuddhi identifies this with a text by Akṣapāda, the *Nyāyasūtra*, in his commentary on the 6th chapter of the PS, this is not the case here, because the *trairūpya* theory is not explained in the NS. See PST Ms B 257b4: *nyāyasūkṣme 'kṣapādoktānām jātīnām ...*

interpretation of *nyūnatā* in the PS had some connection to this second view on **nyūna[-tā/-tva]*.

3. *Nyāyapraveśaka* — a possibility of another interpretation

Dignāga's successor Dharmakīrti, whose interpretations of Dignāga became the mainstream of Buddhist logic, adopts Dignāga's new definition of *nyūnatā* in the PS, i.e., the non-statement (*anukti*) of any one of the three characteristics.¹⁶ The view of another successor, Śāṅkara-svāmin (ca. 500–560), is not clear due to textual problems. There are four versions of the *Nyāyapraveśaka* (NP): the Sanskrit text, which is now available (NP_{Skt.}), Xuanzang's Chinese translation of the NP (NP_{Ch.}), and two Tibetan translations — one translated from a Sanskrit text (NP_{T1}) and one translated from Xuanzang's Chinese translation (NP_{T2}). Of these four versions of the NP, while the description of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* in the Sanskrit version corresponds approximately to Dignāga's traditional view presented in the NMu, the description in the Chinese and Tibetan versions shows another interpretation.

The Sanskrit text of the NP runs as follows:

[4-1] NP_{Skt.} 10,17–11,2: *sādhana-doṣodbhāvanāni dūṣaṇāni. sādhanadoṣo nyūnatvam. pakṣadoṣaḥ pratyakṣādiviruddhatvam. hetudoṣo 'siddhānaikāntikaviruddhatvam. drṣṭāntadoṣaḥ sādhana-dharmādyasiddhatvam. tasyodbhāvanam prāśnikapratyāyanam dūṣaṇam.*

Refutations are to point out the faults of a proof. The fault of a proof is the deficiency (*nyūnatva*) [of three members of a proof]. (1) The fault of the thesis is the contradiction with that which is known

¹⁶ See PVin 3 10,7–8 (≈ PV 4.23): *tenānuktāv api pakṣasya siddher apratibandhāt triṣv anyatamarūpasyaivānuktir nyūnatā sādhanadoṣa ity uktam veditavyam.*

through perception, etc. (2) The fault of the logical reason is (2-1) [its] non-establishment, (2-2) inconclusiveness, and (2-3) contradiction. (3) The fault of the example is the non-establishment of a proving property, etc. To point out the [fault of a proof], i.e., to make a judge understand it, is the refutation.

Here, as Haribhadrasūri's (8th century) NP commentary clearly shows,¹⁷ the *nyūnatva* in this passage should be understood as a generic term referring to the three subsequent types of faults, i.e., *pakṣadoṣa*, *hetudoṣa* and *drṣṭāntadoṣa*, because here *nyūnatva* is used to explain the term "*sādhanaḍoṣa*," which consists of these three types of faults. Therefore, the *nyūnatva* in this Sanskrit text of the NP means an deficiency of any of the three proof members. And hence, this Sanskrit version of NP takes over Dignāga's view on *nyūna*[-tā/-tva] presented in the NMu.

However, the Chinese translation of the NP (*Yinming ru zhengli lun* 因明入正理論), which was translated by Xuanzang in 647, gives a different rendering:

[4-2] NP_{Ch}. T 32/12c12–15: 復次若正顯示能立過失、說名能破。謂初能立缺減過性、立宗過性、不成立性、不定因性、相違因性及喻過性。顯示此言、開曉問者、故名能破。

And next, if [a statement] correctly points out a fault of a proof, it is called a refutation. I.e., [the faults are as follows:] first, (1) the fault of lacking (缺減, **nyūnatva*) [the statement of any one of the members of] a proof, (2) the fault of a thesis, (3-1) the non-establishment [of a logical reason], (3-2) the inconclusiveness [of a logical reason], (3-3) the contradictoriness [of a logical reason], and

¹⁷ NPV 54,12–13: *sādhanaḍoṣo nyūnatvaṃ sāmānyena. viśeṣaṃ āha – pakṣadoṣaḥ pratyakṣādiviruddhatvam*. “‘The fault of a proof’ in general ‘is the deficiency.’ [The following words] ‘the fault of the thesis is the contradiction with that which is known through perception etc.’ explains an individual [fault of a proof].”

(4) the fault of the example. Since [the statement] points out these [faulty] statements and makes a judge understand [the faults of the statements], it is called a refutation.

Xuanzang's Chinese translation does not contain words corresponding to the Sanskrit words "*pratyakṣādiviruddha*," "*hetudoṣa*" and "*sādhana-dharmādyasiddhatva*." Rather, the word "first" (初) has been inserted into the sentence corresponding to "*sādhanadoṣo nyūnatvam*." Because of this word "初," **nyūnatva* (缺減) in this Chinese version is understood as the first of the subsequent faults, in other words, the **nyūnatva* is here regarded as being different from other faults of the three members of a proof. It is likely that the difference consists in whether the member of a proof is stated or not.¹⁸ That is, while the *nyūnatva* occurs when a statement of any one of these three members is absent, the other faults, i.e., *pakṣadoṣa*, *hetudoṣa* and *drṣṭāntadoṣa*, presupposes the existence of a statement of *pakṣa*, *hetu*, and *drṣṭānta*, respectively. If the *nyūnatva* is regarded as a different category of a fault from *pakṣadoṣa*,

¹⁸ This is also supported by Kuiji's commentary on the NP_{ch}, the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏). *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (T 44 141c5–9): 論「謂初能立缺減過性。立宗過性、不成因性不定因性相違因性及喻過性」。述曰。此辨能破境。即他立失分二。初辯闕支、次明支失。「謂初能立缺減過性」此即初辯闕支。或總無言、或言無義。過重先明、故云「初」也。“It is said in the [*Yinming ru zhengli lun*] that ‘i.e., [the faults are as follows:] first, (1) the fault of lacking [any one of the members of] proof, (2) the fault of a thesis, (3-1) non-establishment [of a logical reason], (3-2) inconclusiveness [of a logical reason], (3-3) contradiction [of a logical reason], and (4) the fault of an example.’ The explanation [of this passage] is as follows: This explains the object of refutation. I.e., the faults committed by the opponent are classified as two. [Of these], first, the lack (闕) of the [statement of the] members of a proof (支) is explained, and then the fault (失) of these members of a proof is clarified. [The phrase] ‘first, the fault of lacking [the statement of any one of the members of] a proof’ is the explanation of the former, i.e., the lack of the [statement of the] members of a proof. [The faults of a proof occur] when [any one of the] members of a proof is not stated at all or when [these members of a proof] do not have content although they have been stated. Since the serious fault [should] be clarified first, the word ‘first’ is mentioned.”

etc., the words 此言 (“these [faulty] statements”), corresponding to “*taśya*” in the Sanskrit text, must be plural and refer to the faults that include *nyūnatva*, *pakṣadoṣa*, *hetudoṣa* and *drṣṭāntadoṣa*. It is therefore quite possible that the original text upon which Xuanzang relied when translating it into Chinese had a different wording from the Sanskrit text of the NP as it is extant today.

It is interesting to note that not only the NP_{T2}, the Tibetan translation of the NP_{Ch.}, but also the NP_{T1}, i.e., the Tibetan translation of a Sanskrit text, shows an understanding similar to the Chinese version, i.e., *nyūnatva* (*ma tshang ba*) is enumerated as one of the types of faults, but is not regarded as a general term for the fault of the three members of a proof.

[4-3] NP_{T1} (P184a7–184b1): *sgrub par byed pa'i skyon brjod pa rnams ni sun 'byin pa rnams so || sgrub par byed pa'i skyon yang ma tshang ba dang | mngon sum la sogs pa gnod phyogs kyi skyon nyid dang | rtags kyi skyon ma grub pa'i rtags nyid dang | ma nges pa'i rtags nyid dang | 'gal ba'i rtags nyid dang | dpe'i skyon nyid dang | bsgrub bya'i chos la sogs pa ma grub pa'o || de'i brjod pa'i phyir rgol gyis rab tu rtogs pa'i dus na sun 'byin pa'o ||*

[4-4] NP_{T2} (D92b2-3, P188b5-6): *sgrub par byed pa'i yan lag ma tshang ba nyid dang | bsgrub bya'i skyon nyid dang | ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs dang | ma nges pa'i gtan tshigs dang | 'gal ba'i gtan tshigs dang | dpe rnams kyi gtan tshigs bsal (bsal P: gsal D) bar bstan te | phyir (phyir D: phyi P) rgol gyi (gyi D: gyis P) 'dri ba rnams la legs par khong du chud par byed pas sun 'byin yang dag go ||*

Although Ui 1944: 306 maintains that Xuanzang's translation is closer to the original text, it is probably better to say that there are two textual

transmissions of the NP.¹⁹

4. *nyūna* in East Asian Buddhism

Let us now turn to the interpretations of *nyūna* presented by East Asian Buddhists in Tang China. In his *Limenlun shuji* (理門論述記), the only extant Chinese commentary on the NMu, Shentai (神泰, fl. ca. 650) — one of the disciples of Xuanzang — commenting on the last sentence of the NMu mentioned above in [1-2], reports some views on *nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*] propounded by various Buddhist philosophers, including Dignāga.

[5] *Limenlun shuji* T 44/77c6-21: 由此至立過者、宗因喻三支中隨一種、名缺減、能立性過。陳那已前、若言闕宗或隨闕因喻、名能立過。一師釋云「自有宗而無因喻、自有因而無宗喻、自有喻而無宗因、爲三句。有宗因而無喻、有宗喻而無因、有因喻無宗、無宗因喻 (無宗因喻 em. : 因喻 T, (有無宗因) 力+喻 note) 爲第七句。如此七句名能立缺減性過」。復有師釋云「前之六 (六力 〈甲〉 : 云 T) 句可然。第七句不可也 (也力 〈甲〉 : 以 T) 。若有一二小餘、可云缺減。第七宗因喻俱無、何名闕耶。故不可也」。

陳那云「但於因同喻異喻能立之中有減性過」。自賢愛以前師釋言「自有有因無同異喻、有同喻無因及異喻、有異喻無因及同喻、闕二爲三句。自有有因同喻無異喻、有同異喻無因、有異喻因無 (無力 〈甲〉 : 即 T) 同喻、闕一爲三句。自有無因同異二喻爲第七句」。向賢 (賢力 〈甲〉 : 實 T) 愛已後法師不立第七句。如前所辨。

[The sentence] from “therefore” to “the fault of a proof” means that

¹⁹ It is not clear why NP_{T1} shows a similar view with NP_{Ch.}. One possibility is the influence of Dharmakīrti. In the VN, he also distinguishes *nyūnatva* from *hetuḍoṣa* and *dr̥ṣṭāntadoṣa*. VN 21,12-14: *sādhanaḍoṣāḥ punar nyūnatvam asiddhir anaikāntikatā vādināḥ sādhayitum iṣṭasyārthasya viparyayasāadhanam aṣṭādaśa dr̥ṣṭāntadoṣaś ca*. The problem of there being any relationship between Xuanzang and Dharmakīrti is beyond the scope of this paper.

if [a proof] has only [one or two] of the three members of a proof, i.e., the thesis, logical reason and example, then there is a fault of the proof called a lack (缺減, **nyūna[-tā/-tva]*). Before Dignāga, if [a proof] lacks [the statement of] a thesis, a logical reason or an example, then the fault called a lack occurs. Some teacher(s) explain this [concept of **nyūna[-tā/-tva]*] and say: There are three kinds [of faulty proof], i.e., (1) that which has the [statement of] the thesis, but neither [that of] the logical reason nor the example, (2) that which has [the statement of] the logical reason, but neither [that of] the thesis nor the example, and (3) that which has [the statement of] the example, but neither [that of] the thesis nor the logical reason. Moreover, [there are three other kinds of faulty proof], i.e., (4) that which has [a statement of] the thesis and logical reason, but not [that of] the example, (5) that which has [a statement of] the thesis and example, but not [that of] the logical reason, and (6) that which has [a statement of] the logical reason and example, but not [that of] the thesis. [And (7) a proof] that does not have [a statement of] the thesis, logical reason and example is the seventh. These seven are the fault of a proof called a lack. Other teacher(s) explain this saying: The former six are acceptable, but the seventh is not. If [the statement of] one or two [of these three] remain, it can be called a lack. But if, as in the seventh case, there is neither a thesis, a logical reason, nor the example, then how can it be called a lack? Therefore, [the seventh] is not acceptable.

Dignāga says that the fault [called] deficiency (減性) occurs only with regard to means of proof, i.e., [a statement of] the logical reason, similar example (同喩, **sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*) and dissimilar example (異喩, **vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*). Teachers before Bhadraruci (賢愛 *fl.* ca. 560) explain this saying: There are three kinds [of faulty proof] which lack two [of the three], i.e., (i) that which has [a statement of] the logical reason, but neither [that of] the similar

example nor of the dissimilar example, (ii) that which has [a statement of] the similar example, but neither [that of] the logical reason nor of the dissimilar example, (iii) that which has [a statement of] the dissimilar example, but neither [that of] the logical reason nor of the similar example. [And] there are three [more] kinds [of faulty proof] which lack one [of the three], i.e., (iv) that which has [a statement of] the logical reason and similar example, but not of the dissimilar example, (v) that which has [a statement of] the similar example and dissimilar example, but not of the logical reason, (vi) that which has [a statement of] the dissimilar example and logical reason, but not of the similar example. (vii) The seventh [kind of faulty proof] does not have [a statement of] the logical reason, similar example and dissimilar example. Teachers after Bhadraruci do not maintain the seventh [as a fault].²⁰ The reason has been explained above.

From this description, it is clear that Shentai understands the deficiency (闕 or 減性, **nyūna[-tā/-tva]*) in the NMu as meaning the absence of any one of the statement of three proof members. This view of **nyūna[-tā/-tva]* seems to be influenced by Xuanzang's translation of the NP. Although in the NMu Dignāga explains that the three members of a proof are the statement of a thesis, a logical reason and an example, Shentai here attributes this view not to Dignāga, but to some teacher(s) before Dignāga. According to Shentai, Dignāga maintains that a proof consist of a statement of a logical reason, a similar example (*sādharmyadrṣṭānta*) and a dissimilar example (*vaidharmyadrṣṭānta*). Since, as explained before in §1.2, these three statements (i.e., the logical reason and the two examples) are used to express the three characteristics of a proper logical reason, Dignāga's theory of **nyūna[-tā/-tva]* presented here by Shentai is in the same line with Dignāga's definition of *nyūnatā*

²⁰ Cf. VNT 69,25: *ke punas te sādhanasya doṣā ity āha – nyūnatvaṃ śatprakāram ekaikadvidvirūpānuktau.*

in the PS. Added to this, from the information that during his stay in India, Xuanzang attended lectures on the PS, and the fact that the title of the PS and its *apoha* theory are mentioned in some of the works of Xuanzang's disciples,²¹ it is likely that some of these disciples, including Shentai, were at least partially informed about Dignāga's theories in the PS, probably by Xuanzang himself.

Kuiji (窺基, 632–682), another disciple of Xuanzang, gives a different view of **nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*].

[6-1] *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* T 44/94b17–25: 世親菩薩、缺減過性、宗因喻中、闕一有三、闕二有三、闕三有一。世親已後皆除第七。以宗因喻三爲能立、總闕便非。既本無體、何成能立、有何所闕而得似名。

陳那菩薩、因一喻二、說有六過。則因三相六過是也。闕一有三、闕二有三、無闕三者。大師至彼六十年前、施無厭寺有一論師、名爲賢愛。… 亦除第七。…

The Bodhisattva Vasubandhu [says: there are seven kinds of] the fault [called] a lack (缺減, **nyūna*[-*tā*/-*tva*]). [Of these,] three lack (闕) one of [the three members of the proof, i.e.,] the thesis, logical reason and example. Three [others] lack two [of these three]. The [last] one lacks [all] three. All teachers after Vasubandhu eliminated the seventh [from the fault]. [The reason for this is as follows:] since the three [members of a proof, i.e.,] the thesis, logical reason and example, are [regarded as] the means of a proof, it is not possible for all of them to be lacking. If there is no essential element (體) [of a proof at all], how can it be a means of a proof? [And in that case,] what kind of lack is there, and why is it called a pseudo[-proof]?

²¹ Katsura 2014 reports that Wengui (文軌) mentions the title of the PS and that Kuiji refers to an *apoha* theory that is not found in the NMu.

The Bodhisattva Dignāga says that with regard to one logical reason and two examples there are six faults. I.e., these are six faults concerning the three characteristics [of a proper logical reason]. [Of these,] three lack one [of these characteristics] and three [others] lack two [of them]. [But] no [fault] lacks [all] three [of them]. Sixty years before the arrival of my teacher (i.e., Xuanzang), there was a master called Bhadraruci in Nālandā temple. ... [He also] eliminated the seventh [from the fault].

According to Kuiji, the theory mentioned by Shentai and ascribed to some teacher(s) before Dignāga is that of Vasubandhu.²² Except for his reference to the name of Vasubandhu, Kuiji's explanation of **nyūna[-tā/-tva]* before Dignāga is the same as that of Shentai. And like Shentai, Kuiji also understands Dignāga's three members of a proof as the statement of a logical reason, similar example and dissimilar example.

As for the explanation of Dignāga's view on **nyūna[-tā/-tva]*, Kuiji seems to share Shentai's ideas. However, in the following description, Kuiji's understanding of Dignāga seems to be different from that of Shentai.

[6-2] *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* T 44/106b26–28, 106c21–24: 若談闕過、闕有二種。一無體闕、二有體闕。無體闕者、謂不陳言。但在三支、非在三相。若陳因言、必有體闕。三相既義故非無體。...

賢愛論師陳那菩薩等、不以無體爲闕。故唯六句。雖唯陳宗、元(元：從元 T)無能立、何名能立缺減之過。

If the fault of a lack (闕) should be discussed, there are two types. The first is the lack in the case of the absence of the body (無體闕). The second is the lack in the case of the presence of the body (有體

²² Based on this identification of Kuiji, Frauwallner 1957: 121, fn.35 maintains that Shentai is referring to Vasubandhu's theory of *nyūna*.

闕). The lack in the case of the absence of the body means giving no statement [of any one of the three members of a proof]. [It] is concerned with only the three members [of a proof], but not with the three characteristics [of a proper logical reason]. If the statement of the logical reason is presented, [the fault in this case] must be the lack in the case of the presence of the body. Since these three characteristics are the contents [of the statement of three members of a proof that] have already [been stated], [the fault in this case should] not be the lack in the case of the absence of the body. ...

Master Bhadraruci and Dignāga do not regard the absence of the body (無體) as [the fault called] a lack. Therefore, only six kinds [of a lack are accepted]. Even if only a thesis is stated, [because] it is never a means of a proof, how can it be called the fault consisting in the lack of a means of proof?

Here Kuiji classifies the lack (闕) into two types. The first is the lack in the case of the absence of the body (無體闕). This “body” means a statement of the three members of a proof, i.e., a logical reason, similar example and dissimilar example. Therefore, this first type of *nyūna*[-*tā/-tva*] is correspond to Shentai's understanding of Dignāga's view on *nyūna*[-*tā/-tva*], and hence is equivalent to Dignāga's interpretation of *nyūnatā* in the PS. On the other hand, Kuiji's second type of *nyūna*[-*tā/-tva*], i.e., 有體闕, is a unique interpretation. This type of *nyūna*[-*tā/-tva*] is concerned with only three characteristics of a proper logical reason, but not a statement of these three. In other words, while the first type of *nyūna*[-*tā/-tva*] is a fault in the formulation of a proof, the second is a fault in the contents of a proof. Therefore, in Kuiji's view, any type of fault in a proof, i.e., not only faults in its formulation, but also faults in its contents, are included under the concept of *nyūna*[-*tā/-tva*].

With regard to his understanding of Dignāga's view on *nyūna*[-*tā/-tva*], there can be two interpretations depending on the understanding of the term 無體 in the sentence “賢愛論師陳那菩薩等、不以無體爲闕.” The

Japanese scholar-monk Zenju (善珠, 723–797) explains this 無體 as meaning “the absence of the statement of all three members of a proof (i.e., the logical reason, similar example and dissimilar example)” or “the absence of all three characteristics of a proper logical reason.”²³ According to this interpretation, Kuiji is saying in this passage that Dignāga and Bhadraruci do not accept the seventh kind of a lack, i.e., the absence of all three, in either type of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]*.

But if we take the term 無體 as referring to 無體闕 mentioned in Kuiji’s preceding explanation of the two types of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]*, then the sentence in question means that Dignāga and Bhadraruci do not accept the first type of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]*, i.e., they regard *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* as meaning only the absence of the three characteristics of a proper logical reason, but not the absence of a statement of these three.

Interestingly, a similar interpretation of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* is found in the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*. In his explanation of the definition of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) as attributed to the *Vādaividhāna*,²⁴ Vācaspatimiśra (10th cent.) writes as follows:

[7] NVTṬ 230,17–18 on NS 1.1.33: *trairūpyasampanno hetuḥ pūrṇaḥ. sa triṣu rūpeṣv anyatamena rūpeṇa rahito nyūnaḥ – asiddho vā viruddho vānaikāntiko vā bhavatīti. so ’yaṃ nyūnatā doṣo hetoḥ.*

A complete logical reason is the one which fulfills the three characteristics. [A logical reason that is] devoid of any one of the three characteristics is a deficiency, i.e., a unestablished, inconclusive or

²³ *Inmyōron sho Myōtōshō* (因明論疏明燈抄) T 68/278b11–20: 唯陳其宗、不陳因喻、本無能立、何名缺過。故唯六句、無第七句。且因中三分辨闕有二。初云唯有六句。謂闕一有三、闕二有三。無其闕三爲第七者。前六容是可許成闕、第七本非。故不論闕。譬如俗人尸羅非有、何論持犯。此賢愛論師陳那等義。後云容有七句。

²⁴ See Frauwallner 1933: 301. *dūṣaṇāni nyūnatāvayavottaradoṣākṣepabhāvodbhāvanāni*. (cited in NV 109,4 etc.)

contradictory [logical reason]. Such a fault of the logical reason is a deficiency.

According to this explanation, *nyūnatā* is to be considered a fault of the logical reason. It thus focuses only on the absence of the three characteristics themselves, not on the absence of a statement of these three. Although this interpretation of *nyūnatā* is similar to Kuiji's 有體闕, it cannot be said that there is a relationship between these two, because it is not clear whether Vācaspatimiśra's explanation is really based on any Buddhist theory. But it is possible to say that this interpretation of *nyūnatā* is a kind of extended interpretation of Dignāga's new definition of *nyūnatā* in the PS.

Concluding remarks

In the NMu, Dignāga adopted a traditional view on the fault of a proof called *nyūna[-tā/-tva]*, a deficiency of a statement of any one of the three members of a proof, i.e., the thesis, logical reason or example. In the PS, however, he offers a new definition of *nyūnatā*, where the deficiency means the absence of a statement of any one of the three characteristics of a proper logical reason. With regard to his introducing the *trairūpya* theory into the concept of *nyūnatā*, it might be conjectured that the interpretation of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* mentioned by a Sāṅkhya opponent in the *Shun zhonglun* played some role, although there are still points that are unclear.

After Dignāga, the new interpretation of *nyūnatā* in the PS becomes dominant in the tradition of Buddhist logic, with the exception of its explanation in the NP. Among the four versions of the text of the NP, the Sanskrit version of the NP adopts the traditional view, i.e., Dignāga's interpretation in the NMu. In Xuanzang's Chinese translation and the two Tibetan translations, however, show a different understanding. According to these three versions, *nyūnatva* is regarded as

being a separate type of a fault from *pakṣadoṣa*, *hetudoṣa* and *dṛṣṭāntadoṣa*. This *nyūnatva* occurs when any one of three members of a proof, i.e., a thesis, logical reason or an example, is not stated, while *pakṣadoṣa*, etc., occurs when each of the members of a proof is stated.

In East Asia, the interpretation of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* in the NMu was no longer considered the view of Dignāga. Shentai, in his commentary on the NMu, regards the interpretation of *nyūnatā* in the PS to be Dignāga's view. It is probable that his knowledge of Dignāga's theory in the PS came from Xuanzang. Kuiji classifies *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* into two types. The first is 無體闕, which is comparable to Dignāga's interpretation of *nyūnatā* in the PS. The second is 有體闕 and this interpretation is probably newly introduced by Kuiji. This type of *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* concerns the absence of the three characteristics itself, not the absence of the statement of the three characteristics.

For Dignāga, *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* is consistently considered a fault occurring in the proof (*sādhana*, 能立) or the inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). And a proof consists of a statement of the three members of a proof or a statement of the three characteristics of a proper logical reason.²⁵ Therefore, since *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* is always connected with a statement, it is said that Dignāga deals with *nyūna[-tā/-tva]* in the context of the formulation of a proof, but not in the context of the logical validity of a proof. Dharmakīrti's classification of it as a fault of the speaker (*vakṛdoṣa*) describes this feature quite faithfully.²⁶

²⁵ See NMu k.1a (1a8): 宗等多言說能立.; PSV 3.1ab: *trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ parārtham anumānam*.

²⁶ PVin 3 47,1–3: *na vai vastudharmasamāśrayeṇaiva parārthe 'numāne sādhanadoṣodbhāvanam, api tu vakṛdoṣeṇāpi, nyūnatānanvayaviparītānvayavat*. “In the inference for others, the fault of a proof is pointed out not necessarily by means of the property of real entities, but rather through the fault of the speaker, such as a lack (*nyūnatā*), no positive concomitance [in the statement of the example] (*ananvaya*), and inverted positive concomitance [in the statement of the example]

Although the interpretations of *nyūna*[-*tā*/*-tva*] found in the Kuiji's second classification, i.e., 有體闕 ([6-2]) and in Vācaspatimiśra's explanation of the *Vādaividhāna* ([7]) are different from that of Dignāga, this seems to be the result of their focusing not on the formulation of a proof, but on its contents.

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(*viparītānvaya*).” Cf. DhP 189,18–21 ad NBT on NB 3.55: *nanu hīnāṅgatvaṃ na sādhanadoṣaḥ. vidyamāne 'pi hi rūpatraye dvayor ekasya vā vaktrānabhidhāne sati nyūnatāyāḥ sambhavāt. tat kathaṃ vaktrdoṣaḥ sādhanadoṣa ity ucyata iti cet. satyam, kevalaṃ nātra sādhanadoṣabdena līṅgaṃ abhipretam, kiṃ tarhi tatpratipādaḥ vākyam. tasya cāparipūrṇatā doṣo bhavaty eva. vaktrdoṣas tu nimittam aparipūrṇatāyā iti kim avadyam.*

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Pre-Dharmakīrti Interpretations of Dignāga's Theory of *pakṣābhāsa*

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Dignāga (ca. 5–6th century) was the first Indian logician who clearly set up a theory of *pakṣābhāsa* (fallacious thesis) in relation to the definition of *pakṣa* (thesis). According to him, a thesis cannot be opposed by what is well established by perception or other means of cognition. A thesis that is opposed in this way is regarded as a *pakṣābhāsa* and rejected as an evidently wrong proposition. Dignāga enumerates five types of *pakṣābhāsas* in his *Nyāyamukha* and four types in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. In turn, Dharmakīrti (ca. 7th century), in his early logical works, such as *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, offers detailed explanations of Dignāga's theory of *pakṣābhāsa*.

When explaining Dignāga's theory of *pakṣābhāsa*, Dharmakīrti sometimes mentions and criticizes earlier interpretations of the theory. Presumably, Dignāga's theory was interpreted by others before Dharmakīrti. These interpretations were also not accepted by Dharmakīrti's followers. However, some Buddhists did interpret Dignāga's theory differently from Dharmakīrti's and some of these interpretations seem similar to those criticized by Dharmakīrti.

This study explores one aspect of each of two pre-Dharmakīrti interpretations of the *pakṣābhāsa* theory: the first is Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra's understanding of *śābdaprasiddhanirākṛta* and the second is an enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas* different from that of Dignāga. These pre-Dharmakīrti interpretations of Dignāga's logic are important for they shed light not only on the development of Buddhist logic in India by helping to distinguish between Dignāga's and

Dharmakīrti's theories but also on the development of Buddhist logical works written in East Asia. For Buddhist monks in East Asia who intensively studied Buddhist logic did so based mainly on two Indian works, namely, Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* and Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśaka*, without any information about Dharmakīrti's theory. Moreover, their investigations can also help us better understand the theory of Dignāga itself.

I

Dignāga's theory of *pakṣābhāsa* is presented in his *Nyāyamukha* and *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(-vṛtti) as follows:

- [1] NMu 1a18–24: 爲顯離餘立宗過失、故言「非彼相違義能遣」。若相*違義言聲所遣、如立一切言皆是妄。或先所立宗義相違、如獯狐子立聲爲常。又若於中由不共故無有比量、爲極成言相違義遣、如說懷兔非月有故。又於有法即彼所立爲此極成現量比量相違義遣、如有成立聲非所聞瓶是常等。

(Reconstruction: **anyapakṣadoṣarahita*[*ḥ pakṣa*] *iti darśayann āha* — ***viruddhārthānirākṛta*** *iti* / [1] *yadi viruddhārthavācinā svavacanena bādhyate yathā sarvaṃ uktam mṛṣeti*, [2] *pūrvābhyupagamena vā [pratijñātenārthena viruddhena] yathaulūkyasya nityaḥ śabda iti sādhayataḥ*, [3] *yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpodyate yathācandraḥ śaśi sattvād iti*, [4, 5] *yatra vā dharminī sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ pratyakṣānumānaprasiddhena viruddhenārthena bādhyate yathāśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ, nityo ghata iti, [sa pakṣābhāsaḥ /])*¹

To show that *pakṣa* is to be stated without any other faults, [I (Dignāga)] said, [in the first verse,] “It should not be opposed by an

¹ See Katsura 1977: 113–115; Ui 1929: 549–557. *相 Corr.; 非 T.

object contradictory to it (*viruddhrāthānirākṛtaḥ*).” [If it is opposed, it is regarded as a fallacious thesis. [1] Namely,] if [a statement] is opposed by [the proponent's] own statement indicating what conflicts with it, as in the case of the statement “All statements are false,” [then it is regarded as a fallacious thesis]. [2] [Moreover,] if a statement is opposed by a contradicting thing that has been earlier accepted by the proponent, as in the case of the Vaiśeṣika, [who accepts that sound is impermanent,] stating “Sound is permanent,” [then this is regarded as a fallacious thesis]. [3] [Furthermore,] even though, with regard to a certain [subject that is intended to be proved to be qualified by a property (A), the property (A) cannot be opposed/proved by inference] in the case that the inference [of a contradicting property (B)/of the property (A)] never occurs because [that property (B/A)] is uncommon, if [the property (A)] is excluded by the contradicting object (B), which is well established by verbal convention, [then the thesis is regarded as a fallacious thesis]. For instance, [this type of fallacious thesis can be found in the reasoning] “The moon (*śaśin*) is not [called] *candra* because it exists.” [4, 5] [Moreover,] if a property to be proved in a certain subject is opposed by a contradicting [property], that is established by perception or by inference, as in statements such as] “Sound is not audible” or “A pot is permanent,” [then it is regarded as a fallacious thesis].²

[2] PS(V) III 2b²–d: *sa ca*

anirākṛtaḥ /

pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi // 2 //

² The translation is based on the reconstructed Sanskrit text.

*yo hi dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭo yadi tatra sādhyadharmaviruddhena dharmāntareṇa **pratyakṣānumānāgamaprasiddhena** na nirākriyate, tarhi sādhyanirdeśo niravadyaḥ, anyathā tadābhāsaḥ / tad yathāśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ, nityo ghaṭaḥ, na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthasādhakānīti pratijñāmātreṇa / yatrāpyasādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpodyate, yathācandraḥ śaśī sattvād iti ³*

Besides, it (the thesis) is [explained as follows:]

With regard to [the proponent's] own subject, [a property to be proved should] not be opposed by an object of perception, by what is well established by inference, or by what is well established by trustworthy persons. (2b²–d)

If, with regard to a subject that is intended to be proved to be qualified by a property (A), [the property to be proved (A)] is not opposed by the other property (B) that is contradictory to it (A) and that is well established by perception, inference, or scripture, then the statement of the thing to be proved is faultless. Otherwise, [namely, if it is opposed,] it is a fallacious [thesis]. For instance, [1] [in the statement indicating that] “Sound is not audible,” [sound's inaudibility is opposed by its audibility, which is well established by perception]. [2] [In the statement] “A pot is permanent,” [the pot's permanence is opposed by its impermanence, which is well established by inference]. [3] [In the statement indicating that] “There are no means of cognitions that establish their objects,” [the absence of any of trustworthy means of cognition is opposed by the statement's trustworthiness itself. Although a thesis can be obstructed by faults of other syllogism members from being proved, these theses are obstructed] merely by stating [them, and are therefore regarded as

³ The reconstruction of the Sanskrit text is the result of a workshop on the study of Jinendrabuddhi's PST. I was kindly provided the text by Dr. Toshikazu Watanabe.

fallacious theses.] In addition, [4] even though, with regard to a certain [subject that is intended to be proved to be qualified by a property (A), the property (A) cannot be opposed/proved by inference] in the case that the inference [of a contradicting property (B)/of the property (A)] never occurs because [that property (B/A)] is uncommon, if [the property (A)] is excluded by the contradicting object (B), which is well established by verbal convention, [then the thesis is regarded as a fallacious thesis]. For instance, [this type of fallacious thesis can be found in the reasoning] “The moon (*śaśin*) is not [called] *candra* because it exists.”⁴

In Nyāyamukha, the five following types of *pakṣābhāsas* are enumerated:⁵

⁴ I dare to present here a trial translation on the basis of the understanding that Dharmakīrti and his followers reject. Śākyabuddhi attributes such an understanding to *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkākāras, who may not be identical with Jinendrabuddhi. PVTs D264a2–3, P325a1–2: ‘*dir yang ‘ga’ zhiḡ (PVP 287a7, P342b8) ces bya ba ni tshad ma kun las btus pa’i ṭī kā byed pa dag ste / de dag ni tshig gsum zlas dbye ba byas nas rab tu grags pa’i sgra dang / gsum pa’i de’i skyes bur khas len cing grags pa’i *sgra yang re re la mngon par shyor bar byed do* // “[Devendrabuddhi] said ‘About this, some [commentators explain ...].’ [The words ‘Some commentators’] indicates the authors of *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. They [interpret the compound word *pratyakṣānumānāgamaprasiddha* (PSV) as follows: first, *pratyakṣānumānāgama*] is a *dvandva* compound of three component words. Next, the word *pratyakṣānumānāgama* is connected with the last component word *prasiddha* in the instrumental *tatpuruṣa* compound. [Thus,] they understand the whole compound word *pratyakṣānumānāgamaprasiddha* by connecting the [last] word *prasiddha* with each of the preceding three words.” Prajñākaragupta mentions and criticizes a similar understanding. See PVA 528,10: *pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddheneti ca prasiddhaśabdah pratyekam abhisambadhyate* / This understanding is of PS III 2c–d¹, not of PSV. As is well known, Dharmakīrti understands the word *pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddha* of PS III 2c–d¹ as a *dvandva* compound of the four component words *pratyakṣārtha*, *anumāna*, *āpta*, and *prasiddha*. See PVI in III 28,10–11: ... *pratyakṣārthenānumānenāptābhyāṃ prasiddhena cānirākṛto* ... / Accordingly, the word *pratyakṣānumānāgamaprasiddha* in PSV is also understood as a *dvandva* compound by Dharmakīrti’s followers. Of course, such an understanding is reasonable. However, it seems a little unnatural in some points. I will deal with this problem in another paper.

⁵ In the *Viśeṣāśyaśakabhāṣya-svopajñavṛtti*, when pointing out that the thesis on the doubt of

1. *viruddhārthavācīsvavacana-nirākṛta* (相*違義言聲所遣)e.g., “*sarvaṃ uktaṃ mṛṣā*” (一切言皆是妄)2. *pūrvābhyupagāmaprasiddha⁶-nirākṛta* (先所立宗義相違)e.g., “*aulūkyasya nityaḥ śabdaḥ iti sādhayataḥ*”

(獺狐子立聲爲常)

3. *sābdaprasiddha-nirākṛta* (極成言相違)e.g., “*acandraḥ śaśī sattvāt*” (懷兔非月有故)4. *pratyakṣaprasiddha-nirākṛta* (極成現量相違)e.g., “*aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*” (聲非所聞)5. *anumānaprasiddha-nirākṛta* (極成比量相違)e.g., “*nityo ghaṭaḥ*” (瓶是常)

On the other hand, in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*⁷, the four following types of *pakṣābhāsas* are enumerated:⁷

the self (*ātman*) is fallacious, Jinabhadra Gaṇi (a Śvetāmbara Jain, ca. 6th century) mentions the five following types of *pakṣābhāsas*: *pratyakṣaviruddha*, *anumānaviruddha*, *pūrvābhyupagāmaprasiddha*, *lokaviruddha*, and *svavacanaviruddha*. Jinabhadra's enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas* is quite similar to Dignāga's in his *Nyāyamukha*, with Jinabhadra's examples almost the same as those of Dignāga. Indeed, Jinabhadra may have enumerated these *pakṣābhāsas* on the basis of Dignāga's enumeration cited in *Nyāyamukha*. See *Viśeṣāśyaka* (Ed. Dalsukh Malvania. 3 vols. L. D. Series, Nos. 10, 14, 21. Ahmedabad 1966–68.): II 345,15–26.

⁶ The word *prasiddha* should be supplied to each word in the context of PSV. See note 4. Cf. PV IV 110cd: *pratyakṣādimitā mānaśrutyaūropeṇa sūcitāḥ* //

⁷ It is doubtful whether the four types of *pakṣābhāsas* shown in PSV are directly mentioned in PS. See note 4.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. <i>pratyakṣaprasiddha-nirākṛta</i> | e.g., “ <i>aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ</i> ” |
| 2. <i>anumānaprasiddha-nirākṛta</i> | e.g., “ <i>nityo ghaṭaḥ</i> ” |
| 3. <i>āgamaprasiddha-nirākṛta</i> | e.g., “ <i>na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāni</i> ” |
| 4. <i>śābdaprasiddha-nirākṛta</i> | e.g., “ <i>acandraḥ śaśī sattvāt</i> ” |

Śābdaprasiddha-nirākṛta is included in both lists. Dignāga regards a thesis opposed by *śābdaprasiddha* (what is well established by verbal convention) to be a form of *pakṣābhāsa*, giving the example, “The moon (*śaśī*) is not [called] *candra*.” In both works, he explains this type of *pakṣābhāsa* as follows:

- [3] *yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpodyate, yathācandraḥ śaśī sattvād iti* / (= 又若於中由不共故無有比量、爲極成言相違義遣、如說懷兔非月有故。)

Presumably, here Dignāga simply intends to show the following: a thesis such as “the moon (*śaśī*) is not [called] *candra*,” is opposed by verbal convention, not by inference, because the inference of being [called] *candra* never occurs for the reason that being called *candra* is not common to other things. As is well known, however, Dharmakīrti interprets this passage differently.

Dharmakīrti

As has been reported by Professor Tom J. F. Tillemans and by me, Dharmakīrti understands that this type of *pakṣābhāsa* should be interpreted

in connection with the universal problem of the relation between a word and its object, not with the particular problem of the word *candra*.⁸

According to Dharmakīrti, the term *śābdaprasiddha* (what is well established by verbal cognition) does not signify the convention of the use of a word for a certain object. It signifies the fitness (*yogyatā*) of any object to be designated by any word, or an object's being denotable by any word at the speaker's will (*iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatva*). With *śābdaprasiddha*, Dignāga meant the property obtained by our daily verbal behavior (*vyavahāra* = *prasiddhi*). This property is nothing other than the object's being denotable by any word at the will of the speaker (*iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatva* = *yogyatā*).⁹ Dharmakīrti explains that every object intrinsically has this *yogyatā* regardless of whether a verbal convention (*saṃketa*) has been established.¹⁰

If a proponent declares, "The moon is not called *candra*," he denies such *yogyatā*. The denial of *yogyatā* is rejected by *yogyatā* itself.¹¹ Even if a certain person, such as a person from another country, does not know the meaning of a particular word, everybody knows the well-established fact that any object

⁸ Tillemans 2000: 153–189; Inami 1988. Recently, Dharmakīrti's theory of *śābdaprasiddhanirākṛta*, as stated in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III (PVin III), has been studied by Professor Takashi Iwata. See Iwata 2014. Although some parts are slightly changed, almost all of Dharmakīrti's explanation of this type of *pakṣābhāsa* in PVin III is essentially the same as the explanation in PV IV.

⁹ PV IV 109–110ab: *artheṣv apratiśiddhatvāt puruṣecchānurodhinaḥ / iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatvasyāpto 'trākṣatavāg janaḥ // uktaḥ prasiddhaśabdena dharmaḥ tadvyavahārajaḥ / Cf. PVin III 35,4–6: prasiddhiḥ khalv api virodhinaṃ pratijñārtham bādhati / puruṣecchānurodhino 'rtheṣv aśakyapratīśedhatvād iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatvasya / sa dharmo vyavahārajaḥ prasiddhiśabdenoktaḥ / On yogyatā and śābdaprasiddha, see Tillemans 2000: 154–159.*

¹⁰ PV IV 111: *tadāśrayabhuvām icchānurodhād anīśedhinām / kṛtānām akṛtānām ca yogaṃ viśvaṃ svabhāvataḥ // Cf. PVin III 35,6–7: yogaṃ hi viśvaṃ svabhāvataḥ kṛtākṛtānām śabdānām icchāmātravṛtteḥ /*

¹¹ PV IV 112: *arthamātrānurodhinyā bhāvinyā bhūtayāpi vā / bādhyate pratirundhānaḥ śabdayogyatayā tayā // Cf. PVin III 35,7–8: tayārthamātrānurodhinyā bhāvinyā bhūtayā vā śabdayogyatayā tām pratirundhāno bādhyate /*

can be designated by any word, at the speaker's will.¹² Therefore, the statement "The moon is not called *candra*" is rejected, not because the moon is conventionally admitted to be called *candra*, but because it is conventionally admitted that any object can be designated by any word at the speaker's will.¹³

Dharmakīrti points out that Dignāga said *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* precisely because he was considering the fitness of any object's being denotable by any word (*iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatva*). Namely, a proponent might present the following argument:

¹² PV IV 113: *tadyogyatābalād eva vastuto ghaṭito dhvaniḥ / sarvo 'syām apraṭīte 'pi tasmīṃs tatsiddhatā tataḥ* // Cf. PVin III 35,9–11: *tadyogyatābalād eva vastuto ghaṭito 'syām sarvaḥ śabda ity apraṭīte 'pi tasmīṃs tatsiddhatām āha / yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpodyate na sa pakṣa iti* /

¹³ In the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, Vinītadeva (ca. 8th century) explains this *pratītinirākṛta* type of *pakṣābhāsa* in the two following ways: NBTv D23b5–6, P28b1–3: *la la zhig ri bong can ni zla ba'i sgrar brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhes dam 'cha' bar byed na / de ni ri bong can zla ba'i sgrar brjod pa nyid du gnag rdzi mo yan chad la grags pas sel bar byed do // yang na don thams cad la sgra thams cad kyi brjod par *byar rung bas sel bar byed de / sgra dang don du 'brel ba ni brdar btags pa yin pa'i phyir / dper na bum pa la yang zla ba'i sgrar brjod par bya ba nyid du rung ngo* // "If someone insists that the moon (*śaśin*) is not designated by the word '*candra*,' then he is refuted because it is well known even to a cowherd that the moon is called *candra*. Alternatively, [he is] refuted because anything can be designated by any word. Any relation between a word and an object can be conceptually constructed by verbal convention. For instance, even a pot is fit to be called *candra*." On the other hand, according to Dharmottara (ca. 8th century), the word *praṭīti* means here "being an object of conceptual cognition" (*vikalpavijñānaviśayatvam*). Because an object of conceptual cognition can be connected with any word, the moon (*śaśin*), an object of conceptual cognition, can be designated by any word. If someone insists that the moon is not called *candra*, such insistence is refuted by the fact that it can be called *candra*, as established by its being an object of conceptual cognition. See NBT_{Dh} 183,5–184,4: *pratītyā nirākṛtaḥ acandra iti candraśabdavācya na bhavati śaśīti pratījñātārthaḥ / ayaṃ ca partītyā nirākṛtaḥ / pratīto 'rtha ucyaṭe vikalpavijñānaviśayaḥ / pratītiḥ pratītatvaṃ vikalpavijñānaviśayatvam ucyaṭe / tena vikalpavijñānena pratītirūpeṇa śaśīnaś candraśabdavācyaṭvaṃ siddham eva / tathā hi — yad vikalpavijñānagrāhyaṃ tac chabdākārasaṃsargayogyam / yac chabdākārasaṃsargayogyam tat sāṅketikena śabdena vaktuṃ śakyam / ataḥ pratītirūpeṇa vikalpavijñānaviśayatvena siddham candraśabda-vācyaṭvam acandratvasya bādhakam /*

Argument (I): The moon is not called *candra* because it exists. (*acandraḥ śaṣṭi sattvāt* /)

However, everything can be designated by the word *candra* because anything can be designated by any word at the speaker's will. Then, in the case of argument (I), there is no homologous example (= *acandra*, things that cannot be designated by the word *candra*). That is why Dignāga mentions *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*.¹⁴ This is Dharmakīrti's first interpretation of Dignāga's words.¹⁵

¹⁴ It must be correct that the probans “*sattva*” for the inference of *acandra* should be regarded as a *viruddha-hetu*, not as an *asādhāraṇa-hetu*. Based on Dharmakīrti's theory, the probans can be understood to exist only in heterologous examples (*vipakṣa* = *candra*). Devendrabuddhi solves this problem as follows: PVP D292a4–5, P348b8–349a1: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / thun mong ma yin pa nyid du mi 'gyur te / mi mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa'i phyir 'gal ba nyid du 'gyur ro zhe na / bden te 'on kyang gzhan bum pa la sogs pa mi mthun pa'i phyogs nyid du mi 'gyur ba'i phyir / gzhan gyi bsam pas mi mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa ma yin pa de ltar na thun mong ma yin par brjod do* // (Cf. PST D142b7–143a1, P163b6–7: *de ltar 'gyur mod kyi** (corr.; 'di DP) *mi mthun phyogs kho na la yod pa'i phyir / 'gal ba nyid du 'gyur gyi / thun mong ma yin pa nyid du ni mi 'gyur ro zhe na / 'di ni bden te / pha rol pos bum pa la sogs pa rnams mi mthun phyogs nyid du mi 'dod do zhes pa 'di'i phyir / pha rol po'i bsam pas mi mthun phyogs la 'jug pa ma yin no // thun mong ma yin pa nyid du brjod pa 'ga' zhig go* //) “Some might think as follows: [Objection:] [The probans ‘*sattva*’] cannot be an uncommon [probans] (*asādhāraṇa*). As it exists only in the heterologous [examples], it must be a contradictory [probans] (*viruddha*). [The answer to this is as follows:] That is true. However, another person [who declares the statement ‘*acandraḥ śaṣṭi sattva*’] does not admit a pot and others as heterologous examples. [Namely, for him, there are no heterologous examples.] Therefore, based on such an opinion of another person, the probans can be nonexistent in heterologous examples. Thus, it is said to be an uncommon [probans by Dignāga].” On the other hand, Śākyabuddhi makes the following explanation: PVT§ D267a3–4, P329a1–2: *mthun pa'i phyogs dang mi mthun pa'i phyogs la the tshom za ba yod na thun mong ma yin pa yin no* // “When there is doubt about both the homologous examples and the heterologous examples, [the probans must be regarded as] uncommon.” I am not sure if their explanations are persuasive. Here, Dharmakīrti seems to understand the word *asādhāraṇa* only to mean that there can be no homologous things (= those which cannot be called *candra*), not to mean *asādhāraṇahetu*.

¹⁵ PV IV 114–115: *asādhāraṇatā na syāt bādāhetor ihānyathā / tanniṣedho 'numānāt syāc chaddārthe 'nakṣavṛttitāḥ // asādhāraṇatā tatra hetūnāṇi yatra nāmvaṇi / sattvam ity asyodāhāro hetor evaṃphalo mataḥ* // Cf. PVin III 35,12–36,3: *tata eva bādāhetor asādhāraṇatvaṇi kvacid acandre 'siddheḥ / aśakyaṇiṣedhatām asya darśayann evam āha / apratipramāṇatayā niścayam*

Sādhya: *acandra*

Sapakṣa: *acandra* = $\emptyset$

(There is no *acandra* because everything can be called *candra*.)

Dharmakīrti also presents other interpretations of Dignāga's words. To reject the proponent's argument (I), an opponent might state a counter-argument such as the following:

Counter-argument (II): The moon is called *candra*. (*candraḥ śaśī* /)

However, this counter-argument (II) is not established through inference. The moon's fitness to be an object of the word *candra* is not cognized by a means of inference. The fitness is determined through our verbal convention that anything can be designated by any word. According to Dharmakīrti, such a verbal convention is clearly differentiated from so-called fact-based inference (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, inference invoked by the force of a real thing). Although it is regarded as a kind of inference, it has its own peculiar objects differing from the object of a fact-based inference (*bhinnaviṣayā pratītiḥ*), which is why Dignāga said *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*. This is Dharmakīrti's second interpretation of the phrase.¹⁶ Here, the word "inference" (*anumāna*) means "fact-based inference." The proponent's absurd assertion that "the moon is not called *candra*" is opposed by what is established by

vā / tanniṣedho hy anumānāt syāt / pratyakṣeṇa योग्याता'niścayāt / tatra ca sarva hetūnām asādhāraṇatā yatra sattvam eva nānvayīty udāharaṇam evaṃphalaṃ /

¹⁶ According to this explanation, Dignāga's expression *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* can be understood to mean "the fact-based inference never occurs concerning the object of *śābdaprasiddhi* because it is peculiar, namely, different from the object of fact-based inference." I dare to understand that Dharmakīrti read the whole passage *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* in this way. However, the commentators do not support such an understanding. They see Dharmakīrti's explanation as concerning only the part *anumānābhāve* of the passage.

verbal convention (*śābdaprasiddha* = *iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatva*), not by what is established by fact-based inference.¹⁷

Moreover, Dharmakīrti points out that a proponent who does not admit even the moon to be called *candra* never admits anything being called *candra*. For him, the counter-argument (II) has no homologous examples (= *candra/candraśabdābhidheya*, things that can be called *candra*). That is why Dignāga mentions *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*. This is Dharmakīrti's third interpretation of the passage.^{18 19}

Sādhya: *candra*

Sapakṣa: *candra* = Ø

(The proponent who does not admit even the moon to be called *candra* never admits anything being called *candra*.)

Note that Dharmakīrti explains that when presenting this type of *pakṣābhāsa*, Dignāga did not intend to explain only the example *acandraḥ śaśī*. Dharmakīrti also mentions another example, *avṛkṣo dhātṛī* (“Dhātṛī is not called *vrkṣa*”).²⁰ Moreover, Dharmakīrti points out the fact that people

¹⁷ PV IV 118–119: *athavā bruvato lokasyānumā'bhāva ucyaṭe / kin tena bhinnaviṣayā pratītir anumānataḥ // tenānumānād vastūnāṃ sadasattānurodhinaḥ / bhinnasyātvadvaśā vṛttis tadicchājeti sūcitaṃ //* Cf. PVI III 38,2–4: *atha vā lokasya bruvato 'numānābhāvam āha / tena bhinnaviṣayā pratītir anumānād ity uktam bhavati / tenānumānād vastusadasattānurodhino bhinnaviṣayāyāḥ pratīter na vastuvaśād vṛttir iti sūcitaṃ bhavati /*

¹⁸ PV IV 120: *candratām śaśino 'nicchan kām pratītiṃ sa vāñchati / iti taṃ praty adṛṣṭāntaṃ tad asādhāraṇaṃ matam //* Cf. PVI III 38,4–6: *sa hi śaśinaś candratvam anicchan kām anyāṃ pratītiṃ icched iti taṃ praty adṛṣṭāntam anumānaṃ / tenāsādhāraṇam āha /*

¹⁹ Prajñākara-gupta explains that in the case of this understanding, Dignāga's words *acandraḥ śaśī sattvād iti* should be interpreted as “the moon (*śaśī*) cannot be [proved] to be called *candra* by means of [the inference based on] the reason *sattvāt*.” See PVA 540,26–27: *tataś cācandraḥ śaśī sattvād iti ko 'rthaḥ / candraḥ śaśī na sattvād iti hetoḥ / nānena candratvam sādhyaituṃ śakyam /*

²⁰ PV IV 121: *nodāharaṇam evedam adhikṛtyedam ucyaṭe / lakṣaṇatvāt tathā 'vrkṣo dhātṛīty uktau ca bādhanāt //* Cf. PVI III 38,7–8: *yasmān naitad evaikam udāharaṇam adhikṛtyedam*

conventionally use the word *candra* not only for the moon, but also for camphor (*kharpūra*), gold (*rajata*), and so on.²¹

Dharmakīrti's understanding as described above is well thought out. His followers conformed to his understanding of this type of *pakṣābhāsa*. However, whether it follows Dignāga's intention in his explanation is unclear. It seems rather to be an interpretation that has been developed further.

Still another understanding

Interestingly, some commentators on Dharmakīrti's works refer to another, earlier understanding of this type of *pakṣābhāsa*. According to them, Dharmakīrti is intending here to reject this earlier understanding. Namely, there were those who mistakenly understand Dignāga's intention as meaning that this thesis is opposed by the use of the word *candra* for the moon because the moon cannot be inferred as *candra* since there is one and only one *candra*.

Sādhya: *candra*

Sapakṣa: *candra* = Ø

(There are no *candras* other than the moon because only the moon is *candra*.)

ucyate / sarvapratītivirodhānām sāmānyena lakṣaṇatvāt / tathā na vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapety uktāv api bādhanāt /

²¹ PV IV 122: *atrāpi loke dṛṣṭatvāt karpūrarajatādiṣu / samayād vartamānasya kā 'sādhāraṇatāpi vā //* Cf. PVin III 38,9–10: *atrāpi loke karpūrarajatādiṣu dṛṣṭatvān nāsādhāraṇatā syāt / na ca samayād vartamānasya kācid asādhāraṇatā /* In this context, the meaning of the word *rajata* might be “gold” rather than “silver.” According to Sanskrit dictionaries, the word *candra* can mean gold, but not silver. I have adopted Prof. Kiyokuni Shiga's suggestion on this.

According to the commentators, it is this earlier understanding that Dharmakīrti is rejecting here.

- [4] PVP D293a1–2, P349b7–8: *zla ba gcig yod pa nyid kyi phyir dpe med pa nyid kyi phyir / gtan tshigs thun mong ma yin pa nyid yin no zhes bya ba gang yin pa de yang de ltar ma yin no //*

Some said, “Because the moon is unique, there are no [homologous] examples. Therefore, the reason must be uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*).” However, this is not right.

- [5] PVT_§ D267b4–5, P329b5–6: *zla ba gcig yod pa nyid kyi zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni rigs pa'i sgo'i t'i k'a byed pa'i gzhung 'god pa yin no //* (Cf. Vibh p. 455, fn. 1: *nyāyamukhaṭīkākāram upakṣipati /*)

The passage “Some said ...” [of PVP] is a refutation against Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra's view.

- [6] PVA 540,29–31: *nanu candrasyaikatvād asādhāraṇatā / tat katham etal labhyaṃ sakalapratītipratikṣepavādinam praty etad anumānam asādhāraṇam abhipretam / na kiṃcid etat /*

[Objection:] [Dignāga mentioned] uncommonness because the moon (*candra*) is unique (*eka*). How, then, can it be that [Dignāga] intended to explain that for one who rejects any conventional knowledge, this [type of] inference is regarded as uncommon? [Answer:] This is not correct at all.

- [7] PVA_T D84b6–7, P103a3–4: *slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po'i gzhung 'chad pa gzhan dag ni zla ba gcig yin pa'i phyir na / yod pa'i phyir zhes bya ba 'di thun mong ma yin par brjod nas / grags pas gnod par 'dzer to //*

Some commentators of Master Dignāga's work said that this statement should be opposed by what is established by convention, after

explaining that the reason “*sattvāt*” is uncommon because the moon is unique.

- [8] P_{VV}_M 455,4: *yad apy ucyate dvitīyasya candrasyābhāvād asādhāraṇateti tatrāha ...*

It is said [by some commentators] that [the moon is] uncommon because a second moon does not exist. Against such [understanding], [Dharmakīrti] said

Note that this understanding of the words “*asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*” is attributed to Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra²² by Śākyabuddhi ([5]), and to certain commentators on Dignāga's work by Yamāri ([7]). Of course, Dharmakīrti's followers never supported this understanding rejected by Dharmakīrti. No further information about this other view of this *pakṣābhāsa* exists in their works. However, such an understanding is found in some Indian texts. I now give two examples, one taken from an argument ascribed to Pātrasvāmin in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*(-*pañjikā*) and the other from an argument on *sāmānya* in the *Yuktidīpikā*.²³

Pātrasvāmin

When explaining the Buddhist theory of inference in the *Anumānaparīkṣā* of *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntaraksita (725–788) introduces an objection raised by Pātrasvāmin (a Jaina logician, ca. 7–8th century?) to examine and reject it.²⁴

²² On Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra, see Watanabe 1976 and Tillemans 2000: 42, 44, 177–179, etc. Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra is also mentioned by Jayanta. See PVAṬ D234b6–7, P277b5–6 (ad PVA 493,9: *anyaḥ punar āha /.../*): **gzhan** ni rigs pa'i sgo'i t'i k'a byed pa po'o // Cf. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana's note 6 (PVA p. 493): *nyāyamukhaṭīkākāraḥ /*

²³ I was able to find the passage of *Yuktidīpikā* taken up here thanks to Dr. Hayato Kondo.

²⁴ See Shiga 2007.

Pātrasvāmin, who insists that a valid reason should be said to have only one characteristic, namely, “being otherwise impossible” (*anyathānupapannatva*), criticizes the Buddhist theory of the three characteristics of a valid reason. Pātrasvāmin explains in detail that even when not having any of the three characteristics that Buddhists admit, there are some reasons that can be valid. In his explanation, Pātrasvāmin presents the following example of an inference whose reason is valid without having the second characteristic, “subsistence in homologous” (*sapakṣasattva*):

That rabbit-marked object (*śaśalāñchana*), namely, the moon, is not denied to be *candra*, because it is called *candra*.

According to Pātrasvāmin, in this inference, the reason “being called *candra*” cannot be found in any homologous things because nothing but the moon can be called *candra*. The reason has only two characteristics, namely, *pakṣadharmatā* and *vipakṣāsattva*; therefore, for the Buddhists it would be a fallacious reason. Presenting several other examples, Pātrasvāmin criticizes the Buddhist theory of three characteristics. He insists that based on Jaina’s theory of one characteristic, such reasons can be properly treated as valid.²⁵

Note that Pātrasvāmin mentions an argument proving that the moon is *candra*, and understands that nothing but the moon can be called *candra*. In addition, interestingly, Pātrasvāmin states that “The moon is not non-*candra*” for the thesis and “because it is called *candra*” for the reason.

Śāntarakṣita rejects Pātrasvāmin’s objection by pointing out that the probans “being called *candra*” can be found in some homologous things. According to Śāntarakṣita, the word *candra* is used for certain men, camphor (*kharpūra*), gold (*rajata*), and so on.²⁶ Śāntarakṣita insists that the probans also has the

²⁵ TS 1371: *candratvenāpadiṣṭatvān nācandraḥ śaśalāñchanaḥ / iti dvilakṣaṇo hetur ayaṃ cāpara ucyate //*

²⁶ TS 1394: *candratvenāpadiṣṭatvaṃ sapakṣe 'py anuvartate / kvacin māṇavake yad vā karpūra-rajatādike //*

second characteristic, and accordingly refutes the objection. Apparently, Śāntarakṣira's response has been influenced by Dharmakīrti's explanation of *śābdaprasiddhanirākṛta*.

However, a further objection is raised by Pātrasvāmin: Why did Dignāga say that, when a worldly person (A) intends to refute another person (B) who denies the moon to be *candra*, the inference of its being *candra* never occurs to person (A) because there is no homologous example? In saying this, Dignāga regarded the reason of this inference as lacking the second characteristic.

Śāntarakṣita replies to this objection as follows:

- [9] TS 1395: *candratvasādhane hetāv asādhāraṇatā bhavet / prasiddhi-vyatireke ca vasturūpasamāśraye //*

In the case of an inference based on a real entity itself, which differs from the [verbal] convention [inference], the reason proving that [the moon is] *candra* would be uncommon. [That is why Dignāga said that an inference never occurs in this case.]²⁷

²⁷ See Shiga 2007: 147–149. Kamalaśīla refers to another reading of the beginning of this verse, namely, *acandrasādhane*, and gives another interpretation of the verse as follows: “When a proponent presents a proof that the moon is not *candra*, an opponent intends to present a counter-proof that [the moon is] *candra*. However, in an inference based on a real entity itself, which differs from the [verbal] convention [inference], the reason [proving that the moon is *candra*] would be uncommon. [That is why Dignāga said that inference never occurs in this case.] See TSP 503,18–22: *acandrasādhana* iti kvacit pāṭhaḥ / tatraivam iti sambandhaḥ / pūrvapakṣavādinā ya ukto 'candraḥ śaśī sattvād iti hetus tasminn *acandra-sādhana* *hetau* pūrvapakṣavādinā prokte sati candratvasādhanāya taṃ prati pravṛtta-syottarapakṣavādinō 'sādhāraṇatā' anumānābhāve kāraṇam ācāryeṇodītaṃ “yatṛāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāva” ityādinā / *prasiddhi*vyatiriktaṃ *vastubalapravṛttaṃ* liṅgam āśṛityeti // The meaning of the verse is almost same even in this reading. By adopting the reading *acandrasādhane*, we can understand the first half of this verse to mean that the reason proving *acandra* would be uncommon. However, the second half of the verse would not fit this understanding.

Following Dharmakīrti's theory, Śāntarakṣita differentiates between the fact-based type of inference (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*) and the verbal convention type (*śābdaprasiddhi*). A worldly person can prove that the moon is *candra* on the basis of the verbal convention type of inference, not on the fact-based type of inference. One who denies the moon to be called *candra* never admits other things being called *candra*. For him, there are no homologous examples, so he cannot be persuaded by usual reasoning. The reason why Dignāga said that inference never occurs in this case is because he had the fact-based inference in mind.

Note that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (740–795) mention neither *iṣṭa-śabdābhidheyatva* nor *yogyatā*. They explain that although the *prasiddhi* type of inference functions without any problem, the fact-based type never occurs. However, they do not refer to Dharmakīrti's theory that any object can be designated by any word at the speaker's will, or to Dharmakīrti's first interpretation of Dignāga's words.

Yuktidīpikā

Also in the *Yuktidīpikā* (unknown author, ca. 6th century?), the earliest available commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the problem of the object of the word *candra* is discussed with a Buddhist.

A certain Buddhist insists that verbal cognition, which like inference has the universal (*sāmānya*) as its object, is nothing but inference. According to him, in the case of the inference of sound's impermanence, the probans "being produced" (*kṛtakatva*) is found only in homologous things, namely, impermanent things, not in heterologous things, namely, permanent things. Also in the case of verbal cognition, a word is found to be used for homologous objects, not for heterologous objects.²⁸

²⁸ YD 100,13–16: *āha: na anvayavyatirekāhyām adhigamahetutvāt / yathā kṛtakatvādir dharmo 'nityatvādau viṣaye dṛṣṭas tadabhāve cādṛṣṭa ity anītye 'rthe niścayam ādadhāty evaṃ*

Criticizing this Buddhist's view, Siddhāntin, the author of *Yuktidīpikā*, points out that because the object of the word *candra* is uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*), how, then, can the word *candra* have a property common (*sāmānya*) to other homologous things as its object?²⁹

In response to this question, the Buddhist answers that the object of the word *candra* is regarded as *sāmānya* just because it is “an aggregate” (*sāmānya* = *samudāya*) in comparison with each part. He thinks that such a word is used for the multiple things that constitute an aggregate, as in the case of proper nouns. Therefore, he concludes that verbal cognition is nothing but inference.³⁰

Siddhāntin criticizes this view as follows:

- [10] YD 103,8–12: *yat punar etad uktam candrādīnām avayavāpekṣam sāmānyaviśayatvam iti / etad asat / kasmāt / svamativyāghātāt / yadi khalv api candrādīnām śabdānām avayavāpekṣam sāmānyaviśayatvam abhyupagamyate yad uktam asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śabdaprasiddho 'rtha iti tasya vyāghātaḥ /*

Moreover, you said that the word *candra* and such have *sāmānya* as their objects in comparison with each part. However, this is not right. Why? Because [this explanation] violates your own opinion. Namely, if you admit that the word *candra* and such have *sāmānya* as their objects in comparison with each part, it violates your own statement “Since the object of the word *candra* is uncommon, there is no

*śabdo 'pi svārthe dr̥ṣṭo 'nyatra *cātajjātīye (MsA; 'nyatra tajjātīye VM) na dr̥ṣṭaḥ pratipattihetur bhavati / tasmād anumānād abhinna evāḥam iti /*

²⁹ YD 100,17: *ucyate: candrādiṣv idānīm asādhāraṇaviśayeṣu kā pratipattiḥ syād iti /*

³⁰ YD 100,18–20: *ucyate: candrādiṣv idānīm asādhāraṇaviśayeṣu kā pratipattiḥ syād iti / āha: avayavāpekṣatvāt / candraśabdo hy aneṣu vartate jātīdravyaguṇakriyāsu ca / tathā dīrghādiśabdaḥ / tasmād evaṃjātīyakānām api cānumānād abhedatḥ /* On the meaning of the word “*sāmānya*,” please see my forthcoming paper, which will be published in the proceedings of the 5th Dharmakīrti Conference.

inference of it. Therefore, the object [of the word *candra*] is established [only] by verbal cognition.”

Siddhāntin decries the Buddhist’s explanation as a violation of his own opinion presented in his own statement indicating that the object of the word *candra* cannot be inferred because it is uncommon. Quoting here the Buddhist’s words *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve ...*, Siddhāntin points out that the Buddhist himself states that since the object of the word *candra*, namely, the moon, is uncommon, inference never occurs.³¹

Apparently, Dignāga is assumed by the author as being his opponent here. The author quotes Dignāga’s words from NMu or PSV, interpreting Dignāga’s understanding as the object of the word *candra* being uncommon. In this discussion, the author never refers to Dharmakīrti’s advanced theory.

Nyāyapraveśaka³²

³¹ Cf. Marginal Notes of the Kashmir and Delhi Manuscripts = YD p. 103, fn. (2) to YD 103,8 (*candra*-): *candraśabdasyāsādhāraṇatvenaikasmīn arthe pravṛtter dṛṣṭāntābhāvenānvaṃśa-sūnyatvāt / tasmāc candraśabdavācyaṭvāsādhāraṇatvād ekadharmiṇi [ni-]yatatvād dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇy abhāvād anumeyatvābhāvena śābdyaiva vikalpātmikayā prasiddhyā prasiddho ’yam artho yaś candraḥ sa śāśīti tasmāt prasiddhibādhita evāyam pakṣo nānumānabādhitaḥ / itthaṃ vadadbhir bhavadbhiś candrādaya ekārthanīyatā upagatāḥ / idānū tu sāmānyaviṣayatvena sādharmaṇaviṣayā iti vyāghātāḥ //* (K.36b, D.114-2.)

³² This work has minor problems with regard to its title. Among modern scholars, some call this work *Nyāyapraveśa* and some call it *Nyāyapraveśaka*. At the beginning of the Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit text (NPr^{T1}), the title is transliterated as follows: *rgya gar skad du / nyā ya pra be sha na ma pra mā ṇi pra ka ra ṇam* (P180b2; N183b2). This suggests that the title is *Nyāyapraveśa*. In Da shu (大疏), Kuiji (窺基) mentions the following with regard to the title: 梵云醯都費陀那耶鉢羅吠奢奢薩怛羅。醯都言因。費陀云明。那耶稱正理。鉢羅吠奢翻入。奢薩怛羅論也。唐云因明正理入論。今順此方言。稱因明入正理論。(YMDS 92a10–14.) According to this, the title would be *Hetuvidyā-Nyāyapraveśa-sāstra*. On the other hand, in India, Jains presumably called this work *Nyāyapraveśaka*. With a few exceptions, the Sanskrit manuscripts of this work and commentaries bear the title *Nyāyapraveśaka*. The same name is also mentioned in the *Tārkarahasyadīpikā* (ad *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*). Ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Granthamālā Sanskrit Series No. 36. Varanasi 1969; 2nd

Śāṅkarasvāmin's (ca. 6–7th century) *Nyāyapraveśaka* is a post-Dignāga manual of logic that is essentially based on Dignāga's logic. The first five types in Śāṅkarasvāmin's enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas* correspond to the five types of *pakṣābhāsas* enumerated by Dignāga in his *Nyāyamukha*. Therefore, Śāṅkarasvāmin's enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas* has been thought to be based on Dignāga's.³³ However, note that Śāṅkarasvāmin's five types are different from Dignāga's in a number of respects. The most important differences are as follows: first, the *pakṣābhāsa* corresponding to *śābdaprasiddha-nirākṛta* is

ed: 1981: 577. The author is a Śvetāmbara Jain who flourished in the 15th century.) However, it should be noted that almost all of the Indian information on the title is given by Jains. The title “*Nyāyapraveśaka*” is tentatively adopted in the present paper.

³³ In the *Nyāyapraveśaka*, the definition of *pakṣa* is stated as follows: NPr 1,6–7: *pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatayā* svayaṁ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ* / “The *pakṣa* is a well-established subject that [the proponent] himself wishes to prove to be qualified by a well-established qualifier.” The Sanskrit version of *Nyāyapraveśaka* adds the following sentence: NPr 1,7: *pratyakṣādyaviruddha itī vākyaśeṣaḥ* / (=This sentence should be read by adding the phrase “and which does not conflict with perception and other [means of cognition].”) However, the Chinese translation of *Nyāyapraveśaka* (NPr^{Ch}) does not contain this sentence, and thus it may be lacking in the original text of *Nyāyapraveśaka*. It would seem unnatural that Śāṅkarasvāmin, who is enumerating various *pakṣābhāsas*, does not use this phrase in his definition of *pakṣa*. Of course, it can be viewed that the phrase *sādhyatvenepsitaḥ* in the definition excludes fallacious theses. However, Śāṅkarasvāmin defines *pakṣābhāsa* as follows: *sādhayitum iṣṭo 'pi pratyakṣādiviruddhaḥ pakṣābhāsaḥ* / “Even though [a subject qualified by a qualifier] is wished to be proved, if it conflicts with perception and other [trustworthy means of cognition], it is [not a proper thesis, but] a fallacious thesis.” According to this passage, Śāṅkarasvāmin does not regard the word *īpsita* or *iṣṭa* to be excluding fallacious theses, such as *pratyakṣaviruddha*. He seems to think that there are certain subjects that proponents wish to prove that are refuted by perception and other means of cognition. This suggests that Śāṅkarasvāmin's definition of *pakṣa* must be read by adding the word *pratyakṣādyaviruddhaḥ*. The Sanskrit version of this text may reflect these circumstances. As the Chinese translation of *Nyāyapraveśaka* does not have the additional sentence, some commentators in East Asia understood that fallacious theses, such as *pratyakṣaviruddha*, are excluded by mentioning the word *īpsitaḥ* in the definition of *pakṣa*. Commenting on the words “隨自樂爲所成立性” (*svayaṁ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ*), Kuiji refers to Dignāga's explanation given in *Nyāyamukha*, and adds his own explanation. Kuiji explains that there are the four kinds of *pakṣa*; namely, 遍所許宗, 先承稟宗, 傍憑義宗, and 不顧論宗. According to him, the first three are excluded by mentioning the words. (YMDS 100b27–c11.) Moreover, Kuiji explains that the fallacious thesis and other fallacious members of syllogism are excluded by mentioning the word *īpsitaḥ*. (YMDS 100c23–24: 樂爲之言簡似宗等。) However, this understanding seems inconsistent with Śāṅkarasvāmin's definition of *pakṣābhāsa*, as mentioned above.

called by Śāṅkarasvāmin *loka-viruddha* ([a thesis] conflicting with what people accept), and second, in the *Nyāyapraveśaka*'s Sanskrit version this is illustrated not with the example *acandraḥ śaśī sattvāt*, but with the example “*śuci naraśīraḥkapālaṃ prāṇyaṅgatvāc chaṅkhaśuktivat*” (A human skull is sacred, because it is a part of a living being, like the conch-shell).³⁴

However, in the Chinese translation of *Nyāyapraveśaka*, another example, “The moon is not *candra*” (懷兔非月) is added, and accordingly, two examples are given. The example “The moon is not *candra*,” which Dignāga presented as an example of *śābdaprasiddha*, is regarded as an example of *lokaviruddha*.³⁵ ³⁶ Therefore, the East Asian Buddhist commentators on

³⁴ Bhāṇiveka, in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, mentions the statement “The moon is not *candra*” as an example of *lokaviruddha*. (See Tang 2016: 7.) Kumārila also regards this statement as *lokaviruddha* or *lokaprasiddhiviruddha* in *Tantravārttika*. (See *The Mīmāṃsādarśanam of Mahārṣi Jaimini*, ed. by Mahāprabhuḷāla Gosvāmī. Tara Book Agency. Varanasi 1984. Vol. 4: 496,3–8.) Dharmakīrti uses the term *pratītinirākṛta* for this type of *pakṣābhāsa* in *Nyāyabindu*. Of course, what people accept can be understood as related to verbal convention. However, careful attention should be given to the difference in wording. In *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā-svopajñavṛtti* of Hemacandra (1089–1172), a later work on Jaina philosophy, *pratītibādhā* is distinguished from *lokabādhā*. As examples of these, the statements “The moon is not [called] *candra*” (*acandraḥ śaśī*) and “A human skull is pure” (*śuci naraśīraḥkapālaṃ*) are each shown. (See *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, ed. by Sukhalālji Saṅghavi, Mahendrakumar Śāstrī, and Dalsukh Mālvaṇī. Ahmedabad 1989: 46,1–10.)

³⁵ There are two different Tibetan translations of *Nyāyapraveśaka*: one (NPr^{T1}) is a translation of the Sanskrit text, and the other (NPr^{T2}) is a retranslation of the Chinese translation. Only the latter contains the example *acandraḥ śaśī*. The Sanskrit manuscripts of *Nyāyapraveśaka* and its commentaries were found in Jaina archives in India. All of the extant Sanskrit commentaries were written by Jaina authors, indicating presumably that in India, *Nyāyapraveśaka* was studied primarily by Jains.

³⁶ *Nyāyapraveśaka* or something resembling it might have been studied in southern India for a certain period. As is well known, the 29th chapter of *Maṇimēkalai*, a Tamil epic poem, deals with Buddhist logic similar to the logic explained in the *Nyāyapraveśaka*. The same nine types of *pakṣābhāsas* as those in the *Nyāyapraveśaka* are enumerated, and *lokaviruddha* (*ulōkā-viruttam* in Tamil) is listed there with the example “The luminous round [celestial body that you can see up there, namely the moon,] is not called *candra*” (*ilaku mati cantiraṇ alla*). See Shu Hikosaka, Tamil jojishi *Maṇimekalai* ni tsuite II —Tokuni dai 29 shou bukkyōronrigaku ni tsuite— [On the Tamil Buddhist Epic *Manimekalai* (II), with Special Reference to the Buddhist Logic in Canto XXIX]. *IBK* 33-1: 329-325. 1984. When the *Maṇimēkalai* was composed is still unclear.

Nyāyapraveśaka, who also knew the Chinese translation of *Nyāyamukha*, as well as the commentators on *Nyāyamukha*, give explanations of this example for *pakṣābhāsa*. Let us have a short look at their explanations.

Shentai

In his commentary on *Nyāyamukha*, Shentai (神泰, fl. 645) explains this type of *pakṣābhāsa* as follows:

- [11] YZMS T1839 79a16–26: 論云「又若」至「月*有故」者、此世間相違也。謂若於所立宗中由不共故者、如月唯懷菟者、是月更*無餘同類法是月、此月於餘法更無、故名「不共」。亦如「所聞性故」因、此因「不共」。由同是不共法故、即無同喻等、不*成比量、故云「無有比量」。有[法]愚人見無比量、成立爲月、遂即成立言「是非月」。雖爲此立、然爲世間共說是月相違義遣。言「極成」者、世間共許是月也。「言」者、說月之言也。「相違義」者、即言下(詞?)所詮共許月*義。即此共許月*義、能遣其所立「懷菟非月義」。

This treatise (*Nyāyamukha*) says “又若 ... 月有故.” This is [an explanation of] *lokaviruddha*. [Dignāga's phrase] “With regard to a [certain] subject that is intended to be proved ... because of uncommonness” can be interpreted as follows: For example, only *śāśin* is the moon. [Being] the moon cannot be a property of any other homologous thing, much less a property of other things. Therefore, the moon is called “uncommon” here. For example, the reason “because of audibility” (*śrāvaṇatvāt*) [stated as the proof of sound being permanent] is regarded as “uncommon” (*asādhāraṇa*) [because there never exist audible things other than sound]. In the same way, being the moon is an uncommon property of *śāśin*. Namely, [*śāśin*] does not have homologous examples in terms of being the moon. Therefore, the inference [of its being the moon] cannot be established. Thus, Dignāga said “inference never occurs.” Observing that an inference proving the moon never occurs, some foolish person might

present the argument proving that this (*śaśin*) is not the moon. However, even though he can present such an argument, it should be opposed by the conflicting fact that people commonly say that this (*śaśin*) is the moon. The word “established” (*prasiddha*) means that people commonly accept this (*śaśin*) to be the moon. The word “verbal convention” (*śābda*) means that [people commonly] explain that [*śaśin*] is [another] name of the moon. The word “contradictory thing” (*viruddhārtha*) means “the fact that people commonly accept that the object designated by the word [*śaśin*] is the moon.” Namely, the proposition “*śaśin* is not the moon,” which the [foolish person] intends to prove, should be opposed by the fact that people commonly accept that *śaśin* is the moon.³⁷

Shentai understands here that *śaśin* cannot be proved to be the moon by means of inference. According to him, it has no homologous examples because the moon is unique. Therefore, the absurd proposition “*śaśin* is not the moon” will be opposed not by a correct inference, but by the verbal convention that *śaśin* is the moon.

Shentai’s understanding is apparently similar to that which is negated by Dharmakīrti and his followers. Shentai, who did not know Dharmakīrti’s advanced interpretation, seems to present an interpretation that he considers natural. However, whether Shentai understood that the usage of the word *candra* for the moon (*śaśin*) is the problem at issue is unclear.

Kuiji’s interpretation

Commentators in East Asia explain the example *acandraḥ śaśī*, which is included in the Chinese translation of *Nyāyapraveśaka*, in various ways. However, we can find some difficulties in their interpretations. For example,

³⁷ This is a tentative translation. Cf. Tang 2016: 1–2.

as is well known, Kuiji (窺基 632–682) explains the example *acandraḥ śaśī* as follows:

- [12] YMDS T1840 115b5–7: 初非學世間者。即此所言「月是懷兔。」... 一切共知月有兔故。說此因緣。如西域記。³⁸

[Between the two kinds of common knowledge explained above,] the first kind, namely, the non-scholarly common knowledge, is, for example, the fact that the moon is *śaśī* (月是懷兔). [The thesis stating *acandraḥ śaśī* is opposed by what is established by the non-scholarly common knowledge,] because the fact that there is a rabbit in the moon (月有兔) is commonly known to all. The story about this can be found, for example, in the *Xi yu ji* (西域記).

Kuiji seems to understand this fallacious thesis, *acandraḥ śaśī*, as stating that the moon does not possess a rabbit, or that there is no rabbit in the moon. He does not understand this statement as stating that the moon (*śaśī*) is not designated by the word *candra*. This distortion has a strong influence on later commentators in East Asia.

When explaining the *lokaviruddha* type of *pakṣābhāsa*, Kuiji refers to the passage *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* of the *Nyāyamukha*. Kuiji presents a unique interpretation as follows:

- [13] YMDS T1840 115b10–14: 理門論云「又若於中由不共故、無有比量、爲極成言相違義遣。如說『懷兔非月、有故』。彼言意顯、以不共世間所共有知故、無有道理可成比量令餘不信者信『懷兔非月』。

³⁹

Nyāyamukha says, “Some statement is opposed by verbal convention, when inference does not occur because of being uncommon. For instance, the statement indicating that ‘*śaśī* is not *candra* because it

³⁸ See Tang 2016: 2–3.

³⁹ See Tang 2016: 3.

exists' [is opposed by verbal convention. Such a statement is regarded as a fallacious thesis].” The meaning of this passage is as follows: the proponent's statement is uncommon or unique because worldly persons commonly know that *śaśin* is *candra*. Therefore, he can never construct any logical argument in order to persuade other persons to believe that *śaśin* is not *candra*.

Kuiji interprets the passage *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* as “by any inference, the proponent cannot persuade other persons to believe that *śaśin* is not *candra*, because this insistence is quite unique and is not commonly accepted by other worldly people.” This unique interpretation is not supported by any Indian commentary.

What does the sentence *acandraḥ śaśī* mean? According to the understanding of some modern scholars, the sentence means that the word *śaśin* does not mean the moon (*candra*), or the word *śaśin* does not have the moon (*candra*) as its object. A speaker of this sentence wants to deny the use of the word *śaśin* for the object, the moon. Accordingly, that person's statement should be rejected due to well-established verbal convention. In Sanskrit, the word *śaśin* (literally meaning “the thing possessing a rabbit”) is used to mean the moon.⁴⁰

However, according to ancient Indian thinkers, the statement means that the word *candra* does not mean the moon (*śaśin*), or that the moon (*śaśin*) is not designated by the word *candra*. If a speaker denies the use of the word *candra* for the object the moon (*śaśin*), his claim should be rejected through the well-

⁴⁰ In his note to the English translation of this passage of NPr, Tachikawa comments: “.... In addition to this instance of the fallacious *pakṣa*, Ch gives a second one, viz., ‘Hare-possessor is not the moon.’ (懷兔非月). Since the mark of a hare appears on the surface of the moon, ‘hare-possessor’ is used in Sanskrit as another name of the moon. Therefore, the statement ‘hare-possessor is not the moon’ is contradicted by common sense.” (Tachikawa 1971: 133, note 18.) Ui also understands this example in the same way. According to Ui, the usage of the word “*śaśin*” for the moon (*candra*) is well established because people give credence to the tale saying that there is a rabbit in the moon. (See Ui 1929: 553–554.)

established verbal convention that the word *candra* is used to mean the moon.⁴¹ It is not the use of the word *śaśin*, but the use of the word *candra* that is at issue.

Zenju's comments

When explaining the phrase *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* of *Nyāya-mukha*, Zenju (善珠 723–797) refers to Woncheuk's (圓測 613–696) interpretation: If a person tries to prove that *śaśin* is *candra*, then an inference never occurs to him because there is no homologous example. On the

⁴¹ Under Dignāga's influence, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa adopted the theory of *pratijñābhāsa* in his *Ślokavārttika*. (ŚV anumāna 58cd–75ab.) Kumārila, in accordance with the number of *pramāṇas* that he admits, broadly classifies *pratijñābhāsas* into the following six types: *pratyakṣavirodha*, *anumānavirodha*, *śabdavirodha*, *upamānavirodha*, *arthāpattivirodha*, and *anupalabdhi-virodha*. Among them, the third type, *śabdavirodha*, is further subdivided into the following: *pratijñāvirodha*, *pūrvasañjalpavirodha*, and *sarvalokaprasiddhivirodha*. These three correspond to Dignāga's *svavacanānirākṛta*, *āgamanirākṛta*, and *śābdaprasiddhanirākṛta*, respectively. (As has been pointed out, Dharmakīrti, as well as Kumārila, categorizes *pakṣābhāsas* in accordance with the number of *pramāṇas*. However, unlike Kumārila, Dharmakīrti classifies *pakṣābhāsas* into two groups, namely, *pratyakṣanirākṛta* and *anumānanirākṛta*, because Dharmakīrti admits only two *pramāṇas*. According to Dharmakīrti, the above three, together with [*vastubalapravṛtta*]-*anumānanirākṛta*, fall into the same category, *anumānanirākṛta*. See Inami 1991.) Kumārila explains *sarvalokaprasiddhivirodha* as follows: ŚV anumāna 64cd–65ab: *candraśabdābhidheyatvaṃ śaśino yo niṣedhati // sa sarvalokasiddhena candrajñānena bādhyate* / “A person who denies the moon to be denoted by the word *candra* is refuted by the knowledge [that the moon is designated by the word] *candra*, which is commonly established for all people.” Clearly, Kumārila thinks here that the statement indicating *acandraḥ śaśi* is an example of *sarvalokaprasiddhivirodha*. He interprets the statement as denying the moon being designated by the word *candra* (*candraśabdābhidheyatva*). Namely, Kumārila understands that this example concerns the relation between the word *candra* and its object, the moon (*śaśin*). Nārāyaṇa (17th century), a Mīmāṃsaka, criticizes the Buddhist view that perception is free from conceptualization by quoting the following verse: “Only the [foolish] person who denies the moon to be denoted by the word *candra* intends to deny conceptual cognition to be perception.” The first half of the unidentified verse is the same as that of the above verse of *Ślokavārttika*. MM 197–20,3: *saugatās tu nirvikalpakam eva pratyakṣam āśṛitya savikalpakasya pramāṇatvaṃ pratyakṣatvaṃ ca nāstīty āhuḥ / tad apy ayuktam / tasya pratyakṣatayā lokasiddhasya niṣedhe lokavirodhāt / tad uktam —candraśabdābhidheyatvaṃ śaśino yo niṣedhati / sa eva savikalpasya pratyakṣatvaṃ nivārayet // iti /*

contrary, one can easily construct an inference to prove that *śaśin* is not *candra*[, because there are homologous examples]. However, such a statement is opposed by what is established by the worldly usage of the word *śaśin* for the object *candra*.⁴²

Woncheuk seems to understand that the *candra* inference has no homologous example because *candra* (the moon) is unique. However, whether he thinks this statement deals with the problem of the object of the word *candra* is unclear. It is possible, similar to other commentators in East Asia, that he thinks it deals with the problem of the object of the word *śaśin*.

Zenju refers also to Wonhyo's (元曉 617–686) explanation of this example. According to Wonhyo, the proponent who states that *śaśin* is not *candra* because it exists is insisting that the moon is not a real entity because it is nothing but an empty hole in the night sky, and accordingly it can never be a rabbit-possessor. Such an insistence is opposed by what is commonly established by all people, who admit that the moon exists as a real entity and that it is a rabbit-possessor.⁴³

Moreover, Zenju mentions Dingbin's (定賓, fl. 733) interpretation of the sentence *yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpodyate yathā 'candraḥ śaśi sattvād iti*. According to Dingbin, the three *aprasiddha* types of *pakṣābhāsas* (6, 7, 8) listed in Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśaka* were implied by the first part *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* in Dignāga's sentence, and *lokaviruddha* (4) in the

⁴² IRMS T2270 313a28–b4: 西明疏云。「由不共故、無有比量」者、不共即是、無同喻義。此中意說、又若於此立比量中、無同喻故、比量不成。謂如有人欲立月量、而無同喻、月量不成。是故便立非月比量。雖復量成、而違世間極成月義。故言「爲極成言相違義遣」。Woncheuk (圓測)'s *Yin ming li men lun shu* (因明理門論疏) is not extant.

⁴³ IRMS T2270 313a19–25: 曉法師云。如說懷兔者、是有法。非月者、是法。法與有法合以爲宗。言「有故」者、是因。彼說同喻、言猶如窓牖。是師意言。月是天孔中空之無。懷兔是圖孔之處。故言「懷兔非月是有故」。而諸世間皆謂懷兔是月。月體非空。故相違也。Wonhyo (元曉)'s *Yin ming ru zheng li lun shu ji* (因明入正理論疏/記) is not extant.

Nyāyapraveśaka is explained by the following part of the sentence.⁴⁴ This seems to be an extended interpretation.

Kitagawa's understanding

Professor Hidenori Kitagawa, who was certainly unaware of Dharmakīrti's understanding, pointed out that the *acandra* argument (I) would be correct reasoning within Dignāga's *trairūpya* system of logic. Kitagawa thought that because there are no other *candras* but the moon, there is no *vipakṣa* (= *candra*) in this case. Thus, the reason (= *sattva*) could be regarded as having the three characteristics of a valid reason. However, the counter-argument (II) never leads to the construction of correct reasoning because there is no *sapakṣa* (= *candra*) at all. According to Kitagawa, to solve such difficulties, Dignāga introduced his theory of *pakṣābhāsa*. Kitagawa certainly understood that only the moon can be *candra*.⁴⁵ While this understanding is incorrect if seen from the viewpoint of Dharmakīrti's advanced explanation, nonetheless, a similar understanding can be found in a number of Indian logical texts as well as in some Buddhist logical texts from East Asia, as observed above.

Interestingly, commenting on PV IV 120, Manorathanandin explains Dignāga's intention as follows:

- [14] PVV_M 454,14–18 ad PV IV 120: *ataḥ sarvaśya candrasābdavācyatāyogāt sapakṣo nāstīti taṃ candratāpalāpinam vādinam prati sattvaṃ liṅgam adṛṣṭāntam asādhāraṇam uktam ācāryeṇa, na tu candrasyaikasyānyatrāsambhavāt sapakṣavipakṣayor abhāvād asādhāraṇatvam abhipretam ācāryasya / acandratve sādhye*

⁴⁴ IRMS T2270 313b4–9: 賓師云。又若於中至非月有故者。總明四過。「又若於中由不共故」者、所別不成也。「無有比量」者、能別不成也。即合此二、爲俱不成也。爲極成言相違遣已下。世間相違也。此四過中。除俱不成。即但三過也。Dingbin (定賓)'s *Yin ming li men lun shu* (因明理門論疏) is not extant.

⁴⁵ Kitagawa 1965: 54–67. Cf. Katsura 1977: 114–115.

*ghaṭādeḥ sapakṣasya sattvāt / candras tu vipakṣo mā bhūt / tathāpi
hetunivṛttir asmād avyāhataiva / asato 'pi hetunivṛtteḥ sādhanāt /*

Therefore, because everything is fit to be an object of the word *candra*, there are no homologous examples in the case of the inference of *acandra*. **Thus**, our master [Dignāga] said **to the person** who denies that the moon is [called] *candra* that the probans *sattva*, having **no** [homologous] **examples**, is **uncommon**. But our master [Dignāga] does not intend [to say] that, [the probans *sattva*] is uncommon, because, since the moon (*candra*), being unique, exists elsewhere, [the probans] is neither in homologous examples nor in heterologous examples. If this were intended, the probans would not be uncommon because if *acandra* is proved, homologous examples, such as a pot, exist. On the contrary, a heterologous example, namely, *candra*, never exists in this case. However, the probans is excluded from this [heterologous example] without any problem because it is established that a probans is excluded even from nonexistent things. [Thus, if it were intended that the moon (*candra*) is unique, the inference of *acandra* would be correct because the probans has *trairūpya*.]

Manorathanandin points out here that based on the view that the moon (*candra*) is unique, the inference “The moon (*śaśin*) is not *candra* because it exists” would be correct within Dignāga’s system of logic. Manorathanandin intends to say that, since there is no way that Dignāga wanted such an unfavorable result, he must have never taken the view that the moon is unique.

However, it can also be thought that Dignāga introduced the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* to avoid such difficulties. For example, the statement “Sound is not audible” (*aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*) is presented as an example of *pratyakṣa[prasiddha]nirākṛta*. In this case, too, the inference would be correct and could not be opposed by any counter-inference, in which the reason never has *trairūpya* because there are no homologous examples. Thus, the statement

“sound is not audible” should be opposed only by what is established by perception. When Manorathanandin's explanation is seen, Professor Kitagawa's argument seems rather convincing.

Applying his philosophy of language, Dharmakīrti may have intended to correct such an imperfections in Dignāga's logic. Based on the theory of *iṣṭaśabdābhidheyatva*, the argument for the moon being called *candra* must be valid; it would never be invalid. Instead, the absurd proposition “The moon is not called *candra*” can never be proved because it has no *sapakṣas*.

II

As is described above, Dignāga enumerated five types of *pakṣābhāsas* in his *Nyāyamukha* and four types in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(-vṛtti). However, another Buddhist logician seems to have added three more types of *pakṣābhāsas*, namely *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣya* and, *aprasiddhobhaya*. The following section deals with the problem of this different enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas*.

Dharmakīrti's criticism

In the *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, Dharmakīrti insists that although any fault of proof, such as a fallacious reason (*hetvābhāsa*), can prevent a thesis from being proved, a fault connected to the thesis alone should be regarded as a fault of the thesis (*pakṣadoṣa*); Dharmakīrti then concludes that faults of reason, such as *aśrayāsiddha*, are not faults of the thesis.

- [15] PV IV 149–150: *sarvasāadhanadoṣeṇa pakṣa evoparudhyate / tathāpi pakṣadoṣatvaṃ pratiññāmātrasaṃgīnaḥ // uttarāvayavāpekṣo yo doṣaḥ so 'nubadhyate / tenety uktam ato 'pakṣadoṣo 'siddhāśrayādikaḥ //*

Although all faults of proof obstruct *pakṣa*, [faults] connected only with the proposition are regarded as faults of *pakṣa*. It is already said [in PV IV 82–83] that a fault based on the [other] members following [*pakṣa*] is connected with them. Therefore, the fault of an unestablished basis (*asiddhāśraya*) and so forth are not faults of the thesis.⁴⁶

Dharmakīrti's followers interpreted this as Dharmakīrti criticizing the pre-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logician who added the three other types of *pakṣābhasas*, namely, *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*, and *aprasiddhobhaya*. When introducing these verses, Devendrabuddhi explains the opponent's objection as follows:

- [16] PVP D297b4–5, P355b3–4: *gal te khyad par ma grub pa la sogs sgrub par byed pa yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir / phyogs ltar snang brjod pa / ci'i phyir ma bshad ce na / ...*

[Objection:] Because there is no proof to prove [fallacious] theses such as *a[pra]siddhaviśeṣaṇa* (*a[pra]siddhaviśeṣaṇādi*), they should be enumerated as *pakṣābhāsas*. Why were they not mentioned [as *prakṣābhāsas*]?

Devendrabuddhi (ca. 7th century) pointed out that there were those who insisted on other types of *pakṣābhāsas*, such as *a[pra]siddhaviśeṣaṇa*. Moreover, Devendrabuddhi paraphrases *asiddhāśrayādikaḥ* (PV IV 150d) as

⁴⁶ See Inami 1991: 74. Cf. PV IV 82–83.

**asiddhaviśeṣyādi* (*khyad par gyi gzhi ma grub ba la sogs pa*).⁴⁷ Śākyabuddhi (ca. 7–8th century) interprets the opponent's objection mentioned by Devendrabuddhi ([16]) as follows:

- [17] PVT_s D269b4–7, P332a7–b3: *khyad par ma grub pa la sogs pa zhes bya ba ni khyad par rab tu ma grub pa ni dper na sangs rgyas pas grangs can pa la sgra 'jig pa can yin no zhes bya ba lta bu yin te / sgra'i 'jig pa brjod par bya ba'i don nyid grangs can la ma grub pa nyid kyi phyir ro // khyad par gyi gzhi ma grub pa ni dper na bye brag pas sangs rgyas pa la bdag khyab pa yin no zhes bya ba lta bu'o // gnyi ga ma grub pa ni dper na bdag 'phrod pa 'du ba can gyi rgyu yin no zhes bya ba lta bu'o // sgrub par byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni ji ltar mngon sum la sogs pas bsal ba dag la sgrub par byed pa yod ma yin pa de bzhin du 'di la yang yin pa de bas na sgrub par par byed pa yod pa ma yin pa'i rgyu'i phyir phyogs ltar snang ba brjod pa ste / dga' byed bdag po la sogs pa'i brjod pa tshad ma kun las btus pa mdzad pas cī'i phyir ma bshad ce na zhes bya ba khong nas dbyung ngo //*

The word ‘**a[pra]siddhaviśeṣaṇādi*’ (PVP) can be explained as follows: i) *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa* is, for example, in the case that a Buddhist proponent argues against a Sāṃkhya opponent that sound is perishable. It is not established for a Sāṃkhya that sound is an object designated by the word “perishable.” ii) *Aprasiddhaviśeṣya* is, for example, in the case that a Vaiśeṣika proponent argues against a Buddhist opponent that *ātman* is omnipresent. iii) *Aprasiddhobhaya* is, for example, in the case that [a Vaiśeṣika proponent argues against a Buddhist opponent] that *ātman* is an inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) [of joy, etc.]. The words “because *sādhana* does not occur” (PVP) can be explained as follows: For example, no *sādhana* occurs to prove the theses opposed by [what is established by] perception, etc. Similarly, [no *sādhana* occurs to prove] these [three

⁴⁷ PVP D298a2, P356a2.

theses]. Therefore, for the reason that no *sādhana* occurs, [these three] were said to be *pakṣābhāsas*. Namely, these were called [*pakṣābhāsas*] by **dGa' byed bdag po** (*Śaṅkarasvāmin) and others. Why were these not called [*pakṣābhāsas*] by the author of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*[, namely, Dignāga]? The sentence [of PVP] should be interpreted by supplying words in this manner.⁴⁸

Here, Śākyabuddhi mentions the three other types of *pakṣābhāsas*, namely, *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*, and *aprasiddhobhaya*, with their examples. Interestingly, he explains that these three types of *pakṣābhāsas* are actually enumerated as *pakṣābhāsas* by “dGa' byed bdag po and others.” The name “dGa' byed bdag po” could be considered a Tibetan translation of the Sanskrit name “Śaṅkarasvāmin.”⁴⁹ According to Śākyabuddhi, Dharmakīrti is explaining why Dignāga did not mention these three types in his enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas*, in contrast to what Śaṅkarasvāmin and others did, whereby he is criticizing the enumeration of Śaṅkarasvāmin and others.

Explaining PV IV 148–150, Prajñākaragupta (ca. 8th century) mentions the objection of an opponent as follows:

- [18] PVA 552,3–5: *nanv aparō 'pi sa pakṣābhāsaḥ, aprasiddhaviśeṣyaḥ, aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ aprasiddhobhaya itī** / *aprasiddhaviśeṣyas tadyathā vibhur ātmā / aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ sāmṅhyaṃ prati vināśī śabda itī / aprasiddhobhaya itī samavāyikāraṇam ātmā / tat katham eṣāṃ anupanyāsaḥ /*

[Objection:] There are [three] other types of *pakṣābhāsas*, namely, *aprasiddhaviśeṣyaḥ*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, and *aprasiddhobhayaḥ*. [Among these,] *aprasiddhaviśeṣya* is, for example, the proposition

⁴⁸ See Inami 1991: 74, 80.

⁴⁹ The Sanskrit name *Śaṅkarasvāmin* of a Naiyāyika is translated into Tibetan as “bDe byed bdag po” in the Tibetan translation of *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*.

that *ātman* is omnipresent. *Aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa* is, for example, in the case that [a Buddhist proponent argues] against a Sāṃkhya opponent that sound is perishable. *Aprasiddhobhaya* is, for example, in the case that [a Vaiśeṣika proponent argues against a Buddhist opponent] that *ātman* is an inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) [of joy, etc.]. Why were these unmentioned [as *pakṣābhāsas*]?:⁵⁰

As does Śākyabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta understands the three *aprasiddha* types of faults to be those criticized by Dharmakīrti. However, Prajñākaragupta and his commentators do not mention the name of the objector. The same understanding is also found in Manorathanandin's commentary on PV IV 149-150 and in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on PS(V) III 2.⁵¹

Nyāyapraveśaka

Interestingly, we also find these three other types in Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśaka*. Śāṅkarasvāmin enumerates the nine following types of *pakṣābhāsas*:⁵²

I. *dharmasvarūpanirākaraṇamukhena* (遣諸法自相門故)

⁵⁰ The corrected text is presented here.

⁵¹ PVV_M 463,23–464,10; PST_I D147b7–148a5, P169b3–170a1.

⁵² Variants: *1. 瓶等 NPr^{Ch}, *bum pa la sogs pa* NPr^{T2}. *2. 如說懷兔非月有故。又如說言人頂骨淨。衆生分故。猶如螺貝。 NPr^{Ch}, *dper na ri bong can zla ba ma yin te yod pa'i phyir zhes pa'am / gzhan yang mi'i thod pa gtsang ba yin te sems can gyi cha shas yin pa'i phyir dung chos bzhin zhes brjod pa lta bu'o* // NPr^{T2}. *3. *mātā me bandhyā, pitā kumārabrahmacārīti* NPr^I. *4. *bsgrub bya'i chos ma grub pa* NPr^{T2}. *5. *bsgrub bya'i chos can ma grub pa* NPr^{T2}. *6. *dper na bye brag pas sangs rgyas pa las bdag ni rgyu rkyen 'dus shing rten cing 'brel par sbyor ba'i byed pa po yin no zhes brjod pa lta bu'o* // NPr^{T2}. *7. *phan tshun grub pa* NPr^{T2}. *8. *me dro ba med* NPr^{T1}.

1. *pratyakṣaviruddha* (現量相違) e.g., “*aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*” (如說聲非所聞)
2. *anumānaviruddha* (比量相違) e.g., “*nityo ghaṭaḥ**1” (如說瓶等是常)
3. *āgamaviruddha* (自教相違) e.g., “*vaiśeṣikasya nityaḥ śabda iti sādhyataḥ*” (如說勝論師立聲爲常)
4. *lokaviruddha* (世間相違) e.g., “*śuci naraśiraḥkapālaṃ prāṇyāṅgatvāc chaṅkhaśuktivat*”**2 (如說懷兔非月有故。又如說言人頂骨淨、衆生分故、猶如螺貝。)
5. *svavacanaviruddha* (自語相違) e.g., “*mātā me bandhyā*”**3 (如言我母是其石女)

II. *pratipādanāsaṃbhavataḥ* (不容成故)

6. *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa**4 (能別不極成) e.g., “*bauddhasya sāmṁkhyam prati vināśi śabda iti*” (如佛弟子對數論師立聲滅壞)
7. *aprasiddhaviśeṣya**5 (所別不極成) e.g., “*sāmṁkhyasya bauddham prati cetana ātmeti*” (如數論師對佛弟子說我是思)
8. *aprasiddhobhaya* (俱不極成) e.g., “*vaiśeṣikasya bauddham prati sukhādisamavāyikāraṇam ātmeti*”**6 (如勝論師對佛弟子立我以爲和合因緣)

III. *sādhanaivaiphalyataḥ* (立無果故)

9. *prasiddhasaṃbandha*^{*7} (相符極成) e.g., “*śrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ*”^{**8} (如說聲是所聞)

Among them, the first five (1–5) correspond to those enumerated in the *Nyāyamukha* by Dignāga. Śāṅkarasvāmin newly adds four types of *pakṣābhāsas* (6–9).

Among them, three types (6, 7, 8) are denied to be *pakṣābhāsas* by Dharmakīrti and his followers. The last, *prasiddhasaṃbandha* (9), is neither given special mention by them, nor is it criticized. However, they never list it as a *pakṣābhāsa*.

Thus, the last four types in Śāṅkarasvāmin's enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas* are not supported by Dharmakīrti and his followers. Whether Dharmakīrti actually knew Śāṅkarasvāmin's enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas* cannot be confirmed. However, Dharmakīrti presumably knew the view that the three *aprasiddha* types of faults should be added to Dignāga's list of *pakṣābhāsas*.

The three *aprasiddha* types of *pakṣābhāsas*, which are not supported by Dharmakīrti and his followers, are found not only in *Nyāyapraveśaka*, but also in a few other Indian texts.⁵³

Jitāri's *Hetutattvopadeśa*

Among Buddhist works on logic, the *Hetutattvopadeśa*, which is attributed to Jitāri (ca. 10th century), is exceptional in having an enumeration similar to

⁵³ The same nine types of *pakṣābhāsas* as those in *Nyāyapraveśaka* are enumerated in the 29th chapter of *Mañimēkalai*: *pirattiyakka viruttam*, *aṇumāṇa viruttam*, *cuvacaṇa viruttam*, *ulaka viruttam*, *ākama viruttam*, *appiracitta vicēṭaṇam*, *appiracitta vicēṭiyam*, *appiracitta upayam*, and *ppiracitta campantam**. See note 36.

that in the *Nyāyapraveśaka*. The eight following types of *pakṣābhāsa*s are enumerated:⁵⁴

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| 1. <i>pratyakṣaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>dhūmādir dharmī buddhimatā hetunā janyate</i> ” |
| 2. <i>anumānaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>vedavākyam dharmy apauruṣeyam</i> ” |
| 3. <i>svavacanaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>nānumānam pramānam</i> ” |
| 4. <i>lokaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>śuci naraśiraḥkapālaṃ prāṇyaṅgatvāc chaṅkhaśuktivat</i> ” |
| 5. <i>pratītiviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>kiyatkālasthāyī kṛtako 'nityaḥ</i> ” |
| 6. <i>aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa</i> | e.g., “ <i>vaiśeṣikasya sāmṅkhyam prati vināśī śabdaḥ</i> ” |
| 7. <i>aprasiddhaviśeṣya</i> | e.g., “ <i>sāmṅkhyasya bauddham prati cetana ātmeti</i> ” |

⁵⁴ See HTU 262,5–263,3: *kaḥ punaḥ pakṣābhāsaḥ / yaḥ pakṣa ivābhāsatē / na tu sākṣāt pakṣo bhavati / pratyakṣādibhir bādhitatvāt / sa tu pakṣābhāsaḥ / yathā dhūmādir dharmī buddhimatā hetunā janyata iti sādhye / pratyakṣaviruddhaḥ pakṣābhāsaḥ / pratyakṣeṇa vahnijanyasya dhūmasya darśanāt // anumānaviruddho yathā / vedavākyam dharmy apauruṣeyam iti sādhye / pratyakṣanāntarīyakatve śabdasya pauruṣeyatvasya prasāadhanāt // svavacanaviruddho yathā / nānumānam pramānam iti parapratiṭipādanāya vacanam uccāryamānam parārtham anumānam ity uktatvāt // lokaviruddho yathā / śuci naraśiraḥkapālaṃ prāṇyaṅgatvāc chaṅkhaśuktivat // pratītiviruddho yathā / kiyatkālasthāyī kṛtako 'nitya iti / kiyatkālasthāyino 'pi kṛtakaḥ sarve nitya iti lokapratīteḥ // aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇo yathā / vaiśeṣikasya sāmṅkhyam prati vināśī śabda iti sādhye // aprasiddhaviśeṣyo yathā / sāmṅkhyasya bauddham prati ātmā cetana iti sādhyataḥ // ubhayāprasiddho yathā / vaiśeṣikasya bauddham prati [sukhādi]-samavāyikāraṇam ātmeti // {[prasiddhasaṃbandho] yathā vāyur asthiraśvabhāva iti //}*

The meaning of the last portion of this passage is unclear. Tucci's Sanskrit edition has the following text: *[prasiddhasaṃbandho] yathā vāyur asthiraśvabhāva iti //* This seems to show an example of *prasiddhasaṃbandha*. In the Tibetan translation, however, this part is translated as follows: ... *zhes bya ba lta bu'am // lus ni brtan pa'i rang bzhin yin no zhes bya ba lta bu'o //* (D315a4, P336a5–6). According to the Tibetan translation, this is not an example of *prasiddhasaṃbandha*, but another example of *aprasiddhobhaya*. This matter will not be taken up in the current study, but it does need further investigation.

8. *aprasiddhobhaya* e.g., “*vaiśeṣikasya bauddhaṃ prati*
[*sukhādi*] *samavāyikāraṇam ātmeti ...*”

This enumeration is different from *Nyāyapraveśaka*'s in some points. However, it is similar to *Nyāyapraveśaka*'s enumeration in that the first five are *viruddha* types and the next three are *aprasiddha* types. Why Jitāri, who knew Dharmakīrti's logic, adopted such an enumeration is unclear.⁵⁵

Nyāyamañjarī

Among non-Buddhist works, the *Nyāyamañjarī*'s enumeration is similar to that in the *Nyāyapraveśaka*:⁵⁶

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| 1. <i>pratyakṣaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>anuṣṇo 'gniḥ</i> ” |
| 2. <i>anumānaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>na rūpagrāhi cakṣuḥ</i> ” |
| 3. <i>śābdaviruddha</i> | |
| 3.1. <i>āgamaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>brāhmaṇena surā peyā</i> ” |
| 3.2. <i>svavacanaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>janayitrī me vandhyā pitā me brahmacārī</i> ” |
| 3.3. <i>lokaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>acandraḥ śaśī</i> ” |
| 4. <i>upamānaviruddha</i> | e.g., “ <i>na gavayapadavācya 'yaṃ gosa-drśaḥ</i> ” |

⁵⁵ It seems that the old tradition of Buddhist logical argumentation was not completely discontinued in India and that a short textbook on logic was needed to educate beginners. Old-style works on Buddhist logic must have been deemed suitable for such purposes.

⁵⁶ NMañj II 133,22–32.

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| 5. <i>aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa</i> | e.g., “ <i>nabhuḥkusumakṛtāvataṃsaḥ cai-
traḥ</i> ” |
| 6. <i>aprasiddhaviśeṣya</i> | e.g., “ <i>sugandhi gaganakamalam</i> ” |
| 7. <i>aprasiddhobhaya</i> | e.g., “ <i>khapuṣpakṛtaśekharaḥ bandhyā-
sutaḥ</i> ” |
| 8. <i>siddhasādhyatā</i> | e.g., “ <i>śītaṃ tuhinaṃ uṣṇo ’gniḥ</i> ” |

Although Bhaṭṭa Jayanta enumerates *pakṣābhāsas*, he insists that *pakṣābhāsas* and *drṣṭāntābhāsas* are nothing but *hetvābhāsas* in the ultimate sense.⁵⁷

Kumārila

When criticizing the Vijñānavādin’s view that cognition does not have external objects, in the *Nirālambanavāda* chapter of *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (ca. 7th century) points out that the Vijñānavādin’s thesis is fallacious in various points. According to Kumārila, first of all, the thesis must be an *aprasiddhobhaya* because *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* cannot be distinguished from each other for the reason that cognition of them has no real objects. Moreover, the thesis is also be *aprasiddhaviśeṣya* or *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa* for the same reason.⁵⁸ Second, this thesis must be regarded as an *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*

⁵⁷ NMāñj II 133,32–134,6: *ye caite pratyakṣaviruddhādāya pakṣadoṣaḥ, ye ca vakṣyamāṇāḥ sādhanavikalatvādāyo drṣṭāntadoṣaḥ, te vastuṣṭhityā sarve hetuḍoṣa eva / prapañcamātraṃ tu pakṣadrṣṭāntadoṣavarṇanam / tathā cābādhitatvaṃ hetulakṣaṇam evoktam / drṣṭāntaduṣṭatayā ca hetor eva lakṣaṇam anvayavyatirekayor anyad dhīyata iti, sarve ca te hetuḍoṣa eva // ata eva ca śāstre ’smin muninā tattvadarsinā / pakṣābhāsādāyo noktā hetvābhāsas tu darśitāḥ // kaścīd dhetvanapekṣo ’pi pakṣamātrapratīṣṭhitāḥ / bādho ’numānarūpasya svavākyādikṛto yathā //*

⁵⁸ ŚV Nirālambanavāda 35: *agrāhyatvāc ca bhedenā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayoh / aprasiddhobhayaṭvam vā vācyam anyatarasya vā //* See *Ślokavārtikatātparyāṭikā* (Ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri. Rev. K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy. Madras 1971.) 203,10–12:

because the cognition (*pratyaya*) that is accepted to have no external objects by Vijñānavādins is not established among Mīmāṃsakas.⁵⁹ Third, this thesis must be regarded as an *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa* because what Vijñānavādins intend to prove about cognition, that is, never having an external object, is not established among Mīmāṃsakas.⁶⁰ Fourth, if Vijñānavādins intend to prove that cognition does not grasp its object as an external object, it would be a proof of what is well established. For example, a post is grasped as a post, not as an external object.⁶¹

Here, Kumārila points out the faults in the Vijñānavādin's thesis one after another. Note that Kumārila mentions *aprasiddhobhaya*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, and *siddhasādhana*tā as faults of the thesis. They are not mentioned in Kumārila's enumeration of *pratiñābhāsa* in the *Anumāna* chapter of Ślokavārttika. Whether he actively approves them is unclear. However, he seems to have known other types of faults of *pakṣa*.⁶²

Candrakīrti

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣayor yaj jñānaṃ tasyāpi pratyayatvena nirālambanatvāt tayor aprasiddhiḥ / tataś cāprasiddhaviśeṣanatvam aprasiddhaviśeṣyatvam aprasiddhobhayatvaṃ vā yatheṣṭaṃ vaktavyam /; Nyāyaratnākara (Ed. Swāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī. Tara Publications. Varanasi 1978.) 161,19–21: *pratyayarūpadharmigrāhakasya nirālambanadharmagrāhakasya ca pratyayasya nirālambanatvād aprasiddhaviśeṣya-tvam aprasiddhaviśeṣanatvam aprasiddhobhayatvaṃ vā pakṣadoṣaḥ syād iti /*

⁵⁹ ŚV Nirālambanavāda 46cd: *viśeṣasyāprasiddhiś ca tavāsmākam atādṛśe //*

⁶⁰ ŚV Nirālambanavāda 49: *nirālambanatā cāpi sarvathā yadi sādhyate / viśesanāprasiddhiś ca dṛṣṭāntaś ca na vidyate //*

⁶¹ ŚV Nirālambanavāda 52: *bāhyānālambanatve 'pi bāhya ity agraho yadi / stambhādaḥ naiva tadbuddhir ity evaṃ siddhasāadhanam //*

⁶² Cf. Nyāyakumudacandra (Ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri. Māṇikacandra Dig. Jain Series Nos. 38, 39. Benares 1938.) I 135,20–22: *dharmidharmobhayapratyayānāṃ nirālambanatve vā aprasiddhaviśeṣyaḥ, aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ, aprasiddhobhayaś ca pakṣaḥ syāt /* Prajñākaragupta responds to Kumārila's objection in his PVA. On Prajñākaragupta's argument, see Hisayasu Kobayashi's doctoral thesis (Prajñākaragupta jikoninshiki-riron no kenkyū, 2005).

As is well known, Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century) severely criticizes Bhāviveka's (ca. 6th century?) proof of *śūnyatā* in several ways. In his criticism, Candrakīrti refers to the fault of *asiddhādhāra*. Bhāviveka's proof that is criticized by Candrakīrti is as follows:⁶³

- [21] PP D49a2–3, P58b1–2: ... don dam par nang gi skye mched rnam
bdag las skye ba med par nges te / yod pa'i *phyir dper na shes pa yod
pa nyid bzhin no // (Cf. Pras 25,9–26,2: ... *na paramāṛthata
ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpannāni, vidyamānatvāt, caitanyavad
iti* /)

In the ultimate sense, [six] internal sense bases have not emerged from themselves, because they presently exist, like the mind.

Criticizing this proof, Candrakīrti points out that because the proponent never admits that six internal bases exist in the ultimate sense, the fault of *asiddhādhāra*, which is a fault of the thesis, or the fault of *āśrayāsiddha*, which is a fault of the reason, occur.

- [22] Pras 27,7–9: *yadi saṃvṛtyotpattipratīṣedhanirācīkīrṣuṇā viśeṣaṇam
etaḍ upādīyate, tadā svato 'siddhādhāraḥ* pakṣadoṣa āśrayāsiddho*
vā hetuḍoṣaḥ syāt, paramāṛthataḥ svataś cakṣurādyāyatanānām
anabhyupagamāt* /

If, wishing to negate the emergence of [six internal bases], which is conventionally admitted, you state the qualification [“in the ultimate sense” in your proof], then *asiddhādhāra*, namely, a fault of the thesis, or *āśrayāsiddha*, namely, a fault of the reason, would occur to you,

⁶³ See Yuichi Kajiyama, Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpaḥ* (1. Kapitel). *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie*, Bd. VII, 1963: 49.

because in the ultimate sense, you yourself do not admit that [six] sense bases, including eyes, exist.⁶⁴

Here, Candrakīrti regards the fault of *asiddhādhāra* as a fault of the thesis and distinguishes it from the fault of *āśrayāsiddha*, a fault of the reason. The fault of *asiddhādhāra* can be equated with the fault of *aprasiddhaviśeṣya* in Śaṅkarasvāmin's enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas*. Candrakīrti seems to know the logical theory that *aprasiddhaviśeṣya* (= *asiddhādhāra*) is regarded as a fault of the thesis. Similar expressions, such as “*asiddhādhāraḥ pakṣadoṣaḥ*,” are also found in Pras 28,2; 30,10; 30,15.⁶⁵

A subject of proof can be regarded as a substratum (*ādhāra*) of *sādhya*dharma, which is stated in the thesis, and also as a substratum (*āśraya*) of the *hetu*. If a subject of proof is not established, two faults occur: the fault of *asiddhādhāra* (= *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*), with reference to the *pakṣa*, and the fault of *āśrayāsiddha*, with reference to the *hetu*. However, Dharmakīrti, who thinks that this fault is not of the *pakṣa* but of the *hetu*, claims that *asiddhāśraya* (= *asiddhādhāra*) should not be mentioned as a *pakṣābhāsa*. Note that unlike Dharmakīrti, Candrakīrti mentions here *asiddhādhāra* as a fault of the *pakṣa*.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ See Tanji 1988: 22.

⁶⁵ Whether Candrakīrti knew all nine types of *pakṣābhāsas*, as listed in the *Nyāyapraveśaka*, is unclear.

⁶⁶ According to Tanji 1992: 330, note 13, Bhāviveka regards this fault only as a fault of the *hetu*. Bhāviveka does not seem to think that it can be regarded also as a fault of the *pakṣa*. Prajñākara Gupta refers to the objection that the fault *āśrayāsiddhatā* should be regarded as a fault of the *pakṣa*, with reference to the *pakṣa*, and as a fault of the *hetu*, with reference to the *hetu*, and criticizes it by pointing out that it cannot be a fault of the *pakṣa*. PVA 552,25–26: *athāpi syād āśrayāsiddhatā hi sādhyāpekṣā pakṣadoṣo na sādhanāpekṣā / sādhanāpekṣā tu sādhanadoṣa eva / uktam atra /*; 552,8–10: **atra vibhur ātmeti / yadi kaścid vibhutvayuktam ātmānam sādhyam kuryāt, kaḥ pakṣadoṣaḥ / dharmyabhāvena hetor āśrayāsiddhatvād iti cet / hetos tarhi doṣo na sādhyasya, tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt /*

Kuiji's explanation

Kuiji (窺基) comments on the difference between the enumeration of *pakṣābhāsa*s in the *Nyāyamukha* and that in the *Nyāyapraveśaka*. According to Kuiji, the reason why Dignāga only mentioned five types of *pakṣābhāsa*s is because the other four types are not *viruddha* types. In contrast, Śāṅkarasvāmin thought that there are other *pakṣābhāsa* types other than those enumerated by Dignāga, and therefore, he enumerated nine types.⁶⁷ Interestingly, Kuiji mentions another reason why Dignāga mentioned only five types: Dignāga thought that among the four other types, the first three, namely, *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*, and *aprasiddhobhaya*, should be regarded as *hetvābhāsa* or *drṣṭāntābhāsa*, and that the last type, *prasiddhasaṃbandha*, is not to be proved at all.⁶⁸ Note that Kuiji considers the three *aprasiddha* types in Śāṅkarasvāmin's enumeration to be nothing but *hetvābhāsa* or *drṣṭāntābhāsa*. This understanding is similar to that of Dharmakīrti and his followers.

Unlike Dharmakīrti and his followers, however, Kuiji justifies Śāṅkarasvāmin's enumeration, explaining why Śāṅkarasvāmin enumerated the four other types of *pakṣābhāsa*s. According to Kuiji, even if three *aprasiddha* types are equivalent to some *hetvābhāsa* or *drṣṭāntābhāsa*, they are listed as *pakṣābhāsa*s because Śāṅkarasvāmin is politely explaining the faults of a proof. Such a repetition can also be found in other cases. For example, *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, a kind of *hetvābhāsa*, is equivalent to *sādhyaśiddha*, a kind of *drṣṭāntābhāsa*.⁶⁹ As for the last type of *pakṣābhāsa*, namely, *prasiddhasaṃbandha*, even if it is essentially denied to be a *pakṣa*, there is no

⁶⁷ YMDS T1840 94c3–8: 似能立中且九似宗。陳那菩薩理門等論立有五種、不說後四。謂能所別俱不極成相符極成。以理門說「宗等多言說能立。此中唯取隨自意。樂爲所立說名宗。非彼相違義能遣」、後之四種既非相違所、以略之。天主宗過。不但相違、故申九種。

⁶⁸ YMDS T1840 94c8–12: 第二釋云。陳那菩薩以能別不成、即是因中不共不定等過。亦是喻中所立不成。闕無同喻等過。所別不成、有法無故、即因過中所依不成過。其俱不極成、即合是二過。...

⁶⁹ YMDS T1840 94c15–20: 今者天主加能別不成、以宗合取。不相離性方得成宗。若非能別、誰不相離。若以因中是不共不定等、亦是喻中所立不成、恐繁重故、不須說者、因中已

problem with mentioning it as a *pakṣābhāsa*. For example, even if *ubhayā-siddha*, a kind of *hetvābhāsa*, is essentially denied to be a valid *hetu*, it is actually mentioned as a *hetvābhāsa*. Moreover, even if *ubhayadharmāsiddha*, a kind of *drṣṭāntābhāsa*, is essentially denied to be a correct *drṣṭānta*, it is actually mentioned as a *drṣṭāntābhāsa*.⁷⁰ According to Kuiji, like Śāṅkarasvāmin, Dignāga admitted nine types of *pakṣābhāsas*. However, Dignāga omitted the enumeration of the last four types for reasons of simplicity. On the other hand, Śāṅkarasvāmin enumerated all nine types without any omission. The master and the pupil could not have opposed each other.⁷¹

Thus, Kuiji clearly justifies Śāṅkarasvāmin's enumeration of the nine types of *pakṣābhāsas*. However, Kuiji criticizes other faults of the thesis, such as *pratijñāvirodha*.⁷²

Zenju's comments

In the *Inmyō nisshōriron myōtōshō*, Zenju (善珠) reports that Wonchuek (圓測) referred to the three different interpretations of the differences between the enumeration of *pakṣābhāsas* in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha* and that in Śāṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśaka*. These interpretations were attributed to Xuanzang (玄奘 602–664):⁷³

有闕同品、有不共等過、喻中復說能立不成、一何鄭重。是故加之。

⁷⁰ YMDS T1840 94c28–95a3: 相符極成者、若以相符本非宗故、依何立過、兩俱不成及俱不成并俱不遣、本非因喻、依何立過。若以因喻有所申述何非過者、宗亦有說、如何非過。是故加之。

⁷¹ YMDS T1840 95a3–4: 但陳那影略說。天主委具陳之。非是師資自爲矛盾。

⁷² YMDS T1840 95a4ff.: 又陳那以前古師、宗中復說宗因相違過。...

⁷³ IRMS T2270 228a7–21: 問宗過之中陳那唯立五種相違、不立後四。天主既承陳那作論、何故別立後四過耶。答西明測師、述三藏說云、此有三釋。一云、教法後勝於前。以論釋經、以章解論、展轉分明故。今論主、依就相顯、且說五過。天主就實、具說九過。一云、後四非宗過攝。第一能別不極成過、即入同喻中所立不成。第二所別不成、即入因中所依不成。第

1) The later explanation is better than the earlier one. Dignāga mentions only five types of faults that have distinct characteristics. On the other hand, Śāṅkarasvāmin accurately enumerates all nine types of faults of the thesis. [Therefore, Śāṅkarasvāmin's enumeration is better than Dignāga's.]

2) The last four types of faults should not be included in the list of faults of the thesis. Namely, first, *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa* should be regarded as *sādhyāsiddha*, a fault of the *sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*; second, *aprasiddhaviśeṣya* should be regarded as *āśrayāsiddha*, a fault of the *hetu*; third, *aprasiddhobhaya* should not be listed separately because it is just a combination of these two faults; and fourth, *prasiddhasaṃbandha* should not be listed as a fault of the thesis because it does not hinder the proving of the thesis.

3) Each of the last four types can be interpreted in two ways: first, they can be regarded as faults of the *dr̥ṣṭānta*, which is why Dignāga did not mention them as faults of the *pakṣa*. Second, each of them can be regarded also as a fault of the *pakṣa*, which is why Śāṅkarasvāmin mentioned them as faults of the *pakṣa*.

Zenju comments that Kuiji's explanation is influenced by these three interpretations of Xuanzang. In view of the explanation of Dharmakīrti and his followers, only the second interpretation is admissible.⁷⁴ However, Kuiji, who did not positively adopt this, never concluded that these four additional types of *pakṣābhāsa*s should not to be listed as faults of the thesis.

三俱不成、合前二失。故不別立。第四相符、無不成宗、故亦不說。一云、四種皆有二義。攝在宗過、如第一說。喻過所攝、如第二說。陳那天主各據一義。是故二論互不相違。今此疏主述初二說。此即三藏第一說也。第三說者、合前二說。無別勝用、故不述也。

⁷⁴ Shentai seems to adopt this second interpretation. YZMS T1839 79b20–29: 問、何故宗九過、但說五耶。答、復四過者、天主僭立也。且如「所別不成」、自是因不成過。「能別不成」、自無同喻過。如前解。「俱不極成」、即合前二。二既非過、此亦非過。至「相符極成」、如立聲爲所聞、此本不成宗。... 是故唯五是過。

Moreover, Zenju refers to Dingbin's (定賓) interpretation that the last four types in *Nyāyapraveśaka*'s list of *pakṣābhāsas* were implicitly explained by Dignāga. According to Dingbin, the three *aprasiddha* types of *pakṣābhāsas* (6, 7, 8) were implied by the phrase *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve* in Dignāga's explanation of *śābdaprasiddhanirākṛta* in the *Nyāyamukha*. The last type, *prasiddhasaṃbandha* (9), was implicitly being referred to in Dignāga's phrase “又於此中非欲成立火觸有性、共知有故”⁷⁵ in the *Nyāyamukha*. Dingbin points out that since people did not notice these implications in Dignāga, Śankarasvāmin clearly mentioned the four types and added them to the list.⁷⁶

As I have already set out in earlier work,⁷⁷ Dharmakīrti explains the *pakṣābhāsa* only in his early works, such as *Pramanavarttika* IV. There, *pakṣābhāsa* is interpreted as a logical fault in connection with the *pakṣa* alone and is stated separately from *hetvābhāsa*. However, in his later works, such as *Hetubindu*, Dharmakīrti abandons the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* altogether; there, he prohibits the formulation of *pakṣa*. He insists that if a *hetu* endowed with the three characteristics is formulated, no fault of the *pakṣa* can occur. Explaining *pakṣābhāsa* separately from *hetvābhāsa* is of no use. Post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians in India, following Dharmakīrti's final view, do not mention the theory of *pakṣābhāsa*.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ NMu T1628, 1c9. See Katsura [2] 1978, pp. 114–117.

⁷⁶ IRMS T2270 228a21–b2: 賓云。陳那亦說後四種過。依文約隱、人多不解。故作異說。彼論下文、以真簡似中云、「又若於中、由不共故、無有比量」。言「不共」者、即是所別不成過也。「無比量」者、是能別不成。是故約似及顯真。亦應論云、極成有法極成能別。俱不極成、即合前二。相符極成者、即論文云、「又於此中非欲成立火觸有性、共知有故」。... 如此諸文、論中散在。故具九過。

⁷⁷ See Inami 1991.

⁷⁸ Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 10–11 century) refers to *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, but he regards it as a kind of *asiddhahetu*. See Advaitabinduprakaraṇa (*Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī*. Ed. Ananthlal Thakur. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series No. 5: 345–365. Patna 1st ed: 1959; 2nd ed: 1987.)

On the other hand, following Dignāga's logic as stated in his *Nyāyamukha*, there were still those who saw the theory of *pakṣābhāsa* to play an important role in logic. Since they regarded the *pakṣa* to be an indispensable member of a syllogism, they carried out further examinations of the *pakṣa*. Thus, they continued to explain *pakṣābhāsa* separately from *hetvābhāsa*, and some began to add other types of *pakṣābhāsas*, even including a fault that can also be regarded as a kind of *hetvābhāsa*. Buddhist logical works written in East Asia follow this tradition.

Conclusion

Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's logic exerted a strong influence on later Buddhist logicians. But there were other interpretations not supported by Dharmakīrti, interpretations that therefore did not find their way into the mainstream of Buddhist logic as it continued from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti's followers. These ideas can be traced, however, in a number of Indian texts.

For example, an interpretation of *śābdaprasiddhanirākṛta* similar to that criticized by Dharmakīrti is found in Pātrasvāmin's insistence in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and in the Sāṃkhya's objection to Dignāga in the *Yuktidīpikā*. Moreover, three types of *pakṣābhāsa* — *aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa*, *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*, and *aprasiddhobhaya* — that were criticized by Dharmakīrti are found in the enumerations of *pakṣābhāsas* in other logical works, such as *Nyāyapraveśaka*.

Interpretations similar to those criticized by Dharmakīrti can also be found in Buddhist logical works written in East Asia. There, Buddhist monks studied Buddhist logic mainly on the basis of two Indian works, namely, *Nyāyamukha* and *Nyāyapraveśaka*. Some of their interpretations of *śābdaprasiddhanirākṛta* are similar to the interpretation criticized by Dharmakīrti. With

352,14–15: *evam sati na vijñānaṃ nāma kiñcit niyatam asti, yato bhedenā pratīyamānatvaṃ ghaṭādyākārasya tadbhedaṃ sādhyed ity aprasiddhaviśeṣano hetur asiddhadosagrastah /*

regard to the above three types of *pakṣābhāsa*s, commentators on *Nyāyapraveśaka* in East Asia, unlike Dharmakīrti, try to justify the *Nyāyapraveśaka*'s enumeration through attempts at solving its inconsistencies.

The interpretations criticized by Dharmakīrti should not be ignored as clearly wrong. They show other ways of interpreting Dignāga's theory. Through a comparison with pre-Dharmakīrti interpretations of Dignāga's theory of *pakṣābhāsa*, it has become clear that Dharmakīrti's intention of explaining Dignāga's theory was to revise it in order to present his own more advanced theory.

Abbreviations

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| HTU | Hetutattvopadeśa (Jitāri). Ed. G. Tucci. In: <i>Minor Buddhist Texts Part I</i> . Roma 1956, repr. Kyoto 1978. |
| IRMS | Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō, 因明論疏明燈抄 (Zenju 善珠). 善珠撰『因明論疏明燈抄』六卷, T2270. |
| Inami 1988 | Masahiro Inami, Dharmakīrti no <i>pakṣābhāsa</i> setsu — <i>pratītinirākṛta</i> no baai [Dharmakīrti's theory of <i>pakṣābhāsa</i> —in the case of <i>pratītinirākṛta</i>]. <i>Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū</i> [Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies] 37-1, 1988: 383–380. |
| Inami 1991 | Masahiro Inami, On <i>pakṣābhāsa</i> . In: <i>Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference Vienna, June 11-16, 1989</i> : 69–83. |
| Iwata 2014 | Takashi Iwata, Sekenjō shōnin sareta meidai niyoru tairitsu meidai no hitei no kanousei [The Possibility of the Negation of Contrary Propositions by means of Commonly Recognized Propositions]. In: <i>Indian Buddhist Studies in Honor of President Dr. Shouou (Kiyooki) Okuda in Recognition of his Lifelong Scholarship</i> . Tokyo 2014: 707–724. |

- Katsura 1977 Shoryu Katsura, Inmyōshōrimonron kenkyū [1] [A Study of the Nyāyamukha (1)]. *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 37, 1977: 106–126.
- Katsura 1978 Shoryu Katsura, Inmyōshōrimonron kenkyū [2] [A Study of the Nyāyamukha (2)], *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 38, 1978: 110–130.
- Kitagawa 1965 Hidenori Kitagawa, *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū —jinna (Dignaga) no taikei [Studies in Classical Indian Logic: Dignāga's System]*, Tokyo 1965, repr. Kyoto 1985.
- MM Mānameyodaya (Nārāyaṇa). *Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa (An Elementary Treatise on the Mīmāṃsā)*. Edited with an English translation by C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. The Adyar Library Seires, vol. 105. 1st ed.: Madras 1933; 2nd ed.: Madras 1975.
- NB Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti). In: *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*. Ed. Paṇḍita Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol.2. Patna 1955.
- NBT_{Dh} Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Dharmottara). See NB.
- NBT_V Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Vinītadeva). Tibetan translation. D4230, P5729.
- NMañj Nyāyamañjarī (Bhaṭṭa Jayanta). *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Sukla. Kashi Sanskrit Series, vol. 106 (2 parts). Benares 1936. Repr. 1969, 1971.
- NMu Nyāyamukha (Dignāga). Chinese translation. 大域龍菩薩造『因明正理門論本』一卷(玄奘訳), T1628.
- NPr Nyāyapraveśaka (Śaṅkarasvāmin). Sanskrit text edited by Anandshankar B. Dhruva in: *The Nyāyapraveśa, Part I, Sanskrit*

Text with Commentaries, Critically ed. with Notes and Introduction.
Gaekwad Oriental Series 38. Baroda 1930.

- NPr^{Ch} Nyāyapraveśaka (Śāṅkarasvāmin). Chinese translation. 商羯羅主菩薩造『因明入正理論』一卷(玄奘訳), T1630.
- NPr^J Nyāyapraveśaka (Śāṅkarasvāmin). Sanskrit text edited by Muni Jambuvijaya in: *Nyāyapraveśakaśāstra of Baudha Ācārya Diṇnāga. With the commentary of Ācārya Haribhadrāsūri and with the subcommentary of Pārśvadevaṇi.* Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi 2009.
- NPr^{T1} Nyāyapraveśaka (Śāṅkarasvāmin). Tibetan translation (translated from Sanskrit text). P5706.
- NPr^{T2} Nyāyapraveśaka (Śāṅkarasvāmin). Tibetan translation (retranslated from Chinese translation of Sanskrit text). D4208, P5707.
- PP Prajñāpradīpa (Bhāviveka). Tibetan translation. D3853, P5253.
- PrasP Prasannapadā (Candrakīrti). Ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās [Madhyamikasūtras] de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV. St.Petersburg 1903–13. Repr. Osnabrug 1970.
- PS(V) III Pramāṇasamuccaya(-vṛtti) (Dignāga). Tibetan translation. Edited in Kitagawa 1965.
- PST Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (Jinendrabuddhi). Tibetan translation, D4268, P5766.
- PV Pramāṇavārttika (Dharmakīrti). *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)*. Acta Indologica 2 (1971/72). Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. [Chapters I (svārthānumāna), II (pramāṇasiddhi), and III (pratyakṣa) correspond to III, I, and II in Miyasaka's edition respectively.]

- PV IV Pramāṇavārttika (Dharmakīrti), the fourth chapter. 1-148: Sanskrit text edited in Tillemans 2000; 149ff.: see PV.
- PVin III Pramāṇaviniścaya (Dharmakīrti), the third chapter. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, chapter 3*. Critically Ed. Pascale Hugon and Toru Tomabechi. Beijing–Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House & Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2011.
- PVA Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāra (Prajñākagupta). *Pramāṇavārtika-bhāṣyam or Vārtikālāṅkāraḥ of Prajñākara-gupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārtika)*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.
- PVAT_J Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāraṭīkā (Jayanta). Tibetan translation. D4222, P5720.
- PVAT_Y Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāraṭīkā (Yamāri). Tibetan translation. D4226, P5723.
- PVT_ś Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi). Tibetan translation. D4220, P5718.
- PVP Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (Devendrabuddhi). Tibetan translation. D4217, P5717.
- PVV_M Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (Manorathanandin). Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. *The Journal of the Vihāra and Orissa Research Society* Vols. XXIV, XXV, XXVI. 1938–40.
- ŚV Ślokavārttika (Kumārila Bhaṭṭa). See NR.
- Shiga 2007 Kiyokuni Shiga, *Tattvasaṃgraha oyobi Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā dai 18 shō 'Suii no kousatsu (Anumānaparīkṣā)' wayaku to yakuchū* (1) [An Annotated Translation of the 18th Chapter (Anumānaparīkṣā) of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā* thereon (1)].

Indogaku Chibettogaku kenkyu (Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies), No. 11, 2007: 118–169.

- TS; TSP Tattvasaṃgraha (Śāntarakṣita); Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā (Kamalaśīla). *Tattvasaṃgraha of ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series No. 1, 2 vols. Varanasi 1st ed: 1968; 2nd ed: 1981.
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YD Yuktidīpikā (author unknown). *Yuktidīpikā The most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Eds. Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi. Vol. I. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44. Stuttgart 1998.

YMDS Yin ming da shu 因明大疏, or Yin ming ru zhen li lun shu 因明入正理論疏 (Kuiji 窺基). 大慈恩寺沙門基撰『因明入正理論疏』二卷, T1840.

YZMS Yin ming zheng li men lun shu ji 因明正理門論述記 (Shentai 神泰). 泰法師撰『理門論述記』, T1839.

Bhāviveka's **Hastaratna* on the Vaiśeṣika Argument of Śabda Being Impermanent

- Once Again on Bhāviveka vs. Candrānanda

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0. Preliminaries

Candrānanda is well known as the author's name of the earliest commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* that has so far come down to us. Since this name forms a part of its closing verse, the whole text is called the *Candrānandavṛtti* by scholars, but nothing is really known aside from his name "Candrānanda".¹

From the Jaina monk Jambuvijaya's first critical edition, his outstanding 1961 publication of the *Candrānandavṛtti* (reprinted in 1982), to the most recent work of Miyamoto (2009), a full translation (into Japanese) of the entire Sanskrit text of Jambuvijaya's critical edition, scholars have conjectured that the dates of Candrānanda and his *Vṛtti* lie anywhere from the sixth to tenth century, a period that is long enough to be unhelpful, if not meaningless. Based on my study of the *Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya* chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* – Bhāviveka's (ca.490–ca.570) auto-commentary of the relevant chapter of the *Madhyamakahrdaya*[*kārikā*], where he introduces and criticizes the theories of the Vaiśeṣika school – I earlier offered an analysis of what I called "the two-finger" illustration (*dvyaṅgula*, two fingers in a unit form, or *finger-pair*), which is found several times in the *Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya*. Of the Vaiśeṣika literary corpus, this illustration is found *only* in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*. Thus, I have

¹ Cf. Jambuvijaya (1961, p. 76): *jagato 'syānandakaram vidyāsavayāḥ sadaiva yaś candram / ānandayati sa vṛttiṃ candrānando* vyadhād etām // For the *vidyāśarvaryā*, Ruzsa (Preliminary version, p. 89) reads *vidyāsavayāḥ*, since the former is two morae long.

conjectured that Candrānanda should be placed around 500–550. Taking Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as the ends of a spectrum, between them we thus have, in this order, Uddyotakara, Candrānanda, and Bhāviveka.² Indeed, the grounds for the above conclusions are mainly Tibetan sources, especially the *Tarkajvālā*, a factor that for practical reasons seems a bit weak when problems about the authorship of the *Tarkajvālā* are involved. In the present essay, I would first like to add some supplementary materials regarding the above challenging conjecture, mainly from Chinese sources, in order to further confirm the relative chronology of Bhāviveka and Candrānanda.

1. *Śabda* Inferences of Vaiśeṣika as Reported in Bhāviveka's **Hastaratna*

Bhāviveka refers to Vaiśeṣika thought some six times in his *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論, **Mahāyānahastaratnaśāstra* (hereafter **Hastaratna*), *Jewel in the Hand*.³ Among these six references, three have to do with the issue of *śabda*.⁴ I will call these “*śabda* inferences”, namely, arguments of *śabda* being impermanent. In context, these are as follows:⁵

- (1) 有少智者，作是難言：“若立一切有爲性空，因有爲故，其性亦空；是則此因有不成過。”……又勝論者立“聲無常，所作性故”。有難“此因用聲爲體，亦無常故，有不成過。”如是等類諸敵論者，雖廣勤求立論者過，如所說理，畢竟無能破壞他論。若有此理，何

² See He (2017).

³ As for the Chinese title of **Hastaratna*, see He & van der Kuijp (2014, pp. 301–302).

⁴ The keyword *sheng* 聲 usually means sound in Chinese texts. As the rendition of Sanskrit *śabda*, its usage and meaning should be understood likewise, namely, having at least the two possibilities of meaning sound and word/language. Different connotations of *śabda* will be discussed below (see part 3, below).

⁵ T30, no. 1578, pp. 269, 271, and 271, respectively.

處誰能建立比量，壞我所樂所說道理？⁶

People of little learning object: “If you establish that all conditioned things (*saṃskṛtas* 有為) are empty (*svabhāvasūnya* 空) because of being conditioned, then their nature is also empty; therefore this reason (*hetu* 因) has the fault of being unrecognized (*asiddhi* 不成).” [Bhāṇiveka answers:] ...Similarly, the **Vaiśeṣika argues that śabda is impermanent, because [it] is produced**. One might object that this reason has *śabda* as its nature, which is not permanent, so [the reason] has the fault of being unrecognized. Such arguments, by which the opponent (*paravādin* 敵論) fails to establish the defect of the theories, are completely unfit for reversing the contested theory. If so, who and where can one establish an inference (*anumāna* 比量) that reverses the reasoning I advocate and I state?

- (2) 有餘復言：“所說空因，若就世俗，或就勝義，於自於他，因義不成。”二宗共許，不顯差別總相法門，明正理者許為因故，汝所立難，似不成過，非真不成。如勝論者立“聲無常，所作性故”。聲常論者，說彼過言，分別因義，咽喉等作，或杖等作，如是分別，因義不成。⁷

⁶ See La Vallée Poussin's (1933, p. 80) French translation: Des personnes peu savantes objectent: “Si vous soutenez que tous les *saṃskṛtas* sont vides (*svabhāvasūnya*), l'argument, étant *saṃskṛta*, est lui aussi vide. L'argument présente donc le défaut de non-démonstré (*asiddhi*).”..... De même les Vaiśeṣikas soutiennent que le son n'est pas éternel, parce qu'il est fabriqué (*kṛtakatvāt*). On peut objecter que cet argument a pour nature le son; qu'il n'est pas éternel, qu'il est non-prouvé. Cette sorte d'argumentation par laquelle le controversiste (*paravādin*) peine pour établir le vice des théories, est tout à fait impropre à renverser la théorie attaquée. S'il en est ainsi, qui, en quel endroit, pourra établir un raisonnement (*anumāna*) qui renverse la raison (*tao-li, yukti*) que je préconise, que je dis?

⁷ See La Vallée Poussin's (1933, p. 87) French translation: D'autres disent: “Qu'on se place au point de vue de la vérité relative ou de la vérité absolue, au point de vue de celui qui parle (*svatas*) ou au point de vue de son adversaire (*paratas*), l'argument proposé en faveur de la vacuité n'a pas valeur d'argument (*hetur asiddhaḥ*).” Répondons. Ce que les deux admettent, sans d'ailleurs préciser les définitions (*viśeṣa*), en prenant le caractère général, voilà ce que les logiciens considèrent comme un argument (*hetu*). Par conséquent votre réfutation n'est que la fausse imputation du vice appelé *asiddhahetu*.

Others say: “Let it be from the viewpoint of convention (*saṃvṛti* 世俗) or the viewpoint of the ultimate (*paramārtha* 勝義), the viewpoint of the speaker (*svatas* 於自) or the viewpoint of his opponent (*paratas* 於他), the reason offered in favor of emptiness is unrecognized.” [Bhāviveka answers:] What both (*svatas* and *paratas*) admit, without however specifying the definitions (*viśeṣa* 差別), taking the general is what logicians consider a reason; therefore your rebuttal is only the false imputation of the unrecognized, but it is not really unrecognized. For example, the **Vaiśeṣika argue that *śabda* is impermanent, because [it] is produced.** The supporter of the permanence of *śabda* claims that this inference is fallacious and presents alternatives for the meanings of the reason: [*śabda*] is made by the throat or is made with a stick; thus conceptualized, the reason is unrecognized.

- (3) 復有諸餘異空慧者，別顯喻過：“雖諸幻士非實士故，說名為空；然彼幻士自性不空，有虛妄現士相體故。由此道理，如先所立句義不成，喻不成故。”……如勝論者說“聲無常，所作性故，譬如瓶等”。不應難言“瓶等泥、團、輪等所成，可燒、可見、棒所擊破，可是無常。聲既不爾，應非無常。”此亦分別法喻別故，亦成分別相似過類。⁸

L’argument n’a pas vraiment le vice de “non-prouvé”. Par exemple, le Vaiśeṣika dit que le son est impermanent (*śabdo ’nityaḥ*), parce qu’il est fabriqué (*kṛtakatvāt*). Le partisan de l’éternité du son prétend que l’argument est vicieux, et présente des alternatives (*vikalp*) sur sa signification: fabriqué par la voix? fabriqué par le bâton? Ainsi analysé, l’argument se trouve non-prouvé (*asiddha*).

⁸ See La Vallée Poussin’s (1933, pp. 89–91) French translation: Il y a d’autres hommes, bien habiles, qui exposent autrement le vice de l’exemple: “Quoique l’homme de magie (*māyāpuruṣa*), n’étant pas un homme réel, soit dit “vide”, cependant il n’est pas vide de nature propre, parce qu’il a la nature de l’image (*nimitta*) d’homme apparaissant fausement. Par ceci on voit que, de même que ci-dessus, la qualité à prouver n’existant pas [dans l’exemple], l’exemple n’est pas établi.” (Footnote: *sādhya padārthāsiddhāv asiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ*)...Par exemple, le Vaiśeṣika propose le raisonnement: “Le son est impermanent, parce qu’il est fait, comme la cruche.” On ne peut pas objecter [en examinant la manière dont la cruche est faite...]: “La cruche est faite par boule de terre, roue, etc.; elle peut être cuite, vue, brisée par le bâton; elle sera donc impermanente. Mais le son n’a pas ces qualités: donc il n’est pas impermanent.” Ce que vous faites est aussi “analyse des particularités divergentes de l’exemple”: c’est *vikalpasamajāti*.

There are other men, although clever, who would otherwise expose the defects in the instance (*drṣṭānta* 喻) “Although a person in an illusion is not a real person and is called ‘empty’ [by saying] the person in an illusion is not empty of self-nature, because he has an image that falsely appears. By this principle, just as the previously argued statements (*padārtha* 句義) are unrecognized, the instance is unrecognized.” [Bhāviveka answers:].....For example, the **Vaiśeṣika state that śabda is impermanent, because [it] is produced, like a pot, etc.** It cannot be argued: “A pot, etc., are made of clay, a potting wheel, etc.; [they] can be baked, seen and broken with a stick, [so they] are impermanent. But *śabda* is not the same, so it is not impermanent.” This is also an analysis of different features of the instance, which is also called *vikalpasamajāti* (分別相似過類) .

It is clear that the Chinese designation here of one of the speakers as *Shenglun* (zhe) 勝論(者) is rendering the standard meaning-translation of Sanskrit *Vaiśeṣika*. *Shenglun* means a pre-eminent school/person or work, and thus indicates two possibilities for referring to the Vaiśeṣika traditions, as was reported by Xuanzang's disciple Ji 基 (632–682)⁹ in his *Commentary on the Chengweishilun*, i.e. *Chengweishilun shuji* 成唯識論述記. There we read¹⁰:

云“吠世史迦”，此翻為“勝”。造“六句論”，諸論罕匹，故云“勝”也；或勝人所造，故名“勝論”。

[What is] called *Feishishijia* (Vaiśeṣika) is rendered here as *Sheng*. [This school] composed the **Ṣaṭpadārthaśāstra*, which is much more excellent than any other *śāstras*, [and] therefore it is called *Sheng*. Or, because it was composed by superior men, so [it is] called *Shenglun*.

⁹ On the name of Ji 基 rather than Kuiji 窺基, see He (2015).

¹⁰ T43, no. 1830, p. 255. Similar expressions can be found in Ji's *Great Commentary* 大疏, i.e. *Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa* 因明入正理論疏 *Yinming ruzhenglilun shu* (cf. T44, no. 1840, p. 177).

Similar statements are found in the Chinese Buddhist tradition even earlier than the seventh-century monks Xuanzang and Ji. This probably began with the founder of the Three Treatise school (*Sanlun* school 三論宗), Master Jizang 吉藏 (549–623), who wrote the following in his *Commentary on the One-Hundred Verse Treatise*, 百論疏 *Bailun shu*¹¹:

衛世師，稱為“勝異”。異於僧佉、勝於僧佉，故名“勝異”。
Weishishi (Vaiśeṣika) is called *Shengyi* (extraordinary). It is different from and superior to Sāṃkhya. Therefore, it is named *Shengyi*.

In addition, *li* 立 and *shuo* 說 in the **Hastaratna* mean “to set up [an argument]” or “to state” in general, both indicating that the subsequent words are those of the Vaiśeṣika, that is to say, these arguments can be regarded as direct quotations from Vaiśeṣika treatises.

Concerning the reason *suo zuo xing-gu* 所作性故, a literal translation could be “because of produced-ness” or “because [its property of] being produced”, since this phrase is usually a rigid rendition of Sanskrit *kāryatvāt* or *kṛtakatvāt*, namely, 所作=*kārya* / *kṛtaka*, 性+故= *tva* + ablative case-ending = *tva-at*. Accordingly, the above Vaiśeṣika inferences in quotation (bold font) can be easily reconstructed in Sanskrit as follows:

(1), (2) = **anityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvāt* (or: *kṛtakatvāt*) //

(3) = **anityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvāt* (or: *kṛtakatvāt*) *ghaṭavat* //

Interestingly enough, in the **Hastaratna* Bhāviveka does not criticize these Vaiśeṣika statements as he apparently does in the *Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya* chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*.¹² Quite the contrary, in the **Hastaratna*, Bhāviveka quotes the Vaiśeṣika to support his

¹¹ T42, no. 1827, p. 264.

¹² For the *Vaiśeṣikatattvaviniścaya*, see He (2013, pp. 536-601).

own argument, that is, the so-called **hastaratna* inference (*zhangzhen biliang* 掌珍比量), which reads¹³:

真性有爲空，如幻緣生故；無爲無有實，不起似空花。

**tattvataḥ saṃskṛtāḥ śūnyā māyāvat pratyayodbhavāḥ /*
asaṃskṛtās tv asadbhūtā anutpādāt khapuṣpavat //

In reality, what is conditioned is empty, like an illusion, because it comes about through causes. In reality, the unconditioned has no existence, because it does not come into being, like a sky-flower.

This well-known **hastaratna* inference, which consists of two *trairūpya* constructions, is used to prove the *Madhyamaka* emptiness (*śūnyatā*) within the framework of the two-truth theory (*satyadvaya*). In brief, if the **hastaratna* inference is accepted as valid by both the proponent and the opponent, then emptiness can be proved even at the ultimate level of reality (*paramārthaḥ / tattvaḥ*). The structure of the **hastaratna* inference is clearly based on the rules of Dignāga's *trairūpya* theory, albeit with the addition of a very important innovation – the restriction of the thesis (**pratijñāviśeṣaṇa*), i.e. the phrase “in reality” (真性, **tattvataḥ*) at the beginning of the verse.¹⁴

In the **Hastaratna*, as a kind of strategy or writing style, Bhāviveka assumes that the **hastaratna* inference is criticized by many opponents, negating these critiques in order to further verify the validity of the inference and, moreover, the emptiness in the reality as the final goal. In this particular context, the Vaiśeṣika inferences of *śabda* being impermanent are used as an example by Bhāviveka to negate his counterarguments and support his argument.

In other words, in passages (1) and (2) above, the Vaiśeṣika inference of “*śabda* is impermanent, because [it] is produced” is used as an example; the reason “because [it] is produced” is used to support the **hastaratna* inference's reason (*hetu*) not having the fault of being unrecognized (*asiddha*). Although the specific type of *asiddha* is not

¹³ Cf. La Vallée Poussin (1933, p. 70) and He (2014).

¹⁴ For the **pratijñāviśeṣaṇa*, see He (2014).

identified in the **Hastaratna*, it can be considered to be *anyatara-asiddha* or *āśraya-asiddha*: the former being a reason that is unrecognized by either the proponent or the opponent, the latter being a reason that is unrecognized because its substratum is not admitted. In passage (3), the complete inference of “*śabda* is impermanent, because [it] is produced, like a pot, etc.” is used to argue that an instance (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) should not be conceptualized and that, therefore, Bhāviveka’s instance “like an illusion” in the **hastaratna* inference is likewise valid.

Apparently, Bhāviveka’s purpose is not to reiterate the Vaiśeṣika thesis of *śabda* being impermanent. Buddhists are in agreement with this. In the **Hastaratna*, the more widely known *śabda* inference is being used to argue and support the validity of the *hetu* and the *dr̥ṣṭānta* of Bhāviveka’s newly composed **hastaratna* inference, because the *śabda* inference is a model of the *trairūpya* theory for Indian scholars (see part 4, below).

Before looking at a few Buddhist texts, let us first take a glance at Vaiśeṣika works that deal with the issue of “*śabda* being impermanent”.

2. Arguments of *Śabda* being Impermanent in Vaiśeṣika Works

In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, there are quite a few passages that discuss *śabda*. Generally, it is said that *śabda* is an object that is grasped by the ear, and that it is a kind of attribute (*guṇa*), but not a substance (*dravya*) or a movement (*karman*), as we read in the following *sūtrapāṭhas*:¹⁵

VS-C, 2.2.24: *śrotragrahaṇo yo ’rthaḥ sa śabdaḥ* // (= VS-U, 2.2.21)

Śabda is the object that is grasped by the ear.

¹⁵ The text of the *Candrānandavṛtti* (VS-C, C ad VS) of Jambuvijaya (1961) is numbered according to the *sūtrapāṭhas*, so I do not repeat the page numbers of Jambuvijaya (1961). The *sūtrapāṭhas* text of the *Upaskāra* (VS-U) taken from Sinha (1923) is also numbered according to the *sūtrapāṭhas*, so again, I do not repeat the page numbers.

VS-C, 2.2.27: *ekadravyavattvān na dravyam* // (= VS-U, 2.2.23)

Because of having one substance [as its substrate], [śabda] is not a substance.

VS-C, 2.2.28: *acākṣuṣattvān na karma* // (Cf. VS-U, 2.2.24: *nāpi karmā 'cākṣuṣatvāt* //)

Because of not being seen by the eyes, [śabda] is not a movement.

In the *Candrānandavṛtti*, an introductory sentence for *sūtrapāṭhas* from VS-C, 2.2.24 to VS-C, 2.2.43 [=VS-U, 2.2.21~37] reads as follows:

C ad VS, 2.2.24: *tatra śabda eva tāvat kathyatām* //

Here, śabda itself so far should be explained.

The next twenty *sūtrapāṭhas* with their respective commentaries discuss śabda intensively. Here I found one *sūtrapāṭha* that could possibly be linked to the Vaiśeṣika quotation referred to by Bhāviveka in the *Hastaratna. It reads:

VS-C, 2.2.32: *kāryatvāt* //

Because [it] is produced, [śabda is impermanent].

Candrānanda's commentary is the following:

C ad VS, 2.2.32: *kāryaś ca śabdaḥ saṃyogādibhyaḥ utpatteḥ / tasmād anityaḥ /*

Śabda is an effect because it arises from conjunction, etc.
Therefore [śabda] is impermanent.

Scholars who have dealt with the Sanskrit text of the *Candrānandavṛtti*, such as E. Kanakura 金倉圓照, M. Nozawa 野沢正信, and K. Miyamoto

宮元啓一, have all translated *kāryatvāt* as “because of being an effect”.¹⁶ Only A. Thakur interprets it as “Since (sound) is produced (it cannot be eternal).”¹⁷ Although both renditions are possible and correct, the latter expression is closer to Xuanzang’s translation of *suozuoxing-gu* 所作性故 in the **Hastaratna*.

It is worth noting that this *sūtrapāṭha* (vs-C 2.2.32: *kāryatvāt*) is not found in the common editions of Śaṅkaramiśra’s (ca. 14th–15th century) *Upaskāra*,¹⁸ the most widely used *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* text before Jambuvijaya’s 1961 publication. It is also not found in Vādīndra’s *Vyākhyā*, which is now usually called the *Bhaṭṭavādīndrabhāṣya* or *Tarkasāgara*.¹⁹ Thus, vs-C 2.2.32: *kāryatvāt*, is a unique *sūtrapāṭha*, only found in what is so far the earliest *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* text, that known as *Candrānandavṛtti*.

In addition, vs-C 2.2.32: *kāryatvāt*, is further explained in a few succeeding *sūtrapāṭhas* and their corresponding commentaries by Candrānanda. Here we read:

C ad vs 2.2.36: *kutaḥ kāryatvam ity āha /*

[The opponent] asks: “How is [*śabda*] produced?”

vs-C 2.2.36: *saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdaniṣpatteḥ //*
(=vs-U 2.2.31)

¹⁶ Kanakura (1971, p. 61): “果であることから”; Nozawa (1993, p. 110): “Because of being an effect”; Miyamoto (2009, p. 87): “[音声は] 結果であるから [無常である]”.

¹⁷ See Thakur (2003, p. 53).

¹⁸ See the common editions such as Panchānana (1861), Gough (1873), Sinha (1923) and Miśra (1969). The corresponding *sūtrapāṭha* based on the context of the previous and subsequent *sūtrapāṭhas* in the *Upaskāra* is usually considered to be as follows: vs-U 2.2.28: *anityaś cāyaṃ kāraṇataḥ //* (And, it [=śabda] is impermanent, because of having a cause). This *sūtrapāṭha* does not contradict vs-C 2.2.32: *kāryatvāt*, but it definitely reflects a different aspect of the *śabda* theory. This may have influenced how E. Kanakura, M. Nozawa, and K. Miyamoto understood *kāryatvāt* in the vs-C.

¹⁹ See Thakur (1957), (1960) and (1985); see also Isaacson (1995, pp. 11–22).

[The Vaiśeṣika answer:] Because from conjunction, separation and [another] śabda, śabda originates, [and therefore, śabda is produced].

C ad VS 2.2.36: *bherīdaṇḍasaṃyogād vastradalavibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabdasya vīcis antānavan niṣpatter manyāmahe kāryaḥ śabda iti /*

From the conjunction of drum and stick, from the separation of cloth and fragment, and from [another] śabda, just like the origination of a continuous wave, we consider that “śabda is produced”.

On the other hand, Praśastapāda, another famous Vaiśeṣika scholar who seems to have been active sometime between the 6th and 8th centuries, agreed with the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* that śabda is produced. We read the following passage in his *Padārthadharmasamgraha* (hereafter PDS), found in the so-called *Śabdaprakaraṇam* section:²⁰

śabda 'mbaragūṇaḥ śrotragrāhyaḥ kṣaṇikaḥ kāryakāraṇobhaya-virodhī saṃyogavibhāgaśabdajaḥ pradeśavṛttiḥ samānāsamānajātīyakāraṇaḥ /.....

Śabda is the property of space; [it is] perceptible by the ear; [it is] momentary, and counteracted by effect, by cause and by both; [it is] produced by conjunction, separation and [another] śabda; [it] has a limited existence; [and it is] brought about by homogeneous and heterogeneous causes...

Nevertheless, when Praśastapāda discusses fallacious reasons (*hetv-ābhāsa*) in the context of the “unrecognized reason” (*asiddha*), he gives the following example to explain *anyatara-asiddha*²¹:

²⁰ See Bronkhorst & Ramseier (1994, pp. 66-67), Jhā (1982, pp. 611–612), and Kanakura (1971, pp. 211–212).

²¹ See Bronkhorst & Ramseier (1994, p. 51) and Kanakura (1971, p. 186). The other three kinds of unrecognized fallacious reasons are: *ubhaya-asiddha* (unrecognized to both), *tadbhāva-asiddha* (unrecognized in the form wanted), and *anumeya-asiddha* (unrecognized subject of inference).

anyatarāsiddho yathā 'nityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvād iti /

Unrecognized to one of the two is just like saying “*śabda* is impermanent, because [it] is produced.”²²

For the part that is the quotation – “*anityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvāt*” – we find slightly different wording sequences in the *Nyāyakandalī* and the *Kiraṇāvalī*, respectively:²³

kāryatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ //

śabdo 'nityaḥ kāryatvāt //

Indeed, in the PDS, as well as in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*, it is not explicitly stated who the opponent of *śabda* being impermanent is (i.e., the proponent of *śabda* being permanent [*nityaḥ śabdaḥ*]). Nevertheless, from the contents of vs-C 2.2.34 ~ 43, especially with the appearance of the word *abhivṛyakti* in C ad vs 2.2.35, we can infer that the opponent most probably is a *śabdābhivṛyaktivādin*, those who maintain that *śabda* is manifested, which is a sub-school of Mīmāṃsā. We find the following passages:

C ad vs 2.2.35: *abhivṛyaktau tu /*

Then, regards (the theory of) manifestation.

vs-C, 2.2.35: *doṣāt //* (Cf. vs-U 2.2.30: *abhivṛyaktau doṣāt //*)

Because of a defect, (the theory of manifestation is wrong).

C ad vs 2.2.35: *nityatvenābhivṛyaktau śabdo 'nyena yajñe prayukto nānyena prayujyeta darbhādivad yātayāmatvādi doṣāt / tasmād anityaḥ /*

If *śabda* is permanent and manifests itself, the *śabda* **used** in a sacrifice by one would not be used by another; then there

²² Cf. the Japanese translation of Kanakura (1971, p. 186): “随一不成は、たとえば「声無常なるべし、結果たること（*kāryatva*）の故に」というが如きである。”

²³ See Bronkhorst & Ramseier (1994, p. 51). Cf. Jetly & Parikh (1991) and Jetly (1971) for the *Nyāyakandalī* and the *Kiraṇāvalī*, respectively.

follows the defect of uselessness, just as in the case of *darbha* grass, etc. Therefore, (*śabda*) is impermanent.

As a result, it can be concluded that in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and the *Candrānandavṛtti* (VS-C and C *ad* VS), the Vaiśeṣika holds the thesis that *śabda* is impermanent, with one of the reasons for this being *kāryatva* (it is produced). For Praśastapāda and later commentators, “it is produced” is something agreed upon as one attribute of *śabda*, and it can also be used to describe the characteristics of *śabda*. However, in the PDS and its later commentaries, *kāryatvāt* is defined as a fallacious reason in the *trairūpya* inference, having the fault of *anyatra-asiddha* (not being a valid reason to prove the impermanence of *śabda*), with the opponent most probably a *śabdābhivṛtyādin*.

In addition, the instance (*dṛṣṭānta*) “like the pot, etc” is not found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, nor in the Candrānanda and the Praśastapāda commentaries.

3. Śabda Inferences in pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist Works

The most well-known arguments of *śabda* being impermanent or permanent in Buddhist literature are probably the inferences listed by Dignāga in his enumeration of nine reasons 九句因 (nine [kinds of] *pakṣadharmas*, nine statements of reasons), which he discusses in his **Hetucakraḍamaru*, *Nyāyamukha*, and *Pramāṇasamuccaya*[*vṛtti*]. There are innumerable commentaries on these texts by Chinese, Tibetan and Japanese Buddhists. Among them, the diagram of *phyogs* [kyi] *chos dgu* in the so-called **Hetucakraḍamaru*, *Two-Headed Drum of the Wheel of Reasons*, a Tibetan text known as a synoptic manual for understanding Dignāga's logic, discusses the nine inferences of *śabda*. The intellectual affiliations of the proponents and opponents in this work are not given, but in his *Great Commentary* 大疏, when commenting on the

“nine statements of reasons”, Master Ji explicitly states all the names of the schools in question, even though these are not always exclusive.²⁴

1. Śabdavādin: Śabda is permanent, because it is the object of valid cognition, like space, unlike a pot.	2. Vaiśeṣika: Śabda is impermanent, because it is produced, like a pot, unlike space.	3. Vaiśeṣika: Śabda is effort-derived, because it is imperma- nent, like a pot, unlike lightning and space.
4. Śabdavādin: Śabda is permanent, because it is produced, like space, unlike a pot.	5. Śabdavādin to Bud- dhist: Śabda is permanent, because it is audible, like space, unlike a pot.	6. Śabdavādin: Śabda is permanent, because it is effort-de- rived, like space, unlike a pot or light- ning.
7. Śabdavādin: Śabda is not effort-de- rived, because it is imperma- nent, like lightning and space, unlike a pot.	8. Vaiśeṣika: Śabda is impermanent, because it is effort-de- rived, like a pot and lightning, unlike space.	9. Śabdavādin to Vaiśeṣika: Śabda is permanent, because it is intangible, like space and an atom, unlike action and a pot.

The above table is used to explain the three conditions of a reason (*trairūpya*), particularly to interpret the valid and invalid reasons that follow the second and third conditions, that is, *sapakṣe sattva* and *vipakṣe asattva*. In brief, a reason is valid only when it is present (or partly present and partly absent) in the similar instances (*sapakṣa*) and, at the same time, is absent in any dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*).

²⁴ Not only the order of the arguments, but also the contents of the *pakṣa* and *hetu* of each of the nine reasons in the **Hetucakraḍamaru* are exactly the same in the *Nyāyamukha*, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya[vṛtti]*, Ji’s *Great Commentary*, etc. Although the *Nyāyamukha* does not list specific similar instances and dissimilar instances for each statement, Dignāga clearly states that the *dharmin*-subject is *śabda*, while the **Hetucakraḍamaru* does not mention this. In addition, Ji and others closely follow the sequence of the nine reasons that is given in the *Nyāyamukha*. For the *Nyāyamukha*, see T32, no. 1628, pp. 2b6ff; see also Tucci (1930, pp. 29–30) and Ji, *Great Commentary*, T44, no. 1840, pp. 104–105. For the following table, see He & van der Kuijp (2016, pp. 285–286).

It is interesting to note that *śabda* is taken as the model subject to explain the *trairūpya* theory in detail and is used to analyze the types of valid and invalid reasons case by case, i.e. by means of constituting the nine different types of reasons or inferences. As a result, only no. 2 and no. 8 are valid inferences for the author (Buddhist), as well as for the assumed Vaiśeṣika proponent. In addition, no. 2 “*śabda* is impermanent, because it is produced, like a pot, unlike space” is the specific inference in question.

As a typical complete inference, no. 2 is constituted within all the rules of *trairūpya*. It contains the *dharmin*=*śabda*, *dharma*=impermanent, *hetu*=because it is produced, *sapakṣa*=like a pot, and *vipakṣa*=unlike space. However, according to Dignāga's definitions, the *vipakṣa* as a factor in an inference can be omitted in certain cases. Therefore, the inference without “unlike space”, i.e. “*śabda* is impermanent, because it is produced, like a pot” that is reported by Bhāviveka in his **Hastaratna* can also be considered a valid inference from the standpoint of the Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists who believe that *śabda* is impermanent. One should be reminded at this point that no opponent is mentioned in the above context, although the viewpoint of opponents would have been extremely important for the validity of the inference.

On the other hand, in the *Nyāyapraveśa*, another manual for studying Dignāga's logic written by his follower Śaṅkarasvāmin (ca. 6th–7th), we find that in the discussion of the four kinds of unrecognized reasons,²⁵ the example for interpreting Dignāga's *anyatara-asiddha* is as follows:

kṛtakatvād iti śabdābhivyaaktivādinam praty anyatarāsiddhaḥ / ²⁶

所作性故，對聲顯論，隨一不成。²⁷

²⁵ A fallacious reason is one that does not possess all three aspects of a correct reason. There are three kinds of fallacious reasons: (1) unrecognized (*asiddha*), which lacks the first condition of a correct reason (i.e. *pakṣadharmatva*); (2) inconclusive (*anaikāntika*), which lacks either the second condition (i.e. *sapakṣe sattva*) or the third condition (i.e. *vipakṣe asattva*); and (3) contradicted (*viruddha*), which lacks both the second and the third conditions.

²⁶ Cf. Tachikawa (1971, p. 141).

²⁷ Xuanzang's Chinese translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*, T32, no. 1630, p. 11.

A reason that is unrecognized by either proponent or opponent is as follows: [one would prove that *śabda* is impermanent] to a man who holds that *śabda* has [only a] manifestation says, “because it is produced.”

At first sight, the above passage seems to contradict inference no. 2 found in the **Hetucakraḍamaru* and the *Nyāyamukha*, etc. On the other hand, it is coincident with the passage given by Praśastapāda in his PDS, i.e.: *anyatarāsiddho yathā ’nityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvād iti* (see part 2, above).

A keyword in the *Nyāyapraveśa* is *śabdābhivṛtyādin* 聲顯論. This is the opponent who believes that *śabda* has only a manifestation, that is, a follower of a school that insists *śabda* is permanent, not produced, and only manifested under some circumstances. It most probably refers to a viewpoint entertained by certain Mīmāṃsā scholars.

A similar statement is found in Dignāga’s *Nyāyamukha*:

又若敵論不同許者，如對顯論“所作性故”。²⁸

Again, if the opponent does not agree with the similarity, such as [one proving that *śabda* is impermanent] to a man who holds that [*śabda* has only a] manifestation (i.e. [*śabda*]-*abhivṛtyādin*, [聲]顯論), he says, “because it is produced.”

In his commentary on the *Nyāyapraveśa*, Master Ji points out that there are two kinds of *śabda*, one that is produced and the other that is manifested. This reads as follows²⁹:

若聲生論，本無今生，是所作性，非勤勇顯。

若聲顯論，本有今顯，勤勇顯發，非所作性。

For the **Śabdopattivādin* (who believe that *śabda* is produced), [*śabda*] used to be non-existent and is now born; because of its produced-ness, it is not manifested by being effort-derived.

²⁸ Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the *Nyāyamukha*, T32, no. 1628, p. 1. Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccaya*[vṛtti]: *gcig la yang bzlog pa ni mngon par gsal bar smra ba la byas pa nyid lta bu’o* //; see Katsura (1977, p. 124).

²⁹ T44, no. 1840, p. 124.

For the Śabdābhivṛtyādin (who believe that śabda is manifested), [śabda] used to be existent and is now manifested; it is manifested by being effort-derived, but not because of its produced-ness.

Therefore, for the śabda inference of the Vaiśeṣika, Master Ji comments as follows:³⁰

若勝論師對聲顯論立“聲無常，所作性因”。其聲顯論，說聲緣顯，不許緣生，所作既生，由斯不許，故成隨一。

When the Vaiśeṣika argues with the Śabdābhivṛtyādin that “śabda is impermanent, because it is produced,” because the Śabdābhivṛtyādin holds that śabda depends on manifestation, but not on dependent-origination; being produced means originated, which is not allowed [by the Śabdābhivṛtyādin]. Therefore, it [the reason] is *anyatara-asiddha*.

Master Ji's words remind me of the manifestation of śabda mentioned in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and in Candrānanda's *Vṛtti*. That is to say, one kind of śabda may coincide with the so-called *sound* that is produced from the conjunction of a drum and a stick, or from the separation of a fragment from a piece of cloth (C *ad* vs, 2.2.36). The other kind of śabda is better called a *word* that is utilized in a sacrifice (C *ad* vs, 2.2.35), namely, the *words* of the *Vedas* to be manifested by the mouth of a superior human being.³¹

In a word, the reason of “it is produced” (*kāryatva* / *kṛtakatva*) could be valid only when the opponent is someone who agrees that śabda is produced, i.e. a *Śabdopattivādin, who at the same time disagrees with the impermanence of śabda. If the opponent is someone who believes that śabda is manifested, i.e. a Śabdābhivṛtyādin, then the reason of “it is produced” (*kāryatva* / *kṛtakatva*) would have the fault of *anyatara-asiddha*, i.e. it would be an invalid *hetu*.

³⁰ T44, no. 1840, p. 121.

³¹ Cf. Kanakura (1971, p. 45), which commented that Candrānanda's explanation of *liṅga* from the aspect of the *Veda*, is unreasonable.

As a matter of fact, in the same *Nyāyapraveśa*, when explaining the *pakṣa*, the *hetu* and the *drṣṭānta* of the *trairūpya* formula, the above *śabda* inference with the reason *kṛtakatva* is used as a model, just as Dignāga earlier did. We read:³²

eṣāṃ vacanāni parapratyāyanakāle sādhanam/ tadyathā/ anityaḥ śabda iti pakṣavacanam/ kṛtakatvād iti pakṣadharmavacanam/ yat kṛtakam tad anityam drṣṭam yathā ghaṭādir sapakṣānugamavacanam/ yan nityam tad akṛtakam drṣṭam yathākāśam iti vyatirekavacanam// etāny eva trayo 'vayavā ity ucyantell

已說宗等如是多言，開悟他時，說名能立。如說：聲無常者，是立宗言；所作性故者，是宗法言；若是所作，見彼無常，如瓶等者，是隨同品言；若是其常，見非所作，如虛空者，是遠離言。唯此三分，說名能立。

Statements of these [factors, i.e. the *pakṣa*, the *hetu* and the *drṣṭānta*,] are the means of proof when one would like to convince others. For instance, “*Śabda* is impermanent” is a statement of the *pakṣa*. “Because it is produced” is a statement of the property of the *pakṣa* (i.e. the *hetu*). “Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot, etc.” is a statement of positive concomitance with the *sapakṣa*. “Whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, like space” is a statement of negative concomitance. With regard only to these three members (i.e., *pakṣa*, *hetu*, and *drṣṭānta*), we call it the “means for proof”.

Here, although this is described as being the means of proof when one would like to convince others, the opponent is not actually mentioned. The reason of “because it is produced” (*kṛtakatvāt*), together with the *pakṣa* and the *drṣṭānta*, can constitute the classical form of the three-membered Indian syllogism and is used to convince others who are not *Śabdābhivvyaktivādins*. Otherwise, a *Śabdābhivvyaktivādin* would argue that the proof carries the fault of *anyatara-asiddha*.

It is clear that what I have called the “*śabda* inference” – “*śabda* is impermanent, because it is produced, [like a pot]” – in this paper was

³² Cf. Tachikawa (1971, p. 141), and T32, no. 1630, p. 11.

widely used to expound the *trairūpya* theory in Dignāga's and his successors' works, either to interpret the factors of an inference or to reveal the fault of *anyatara-asiddha*. What is quite interesting is that when we comb through various Chinese Buddhist texts, we discover similar inferences or arguments about *śabda* in the works of Asaṅga (ca. 4th century) and even Āryadeva (ca. 3rd century).

As was first pointed out by both the Chinese scholar Ch. Lü 呂澂 and the Japanese scholar H. Ui 宇井伯壽, almost at the same time (and yet seemingly independently), Asaṅga was probably the first Indian Buddhist to mention the *trairūpya*. In his *Shunzhong lun* 順中論 **Madhyāntānugama*, it reads as follows:³³

復以何者是因三相？朋中之法，相對朋無，復自朋成。

The *Shunzhong lun* was translated around 543 C.E. by Prajñāruci (般若流支) or by Bodhiruci (菩提流支), both South Indian Buddhist scholars.³⁴ The former arrived in China in around 516, the latter in about 508. The above Chinese sentence is therefore considered so far to the earliest mention of *trairūpya* that has been handed down to us.³⁵ Namely, *peng* 朋 is a transcription of Sanskrit *pakṣa*, *xiangdui peng* 相對朋 of *vi-pakṣa*, and *zi peng* 自朋 corresponds to *sa-pakṣa*. Thus, the original Sanskrit of the second sentence was most likely the following:

**pakṣadharmatvam°vipakṣe 'sat sapakṣe sat°ca /*

This can be interpreted as listing the first condition of *pakṣadharmatvam* = 朋中之法; the second condition of *sapakṣe sat* [ca] = [復]自朋成; and the third condition of *viapṣe 'sat* = 相對朋無. The above passage of the *Shunzhong lun* can therefore be rendered as follows:

³³ T30, no. 1565, p. 42a.

³⁴ For the translators of the *Shunzhong lun*, see Hachiriki (1979, pp. 70–73) and Huiguang (2004).

³⁵ See Lü (1926, p. 27) and Ui (1929, pp. 429–452).

Then, what are the three conditions of the reason (*trairūpya*)? [They are] that it be a property of the *pakṣa*, that it be present in the entities homogeneous with the *pakṣa*, and that it not be present in the entities heterogeneous to the *pakṣa*.

In addition, to further explain the *trairūpya* theory Asaṅga gives an example, in fact, a *śabda* inference. We read³⁶:

如：聲無常，以造作故、因緣壞故、作已生故，如是等故，若法造作皆是無常，譬如瓶等。

Such as: *śabda* is impermanent, because it is produced, because it perishes through causes, because it arises after having been produced, and reasons such as this; whatever is produced is impermanent, just like a pot, etc.

Strictly speaking, each *trairūpya* should contain only one *hetu*. Thus, Asaṅga's application of the *trairūpya* could be restructured into three inferences with their respective reasons as follows: (1) because it is produced, (2) because its cause is broken, (3) because produced-ness is originated. Of these, Dignāga, then followed by Śāṅkarasvāmin and Bhāviveka, probably adopted the first reason, i.e. the reason of "because it is produced," as being the most representative of the three.

It is also noteworthy that Āryadeva's *The Hundred Letters* 百字論 **Akṣaraśataka*, which is also said to have been translated by the South Indian Buddhist scholar Bodhiruci, has a similar *śabda* inference, albeit in the form of a five-membered syllogism. There we read:³⁷

復有異說，名：聲無常。以何故？聲是作法，故無常。以何為喻？如瓶因泥、輪、繩、人功、水等而成。瓶以作因生故，瓶無常，如聲從唇、齒、喉、舌眾緣生。故聲亦無常。

Again, there is a heterodoxy who says that (1) *śabda* is impermanent. (2) Why? Because *śabda* is produced, so it is impermanent. (3) What is the instance? Just like a pot is made of clay, a potting wheel, rope, human effort, water and so forth. (4)

³⁶ T30, no. 1565, p. 42a.

³⁷ T30, no. 1572, p. 251a.

A pot is produced by the reason of production; therefore the pot is impermanent, likewise *śabda* is produced from the lips, teeth, throat, and tongue, etc. as its causes. (5) Therefore, *śabda* is also impermanent.

It would appear that none of the pre-Bhāviveka Buddhist scholars, including Āryadeva, Asaṅga and Dignāga, identified the *śabda* inference as referring to the Vaiśeṣika. Neither did Bhāviveka when he composed his *Prajñāpradīpa*.³⁸ But he did in his **Hastaratna*!

4. Concluding remarks

What can be concluded from the foregoing? I began this essay with three quotations from the fifth to sixth century Indian scholar Bhāviveka, whose last work was probably the **Hastaratna*. There, he identified what I have called “*śabda* inference” with the Vaiśeṣika. The cited passages presented me with several problems.

First, the key constituent of the “*śabda* inference”, i.e. the reason of *kāryatvāt*, is found only in the *Candrānandavṛtti* and not in other classical Vaiśeṣika works. While the earliest such text, it is so far undated. There, the *trairūpya* theory does not seem to be involved.

Second, within the framework of *trairūpya*, *kāryatvāt* is considered an invalid reason in the *Padārthadharmasamgraha* and its commentaries, while at the same time *kāryatva* is used to describe the attributes of *śabda*.

Third, it is only in Bhāviveka's **Hastaratna* that the “*śabda* inference” is specifically identified as belonging to the Vaiśeṣika.

In this connection, I would like to offer two conjectures to tentatively respond to the above three problems, as well as to close this essay.

Concerning the uniqueness of *sūtrapāṭha* VS-C 2.2.32: *kāryatvāt*, from the *Candrānandavṛtti* and Bhāviveka's three mentions of the Vaiśeṣika *śabda* inference in his **Hastaratna*, we can infer that Bhāviveka was familiar with the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* as found in the

³⁸ Cf. *Boredeng lun shi* 般若燈論釋, T30, no. 1566.

Candrānandavṛtti, or in at least with some other old cognate text. This can be considered additional evidence from Chinese sources for my earlier conjecture on the relative chronology of Bhāviveka and Candrānanda, namely, that Candrānanda was a junior contemporary of Dignāga and a senior one of Bhāviveka.³⁹

Bhāviveka's ultimate purpose was to prove the Madhyamaka emptiness (*śūnyatā*) in reality (*tattvataḥ*) through the framework of the *trairūpya* theory. In this he was influenced by Dignāga. Thus, formulating a valid inference was extremely important for Bhāviveka. The discussion of the Vaiśeṣika inference of *śabda* being impermanent in the **Hastaratna* can be regarded as one such example, an example that is characteristic of Bhāviveka's way of thinking and his writing style. How much he inherited from his Buddhist seniors, such as Dignāga, etc., as well as how much he contributed in his own way to differentiate himself from his predecessors, are important questions that will help us better understand this interesting Indian scholar and his place in Indian intellectual history, as well as how his thinking was received in East Asia.

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VS-C

Sūtrapāṭha of the *Candrānandavṛtti*.

VS-U

Sūtrapāṭha of the *Upaskāra*.

Kuiji's Analysis of the Four Kinds of Contradictory Reasons

Shinya Moriyama, Matsumoto

0. Introduction

As is well known, the East Asian Buddhist *yinming/inmyō* tradition developed on the basis of two texts transmitted from India through translations by Xuanzang (玄奘, 602–664), namely, his translation of the *Nyāyamukha* (*Yinming zhengli men lu* 因明正理門論, NM) by Dignāga (ca. 480–540) and of the *Nyāyapraveśaka* (*Yinming ru zhengli lun* 因明入正理論, NP/NP_{Ch}) by Śāṅkarasvāmin.¹ After these two translations were completed, Xuanzang's disciples composed a number of commentaries on both texts, but many of these earlier commentaries are now lost or only known through fragments. Of the surviving earlier commentaries, the *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏 (YRZLS) is the most authoritative, and throughout East Asian Buddhism has been widely acknowledged as the standard interpretation of Buddhist logic. Its author, Kuiji (窺基 or Ji 基, 632–682), was a prominent disciple of Xuanzang. After Xuanzang's death, Kuiji founded the Faxiang school based on the Chinese Yogācāra doctrine, and composed a great number of commentaries on Buddhist texts, including the YRZLS. The YRZLS is also called the “Great Commentary” (*Yinming da shu*, 因明大疏), since it contains word-by-word glossing and paraphrases, and systematically analyzes each sentence and argument of the NP. However, while Kuiji's commentary has been popular and highly esteemed in the East Asian

* I would thank Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for correcting my English.

¹ For translations of the NP, as well as explanations and textual information, see Tachikawa 1971, Gillon & Love 1980, and Inami 2011.

yinming/inmyō tradition, there are modern scholars who have expressed some skepticism about the validity of Kuiji's interpretation of the NP. For instance, in his introduction to a Japanese translation of the YRZLS, Hajime Nakamura pointed out that Kuiji's extremely scholastic explanations of each technical term based on his analysis of the NP's Chinese translation are nearly useless for understanding the NP's Sanskrit text. In addition, Nakamura also criticized Kuiji's misconception of a main component of Buddhist logic as follows:

Kuiji was therefore unable fully to understand the fallacy of the logical reason, which was indeed the most significant topic into which Indian logicians funneled their energy. For instance, the contradictory reason taught in the NP refers to a logical reason implying a proposition that is contradictory to the proposition to be proved. However, Kuiji was unable to understand this and thus gave an extremely strained interpretation. (Nakamura 1960: 6, *Translated from Japanese by SM)

Although Nakamura does not provide any more details about Kuiji's "extremely strained interpretation," he is probably indicating that Kuiji's interpretation of the contradictory reason does not provide a genuine logical analysis of the reason, but rather addresses more practical concerns: how to apply the argument of logical fallacy in an actual debate. Nakamura and other scholars at that time were trying to establish the Buddhist logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as an Indian version of formal logic, a logic dealing mainly with the analysis of propositions or predicates. In their eyes, Kuiji's explanation was a misguided effort. Today, however, ideas have changed. Scholars no longer think of Dignāga's logic as one of propositions and predicates, but rather they think of it as one of debate. For instance, as I have argued elsewhere, Dignāga's analysis of the antinomic reason (*viruddhāvyabhicārain*) shows traces that his logic was still based on the tradition of debate (*vāda*). It thus seems worthwhile to reevaluate Kuiji's interpretations.² For scholars who are familiar with Dharmakīrti's sophisticated interpretation of Dignāga's

² Moriyama 2015.

logic, Kuiji's explanations seem unusual. But if one considers the possibility of an intermediate stage between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti during which several alternative ideas regarding Buddhist logic emerged, this opens a path for looking at Kuiji's interpretation with fresh eyes. Accordingly, in the following, I will examine Kuiji's analysis of the NP's so-called "four kinds of contradictory reason" (*si xiangwei* 四相違). Since I have already published articles on *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* and *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*,³ here the focus will be on a point not discussed previously, namely, the problem of the definition and subdivisions of the contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*).

1. Explanation of the term "contradictory reason" (*viruddhahetu*)

Let us start with Kuiji's explanation of "contradictory reason" (*viruddhahetu*), which Xuanzang translates as *xiangwei yin* (相違因):

YRZLS 127c28-128a2: 相違因義者，謂兩宗相返。此之四過。不改他因，能令立者宗成相違。与相違法而為因故名「相違因」。因得果名名「相違」也。非因違宗名為相違。故無宗亦違因例而成難。

The [term] *xiangwei yin* (**viruddhahetu*) signifies the mutual contradiction (*xiangfan*) of two theses. For this, there are four kinds of fallacies. Without changing to another reason, [one, i.e., the opponent] can bring about a contradiction with the proponent's thesis.⁴ Since it is the logical reason for proving a property that is contradictory [to the proponent's thesis], it is called the "contradictory reason." [Here,] the effect (i.e., the

³ Moriyama 2019a, 2019b.

⁴ This explanation is based on Dignāga's NM 2a4-5: 若法能成相違所立，是相違過，即名似因；“If a [reason's] property can prove a contradictory probandum (*xiangwei suoli*, 相違所立), it is the fallacy of the contradiction, which is also called a sort of fallacious reason.” Cf. Katsura 1978: 125. Note that Zenju paraphrases *xianwei suoli* with the “probandum about which two theses are contradictory” (兩宗相違所立). Cf. IRMS 370a16–17.

contradiction of the two theses) is called “contradictory,” instead of its cause (i.e., the reason). However, calling it “contradictory” is not because the reason (e.g., being produced) is contradictory to the thesis (e.g., sound’s permanence). Consequently, it should not be criticized from the point that the thesis[, in turn,] would also oppose the logical reason.

According to Kuiji, the contradiction occurs between the two different theses (*zong*, 宗, **pratijñā*) of the two parties in a debate. Suppose a debate occurs between two parties holding opposite opinions about the essence of sound. When one proponent asserts sound’s permanence by applying the reason “because it is produced,” the interlocutor presents a counter-inference called *xiangwei liang* 相違量 in the form: “Sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot” (YZLS 128b24–25). Later commentators like Zenju 善珠 (723–797) call this *nengwei liang* 能違量, namely, an inference that contradicts the proponent’s inference (*suowei liang* 所違量).⁵ This counter-inference reveals that the proponent’s thesis (e.g., sound’s permanence) is contradictory to another thesis (e.g., sound’s impermanence) based on the same reason (e.g., being produced). As Kuiji emphasizes, this does not imply that the reason is contradictory to the proponent’s thesis. In order to establish a contradictory reason, the interlocutor would have to present a counter-inference of that reason. By coupling the counter-inference to the original inference, one understands that a single reason leads to mutually opposing theses.⁶

⁵ IRMS 373b27–29: 「因必仍旧」者。四六句中比量三支為所違量。二八句中比量三支為能違量。此能違量必仍順前所違量因。故云「因必仍旧」。

⁶ The Jain commentator Haribhadrasūri provides the following explanation of *viruddhahetu* (NPT 38.19–20): *viruddha: viruddhyate sma viruddhaḥ. tathā hi, ayaṃ dharmasvarūpādiviparītasāadhanād dharmeṇa dharmiṇā vā virudhyata eveti* Here, Haribhadra first notes that (1) the reason implies something contrary (*viparīta*) to the inherent nature of the property to be proved (*dharmasvarūpa*), etc., and through this, (2) it is contradicted by the property to be proved and the subject. Thus, he admits that a contradiction can occur not only between two theses, but also between a reason and the thesis it implies. As we will see below, these two points were also discussed by Wengui and Kuiji in the *yinming* tradition. For Dharmakīrti’s definition of *viruddhahetu*, see NB III 86–91.

Regarding this, however, one might remember that Dignāga defines a contradictory reason in terms of his innovative theory of the “wheel of reason” (*hetucakra*), a checklist of nine possibilities for combining a reason’s presence/absence in the domains of similar and dissimilar instances (*sapakṣa/vipakṣa*).⁷ If a reason is absent from the domain of similar instances, yet present wholly or partially in the domain of dissimilar instances, that reason is classified as “contradictory.”⁸ This implies that a reason concluding an object that lacks a property to be proved is called a contradictory reason. In this case, Dignāga is not presupposing a debate model, and thus, it does differ from Kuiji’s explanation.

In connection with this, it is worth noting the view of an opponent cited in Kuiji’s above account. This opponent defines a contradictory reason as that which is contradictory to the thesis (*yin wei zong* 因違宗). The 8th-century Japanese monk-scholar Zenju (善珠, 723–797) ascribes this view to Kuiji’s contemporary Wengui (or Mungwe, 文軌), whose commentary on the NP is

⁷ For the reader’s convenience, the wheel of reason is shown in the following table. Cf. Matilal 2001: 190. In the table, “+” indicates “wholly present,” “-” indicates “wholly absent,” and “some” indicates “partially present.”

1 (=inconclusive, too wide) + <i>sapakṣa</i> / + <i>vipakṣa</i>	2 (=correct reason) + <i>sapakṣa</i> / - <i>vipakṣa</i>	3 (=inconclusive) + <i>sapakṣa</i> / some <i>vipakṣa</i>
4 (=contradictory) - <i>sapakṣa</i> / + <i>vipakṣa</i>	5 (=inconclusive, too narrow) - <i>sapakṣa</i> / - <i>vipakṣa</i>	6 (=contradictory) - <i>sapakṣa</i> / some <i>vipakṣa</i>
7 (=inconclusive) some <i>sapakṣa</i> / + <i>vipakṣa</i>	8 (=correct reason) some <i>sapakṣa</i> / - <i>vipakṣa</i>	9 (=inconclusive) some <i>sapakṣa</i> / some <i>vipakṣa</i>

Cf. also Kitagawa 1965: 27–39.

⁸ On Dignāga’s definitions of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* (*apakṣa*), see Katsura 2004.

still extant in parts.⁹ It is said that Wengui presented two interpretations of the term *xiangwei yin*: while the first focuses on the contradiction between a reason and its thesis (*yin fan zong* 因反宗),¹⁰ the second focuses on the contradiction between two theses (e.g., *wuchang fan chang* 無常反常).¹¹ Of the two, the first interpretation is provided as a reply to the question: “If a reason that contradicts a thesis is called the ‘contradictory,’ then the thesis also contradicts the reason. Why is it only a fallacy of the reason? If it is not a fallacy of the thesis, why is it called ‘mutual’ (*xiang*)?”¹² To this question, Wengui replies that with the word “mutual” (*xiang*) it is possible to denote that one brings forth the other, as for instance, *fuzi xiang sheng* 父子相生 for denoting that a father brings forth his son. Therefore, the term *xiang* of “contradictory” (*xiang-wei*) does not imply two ways, but only one way. Thus, “contradictory” (*wei*) means that the reason contradicts the thesis.¹³ However, this interpretation is unacceptable for Kuiji, because for him the contradiction occurs between the two theses as presented by the proponent and his interlocutor, not between the reason and thesis in a single inference.

⁹ On Wengui’s commentary on the NP, see Takemura 1986: 32–34, 217–246; and Frankenhauser 1996: 190.

¹⁰ IRMS 341b28–29, IDS 583c20–21.

¹¹ IRMS 369c8–9, IDS 583c24.

¹² IRMS 369c19–20, IDS 584c14–15: 若因違宗名「相違」者，宗亦乖因，豈唯因過。過不在宗何得名「相」？

¹³ IRMS 369c21–22, IDS 584c16–17: 如父子相生。子不生父。亦彼名相。此則宗因兩形為「相」。因反宗故名「違」。It is interesting to note that Wengui’s interpretation recalls the opinion in Vasubandhu’s *Vādaśāstra* that a proponent’s reason which is incompatible with his own established position (*siddhānta*) or thesis (*pratijñā*) should be called contradictory. Cf. Kitagawa 1965:144–145. As a second example, Vasubandhu gives the following Sāṅkhya proof: “Effects are [already] existing in [their] causes, because what exists arises” (*rgyu la ’bras bu yod pa yin te, yod pa skye ba’i phyir ro*). According to Vasubandhu, if the reason that “arises” is contradictory to the thesis, it becomes contradictory. Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 35. Dignāga, however, does not consider such a reason to be contradictory, but rather to be unestablished or inconclusive. Cf. Kitagawa 1965: 397–404.

With regard to the second interpretation, Wengui explains: “If one wishes to prove the thesis of [sound’s] permanence at the time of the reason’s presentation, but the reason implies the thesis of [sound’s] impermanence, then it becomes the reason for [something] contradictory [to what one wishes to infer]. It is therefore called a contradictory reason.”¹⁴ Although at first glance the second interpretation looks similar to Kuiji’s, one should not overlook that Wengui’s interpretation does not necessarily presuppose a debate as its background. Wengui is merely describing a reason that implies a thesis contradictory to the thesis one wishes to infer, mentioning nowhere a “counter-inference.” In this sense, Wengui’s interpretation is different from Kuiji’s. How then should we evaluate Kuiji’s analysis?

2. Classification of *viruddhahetu* and its significance in debate

One answer to the question above might be given by reconsidering Kuiji’s attempt to interpret systematically the four kinds of *viruddhahetu* by focusing on the latter three cases but not on the first one. Remember how Śāṅkarasvāmin illustrated these four kinds:

1. A reason that proves the opposite of the property to be proved itself (*dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana*):

Example: Sound is permanent because it is produced or because it arises immediately after mental effort.¹⁵

2. A reason that proves the opposite of a specific quality of the property to be proved (*dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*):

¹⁴ IRMS369c9–11, IDS 583c24–26: 立因為欲成常住宗。其因乃成無常宗義。与相違為因，故名「相違因」也。

¹⁵ NP 7.4–5.

Example: [Organs] such as eyes are for the benefit of something else because they are aggregates, like the individual parts of a bed or a chair.¹⁶

3. A reason that proves the opposite of the intrinsic nature of the subject (*dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*):

Example: Existence (*bhāva*) is not a substance, not a quality and not a motion, because it has a single substance and because it is present in qualities and motions, like specific universals (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*).¹⁷

4. A reason that proves a specific quality of the subject (*dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*):

Example: The same as the previous example 3.¹⁸

Of the four cases, some modern studies regard the first as the standard definition of *viruddhahetu* based on the wheel of reason, seeing the other three cases as its derivative types.¹⁹ Certainly, in the classification based on Dignāga's division of nature (*svarūpa*) and specific quality (*viśeṣa*) with regard to both the property (*dharma*) and subject (*dharmin*) of the thesis,²⁰ only

¹⁶ NP 7.8–9: *parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ sanghātāt vāc chayanāsanādyanigavad iti*. For details of this proof, see Tillemans 2000: 53–57; Watanabe 2008.

¹⁷ NP 7.12–15: *na dravyam na karma na guṇo bhāva iti, ekadravyavattvāt guṇakarmasu ca bhāvāt, sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti. ayaṃ hi hetur yathā dravyādīpratiṣedhaṃ bhāvasya sādhayati tathā bhāvasyābhāvatvam api sādhayati, ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt*. For a translation, see Tachikawa 1971: 126. As for the background of the proof, see VS 1.2.8–10; Halbfass 1992: 140. For details on the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*, see Oetke 1994: 35–41; Moriyama 2019a.

¹⁸ Cf. NP 7.16–18. The specific quality (*viśeṣa*) of “existence” is called “causing the notion ‘existent’” (*satpratyaṣakartṛtva*). The same reason 3 concludes what is contradictory to the quality of “causing the notion ‘existent’.” On this reason, see Oetke 1994: 35–41. For *satpratyaṣakartṛtva* and its interpretation by Kuiji and his followers, see Moriyama 2019b.

¹⁹ Ui 1966: 218–223.

²⁰ Cf. PS III. 27: *dharmadharmaisvarūpasya tadviśeṣasya caiva saḥ | viparītopakāritvād viruddho 'sati bādhane* || PS 3.27|| “Since this [kind of reason] serves [to prove] the opposite of the *dharma* and the *dharmin* themselves, as well as [the opposite] of their specific qualities,

the contradictory reason based on the first (i.e., *dharmasvarūpavi-parītasādhana*) presupposes two properties of a probandum and the reason to prove it. Therefore, the majority of scholars take the first as the standard model of *viruddhahetu*. However, Kuiji's stance is different. He understands the entire *viruddhahetu* within the framework of a debate model, as is shown in the latter three cases. According to his understanding, a reason is judged to be *viruddhahetu* only when an interlocutor formulates a counter-inference (*xiang wei liang*) after the proponent's presentation of the inference. For instance, in the second case, an interlocutor might present the following counter-inference:

Example 2': Organs such as eyes are necessarily better used for the benefit of something else that is aggregated, because they are aggregates, like the individual parts of a bed or a chair.²¹

Kuiji states that the above proof was presented by Dignāga to refute the Sāṅkhya proof of *puruṣa*. In this counter-inference, the interlocutor adopts the same reason used by the Sāṅkhya proponent and a similar instance, but changes the thesis since it clearly indicates the opposite of what the proponent intended to state in his inference, namely, a specific quality (*viśeṣa*).²² In a

[it is] contradictory, inasmuch as [the thesis] is not invalidated [by means of a valid cognition].” Cf. NM 2b 27-28: 邪證法有法 自性或差別 此成相違因 若無所違害; Katsura 1979: 78–79. For more details on my interpretation of this verse, see Moriyama 2019a. For the Sanskrit text of the PS, I am referring to the reconstruction of chapter 3 by Shōryū Katsura and Toshikazu Watanabe. I am grateful to Prof. Katsura and Prof. Watanabe for having provided me with a copy of their edition of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Chapter 3, and its related materials. On Dignāga's use of *svarūpa* and *viśeṣa*, see Watanabe 2006.

²¹ YRZLS 129c19–20: 眼等必為積聚他用勝，積聚性故。 Cf. YRZLS 129b11–23: 今者陳那即以彼因與所立法勝劣差別而作相違。.... 此自相上意之所許「積聚他用」「不積聚他用」，是法差別。彼積聚因今更不改。還即以彼成立意許法之差別「積聚他用」。其臥具等積聚性故，既為積聚假我用勝。眼等亦是積聚性故，應如臥具亦為積聚假我用勝。

²² The specific quality (*viśeṣa*) means a quality that is intended or implied, *yi xu* 意許. On the distinction between *svarūpa* and *viśeṣa*, Kuiji provides three criteria, namely, specific/common (*ju ton*, 局通), prior/posterior (*xian hou*, 先後), and explicit/implicit (*yan xu*, 言許), describing the third in his YRZLS. Cf. YRZLS 128a15-b4. On these three criteria, see Frankenhauer 1996: 36-37; Harbsmeier 1998: 382-383; and Chen 2018: 31–42. To my limited

nutshell, there is a contradiction between an organ being for the benefit of *puruṣa* (or *shiwo*, 実我), a soul that is non-aggregated, and an organ being for the benefit of a provisional self (*jiawo*, 仮我), which is aggregated. Moreover, Kuiji points out the importance of the comparative word “better” (*sheng*, 勝) that functions to remove the fallacy of thesis called the “thesis with a well-established connection” (*prasiddhasaṃbandha*, *xiangfu jicheng*, 相符極成). If the interlocutor merely argues that organs are used for the benefit of something else that is aggregated, the Sāṅkhya proponent could reply that the thesis is acceptable for him too, since he admits that chairs and beds, etc., are used for both *puruṣa* and the provisional self. We see here that Kuiji constructs the counter-inference by taking all possible situations of debate into consideration. This shows that his commentary was written not just as a theoretical explanation of Dignāga’s logic, but also as a manual for its concrete application in every practical scene of a debate.

Let us look at another example. In response to the Vaiśeṣika inference of “existence” (*bhāva/sattā*), which is demonstrated in the third example above, the following counter-inference arises:

Example 3’: The “existence” that is put forth by the proponent is not existence because it has a single substance and because it is present in qualities and motions, like specific universals.²³

In this presentation, the fallacy of the Vaiśeṣika inference attributed to the school’s founder Ulūka is shown, with the intention being to establish the category “existence” independently of the other three categories, namely, substance, quality, and motion. However, paradoxically, the inference presented by the proponent reveals its own refutation. As the counter-inference

knowledge, the third difference is not found in the Sanskrit terms *svarūpa* and *viśeṣa*. Most probably, the idea is to be attributed to Kuiji or his master Xuanzang. In particular, for Kuiji, whose aim seems to be to re-systematize Buddhist logic in the framework of debate, not only are a debater’s explicit statements important, but also the debator’s intention, since otherwise any analysis of a debate would be in vain.

²³ YRZLS130c21–22: 所言有性応非有性, 有一實故有徳業故, 如同異性。For more details of the fallacy, see Moriyama 2019a.

shows, it is fully possible that by using the same reason and a similar instance, the interlocutor is able to demonstrate the opposite of the intention, namely, that “existence” is not existence.

I will skip the fourth case, but the same is easily shown there. In this manner, the latter three kinds of contradictory reason can be well understood in the context of debate. Only when an interlocutor presents a counter-inference does one apprehend that the proponent's proof is based on a contradictory reason, a reason implying something contradictory to what the proponent wishes to prove. This is why Kuiji inserts a counter-inference in the first case as well, in order to coherently explain all kinds of contradictory reasons.

3. Lingjuan's criticism and an analysis of the combinations of the four kinds of contradictory reasons

Kuiji's above attempt to bridge the gap between *dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana* and the other three kinds of contradictory reason was criticized by his contemporary Lingjuan 靈雋. In the YRZLS, Kuiji praises this friend's genius highly, especially since only he, having read the commentaries of both Wengui and Kuiji, raised the crucial question concerning the gap between the first type of contradictory reason and the other three.²⁴ Lingjuan's first question is summarized as follows.

Question 1: According to Dignāga's wheel of reason, a reason that is absent from the domain of similar instances and present in the domain of dissimilar instances is called a contradictory reason. Of the four kinds of *viruddhahetu*, only the *dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana* fits this account of Dignāga, whereas the other three, in contrast, indicate reasons that are present in the domain of similar instances and absent from the domain of

²⁴ YRZLS 132a13-b1. In the text, his name is referred to as Juan fashi 雋法師. Cf. ISSR 366c27-28: 雋者靈雋也。On Lingjuan, see Takemura 1986: 41.

dissimilar instances. Why are these three kinds instances of the fallacy of contradiction?

In response, Kuiji provides the following statement, in which he re-defines the notion of “similar instance”:

YRZLS 132b6-13: 夫正因相者，必遍宗法，同有異無。生他決智。因法成宗可成四義：有法及法，此二各有言陳自相意許差別。隨宗所諍成一或多。故宗同品說所立法均等義品名為「同品」。隨其所諍所立之法有處名「同」。非取宗上一切皆同。若爾便無異喻品故。若令皆同，亦是分別相似過類。又非唯取言所陳法。不爾便無自余過失，如前數說。故隨所應因成宗中一乃至四。所兩競義，有此法處名為同品。

Now, the conditions for a correct reason are (i) [its] necessarily pervading the subject's property, (ii) presence in the domain of similar instances, and (iii) absence from the domain of dissimilar instances. It produces an ascertainment in the other's [mind]. A reason's property establishes the thesis, namely, its four meanings: subject (*youfa*, *dharmin*) and property (*fa*, *dharma*), and the own nature (*zi xiang*, *svarūpa*) that is explicitly said, and the specific quality (*cha bie*, *viśeṣa*) that is implicitly intended for each, respectively (i.e., *dharmisvarūpa*, *dharmiviśeṣa*, *dharmasvarūpa*, and *dharmaviśeṣa*). In accordance with the point of controversy, [a reason] establishes one or some [of the four elements of the thesis]. Therefore, a thesis's *sapakṣa* is the domain of instances that are similar [to that thesis] with respect to the property to be proved. In accordance with the point of controversy, the domain where the property to be proved is present is called *sapakṣa*. It is not the case that all [elements of] the thesis (i.e., its own nature and the specific qualities of the subject and its predicate property) are taken as *sapakṣa*. Otherwise, there would be no domain of dissimilar instances. If one makes *sapakṣa* from all [elements of the thesis], this is a false rejoinder based on a wrong assumption

(*vikalpasama*, *fenbie xiangsi*, 分別相似).²⁵ Moreover, it is not the case that only the property that is explicitly stated is taken [to be the reason]. Otherwise, as previously stated, no fallacies other [than *dhar-masvarūpaviparītasādhana*] would occur. Therefore, a reason establishes one to four [element(s)] of the thesis, as needed. Concerning the target to be disputed by the two [parties], the domain where this property is present is called *sapakṣa*.

At first glance, this account looks like the well-known explanation of the three conditions (*trairūpya*) of a correct reason and the definition of *sapakṣa*. However, if we look more closely, we notice that what Kuiji says goes beyond what is strictly required by the *trairūpya* condition. For instance, after the account of the three conditions of a correct reason, he states that a reason which fulfills those conditions “produces an ascertainment in the other’s mind.” This means that Kuiji sees the correctness of a reason being judged not only based on the form of the reason itself, but also based on whether or not that reason has convinced the opponent in a debate. Since a debate situation is presupposed, when examining an inference not only are the explicit statements taken into consideration, but also the implicit intentions behind those statements.

In this connection, Kuiji defines *sapakṣa* not simply as the domain where the property to be proved is present, but as the domain where the property to be proved *in a dispute* is present. For instance, in the case of the Sāṅkhya proof of *puruṣa*, what is accepted as *sādharmyadrṣṭānta* is not an instance that has the property of “being for the benefit of something else,” but an instance that has the property of “being for the benefit of something else that is not aggregated.” In this manner, one can accept that the reason “being aggregated” is contradictory, being absent from *sapakṣa* and present in *vipakṣa*. Likewise, two more kinds of contradictory reason are classified as being contradictory

²⁵ On *vikalpasama*, see PS VI 12ab. For Dignāga’s definition of *vikalpasama*, see Kitagawa 1965: 316f. Cf. also NM 4a22–27, Katsura 1984: 54–55.

in the list of the wheel of reason.²⁶ This is the reply to Lingjuan's first question.

His second question is concerned with a counter-inference that refutes the proponent's inference through various combinations of contradictory reasons:

Question 2: When refuting a proponent's inference based on the *dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana*, an interlocutor makes a counter-inference by replacing the proponent's similar instance with his own side's dissimilar instance, and the proponent's dissimilar instance with his own side's similar instance. On the other hand, in the case of the three other kinds of contradictory reason, an interlocutor makes a counter-inference by using the same similar instance and dissimilar instance as the proponent used for his inference. Therefore, the form of the presentation of the counter-inference is different between the first case and the other three cases. Nevertheless, Kuiji claims that one can combine the first case with the other three cases, like the combination between *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* and *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana* in the Vaiśeṣika inference of the "existence." How is such a combination possible?

As stated above, the Vaiśeṣika inference is an instance of both fallacies of contradictory reasons concerning *dharmisvarūpa* and *dharmivīśeṣa*. In addition to this, in Xuanzang's translation of NP, the four kinds of contradictory reasons are listed and at the end, a word *deng* 等, which means "etc.," is added.²⁷ Commenting on this word, Kuiji explains that it is an abbreviation for the fifteen patterns of combining the four *viruddhahetus*. The list is as follows²⁸:

²⁶ See fn. 7.

²⁷ NP_{Ch} 12a15–16: 相違有四。謂法自相相違因，法差別相違因，有法自相相違因，有法差別相違因等。

²⁸ YRZLS 128b7–12.

1. A reason that is an instance of the fallacy of *dharmasvarūpavi-parīta-sādhana* (= the NP's example 1)
2. A reason that is an instance of the fallacy of *dharmaviśeṣaviparīta-sādhana* (= the NP's example 2)
3. A reason that is an instance of the fallacy of *dharmisvarūpavi-parīta-sādhana*
4. A reason that is an instance of the fallacy of *dharmiviśeṣaviparīta-sādhana*
5. A reason that is an instance of the two fallacies 1 and 2
6. A reason that is an instance of the two fallacies 1 and 3
7. A reason that is an instance of the two fallacies 1 and 4
8. A reason that is an instance of the two fallacies 2 and 3
9. A reason that is an instance of the two fallacies 2 and 4
10. A reason that is an instance of the two fallacies 3 and 4 (= the NP's examples 3 and 4)
11. A reason that is an instance of the three fallacies 1, 2, and 3
12. A reason that is an instance of the three fallacies 1, 2, and 4
13. A reason that is an instance of the three fallacies 1, 3, and 4
14. A reason that is an instance of the three fallacies 2, 3, and 4
15. A reason that is an instance of all four fallacies

This list enumerates the theoretically possible combinations of the four *viruddhahetus*. Of them, although the combinations of three (2, 3, 4) are theoretically intelligible, it is difficult to imagine how to combine *dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana* (case 1) with all three other kinds of contradictory reason (2, 3, 4). Unlike the first case, here, in these three cases, their counter-inferences are formulated by using the same reason and same similar instances as that of the proponent's inference.

Regarding question 2, Kuiji replies that it is not always true that in cases of those three contradictory reasons (2, 3, 4), their counter-inferences are presented without replacing the similar instance of the proponent's inference. As an example, Kuiji illustrates an inference presented by Vaiśeṣikas for proving

that “existence” (*you* 有) is an independent category different from the other five categories of their school, namely, substance, quality, motion, inherence, and specific universals:

YRZLS 132c9–10: 所說有性離実等外有別自性, 許非無故, 如同異性。

[Thesis:] The existence in question retains its own independent nature (*zixing* 自性, **svarūpa*), apart from [other categories like] substance, etc. (i.e., quality and motion).

[Reason:] because it is admitted not to be “nonexistence” (*wu* 無, **abhāva*),

[Example:] like specific universals (*tongyi* 同異, **sāmānyaviśeṣa*).

The alleged historical gackground of this inference is same as that of the example of *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*. When the Vaiśeṣika founder Ulūka taught the school’s doctrine of six categories to his disciple Pañcasikhī, his disciple understood the first five categories but not the last one, namely, “existence.” He considered the inherence of specific universals like substance-ness (*dravyatva*), quality-ness (*guṇatva*), and motion-ness (*karmatva*) to an object to be sufficient for showing that the object exists. For him, there seemed to be no reason to require a further extra category of “existence.” Thus, in order to persuade his disciple, Ulūka presented the above inference to show that the category “existence” is necessary because one should distinguish an object’s existence from its non-existence.

It is uncertain whether the inference is derived from a particular Vaiśeṣika source or is Kuiji’s fictional creation. In any case, he explains that the point of the inference lies in the expression “apart from [other categories] like substance, etc.” (*li shi deng* 離実等) of the thesis. If the “etc.” only includes substance and quality, the inference functions well. However, if Ulūka intended “etc.” to indicate five categories, and the subject “existence” to indicate the supreme existence (*dayou* 大有) as the highest universal, there would be no similar instance for the inference. In later terminology, this would be called *kevalavyatirekin*, or an inference based

merely on the negative concomitance.²⁹ In this case, “specific universals,” which are presented as a similar instance in the above inference, should be regarded as a dissimilar instance. As a result, since there is no similar instance in the inference, it follows that the reason “being not non-existent” is present in the dissimilar instances, namely, the five categories, and is absent from any similar instance. Note that in the case that an inference has no similar instance, the reason is automatically judged as “absent from all similar instances.” Thus, the reason is classified as *viruddhahetu*.

To be more precise, that such a reason commits all four kinds of *viruddhahetu* is revealed by each counter-inference, respectively:

[A.] The reason commits the contradiction *fa zixiang* 法自相 (*dharmasvarūpa*) because of the counter-inference:

YRZLS 132c19-20: 法所說有性離実等外無別自性。許非無故。如実徳等。

[Thesis:] The existence in question does not retain its own nature, apart from substance, etc.,

[Reason:] because it is admitted not to be “non-existence,”

[Example:] like substance, quality, and motion.

[B.] The reason commits the contradiction *fa chabie* 法差別 (*dharma-viśeṣa*) because of the counter-inference:

YRZLS 132c24-26: 所說有性応非能有実徳業離実等有性。許非無故。如実徳等。

²⁹ In Uddyotakara's extended version of wheel of reasons, in which sixteen patterns of inference are enumerated, the fifteenth is a valid reason that has only the negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*). Cf. NV (ad NS I.2.4) 257.17–19. According to Uddyotakara, inference is of three kinds, that which is based on both *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, that which is based only on *anvaya*, and that which is based only on *vyatireka*. Cf. NV (ad NS I.1.5) 43.7–12. For *kevalavyatirekin*, see Prets 1999, Kanō 2001, Okazaki 2005: 69–90.

[Thesis:] The existence in question should not be the existence that causes substance, quality, and motion to exist (能有) and that is distinct from substance, etc.,

[Reason:] because it is admitted not to be “non-existence”

[Example:] like substance, quality, and motion.

[C.] The reason commits the contradiction *youfa zixiang* 有法自相 (*dharmisvarūpa*) because of the counter-inference:

YRZLS 132c26-28: 所說有性忤非有性。許非無故。如實德業。

[Thesis:] The existence in question is not “existence,”

[Reason:] because it is admitted not to be “nothing,”

[Example:] like substance, quality, and motion.

[D.] The reason commits the contradiction *youfa chabie* 有法差別 because of the counter-inference:

YRZLS: 133a3-4: 所說有性非作有性有緣性。許非無故。如實德等。

[Thesis:] The existence in question does not cause the notion of “existence,”

[Reason:] because it is admitted not to be “non-existence,”

[Example:] like substance, quality, and motion.

In this manner, Kuiji shows the possibility of a reason committing all four kinds of *viruddhahetu* by illustrating four counter-inferences, all of these presented by replacing the proponent’s dissimilar instances with similar instances. Through the above examples, he replies to Lingjuan’s second question and concludes that a combination of all four fallacies of *viruddhahetu* is possible by paying no attention to the gap between *dharmasvarūpavi-parītasādhana* and the other three types. In this discussion, again, it can clearly be seen that for Kuiji, *viruddhahetu* is not a logical fallacy that occurs in a single inference, but a fallacy that is revealed in a debate.

Two additional points are worth noting with regard to Kuiji's above explanation. First, all of the four counter-inferences are established without a dissimilar instance. That is, the four counter-inferences are formulated as variations of the self-refuting thesis "A is not A" (e.g., "existence is not existence"). In this case, whereas one can assume similar instances such as B, C, D, it is impossible to assume any dissimilar instances, because similar and dissimilar instances must be established outside the subject. Since A-ness is unique to the subject, it is completely inapplicable to any other instance, and thus, the third condition of the reason, namely, its absence from the domain of dissimilar instances, seems impossible. However, it must be recalled that Dignāga accepts the fulfillment of the third condition even in inferences that have no dissimilar instance.³⁰ Thus, all four counter-inferences, which are classified as *kevalānvayin* in later terminology, function well to contradict the proponent's thesis.

Secondly, this peculiar inference for proving "existence" as an independent category from the reason "being not non-existence" most probably derives from the *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論, the **Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Dharmapāla, et al., where we find the following discussion³¹:

CWL 3a12-18 彼所執有應離實等無別自性，許非無故，如實德等。若離實等應非有性，許異實等故，如畢竟無等。如有非無，無別有性。如何實等有別有性。若離有法有別有性，應離無法有別無性。彼既不然，此云何爾。故彼有性唯妄計度。

[1] The existence that is accepted by him (i.e., the Vaiśeṣika) does not retain its own nature apart from [other categories like] substance, etc., because it is admitted not to be non-existence, like substance, quality, etc.

³⁰ Cf. Kitagawa 1965: 187.

³¹ Cf. IDS 695c8–10.

[2] Alternatively, [existence] should be different from existence apart from [other categories like] substance, because it is accepted as [non-existence] that is apart from substance, etc., like absolute non-existence (*bijing wu* 畢竟無 **atyantābhāva*).

[3] Just as existence is different from non-existence, non-existence is different from “existence” (*youxing*, 有性). How is there a different “existence” for [an existent] substance, etc.?

[4] If there were a different “existence” for existence (*youfa* 有法), there would be also a different “non-existence” (*wuxing* 無性) for non-existence. But the latter is untrue. How is then the former true? Hence, “existence” is solely an imaginary product.³²

This argument appears as one in a series of arguments criticizing the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of six categories.³³ With this argument, the Yogācāra masters, represented by Dharmapāla, conclude that the Vaiśeṣika category “existence” is untenable, because categories like substance, quality, and motion already imply existence, and therefore no additional category “existence” is required. If such a category were necessary for an object’s existence, the same would be needed for the category “existence” itself. The absurdity of this is obvious, especially when one assumes the same in the case of non-existence. Justifying a case of non-existence through another case of non-existence, this in turn by a further case of non-existence and so on, is an infinite regress. Thus the CWL explains the reasoning behind the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika category “existence.”

Kuiji, who contributed to the compilation of the CWL, knew this argument and applied it in the account of a single reason committing the four fallacies of *viruddhahetu*. He wrote two commentaries on the CWL: an extensive commentary, *Shuji* 述記, and a condensed commentary, *Shuyao* 樞要. Of the

³² For a translation, see Cook 1999: 19.

³³ CWL 2c22–3b7.

two, the former divides this argument into four parts, but does not mention the name of each fallacy³⁴; the latter dedicates a paragraph to each of the four fallacies in the Vaiśeṣika argument: [1] describes the fallacy of *dhar-masvarūpaviparītasādhana* or *fa zixiang xiangwei guo* 法自相相違過; [2] describes the fallacy of *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* or *youfa zixiang xiangwei guo* 有法自相相違過; and [3] and [4] describe the fallacy of the thesis that is opposed by inference (*biliang xiangwei* 比量相違 *anumānavi-rodha*).³⁵ Kuiji thus recognized [1] of the CWL, which is same as [A.] of the YRZLS, to be an inference aimed at criticizing the Vaiśeṣika inference of “existence” through the reason “being not non-existence.” It seems that in his eyes, the CWL’s argument above was a good example for showing how Indian Buddhist masters used the fallacy of *viruddhahetu* in actual debates, not just in theoretical deliberations.

5. Conclusion

Through the above examination of Kuiji’s analysis of the four kinds of contradictory reasons, it is now apparent what he considered the essence of the NP’s argument on the issue to be. In comparison to Indian discussions of *viruddhahetu*, which usually examine it through a single inference, Kuiji’s interpretation presupposes a debate model with two opposing inferences presented by two different parties. Here, a reason is judged to be *viruddhahetu* only if it is criticized by a counter-inference that leads to a thesis contradictory to that concluded by the proponent’s reason. Although this may seem an extraordinary interpretation for scholars who are familiar with Indo-Tibetan Buddhist logic, this idea becomes more reasonable when seen as a scheme by Kuiji to re-systematize Buddhist logic as a manual for debate. He attempts to apply each logical concept of the NP to concrete examples of actual debates,

³⁴ CWL-Shuji 259c3–260a17. In his explanation, however, Kuiji presupposes the ten categories of the Vaiśeṣika system known from the *Daśapadārthī*.

³⁵ CWL-Shuyao 622c11–17.

some deriving from descriptions of Indian Buddhist texts such as the CWL. In other words, his commentary shows how Dignāga's logic applies in actual debates. Indeed, the intermediate period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti was a period that witnessed a golden age of debating, not only between different religions, but also between different schools within the same religion. It was also the age in which Kuiji's teacher, Xuanzang, learned the central precepts of Buddhist logic in India. It thus seems overhasty to reject Kuiji's peculiar interpretation as being a misconception of Dignāga's logic. Rather it seems to be an important evidence of an alternative development in Buddhist logic that survived in the shadow of Dharmakīrti's reformation of Dignāga's logic. Thus, reevaluating the *yinming/inmyō* tradition and its relation to its Indian sources seems to be a project that is not insignificant.

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- NPT *Nyāyapravekaṭikā śiṣyāhitā* of Haribhadrāsūri: see NP.
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- PS VI *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, Chapter VI (*jāti*). See Kitagawa 1965.
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Was There a Dispute between Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka?

East Asian Discussions on the Historicity of the Proofs of *Śūnyatā*

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“Only [through the disclosure of historical a priori] can there be an a priori science extending beyond all historical facticities, all historical surrounding worlds, peoples, times, civilizations: only in this way can a science as *aeterna veritas* appear.” (Edmund Husserl)¹

0. Introduction

As shown in Moro 2015, it was one of the most important problems in the history of the East Asian Buddhist logic based on Xuanzang’s (玄奘, 602–664) translations to compare the proof of consciousness-only or *viññaptimātratā* (Ch. *weishi biliang* 唯識比量) attributed to Xuanzang and the proof of emptiness or *śūnyatā* (Ch. *zhangzhen biliang* 掌珍比量) found at the beginning of Bhāviveka’s *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論 (DZL; *Jewel in Hand*). The former tries to show the logical validity of the theory of consciousness-only:²

YDS 115b26–27: 眞故極成色不離於眼識_宗。自許初三攝眼所不攝故_因。猶如眼識_喻。

Thesis: In reality (眞故), colors and forms (色) mutually accepted [by

¹ Husserl 1939, 179.

² Tang 2018 is useful to understand the discussions on the proof.

proponent and opponent] (極成) are not separate from the visual consciousness.

Reason: Because, [based on the grounds] I accept (自許), they are included in the first three [of the eighteen *dhātus*] but not in the eye.

Example: Like the visual consciousness

The latter shows two formulae in verse to demonstrate the emptiness of all phenomena, namely conditioned and unconditioned:

DZL 268b21–22: 眞性有爲空 如幻緣生故 無爲無有實 不起似空華

[*Thesis 1:*] In reality (眞性), conditioned [existences] are empty

[*Example 1:*] like an illusion,

[*Reason 1:*] because they are produced by causal conditions.

[*Thesis 2:*] [In reality,] unconditioned [existences] are not real,

[*Reason 2:*] because they never occur,

[*Example 2:*] like a flower in the sky.

These two proofs open with the same restriction phrase “in reality.” Many Buddhist logicians have discussed whether or not the restriction *zheng* 眞故 of the former was identical to *zhenxing* 眞性 of the latter. For example, Kuiji (窺基 or Ji 基, 632–682), one of the most famous disciples of Xuanzang, and his followers regarded Bhāviveka as one who held on to a mistaken interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness (惡取空; **durgrhūta śūnyatā*), based on the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and tried to point out fallacies in the latter; they believed the former proof to be Xuanzang’s and without any logical fallacies, based on the tradition of Kuiji’s commentary of the *Nyāyapraveśa* or *Yinming dashu* 因明大疏 (YDS). The tradition says that Xuanzang demonstrated the proof of *viññaptimātratā* against non-Buddhists and Hīnayāna Buddhists, who had been called to King Śīlāditya’s uninterrupted Buddhist service, and no one could refute Xuanzang. Kuiji seemed to try to affirm the logical validity of the proof using the tradition of Xuanzang’s authorship.

One of the related topics was the comparison between Bhāviveka’s proof mentioned above and the similar proof found in Dharmapāla’s commentary of

Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka* or *Dasheng guangbailun shilun* 大乘廣百論釋論 (DGS).

DGZ 225a1–15: 今當總破外道餘乘遍計所執一切境相。……又所執境略有二種。一者有爲、二者無爲。諸有爲法、從緣生故、猶如幻事、非實有體。諸無爲法亦非實有、以無生故、譬似龜毛。……諸有智者應正了知、有無等境皆依世俗、假立名相、非眞勝義。

Now, I comprehensively refuse all the characteristics of objects delusionally attached by non-Buddhist and other vehicles. (...) Furthermore the objects attached [by them] are mainly classified into two groups: Conditioned (**samskr̥ta*) and unconditioned (**asamskr̥ta*). All conditioned existences do not have real substance, because they are produced by causal conditions, like an illusion. All unconditioned existences also do not have real substance, because they never occur, like the hair on a tortoise. All wise persons should understand that the objects, such as existence and nonexistence, are based on the conventional [truth] (**saṃvṛti-satya*) and provisionally established nominal phenomena, and are not the real ultimate [truth] (**paramārtha*).”

Since Dharmapāla's interpretation in the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (CWL) was regarded as orthodox by Kuiji and his followers, many logical discussions comparing the proofs in DZL and DGZ also occurred in East Asia, besides referring the legends on Bhāviveka and questioning the historicity of the dispute between Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka.

I state in Moro 2014 that “writing history and tradition is a religious/ideological practice,” since Xuanzang's biography, especially the description of the proof of *viññaptimātratā*, seemed to be created along with the formation of the orthodoxy of his school after his death. In this paper, I would like to examine logical discussions on the proof of *śūnyatā* in East Asia, which are connected with their historiographies.

1. Interpretations of the restriction “*paramārthatas*”

It has been said that the proof of *viññaptimātratā* was based on the same logical

system as Bhāviveka's logic, and Xuanzang learned of the system during his visit to India.³ Bhāviveka modified Dignāga's logical system to prove emptiness or *śūnyatā* positively. According to Ejima (1980, 102–137), the characteristics of Bhāviveka's logic are as follows:

1. The restriction “*paramārthatas*” (“in ultimate reality”) is used to protect the thesis from invalidations by direct perception, faith, and agreement (*pratyakṣa*-, *abhyupagata*-, and *prasiddha-bādhā*).⁴
2. The negation should be interpreted as a non-implicative negation (*prasajya-pratiṣeda*).
3. The nonexistence of the negative example (*vipakṣa*).

The proof of *viññaptimātratā* also has the restriction *zhengu*, which can be interpreted as a translation of **paramārthatas* or **tattvatas*.⁵ YDS quotes the proof of *śūnyatā* as an example of the restriction to describe the logical validity of the proof of *viññaptimātratā*.⁶ Moreover, Zenju 善珠 (723–797), a great

³ See Ejima 1980, 204–205; He 2014.

⁴ See Ejima 1980, 106–108. These fallacies correspond to the contradiction by direct perception (*xianliang xiangwei* 現量相違; **pratyakṣa-viruddha*), that by one's own doctrine (*zijiao xiangwei* 自教相違; **āgama-viruddha*), and that by worldly consensus (*shijian xiangwei* 世間相違; **loka-viruddha*) of NP_{Ch} respectively. Mungwe also seemed to consider that the restriction can protect the thesis from these three fallacies (如約勝義立“色等空、以緣生故、猶如幻事”。此亦約情、違世現教。Shen 2008, 361) as well as from the fallacies of **aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa* and **aprasiddha-viśeṣya* (能別所別極成、可以勝義簡過。謂就勝義、眼等體空。Shen 2008, 343). Zenju states that the restriction can avoid the first five fallacies of thesis, that is, **pratyakṣa*-, **anumāna*-, **āgama*-, **loka*-, and **svavacana-viruddha* (IRMS 315c9–11: 問。以勝義諦簡別立宗九過之中、能離幾失。答。但能簡初五種過失。後之四過、非言能簡。).

⁵ Although He (2014) considers the original Sanskrit term of *zhengu* as **tattvatas*, the example quoted below, which contrasts *zhengu* with *sugu* (literally “because of the conventional [truth]”) based on the twofold truth theory, suggests the possibility of **paramārthatas* (CWL 38c11–12: 心意識八種 俗故相有別 真故相無別 相所相無故).

⁶ YDS 116b17–20 凡若宗標勝義、如掌珍言「真性有爲空 如幻緣生故 無爲無有實不起似空花」、亦無違自教世間等過失。(A translation appears later.)

Yogācāra master in the Nara period who wrote some important works on Buddhist logic, stated that the proof of *viññaptimātratā* also does not have *vipakṣa*.⁷ It is reasonable to think that the author⁸ of the proof refers to Bhāviveka's logic.

Regarding the first point, it should also be noted that Bhāviveka introduced an improper, overapplied usage of the restriction—demonstrated by a *śrāvaka* scholar criticizing Bhāviveka's logic in his *Madhyamakahrdaya-kārikā* (MHK), chapter IV as follows:

Thesis: In truth, an unknown [woman] (*ayānīkṛtā*) should be known [by a man].

Reason: Because [she is] a woman.

Example: Like another woman [i.e. the wife of the man] (Ejima 1980, 108–109)

If the restriction could defend the proposition against the opponent's invalidation based on social agreement (*prasiddha-bādhā*), every thesis with the restriction that did not comply with public order, including the example above, would be regarded as invalid. According to Ejima (1980, 109), in Bhāviveka's logic, *paramārtha* (the ultimate truth) of the restriction "*paramārthatas*" should mean that the restricted thesis orients toward the ultimate truth, based on his theory of the twofold truth.⁹ That is, Bhāviveka thought the restriction should be used only

⁷ IRMS 319b18–20: 問。掌珍比量、無共異品。三藏比量、若有異品耶。答。此唯識量、亦無異品。大乘都無離識、法故無異品也。

Question: the proof in DZL does not have *vipakṣa*. Does the proof of Tripitaka Master [Xuanzang] also have no *vipakṣa*? Answer. The proof of *viññaptimātratā* also does not have *vipakṣa*, since there are no existences at all in Mahāyāna other than consciousness.

⁸ Based on the criticism of the biographies of Xuanzang, I doubt that he set out his proof of consciousness-only in India (Moro 2015, 45–72).

⁹ According to Ejima (1980: 102–105) and Hayashima (2013), Bhāviveka classified *paramārtha* into three types: (1) the ultimate object/meaning (*karmadhāraya* interpretation), (2) the object of the ultimate (non-discriminating) cognition (*tatpuruṣa* interpretation), and (3) what possesses/orients toward the ultimate object (*bahuvrīhi*

in the context of proving *śūnyatā*, and it was not applicable for all theses.

In East Asia, there were two kinds of interpretations of the restriction's function. In the section “the fallacy of contradicting worldly consensus” (世間相違; **loka-viruddha*) of IIRS¹⁰, Mungwe (Wengui)¹¹ 文軌 (7th century), one of the direct disciples of Xuanzang in Buddhist logic, classified “worldly consensus” as follows:¹²

1. Worldly consensus of disciples (學者世間)
 - i. Within proponent's discipline (自): e.g. a Buddhist claims to Buddhists that X has *ātman*.¹³
 - ii. Within opponent's discipline (他): e.g. a Buddhist claims to the disciples of Vaiśeṣika that X is selfless.¹⁴
 - iii. Within the common discipline between proponent and opponent (共): e.g. Buddhists and disciples of Vaiśeṣika claim to each other that a gross form (粗色) is permanent.
2. Worldly consensus of non-disciples (非學者世間): e.g. a scholar claims to non-scholars that *śaśin* is not the moon (懷兔非月), or that human skulls are pure (人頂骨淨), etc.

According to Mungwe, “the fallacy of contradicting worldly consensus” occurs only in the cases of 1-iii and 2, while 1-i should be called “the fallacy of contradicting one's own doctrine” (自教相違; **āgama-virodha*), and 1-ii is the

interpretation). The restricted thesis is regarded as (3).

¹⁰ Moro 2017 and Tang 2019 are recent contributions on IIRS.

¹¹ Mungwe is said to be a Korean transliteration of 文軌, because, according to Ishii (1990) and Lee (1999), it is likely that he was a Silla monk. See also Li 1995.

¹² Shen 2008: 341; X53, 848, 689c22–690a19. A classification like this cannot be found in Shentai's 神泰 commentary of the *Nyāyamukha* (*Limenlun shuji* 理門論述記).

¹³ A quotation of IIRS by Zenju reads: 一者自學者世間、如佛弟子同習無我、數勝論等同習有我。(IRMS 312a22–23).

¹⁴ A quotation of IIRS by Zenju reads: 二他學者世間、如勝論師望佛弟子、所習我等。(IRMS 312a23–24).

correct thesis to persuade the opponent. The restriction “*paramārthatas*” can avoid the fallacy in case 2. When a Buddhist claims to non-scholars, such as cowherds, “In the ultimate truth [of the Buddhist], the essential nature of the eye, etc. is empty (眼色等體性是空),” or Kāpālika (結鬘外道), a non-Buddhist who used skulls for ornaments, claims to non-scholars “In the ultimate truth [of Kāpālika], skulls are pure,” those theses with the restriction do not have the fallacy. Though the former example seems to be based on DZL,¹⁵ the latter shows that Mungwe thought the restriction could be used by any school. This interpretation is similar to that of the śrāvaka scholar’s in MHK as mentioned above.

More radically, Dingbin 定賓 (7–8th century)¹⁶ criticized Mungwe’s classification of “worldly consensus” and stated that the existence of fallacies depends on the judging audience.¹⁷ Thus, he also said the proof of *vijñaptimātratā* was claimed “by Xuanzang for temporary use to confront the opponents, and it was not fit to spread for a long time.”¹⁸

However, though Kuiji also divides “worldly consensus” into two types

¹⁵ Shen 2008: 341; X53, 848, 690a9–13. DZL 268c06–269a1: 以諸世間於此境上多起分別故說是言「真性有爲空、如幻、緣生故」。此中世間同許有者、自亦許爲世俗有故、世俗現量生起因緣亦許有故。眼等有爲世俗諦攝、牧牛人等皆共了知眼等有爲是實有故。勿違如是自宗所許、現量共知、故以真性簡別立宗。真義自體說名真性、即勝義諦。就勝義諦立有爲空、非就世俗衆緣合成。有所造作故名有爲、即十二處、唯除法處一分虛空、擇非擇滅及真如性。此中復除他宗所許虛妄顯現幻等有爲。若立彼爲空立已成過故。若他遍計所執有爲、就勝義諦實有自性今立爲空。且如“眼處一種有爲、就勝義諦、辯其體空”。

IIRS repeatedly discusses similar formulae: 能別所別極成、可以勝義簡過、謂“就勝義、眼等體空”。(Shen 2008: 343); 如大乘對小乘等立量云“就勝義諦、眼根是空。以緣生故。猶如耳根”。(Shen 2008: 379).

¹⁶ Dingbin was well known as a Vinaya master in the Tang dynasty—his work on Buddhist logic has been criticized by Kuiji’s followers, especially in Japan, but is highly regarded by modern scholars, such as Nakamura Hajime (1958, 12). For more bibliographical information on Dingbin, see Moro (2015, 386–390).

¹⁷ IDS 312b19–20: 無問自學他學共學非學、但觀立時證義之衆。

¹⁸ IDS 315a25–26: 三藏一時之用、將以對敵、未必即堪久後流行。

(disciples and non-disciples),¹⁹ his understanding of the restriction “*paramārthatas*” slightly differs from Mungwe’s. After introducing the tradition of the proof of *viññaptimātratā*, Kuiji described the restriction’s function as below:

YDS 115c4–8: 此比量中、有所簡別、故無諸過。有法言真、明依勝義、不依世俗、故無違於非學世間。又顯依大乘殊勝義立、非依小乘、亦無違於阿含等教色離識有、亦無違於小乘學者世間之失。

Since this proof has [the terms] restricted [by some restrictions], it does not have any fallacies. The subject (**dharmin*; 有法) says “[in] truth,”²⁰ [hence the proof] is obviously based on the ultimate truth, not on the conventional [truth]. Therefore, [the proof is] not in contradiction with the worldly consensus of non-disciples. Moreover, [the restriction] shows that [the proof is] set forth based on the extraordinary doctrine of Mahāyāna, and is not based on Hīnayāna. [It] also [shows that the proof is] not in contradiction with scriptures (**āgama*) that preach that colors and forms (色) separate from the [visual] consciousness exist. [It] also [shows that the proof does] not have the fallacy of contradicting the worldly consensus of Hīnayāna disciples.

Kuiji showed two interpretations: First, the restriction can protect the restricted thesis from the fallacy of contradicting the worldly consensus of non-disciples. The restriction of Bhāviveka’s proof may be used for this purpose:

YDS 116b17–20: 凡若宗標勝義、如掌珍言「眞性有爲空。如幻緣生故。無爲無有實。不起似空花」、亦無違自教世間等過失。

¹⁹ YDS 115b2-5: 此有二種。一非學世間、除諸學者、所餘世間所共許法。二學者世間、即諸聖者所知眞法。若深妙法、便非世間。

²⁰ According to Ejima (1980: 106), Bhāviveka seemed to have two different views on the scope of the restriction: the whole thesis and the prejudice (**dharma*). In East Asia, however, the relationship between the restriction and the subject of the thesis was one of the major points of the dispute on the proofs of *viññaptimātratā* and *śūnyatā*. See Moro (2015: 163–166).

When a thesis shows “[in] the ultimate truth,” it does not have the fallacies of contradicting one’s own doctrine (**āgama-*) and worldly consensus (**loka-viruddha*). For example, [Dasheng] zhangzhen [lun] states “[In] the true nature (眞性), conditioned [existences] are empty like an illusion, because they are produced by causal conditions. [In the true nature,] unconditioned [existences] are not real, because they never occur, like [illusory] flowers in the sky.”

It is reasonable to suppose that this usage corresponds to case 2 of IIRS as mentioned above.

Second, the restriction can also protect the restricted thesis from the fallacy of contradicting the common sense of Hīnayāna disciples. This interpretation is likely to be similar to Bhāviveka’s understanding of “*paramārthatas*” in MHK IV as mentioned above, though their interpretations of *paramārtha* are different.

Ejima (1980, 140; fn. 28) stated that Kuiji was not consistent in his understanding of the restriction “*paramārthatas*,” since he criticized the logical errors of the restriction of the proof of *śūnyatā* in his commentary of CWL while supporting the restriction’s function. Ejima (1976) also pointed out that Dharmapāla’s usage of the restriction in DGS seemed to lack coherence. Kuiji’s double standards might be based not only on his misunderstanding, as Ejima said, of Bhāviveka’s logic, but also on the context of the discussions on the restriction, which can be found in MHK, DGS, and IIRS.

2. Revision of Bhāviveka’s biography

The Great Tang Records on the Western Regions or *Datang xiyu ji* 大唐西域記 (DXJ) attributed to Xuanzang seems to show positive evaluation of Bhāviveka. According to DXJ, Bhāviveka of “broad mind and deep virtue” could not meet and discuss with Dharmapāla, although a dialogue considered to be Dharmapāla’s criticism of Bhāviveka can be found in DGS:²¹

²¹ See Keenan 1997 and Hoonaert 2004.

DXJ 930c11–931a8: 馱那羯磔迦國...城南不遠有大山巖、婆毘吠伽^{唐言清辯}
論師住阿素洛宮、待見慈氏菩薩成佛之處。論師雅量弘遠至德深邃。...聞
 摩揭陀國護法菩薩宣揚法教學徒數千、有懷談議杖錫而往、至波吒釐城。
 知護法菩薩在菩提樹。論師乃命門人曰、汝行詣菩提樹護法菩薩所...護法
 菩薩謂其使曰、人世如幻身命若浮、渴日勤誠未遑談議。人信往復竟不會
 見。

Not far south from the capital of Dhanakaṭakā, there is a big mountain where Bhāviveka, staying at the palace of Asura, is waiting to see Maitreya attain Buddhahood. The master [Bhāviveka] has broad mind and deep virtue. (...) He heard that Bodhisattva Dharmapāla of Magadha enhanced the teaching [of Buddha] and had thousands of students. Wanting to talk [with Dharmapāla], he traveled with a staff and arrived at Pāṭaliputra [the capital of Magadha]. Hearing that Bodhisattva Dharmapāla was under a bodhi tree, the master [Bhāviveka] ordered his pupil to visit the tree. Bodhisattva Dharmapāla said to the pupil: “The human world is like an illusion and a life is like a floating [bubble]. Being athirst for the days to devote [myself] to the truth, I have no time to talk [with you].” Messengers and letters passed [between them], but eventually [Bhāviveka] could not meet [Dharmapāla].

In later traditions, however, he came to be described as a highly selfcentered person who misunderstood the doctrine of emptiness. Ruli 如理, a fourth-generation disciple of Kuiji in the Tang dynasty, revised Bhāviveka's tradition based on DXJ in his sub-commentary of CWL or *Cheng weishi lun shu yiyen* 成唯識論疏義演 (CWLSY):

CWLSY 723a6-20: 然清辯者是地前小菩薩、極有我執。有中疑、不肯向上上問彌勒決。故遂言「彌勒未成佛、有妻子與我相似、不決我所疑。待當來下生成佛、方就決疑也」。遂欲留身久住於石。觀世音菩薩像前七日七夜不食...滿七日已、即觀音菩薩、於石中忽然現身、語清辯言「...欲何所求」。清辯言「...今欲得留身久住、見彌勒當來成佛...」。觀音言「汝若欲得見彌勒、當廣發願生彌勒天宮...」。清辯白「願不可改、志不可移...」。觀音言「向阿修羅處中」。即窟令開、開已遂告諸人曰「若欲得留此身者、

可入此窟」。當時唯有六人、同入已窟門還閉。清辨既是惡趣空故、不能善修。有說清辨當時歲二十八歲也。

Bhāviveka was a petty bodhisattva, yet to attain the first level, with a strong self-attachment. He had doubts on the Middle [way], [yet] he was not willing to approach Maitreya to have him resolve them. In the end, therefore, he said: “Maitreya has yet to become a Buddha, like me, having a wife and children. he cannot solve my question. He will not resolve my doubts. When he will be born as a Buddha, he will solve my doubts.” Accordingly, intending that his body be preserved in the stone [cave] for a long time, [he remained] in front of the statue of Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara for seven days and nights, not eating. After seven days had gone by, Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara appeared in the stone [cave] and spoke to Bhāviveka: “(...) What is your request?” Bhāviveka said: “(...) I want to be able to preserve my body long enough so as to see Maitreya become a Buddha (...)” Avalokiteśvara said: “If you wish to be able to see Maitreya, you ought to take the extensive vow to be born in Maitreya’s heavenly palace. (...)” Bhāviveka stated: “My vow cannot be changed; my will cannot be altered. (...)” Avalokiteśvara said: “Go to the place of Asura.” Then he ordered the cave open and, once opened, he thereupon said to everyone: “If you wish to preserve this body, you may enter this cave.” At that time, only six persons entered, and once they were all in, the gate of the cave was closed again. Because Bhāviveka was a person who held on to a mistaken interpretation of the doctrine of emptiness, he could not practice well. It is said that Bhāviveka was 28 years old then.

Clearly, this revised biography assesses Bhāviveka rather negatively. This revision was made probably on the basis of Kuiji’s criticism, because he often use the similar term “a person who is mistakenly attached to the doctrine of emptiness (惡取空)” in his commentary of CWL to criticize Bhāviveka.²² As I mentioned above, while Kuiji criticized Bhāviveka, his interpretation of the restriction “in reality” was partly similar to Bhāviveka’s. It may be presumed that

²² T no. 1830, 43, 494b25–26.

the negative aspect of Kuiji's evaluation has been emphasized through generations of his followers, and Bhāviveka's biography revised accordingly.

3. Difference between the proofs of Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla

As has been noted, there were two understandings of the purpose of the restriction "*paramārthataḥ*": (1) that it could be used by any school to avoid some fallacies of the thesis and (2) that it should be used for a limited purpose, that is, the proof of *śūnyatā* and/or the ultimate truth of Mahāyāna. Bhāviveka and Kuiji seemed to allow both purposes, while Mungwe never discussed the latter option. In other words, the restriction of case (1) is context-dependent and that of case (2) context-independent, although the meaning of *paramārtha* would change according to the user of the restriction in both cases.²³ These understandings seemed to influence later discussions on the difference between the formulae of Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla.

Seong yusig non hakgi 成唯識論學記 (SYNH), a Silla commentary of CWL edited by Daehyeon 大賢 (8th century), introduced the views of Wonhyo 元曉 (617–686) as well as Sungyeong 順憬 (7th century), a Silla contemporary of Wonhyo and Kuiji, on the difference between the proofs of *śūnyatā* of Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla:²⁴

- Sungyeong regarded these two proofs as consistent, as the negations used in both were *prasajya-pratiṣeda*, and the target of the criticism was a master of Yoga (相應論師).²⁵ There was no dispute between Bhāviveka and

²³ For details on the understanding of the ultimate truth in East Asian Yogācāra tradition, see Moro 2018.

²⁴ SYNH 484a8-17: 有說此二語靜意同。...護法宗必舉所執無、表離四句、空有等性皆所執故、二性妙有不全無故。由此說言、二空非真、空謂一邊、亦不空有、路絕名真如故。清弁菩薩舉世俗有、離諸無、簡諸真無俗亦無故、二性妙無無所得故。若唯遣有、便可得無、亦遣無故、言無所得。無所得者、離四句義。無著般若論云「四句皆是法執攝故」。由此正理、元曉師等、語靜意同。

²⁵ SYNH 483c13-484a6: 有說二師都無靜論、清弁不許勝義無故。如掌珍云「此非有言、唯遮有性。功能斯盡、更不詮無。如世間說、非自絹言。未必彼言即詮黑故」。又通難言「又彼所言、若就真性一切有爲都無所有...是立宗義即謗一切隨邪見者、此中

Dharmapāla.

- Wonhyo stated that their understandings of *sūnyatā*—Dharmapāla's as the ultimate existence (妙有) and Bhāviveka's as the ultimate nonexistence (妙無)—appeared to oppose each other on the surface but were essentially same in the sense that both were beyond words and logic.

Zenju stated in his *Yuishiki bunryō ketsu* 唯識分量決 (*Solutions to the theory of four-part cognition and the proof of vijñaptimātratā*; YBK) that Wonhyo and Sinbang 神昉 (7th century) also regarded these two proofs as the same, while Dojeung 道證 (7–8th century) and Gyeongheung 憬興 (7th century) thought of them as different:²⁶

- Wonhyo claimed that both proofs were the same.
- Dojeung criticized Wonhyo, claiming that both proofs were not the same as their targets were different—Dharmapāla stated the proof to criticize Hīnayānists and non-Buddhists, while Bhāviveka's target included Mahāyānists as well as Hīnayānists and non-Buddhists.
- Sinbang criticized Dojeung as he considered the targets of both proofs identical.

It should be noted that these Silla scholar monks, barring Wonhyo, were concerned with the targets of the proofs. They seemed to be interested in the context of the proofs of Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, following Mungwe's logical view on the restriction, and to consider that their logical equality depended on the context. However, Wonhyo discussed *sūnyatā* beyond words and logic, that is, the ultimate reality independent of context. Consequently, it can be seen that

宗義謂空無性虛妄顯現門之差別、非一切種皆謗爲無」。護法勝義亦不許有、如廣百云「現在亦非勝義諦有、從緣生故、如幻事等」。「又說空言是遮非表、非唯空有亦復空空」乃至廣說。掌珍所破相應論師、非爲護法。護法菩薩廣百釋中破相應師、亦同彼故。爲以此證、順憬師等傳無諍論。

²⁶ YBK 449c8-17: 新羅元曉法師判比量論云「掌珍比量同廣百量」等云云。道證師解此判非理、量意別故。掌珍論云「若他遍計所執有爲、就勝義諦實有自性、今立爲空」。廣百第七云「欲破外道餘乘遍計所執境相」。立此二量、雖彼二論皆破所執、而所對異。廣百唯破小乘外道、掌珍通對大小及外。昉法師說、珍百二論所對無異。掌珍他言、攝外道及餘乘故。設對大乘皆破所執。顯法非實、量意同故。是以證評亦非盡理。

the historical understandings of the dispute between Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka among East Asian Buddhist logicians were closely related to their logical positions.

4. Conclusion

Methodologically speaking, a historical logic should be studied from the points of both non-historical and historical view. On the one hand, a logical system constructed historically is expected to work non-historically under a universal rule or law. Ueda (2001, 6) stated that “(...) Dignāga’s logic may not necessarily work as he expected. (...) Understanding the purpose or motive of the Dignāgan logic is insufficient to understand it. Therefore, generally speaking, the way of understanding thought is not identical with that of understanding logic.” The rule or law of historical logic is often reconstructed based on the contexts.

I agree with Ueda but also think of the background of historical research. Up till here, we have outlined the close relationship between logical discussions on the proofs of *viññaptimātratā* or *śūnyatā* and historical descriptions of Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla. East Asian Buddhist logicians seemed to have believed that an Indian logician’s life reflects his understanding of logic—an Indian logician who has an incorrect understanding of logic will live an improper religious life. If the proofs of two logicians are same, they should not dispute each other. Even now, we often investigate historical descriptions influenced by the authors’ logical understandings to consider a logical problem, although Ueda claims as quoted above.

E. H. Carr (1892–1982), an English historian, opposes the idea that “history deals with the unique and particular, and science with the general and universal.” He claims that “[h]istory is concerned with the relation between the unique and the general” because “[t]he very use of language commits the historian, like the scientist, to generalization” (Carr 1961/2018, 57). Historiography and logical investigation might share a part of the universal problem, and the two would be inseparable, at least at the beginning of the development of East Asian Buddhist logic.

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YBK

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